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Foreword 
The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established interdisciplinary 
research on policy problems as the core of its educational program. A major part of this 
program is the nine-month policy research project, in the course of which two or more 
faculty members from different disciplines direct the research of a small group of 
graduate students of diverse backgrounds on a policy issue of concern to a government or 
nonprofit agency. This “client orientation” brings the students face to face with 
administrators, legislators, and other officials active in the policy process and 
demonstrates that research in a policy environment demands special talents. It also 
illuminates the occasional difficulties of relating research findings to the world of policy 
realities. 
This publication presents the results of a policy research project conducted during the 
2011-2012 academic year that examined challenges and opportunities of  binational 
cooperation in electricity connections, trade, and investment, applied to the US-Mexico 
region. The students researched the different market structures of this industry in North 
America, where Mexico has a vertically integrated state-owned utility Comisión Federal 
de Electricidad (CFE) that operates in a shadow national market with independent power 
producers and close to 700 permits for non-utilities’ generation. The US connects with 
Mexico with two principal entities: the Electrical Reliability Council of Texas, or 
ERCOT, independent from the federal regulator FERC, and the Western Electricity 
Council of California or CAISO-WECC. 
The curriculum of the LBJ School is intended not only to develop effective public 
servants but also to produce research that will enlighten and inform those already 
engaged in the policy process and the emerging market and  binational issues. The project 
that resulted in this report has helped to accomplish these tasks. 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the LBJ School nor The University of Texas at 
Austin necessarily endorses the views or findings of this report. 
 
Robert Hutchings 
Dean 
The LBJ School of Public Affairs 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction: Setting the Stage for International 
Electricity Integration 
by Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez 
Abstract 
This introductory chapter sets a global framework of electricity trade and international 
integration, from converging domestic policies in Nordic countries and continental 
Europe to Central Europe and other international regional markets towards a deep legal 
and regulatory convergence. Trade in electricity is argued to increase reliability and 
security at the same time that states relinquish part of their control attributions towards 
international pools and markets. The chapter shows that electricity can share the 
characteristics of an essential resource to a country, to be protected, with the concept of 
being a tradable good or service. As a framework for analysis, it then shows that the 
insufficient US-Mexican set of interconnections makes this market an outlier vis a vis 
other heavier trading areas and investment projects, and this offers great opportunities to 
increasingly share a common policy vision and joint physical interconnection strategies. 
One important lesson from heavier trade and investment markets across the world is the 
separation between transmission and generation, not necessarily the property of the 
modern electricity markets by the state or private interests. 
1.1 Setting of the Research Framework 
Constrained transmission electricity lines are a typical aspect of restructured electricity 
markets. For the past 15 years or so, electricity has transited from vertically integrated 
utilities under government ownership and management to the opening up of competition 
in generation for exclusive sale to the incumbent under long-term contracts (sole buyer 
model). More recently although in an asymmetric manner across the world, regulatory 
incentives to expand transmission investments under stressed infrastructure arising from 
demand and also from renewable sources of energy have characterized some economies, 
while in others full unbundling, vertical separation of transmission from generation and 
trade, are typical. A wide mix of market structures makes research in the various systems 
relevant. Moreover, even if a new market for electricity is now apparent in Europe and in 
the Americas, connected systems and trade have been rather incipient but call for a 
profound analysis, not only of the alternative non-market, transitional, and market 
dynamics, but also of the stakeholders and political interests in an industry that is critical 
for economic development. This Policy Research Project addresses this key issue applied 
to the linkages and connections between Mexico and the United States, mainly in the sub-
regional levels of Texas-Mexico and California, given the experiences in other 
international cooperative infrastructures. 
When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was launched in 1994, trade 
liberalization and investment in the energy sector in Mexico were constrained because oil 
was excluded from the agreement, but electricity deregulation and opening up is 
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contained in Chapter 6 of NAFTA. Chapter 6 applies both to trade in “energy goods” and 
“measures related to investment and the cross-border trade in services associated with 
those goods.” Tariffs on electricity goods and services (as well as petrochemicals also 
under Chapter 6) were totally phased out in 1998, and national treatment measures for 
cross-border investment have been warranted (Horlick, Schuchhardt, and Mann, 2002). 
Chapter 9 refers to standards, while Chapter 10 of NAFTA applies to the environment 
and environmental converging standards. Additionally, Chapter 11 is dedicated to foreign 
investment liberalization, protection, national treatment provisions, and related measures 
including disputes. According to the cited authors, Article 605 (a) to (c) establishes that 
parties may not impose export restrictions if they reduce the proportion of the total supply 
made available to the other NAFTA parties, below the level of the preceding three years 
or other agreed period; or set a higher price on exports to another NAFTA country than 
on domestic sales and disrupt normal supply channels or alter the normal mix of energy 
products. Article 605 only applies between the US and Canada because Mexico entered a 
reservation in Annex 605 such that limitations on the use of export restrictions shall not 
apply between Mexico and the other NAFTA parties. 
Now, according to the Mexican Public Utilities Law, called Ley del Servicio Público de 
Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) that became operational in 1993, electricity is separated 
between utilities (as a public good/service exclusively provided by the vertically 
integrated parastatal Comisión Federal de Electricidad or CFE), and non-utilities, that can 
entail private investment interests under the following alternatives. First, there are the 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) under long-term contracts with incumbent CFE and 
also considered utilities that provide electricity flows from their investments in 
exclusivity to CFE (IPPs in Mexico are defined differently from their US counterparts; 
see corresponding section below). Second, there are private investors or investment 
grouped interests of generating non-utilities for self-supply (auto-generation), for self- 
supply from combustion processes derived from industrial gases, or co-generators. Then, 
the law allows permits for export and also for import of electricity if interested parties 
request corresponding permits. This means that a firm that holds a permit, for say, co-
generation, cannot be involved in export or import, unless it requests the corresponding 
permit in Mexico, hence no piggy-back permits are allowed, which differs from the US 
state of regulations (CFE Annual Report 2010; CRE interview, January 10, 2012; Ibarra-
Yunez 2008a). 
To have an ample framework for a detailed analysis in the research project, the American 
regulation establishes that the exports of electricity from the United States to a foreign 
country are regulated by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to 
sections 301(b) and 402(f) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 
7151(b), 7172(f)) and require authorization under section 202(e) of the Federal Power 
Act or FPA (16 U.S.C. 824a(e)). Because of the provision of public interest in 
transmission of electric flow to a party of a third country or jurisdiction, sales of 
electricity in interstate commerce or exports of electricity in the United States are 
regulated by FERC, although not prohibited if jurisdictional consumption is guaranteed 
and satisfied. Imports are not regulated in the US or Canada, but need a permit in Mexico  
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Moreover, the federal authority has jurisdiction of transmission entities that carry or 
participate in interstate commerce, but not on generating facilities, transmission, and 
distribution activities in intra-state commerce. For this reason, among other regulations, 
there are regional regulated interconnects with few links and trade (EIA 2011). 
Given the main listed provisions does not totally explain the almost null electricity trade 
at the sub-regional level, between Texas ERCOT and Mexico (taken as one integrated 
market), mainly in asynchronous, direct current DC manner; and a more integrated 
synchronous DC and AC (alternating current) connects between Baja California in 
Northwestern Mexico and California (Baja California is part of the US Western 
Electricity Coordinating Connection or WECC). Turning electricity from a public good 
towards a tradable good has rendered benefits in more integrated systems in the world, 
such as Nordic countries, Western Europe, but also Canadian provinces with the United 
States, in terms of reliability and security for the systems, but also because it has included 
open access to better technologies and sources of energy that move prices downwards 
and extend electricity sourcing strategies to private, mostly industrial, users. Additionally, 
Canadian energy carries the renewable and green tag as a complementary good/service 
for regional US markets to reach green objectives (Goodman 2010). 
Systems that prefer staying as islands with few interconnections opt for it predicating 
better control over reliability and security of energy, and not to depend on third parties. 
However, electricity connections can be observed in layers of degree of commitment and 
control, in a similar fashion than foreign direct investment flows of various levels of 
control/commitment, extending from minority shares, to shelter programs, to joint 
ventures, majority shares, and in the extreme wholly-owned subsidiaries (UNCTAD 
2008, 2010). 
A first layer can be analyzed mostly in cases of emergencies. ERCOT or WECC have 
entered into emergency connections with CFE of Mexico that has supplied electricity to 
the north in an asynchronous way, using DC connectors. Both in situations of extreme 
freeze and extreme heat that occurred in Texas in February and July-August of 2011, 
CFE was able to provide backup electricity, but without long-term contracts. For 
example, in the case of the deep freeze in Texas in February 2-4, 2011, the climate front 
moved to Mexico after three or four days of the backup supply, for which CFE stopped 
the supply across the US-Mexican border to cover local demand (interview with Cleary 
in Austin, Texas, and with Aboytes in Mexico City). 
In the case of Baja California, emergencies in California or south of the border have been 
possible in a more integrated way, since the Mexican Baja state is part of WECC and has 
no problems compulsorily connecting with CFE across the peninsula, because it operates 
separate from the rest of the Mexican grid. CFE has a signed long-term contract with San 
Diego Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison, of 220 MW with a firm 
Purchasing Power Agreement (PPA) since 1984 (interview with Mr. Arias, January 9, 
2012). So a second level of integration is to invest in deeper connects, again, for back-up 
services, both north and south of the California border but where electricity flows are 
more continuous and day-to-day, with both DC and AC connectors. Thirdly, a more 
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cooperative infrastructure development could be ensued in parallel across the borders, 
where the two systems are not planned to be integrated but costs of infrastructure 
expansion are allocated in each country, such as in some parts of Canada that then invests 
in connections (Goodman 2010). This could be a case of cooperation in national 
investment projects while keeping them independent but where ancillary services and 
convergence of wheeling and price practices are shared. A related case is the possibility 
to have a trading interest across the border for which a subsidiary has installed capacity in 
the partner country for supplying or mostly importing and marketing (given regulatory 
restrictions in exporting), but this needs unbundling of the grid operator. This has been 
possible in Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia with US states or regional markets. 
Finally, there is a case of energy pools and integrated systems where the critical problem 
is gaming of shared projects by partners that could have incentives to renege their share 
of a transnational project expansion costs (Laffont and Martimort, 2005). 
After presenting the research objectives and framing the institutional setting, this 
introductory analysis is organized as follows. The next section analyzes how markets are 
organized and what incentives and challenges are critical as lessons for a more integrated 
North American electricity market. It emphasizes policy and price structures. Then 
markets in Europe are presented that have increased links and trade, along with 
institutional changes that tend towards trans-national policy decisions. The following 
section analyzes and frames ERCOT in Texas and how it differs or has similarities with 
WECC and the California ISO and market. Then the chapter concludes with the various 
topics and particular investigations to be presented in the rest of the report of the research 
teams. 
1.2 Organization of Electricity Markets and Incentives to Trade 
The Mexican Utilities Law (LSPEE) passed in 1993 has allowed for many private 
generation possibilities, to now represent around 36% of total generation with a forecast 
to reach 45% of total power production in 2015 (SENER 2011). However, given political 
times and structural weakness by the secretaries of energy in both Mexico and the United 
States, corresponding infrastructure expansion has not been evident in both policy plans 
and reality. 
There has even been discussion as to whether there exists an energy policy in North 
America that maintains clear aims at reaching levels of carbon emission reductions, with 
clean energy sources, and where generation projects are endogenous with transmission 
expansion and even demand load management (Pineau, Hira and Froshauer 2004). 
Contrary to an apparently clear energy strategy, a business as usual (BAU) position has 
been generally taken as a reality by both researchers and market participants. For 
example, Braun (2011) evaluates the division of competences by legal instances for the 
European Union around foreign policy related to technical innovation and developing of 
long-term supply relations, the environmental aspect of shared energy policies, and 
competition aspects. If addressing these issues is postponed or international commitment 
is not granted, then the BAU result faces politics rather than welfare and innovation. 
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On other technical approaches, Laffont and Martimort (2005) emphasize the possibility 
of parties to extract rents and renege to cooperation in transnational public goods 
projects. Independent and Regional Systems Operators (RTOs) ERCOT, WECC/ CAISO, 
and the Mexican CENACE—Cenace is a division of CFE in charge of electricity dispatch 
and system operator in less than independent ways—follow their BAU position from 
argued uncertainty in opening up to other supplier organizations, a case of transaction 
cost economics that set boundaries of a firm, in this case the RTOs. 
With the above, the market organizations and incentives to trade differ across borders. 
Indeed, electricity is a special product/service because it cannot be stored economically, 
and its delivery requires a grid where connections exist at the same time across all 
participants. However, demand varies widely from hour to hour of the day, from days, 
seasons, and years, so generating capacities need to adjust immediately and 
synchronously with demand of power. Additionally, reserve capacity is needed to meet 
peak demand, balancing consumption and generation to meet frequency, voltage, and 
stability constraints. Since demand for electricity is very inelastic, then prices fluctuate 
starkly within a day (Stoft 2006). 
For the above reasons, trade between all stakeholders in this industry (generating 
companies, suppliers, distributors, traders, customers, and the transmission system 
operators), has evolved from a centralized command-and-control system such as 
Mexico’s to wholesale bilateral markets through power pools and exchanges. In the case 
of trans-border markets, Bieleki (2004) has defined three trading models: a single buyer 
model such as Mexico; open access or third-party model (qualified users in Europe and 
some parts of the US and provinces in Canada), and regulatory provisions for non-
discriminatory access to the grid by any producer and market player. Finally, one can 
observe power pools or wholesale power exchanges such as is the case in Nordic 
countries. 
The Definition of Participants Varies across Markets 
According to the Mexican law, utilities are concentrated in a sole producer and consumer, 
the parastatal CFE, and what in a very unique contractual format, subcontracted private 
utilities of more than 35 MW capacity for exclusive sale to CFE that are called 
Independent Power Producers, similar to what occurred in ERCOT when vertical 
integration existed and IPPs would sell to the grid operator in 1995. 
Mexican IPPs can be and actually are affiliated with foreign energy corporations, and 
operate as subsidiaries of their parent companies in Mexico under permits from the 
regulator CRE. Total IPPs reached 28 by end 2011 (there were 22 in 2008). Examples of 
such utilities are Iberdrola, Union Fenosa, Electricite de France-Tractebel, Mitsubishi, 
and General Electric. As can be deduced, IPPs in Mexico sense have taken advantage of 
NAFTA’s foreign investment protection and its corresponding Chapter 6 regarding trade 
of goods and electrical services (Ibarra-Yunez 2008b). 
Other generating or marketing participants in the Mexican setting are auto-generation 
(491 permits in 2011, down from 563 in 2008); co-generation (67 permits in 2011, up 
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from 57 in 2008); importer permits (29 permits in 2011 versus 37 in 2008); exporters (5 
permits only both in 2011 and 2008); and small production (6 permits). In total, there 
were 670 regulated permits or licensed players or groups in 2011, with total capacity of 
28,893 MW, and with an estimated investment of US$ 33.7 billion in 2011, according to 
official data from CRE (2011). 
In contrast, the definition in ERCOT of the various participants in the market makes use 
of the Senate Bill 7 (SB7) of 1999 that liberalized wholesale and required that all Investor 
Owned Utilities (IOUs) be unbundled into three kinds of companies (affiliation has been 
allowed): power generation company (PGCs), retail electric providers (REPs), and 
transmission and distribution service providers (TDSPs), at the same level in a vertically 
unbundled market. ERCOT then became an independent, unbundled Service Operator 
(ISO). PGCs whose aims are wholesale can be affiliated with REPs to provide both 
wholesale and retail electricity to consumers in a competitive market, for which ERCOT 
only concentrates in being the passive system operator. The PGCs cum REPs have 
produced long term contracts and have driven the restructured market. This joint figure 
was not promoted in California’s CAISO, for which frictions existed between 
wholesalers and retailers (and their regulators) in the crash of 2001 (Wolak 2005). 
REPs and PGCs are not regulated if they operate inside the ERCOT market (it 
encompasses Texas, so no FERC regulation for interstate commerce applies). Now the 
TDSPs are regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT) and are 
required to offer open access to any supplier, under equal and non-discriminatory 
conditions. So far no parallelism exists of this figure in Mexico’s CENACE that connects 
all generating players but could restrict access. The PUTC sets the rates for transmission 
and distribution services under different pricing mechanisms, so again there is a stark 
difference in ERCOT with the Mexican setting (see below). 
Before further deregulation, all customers were served by IOUs (in their three types), 
plus what the US law names Municipally Owned Utilities (MOUs), and also Electric 
Cooperatives or Co-Ops, but these have few if any retail customers; they account for 
11.2% and 13% of sales (ERCOT 2011). 
For ERCOT, IOUs access the grid with no discrimination, but other participants exist in 
the market, called resources (Baldick and Niu 2005). One such optional market 
participant is called a Qualifying Facility or QF that can be a private interest or a group of 
producers, while another is called a Load-Serving Entity (LSE). In this sense, the PGCs 
for wholesale are the equivalent to the Mexican IPPs, and do not own transmission or 
distribution facilities. QFs are considered in this analysis similar to the Mexican co-
generators, self- or auto-generators that sell to themselves and also provide their 
electricity to the grid. QFs, LSEs, and REPs are what in the Mexican laws and regulations 
are considered non-utilities. Under US federal and state laws an Independent Power 
Producer is a non-utility generator that is not a regulated, and differs in its definition in 
Mexico. 
All Mexican business figures are subject to regulation: CFE as the incumbent parastatal is 
under the oversight of the Secretary of Energy and the Treasury, whereas the regulatory 
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commission CRE oversees all private permits, including the IPP figure. In short, the 
Mexican regulations depend much on property rights that allow for private investment 
(domestic and foreign) in generation for defined non-utilities, while the IPP in Mexico is 
a subcontracted regulated utility for exclusive sale to CFE. Their investment of US$15 
billion in 2011 (up from a level of US$7.2 billion in 2008) represents 44.5% of the total 
investment by private permits. Some challenges for more integration between CFE and 
ERCOT along the US-Mexican border can be inferred to arise from competition 
incentives in the north in a new market (full restructuring only took place in 2010), and 
vertical integration and monopoly/monopsony power in the south, with competition in the 
margins by permit holders of non-utilities. 
Since there is not a true market but an integrated system in Mexico, electric services 
provided directly to customers can only exist under the co-generation, auto-generation 
permits, small-scale self-supply (less than 1 MW), and import permits that allow for 
private interests to form so-called Specific Objective Contracts or Contratos de Objetivo 
Específico, which are part of the CRE permits. They calculate their loads as a group and 
generate according to cost plans and residual energy sold to CFE. In the case of ERCOT, 
Load Serving Entities or LSE provide services directly to customers that can encompass 
REPs, QFs, MOUs, and Co-Ops under diverse contracts, conditions, and schedules, under 
wholesale “protocols” by ERCOT (Baldick and Niu 2005; Ibarra-Yunez 2008b). 
Other participants in the ERCOT market structure are power marketers and aggregators, 
who do not own facilities but buy and sell electric energy at wholesale, typical of an 
unbundled market. They get authority by FERC on rates and by the PUCT as registered 
marketers or aggregators. In sum, all the retailing part of ERCOTs market structure (LSE, 
Marketers, Aggregators, and REPs) is not replicated in its Mexican counterparts. 
Wholesale in Mexico is guaranteed by both the CRE permits and the incumbent CFE 
power purchasing agreements. Moreover, given the vertically integrated incumbent in 
Mexico, bilateral, market-driven, or regulatory-driven prices and contracts are spelled out 
by a series of agencies, instead of by ERCOT in the Texas case. 
To close this section, the difference in market architecture and structure of participants 
creates various origins of transaction costs and costs of binational coordination, but allow 
for connections and links between the binational space, with a true ISO in Texas and 
retail competition. Industrial and commercial consumers are however similar in their 
electricity needs in both sides of the border. While CFE serves 35 million customers, 
ERCOT serves around 22 million. ERCOT capacity for 2010 reached around 77,000 
MW, while Mexico’s CFE reached around 60,400. ERCOT manages 37,000 miles of 
transmission, while CFE has 30,630 miles (SENER 2011; ERCOT 2011). 
The Pricing Structures as Critical Elements across Systems 
In order for the market to clear and reach efficient equilibria, price structures vary across 
a spectrum that covers transmission, congestion, wholesale, retail, ancillary services, and 
load. Even though the Texas market largely faces bilateral tariff rates among all 
participants, there are transactions that are carried out by ERCOT-administered spot 
market (the balancing market). All Resources, LSEs and aggregators, called Qualified 
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Scheduling Entities in general or QSEs, submit schedules and load to ERCOT who “must 
run” and accommodate the flows. Participants can schedule their transactions without 
ERCOT denying transmission services. In case of congestion, then ERCOT has recently 
implemented a nodal clearing price. Inter-zonal (now nodal) costs of congestion are 
directly charged to market participants, but intra-zonal ones are charged to retailers on a 
load-ration share basis. In order for participants to avoid price fluctuations in contracts 
and balancing, a bid-based day ahead and real-time market, centrally dispatched, has 
been created. Other day-ahead and spot tariffs are also applied for Ancillary Services 
(AS) that maintains the system reliability and security. Services are provided by the 
participants or pay ERCOT for it to provide them itself by auctions. 
The recent implementation of nodal market is predicated by reasons to: (a) allow for 
reduced congestion costs by wholesalers; (b) improve transparency in the day-ahead 
market; (c) respond faster to system volatility in the dispatch every five minutes; and (d) 
better allocate locational resources, and open infrastructures for new renewable 
generation, payable by node. Ancillary or reserve services by ERCOT are also divided 
into up-or-down dispatch, responsive reserve tariff, and non-spinning reserve dispatch 
and tariffs. Finally, in order for consumers to make strategic decisions regarding 
production programming in times of high price volatility, ERCOT also administers 
voluntary disconnections by demand in what are known as interruptible contracts. This 
adds new enhanced players in the energy market, on the side of consumers or load 
management participants. All the above array of contracts, prices, wholesale tariffs, push 
to reflect various levels of costs and capacity utilization, as analyzed by Wilson (2002). 
In Mexico, prices are organized as follows and are much influenced by the regulated ones 
set by both the Secretary of the Treasury (SHCP), CFE, and CRE for non-utilities. First 
for IPPs under long-term 20-year contracts with CFE, power sold to CFE in exclusivity 
has implied Purchasing Power Agreements or PPAs that include a double contract price 
to IPPs, one that is a proportional rate to the firm’s capacity made available to the single 
buyer incumbent (part of their committed capacity contracts), and another that covers the 
variable costs incurred for energy produced and dispatched by CFE (Ibarra-Yunez 2008a; 
Maurer and Barroso 2011). Against such power flow, CFE-CENACE charges 
transmission costs to all private participants, that consist of the sum of infrastructure use-
plus transmission losses (at voltage, month, and zone), and published administrative costs 
(by voltage and distance). 
Secondly, for all other auto-generators, co-generators, small-scale producers, and in 
general for all permit holders that sell excess power to CFE, CENACE sets spot and day-
ahead prices to be paid that arguably cover the incremental cost of expanding generation 
capacity, but the incentive is small and conditioned by the ceiling or upper limit of 
generation (capacity less than 20 MW). Additionally, all permit holders must offer power 
in case it is needed in emergencies by CFE for public service using a wheeling tariff set 
by CFE in a bilateral manner or what is called take-or-pay (part of their PPAs by 
voltages). When demand is higher than ready-use energy, the contract has involved both 
economical tariffs, and also auctioned flows ex ante (the permit holder firm is required by 
law to inform 15 days ahead of time the quantity and target price expected to be delivered 
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on a daily basis). CFE must acquire up to 90% of power flows. The permit holders must 
assure that delivered energy must not vary more than +10% of deliverables program. In 
case of higher variation, CFE sets lower prices called “automatic and non-notified” 
energy (85% of total auctioned price by region, monthly days, and hours such as 
minimal, base, and maximum load tariffs). As one can conclude, there is some sort of a 
shadow market as a step towards a full-fledged spot, day ahead, and auctioned market 
(Ibarra 2008c). 
Thirdly, back-up wheeling tariffs exist for co-generators to start their power plants, 
charged by CFE. The price is set at a fixed rate if low voltage, and at price per KWh if 
high voltage. On all non-utility generation, there exist interruptible contracts, but permit 
holders have made minimal use of them in the past (Interview with CFE, January 2012). 
Finally, for renewable energies, CRE established in 2008 an overall call for proposals 
under a promoted modality of “open season.” The specific law is called Law for 
Renewable Energy and Financing of Energy Transition, or Ley para el Aprovechamiento 
de las Energías Renovables y el Financiamiento de la Transición Energética (LAERFTE), 
that offers a type of “feed-in tariffs” for all permit holders (CRE 2011). 
Trading Opportunities 
Electricity trade faces the following driving forces: economic efficiency and arbitrage, 
security in supply, and environmental issues. The above have to gain against autonomy 
and independence arguments for a grid operator. On the first account, it is sometimes 
cheaper and more efficient to open interconnections (DC are more expensive than AC, 
but are preferred when used mainly for emergency backups), than to maintain reserve 
margins through investments in more capacities. Then, it is economically sound to 
manage asymmetric prices and buy where congestion is low and/or demand load faces 
asymmetric peak-loads, such as a region that encounters stronger winters or summers, or 
hour of day differences to apply peak shaving. 
Regarding security of supply, an importer can take advantage of fuel type differences or a 
wider energy portfolio (Zenon and Rosellón 2010). At the same time, competitive 
elements are added to the power industry under transition. Finally, as it is the case of US 
importers in California, there are considerations of imported clean Canadian electricity to 
reach environmental objectives (Goodman 2010). As already argued, all these generate 
comparative advantage positions that drive increased trade. Against this argument, there 
are political and strategic positions in favor of independence and autonomy by systems 
operators such as ERCOT in Texas, to be little dependent but being able to rely on excess 
capacity or infrastructure south of the border. Less evident is this reason in California 
system operator CAISO (KEMA Inc. 2008). In the case of Mexico, CENACE, the system 
operator from CFE, plans its expansion with little or no international connections, 
arguably out of inertia (interviews with CENACE, and CFE programming, January 
2012). 
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1.3 Experiences in Other Markets and Lessons Derived 
The consideration of vertically integrated monopolies prevalent in past decades has 
changed dramatically in the last 20 or so years, beginning with deregulation and 
unbundling in Great Britain and Wales in 1989 (creation of the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets OFGEM), and nowadays with most markets unbundled, although not 
necessarily in private interests. This consideration is critical in the case of Mexico, where 
proposals for deregulation by the executive since 1997 have reiteratively faced votes 
against deregulation in Congress, with the wrong argument of risk of privatization for 
which the electric industry has lagged behind counterparts elsewhere in the world. This is 
very evident in the oil industry that has not become a public enterprise but has remained a 
state-owned enterprise (PEMEX and its divisions such as PEMEX-Gas) being a fiscal 
cash machine for the federal government, but an element of distortion in the energy 
panorama in Mexico, and a source of international frictions since NAFTA (Weintraub 
2007). The following table shows the evidence in a selected group of countries regarding 
unbundling, rather than privatization. 
 
Table 1.1 
International Reference of State-Owned Enterprises, vs. Mixed 
Enterprises and Private Firms in Electricity, with and without 
Unbundling 
(Generation and Transmission) 
State-Owned 
Enterptrises  
Mixed 
Property 
Enterprises 
 
Private 
Firms  
Integrated Vertical 
unbundling 
Integrated Vertical 
unbundling 
Integrated Vertical 
unbundling 
Hungary France Island Brazil Denmark Argentina 
Luxemburg Norway Portugal Austria Netherlands Chile 
Russia Czech Rep.  Australia  Finland 
Paraguay Switzerland  Hong Kong  Japan 
Mexico South Korea  Indonesia  Peru 
 Honduras  Colombia  Spain 
   Central America 
(SIEPAC) 
 UK 
   Canada  USA 
Source: Author’s generation with data from International Energy Agency IEA (2005, 2011). 
 
As can be evidenced, most markets have increasingly faced unbundling as a driving force 
towards both more competition, and also more pressing challenges of coordination of 
market participants. Each country however, faces its own market and regulatory 
challenges. However, the most salient cases can be observed in Europe. Selected cases 
have inserted at least the following into their regulatory compacts:  
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1. Obligations to provide non-discriminatory access to competitive segments; 
2. True unbundling of the transmission segment (sometimes along with distribution) 
that includes accounting, administrative, and operative unbundling; 
3. Opening of electric dispatch and wholesale market, both driven by regulated 
prices in some cases, and market driven transmission rights in others (see 
Rosellón, Myslikova, and Zenon 2011 for the PJM market); 
4. Integration of qualified user, among some consumers such as big industrials 
(others have also included all retail residential); and 
5. Increasing cooperation in transmission capacity and international links. 
According to Hogan, Rosellón, and Vogelsang (2010), despite liberalization efforts in 
Europe, the markets in Europe and Eurasia remain rather fragmented. For example, in 
2000, inter-regional trade in Europe consisted of around 2% of generation in the 
continent, excluding intra-regional trade (Bieleki 2004). Since Europe is partitioned into 
neighboring blocs, some are synchronous such as Central and Western Europe (called 
CENTREL AND UCTE), and some have separate synchronous grids, such as 
Scandinavia NORDEL and Central Europe CENTREL. UCTE encompass Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
Switzerland, which trade around 160 TWh among themselves. In Southern Europe, trade 
reaches 23% of total generation, whereas CENTREL (encompassing the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic), faces 10% exchanges. One key explanation 
is lack of agreements on sharing costs of transmission expansion across Transmission 
Systems Operators (TSOs), and another is lack of arbitrage and asymmetric export 
charges and compensation charges for transmission to make prices converge. Net flows 
basically go from east to west in a chain of countries. 
It is not clear whether systems are modeled as star-like connections in bilaterals, or as 
meshed ones, as has been studied for example by Balaguer (2011), Joskow and Tirole 
(2005), and Wang, Zhou, and Botterud (2011), where the emphasis is on the bidding for 
allocation of electric net flows. It could be the case that absence of clear price 
mechanisms scare away participants and countries in international trade and investment. 
The lack of more tradable flows of electricity can partly be explained, as argued above, 
by the idea of operators to remain self-sufficient and assure security of supply, but can 
also find an explanation in transaction costs or inertia. The consequence would be that 
TSOs or ISOs would over-invest in excessive reserve capacity, up to around 20% in the 
case of ERCOT in 2010, to around 40% in Mexico’s CFE in the same time (interviews 
with respective executives of these two operations). The same regional operators plan to 
reduce reserve margins to 13.5% in ERCOT and 12% in CFE by 2013 and 2014, 
respectively, such that mothballing (closing) generation plants and restructuring 
generation from renewable sources would be implemented with no transmission 
expansion pressures. However, some electricity load corridors face congestion. Such is 
the case of the San Diego area, Imperial Valley and two northward corridors in 
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California, and the Houston, Dallas-Fort-Worth, or Texas Valley areas in Texas (KEMA 
2008; Interview with Bill Bojorquez, October 6, 2011). 
Another reason of low transmission across regions or countries is the cost of transmission 
over long distances and transmission losses, in addition to the fact that new generation 
tends to be located close to consumption centers. Hence transmission not only is sub-
optimally invested, but is also subject to allocation of payments or rents, a phenomenon 
analyzed in investment but regulated markets by Matsuyama (1990), where the investor 
conditions its expansion plans to a government shield, in case there are no clear rules 
regarding non-incumbent owned investments in transmission complementary lines from 
generation to the high voltage connector. So over-investment can result from self-reliance 
motifs in excess reserve allocations, while under-investment could arise from 
conditioning investments to regulatory shields. 
A third explanation is that given asynchronous connections, as is observed in all US-
Mexico connections except for Baja California and Guatemala-Belize, DC cable links are 
expensive and used for high transit capacities and small distances for which day-to-day 
trade opportunities dilute. They are justified however, by the fact that control of a 
contract area is simpler in DC current than synchronous AC links that face the loop-flow 
problem where electricity flows through the line of less resistance rather than contract 
lines. Thus more involvement in cooperating or sharing of projects can divert efforts 
towards more integration, and an indicator of commitment could be the amount of AC 
connections across borders versus DC ones, other things being equal. 
Still another problem in international trade in electricity (gas has resolved the issue) is the 
existence of monopolies and exclusivity of rights, where the transmission operator could 
discriminate against the access of another party, or charge high and discriminatory tariffs 
for delivery, and if vertically integrated, could prefer its own generating-transmitting 
capacity rather than renting it out, or an “empire-building motive.” 
In all, trade in electricity flows shows an incipient performance, as shown in the 
following Tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 by region, but where there exists short to medium 
potential for increased electricity trade capacity seems to be under-utilized and price 
differences give rise to trade benefits. The tables present domestic production and 
imports and exports, with no reference to sources of generation. Countries within a 
regional connection are grouped together for observation both at the country participant 
and within a regional connection. 
In comparison North America seems an outlier from comparative European connections 
and country participants in those regional markets who are heavier traders overall. Flows 
are measured by country, so it is not totally possible to analyze if flows exist within the 
regional markets or inter-regions. However, according to Montravel (2004), a total of 63 
GVA of interconnection capacity existed between European regions in 2004, around 10% 
of total generating capacity. In comparison, Ibarra-Yunez (2008a) found Canada-US 
interconnection of around 5% of Canadian capacity in 2008. 
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Table 1.2 
Trade in Electricity in Europe by Regional Connection: UCTE 
(GWh in 2010) 
Country Domestic Production (1) Imports (2) Exports (3) 2/1 (%) 3/1 (%) 
Austria 68,291 19,745 17,528 2.9 2.6 
Belgium 95,531 12,404 11,842 13.0 12.4 
France 547,821 37,101 66,600 6.8 12.2 
Germany 580,849 42,960 57,918 7.4 10.0 
Greece 57,048 8,516 2,573 14.9 4.5 
Italy 287,013 45,761 1,817 15.9 0.6 
Luxemburg 4,539 7,280 3,216 160.4 70.9 
Netherlands 110,109 15,584 12,809 14.2 11.6 
Portugal 51,781 5,812 3,192 11.2 6.2 
Spain 287,766 5,169 13,514 1.8 4.7 
Switzerland 66,248 33,401 32,882 50.4 49.6 
Source: International Energy Agency EIA, statistics, electricity table 2010, and author’s calculations, 
consulted at http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp. Total domestic production in UCTE totaled 2,156,996 
GWh, with total imports of 233,733 GWh, or 10.8% of total production, and exports of 223,891 GWh, 
or 10.4% of total production. 
 
Table 1.3 
Trade in Electricity in Europe by Regional Connection: NORDEL  
(GWh in 2010) 
Country Domestic Production (1) Imports (2) Exports (3) 2/1 (%) 3/1 (%) 
Denmark 36,662 10,599 11,735 28.9 32.0 
Finland 77,035 15,717 5,217 20.4 6.8 
Norway 123,740 14,671 7,125 11.9 5.8 
Sweden 149,282 14,931 12,851 10.0 8.6 
Source: International Energy Agency EIA, statistics, electricity table 2010, and author’s calculations, 
consulted at http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp. Total domestic production in NORDEL totaled 
386,679 GWh, with total imports of 55,918 GWh, or 14.5% of total production, and exports of 36,928 
GWh, or 9.6% of total production. 
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Table 1.4 
Trade in Electricity in Europe by Regional Connection: CENTREL 
(GWh in 2010) 
Country Domestic Production (1) Imports (2) Exports (3) 2/1 (%) 3/1 (%) 
Czech Rep 79,470 6,641 21,591 8.4 27.2 
Hungary 34,845 9,897 4,702 28.4 13.5 
Poland 143,592 6,310 7,664 4.5 5.3 
Slovak Rep 25,278 7,334 6,292 29.0 15.0 
Source: International Energy Agency EIA, statistics, electricity table 2010, and author’s calculations, 
consulted at http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp. Total domestic production in CENTREL totaled 
283,185 GWh, with total imports of 30,182 GWh, or 10.7% of total production, and exports of 40,249 
GWh, or 14.2% of total production. 
 
Table 1.5 
Trade in Electricity in North America 
(GWh in 2010) 
Country Domestic Production (1) Imports (2) Exports (3) 2/1 3/1 
USA 4,164,681 41,503 22,795 1.0 0.6 
Canada 579,497 18,631 44,817 3.2 7.7 
Mexico 256,319 397 1,348 0.2 0.5 
Source: International Energy Agency EIA, statistics, electricity table 2010, and author’s calculations, 
consulted at http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp. Total domestic production in North America totaled 
5,000,497 GWh, with total imports of 60,531 GWh, or 1.2% of total production, and exports of 68,960 
GWh, or 1.4% of total production. 
 
Also, some smaller countries such as Luxemburg or Switzerland in UCTE, or Denmark 
in NORDEL, or Slovak Republic in CENTREL, relatively depend more on imports if 
their production base is conditioned by economies of scale. However, such conclusion 
would not apply for Mexico, for example. Across European connects, electricity seems to 
flow from east to west, and from Germany and France to the south and west. Trade 
balances (exports minus imports) do not necessarily have a capacity to penetrate other 
markets and many examples show balanced bilateral trade. In sharp contrast, Canada 
resembles France or Germany in its flows, but it stands out as a net exporter. From the 
tabular analysis, Mexico strongly stays un-connected. Of the above tables, the heaviest 
traders (both ways) are Luxemburg and Switzerland in UCTE, Denmark in NORDEL, 
and the Slovak Republic in CENTREL. Heavy importers in the tables are Greece, Italy, 
Finland, and Hungary, while the stronger net exporter related to domestic production is 
the Czech Republic. 
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The more closed-down markets again seem to be the USA and Mexico but there seems 
not to be a justified correspondence of this situation, related to a high correlation between 
the size of an economy (in GDP per capita) and the generation/consumption capacity that 
would imply more integration of electricity markets. Figure 1.1 evidences the high and 
increasing correlation between GDP per capita (in PPP dollars for 2010), and net 
generating capacity per capital for the last data available from the IEA (2011). 
 
Figure 1.1 
World net per capita Electricity Consumption and per capita GDP 
2010, Purchasing Power Parity Dollars 
 
Source: Author’s generation with data from WB economic indicators 2011, and EIA 2011. 
 
1.4 State of Markets in North America 
Electricity as a transition industry needs policy changes over time, but at least some of 
the following aspects are evident across the world: (a) a move towards open access and 
market-driven pricing rules; (b) separation between generation and transmission; (c) 
rulings regarding wholesale trade, either using incentive regulation or transmission 
marketable rights or FTRs; and (d) some incentive mechanisms for transmission 
expansion. According to Rosellón and Weigt (2011) and Rosellón, Myslikova, and Zenón 
(2011), both market-oriented and regulation-oriented strategies are possible, but not all 
interconnection efforts have reached the above four conditions, mainly conditions (b) and 
(d). In the case of Canada, provincial development and supply have moved with different 
levels of restructuring. 
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For example, Manitoba does not allow for retail sales in competition (though it exports to 
the Great Plains US states), while other provinces allow for large industry qualified users 
both inside their markets and within the United States. This is the case of Alberta and 
British Columbia with the US Western Connection WECC; Quebec and New Brunswick 
with the East Interconnection and the US regional RTO called NPCC. Ontario has a 
totally liberalized market inside and with it is interconnect with the US region RFC in the 
Eastern Interconnection. The US FERC has mandated that RTOs oversee transmission 
interconnections in competitive markets. Canada adheres to FERC rules. Main high 
voltage links exist in Quebec with the US Northeast; between Ontario and Michigan, 
New York, and Pennsylvania; between Manitoba and the US Midwest; and between 
British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest and California. According to the Canadian 
Electricity Association (2010), there are more than 74,600 Km, equivalent to more than 
46,900 miles of high voltage (higher than 230 kV) international transmission lines, where 
more than 50% are AC of 230 kV or higher. 
A form of business integration is through the so-called marketing licenses. In the case of 
Mexico, connections of high voltage exist in the Tijuana-Mexicali areas with the 
Southern California CAISO (San Diego-Mesa Otay and Tijuana, Imperial Valley), and in 
the Juarez-El Paso border. For its part ERCOT relies and seeks asynchronous DC 
connections not only with Mexico but with other regional markets in the United States. 
Main connectors are the following, covering from west to east: Eagle Pass (36 MW), 
Laredo variable frequency transformer (100 MW), and McAllen-Sharyland (150 MW). 
Also, connections to the north (Dallas-Fort-Worth area) of 220 MW with Oklaunion, and 
to the east at Monticello (Swepco and Entergy) of 600 MW, complete ERCOT’s links. 
Table 1.6 shows the various levels of deregulation and unbundling of the different 
Canadian provinces, voltage for long-distance transmission, and state of trading 
indicators. This completes the overall framework of North American electricity 
challenges. 
1.5 Similarities and Differences between the US and Mexico: ERCOT 
and CAISO/WECC 
The two systems operators that have connections with Mexico are the California ISO that 
was created in 1998 and ERCOT that began operating in 1995, with full unbundling 
starting in 2002. The two systems are similar in population served and capacity generated 
that is monitored and managed. However, in the case of California, non-utilities are 
concentrated geographically in the north whereas the ERCOT generating park combines 
utilities and non-utilities, as was described in a previous section, throughout the part of 
the state under ERCOT’s control. Additionally, CAISO within the Western 
Interconnection WECC extends beyond the state of California and monitors transmission 
capacity of 14 western states, plus British Columbia and Alberta, and part of northern 
Mexico. Hence, it must follow wholesale production under FERC surveillance while 
retail is not regulated, as opposed to ERCOT’s promotion of having wholesalers and 
retailers to be integrated with no surveillance of FERC in electricity trades within Texas. 
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Another important difference is that in CAISO there is a Power Exchange in charge of 
scheduling and setting market clearing prices in day ahead and hour-ahead operations. 
 
Table 1.6 
Canada’s Utilities and Transmission Points and Trade, Comparison 
with Mexico, 2009 
Province Number of Utilities 
Year 
became 
Wholesale 
Comp. 
Retail 
Comp. 
Trans-
mission 
status 
KV of Inter-
connection Trade 
Alberta 4 (co-gen) 1996 Large 
industrials 
Investor-
owned com-
panies (ISO) 
500 kV + 135 
kV (2) also via 
BC 
Marketing 
licenses 
Ontario 2 (nuclear) 2002 Yes Vertically 
semi-
liberalized 
345 kV (2)+ 
230+ 120+ 115 
 
British 
Columbia 
1 (hydro), 
plus other 
non- 
utilities 
1996 Large 
industrials 
Vertically 
semi-
liberalized 
(state) 
500 kV (2)+ 
230 (2) 
All West 
and 
California 
Quebec 1 (hydro) 1997 Large 
industrials 
Vertically 
integrated 
765 kV + 120 
(2) + 450+ 120 
(2) 
New 
England 
and NY 
Manitoba 1 (hydro) 1997 No Vertically 
integrated 
500 kV + 230 + 
230 (2) 
 
N. Brunswick 1 2003 Large 
industrials 
ISO 345 kV (2) + 
230 (2) + 345+ 
345+ 138 (2) 
Maine and 
NY 
Mexico 1 plus other 
co-gen 
2002 with 
law adjust-
ments 
No Vertically 
integrated 
230 kV + 200+ 
115+ 138 (2)+ 
136 (2)+ 400 
kV planned for 
Guatemala 
Calif., 
West and 
South 
Texas 
Source: Author’s generation with data from NEB (various reports); for Mexico, CRE. 
 
Both ISOs have in their mandates transmission security, dispatch, and ancillary services. 
However, the regulatory framework seems to be of minimalist stance in the case of 
ERCOT, while the California ISO intervenes more. Table 1.7 summarizes the main 
differences between the two systems. 
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Table 1.7 
Similarities and Differences between ERCOT and CAISO, 2012 
ERCOT CAISO 
Intervenes in planning and scheduling of 
transmission only in congestion events 
Plans and sets scheduling of transmission, and 
coordination in bilaterals 
Power exchanges are private bilaterals and not 
regulated 
Power exchange is active and separated from the 
ISO 
Coordinates measures to alleviate congestion Same as ERCOT 
Monitors operation of power systems to ensure 
enough reserves and ancillary services 
Congestion management 
No operation of Financial Transmission Rights; 
Reforms more in steps. 
Financial Transmission Rights are active and 
monitored by the ISO; CAISO’s activities are 
complex and launched rapidly from beginning 
Nodal pricing began in Dec. 2010, with ERCOT 
increasing congestion monitoring; Congestion 
corridors measured in northern Houston and San 
Antonio areas 
Locational marginal cost pricing; Congestion 
areas in northern, central, and southern California 
System operation reliability, stability, price 
alignment, successful monitoring of customer 
switching 
System is more complex and with higher control 
levels, reliability, with some past issues 
Promotes and coordinates transmission expansion; 
ERCOT has grown its 320 kv+ around 21% 
between 2002- 2009 
Monitors transmission expansion that grew 7% 
between 1997 and 2007 (320 kv+) 
Consumer orientation is part of ERCOT mandate; 
No FERC supervision of a Standard Market 
Design (SMD), it can be changed in the future; 
Follows “best practice” 
Consumer orientation is somewhat loose in 
CAISO mandate; Part of this reason is argued that 
provoked the 2001 electricity crisis 
Source: Author’s generation with information from CAISO, ERCOT, NERC reports; Baldick and Niu 
(2005); Tierney (2008); Wolak (2005). 
 
1.6 Conclusions and Content of the Report 
This introductory chapter is complemented in Chapter 2 with the description of 
generation participants in the markets of both sides of the US- Mexico border, along with 
the analysis of the types of regulated permits and the different definitions of independent 
power producers that result from the asymmetric market designs. The report then presents 
an analysis of main issues that pose both challenges and opportunities for deeper 
cooperation. Chapters 3-5, on demand for electricity, the transmission grid status, and 
challenges for deeper integration of the differently defined markets, analyze and present 
finding on the new trends in demand and load management and interruptible tariff 
differences, trends in demand by the four US and six Mexican border states, and the state 
of the transmission grids and cooperation alternatives. 
Chapters 6 and 7 analyze not only the legal and regulatory settings in both countries, but 
also the political economy and institutional background for the internal distribution of 
regulatory competences and endowments, as part of the study of areas of bilateral 
cooperation. One of these two chapters concentrates on Mexico, while the other focuses 
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on the United States and on the system operator Electricity Reliability Council of Texas, 
or ERCOT. 
Chapters 8 and 9 concentrate on analyses of supply challenges to the binational electric 
systems. One chapter presents the alternative agent-based methodologies to theoretically 
ground an analysis of transmission expansion and connections, and presents a simulation 
exercise that proves benefits of interconnection in reducing congestion and wholesale 
prices, and increasing availability and reliable supply of power, but also shows that 
welfare enhancing market expansion might need to create additional incentives to 
transmission operators on both sides of the US-Mexico border. The final chapter focuses 
on analyzing the emerging and important renewable markets, and its challenges for 
incentive mechanisms and government policies. 
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Chapter 2.  The Structure of Utilities and Non-Utilities in 
North America, and Regional Players 
by Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez 
Abstract 
This chapter analyzes the asymmetries in market design between Mexico and regional 
interconnections in the US, ERCOT in Texas and CAISO in California, regarding the 
market spaces apparent for suppliers of utilities and non-utilities on both sides of the 
border. Many stakeholder power producers are critical players for electricity markets, 
where electricity producers could use their market power to restrain supply, while the 
transmission and distribution part of the market could underinvest to artificially create 
high-priced congestion. The nature of unbundled versus integrated systems is studied, 
typifying the multiple parts and players in this increasingly restructured market. The 
study delineates all licensing characteristics on both sides of the border, regarding power 
producers as legal and administrative elements of transaction costs, applied to 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), auto-generators, and co-generators. It also presents 
other players in unbundled markets such as retailers, distribution, ancillary service 
providers, schedulers, and qualifying facilities, among others in the US, that create a 
complex market but offer many strategic opportunities. 
2.1 Introduction 
Traditionally the operation of electricity systems in the world assumed a vertically 
integrated firm or regional set of firms that integrated generation, transmission, and 
distribution. A justification existed in economic theoretical terms that the vertically 
integrated firm was a natural monopoly, with high economies of scale in all segments and 
cost subadditivity, meaning that only the integrated firm will produce at lowest average 
costs than unbundled ones (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). However, given 
advances during the 1980s mainly in technology, noteworthy in thermal generation 
processes, a strong evidence emerged of competitive markets in generation, access, 
retailing, and overall trading that called for a deep revision of regulatory processes across 
the world (Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers 1994; Hunt 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt 2005; 
Joskow 2002; Spiller and Tommasi 2005; Stern and Cubin 2005; Wilson 2002). 
Historically Chile began deregulating the industry in the 1970s, which called for 
unbundled parts of the industry and separation of what can be called utilities and non-
utilities, or electricity generation as a public versus non-public good, where competition 
was begun under regulatory oversight (Beato and Laffont Eds 2002). A summary 
characterization of Chile’s inclusion or market forces included: (a) listing state-owned 
enterprises in their stock markets, or capital democratization; (b) operational, financial, 
and administrative separation; and (c) sale to private interests via auctions. Similar 
procedures occurred in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, but no capital 
democratization occurred as a first step. Other countries in the world followed the 
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described dynamics. After experience with about 20 years of deregulation, they have 
shown better economic efficiency and performance by the process of unbundling 
competitive parts while maintaining regulated monopoly transmission and some 
distribution, without resorting to massive privatization (Ibarra-Yunez 2011). 
This point is critical to settings such as Mexico, where deregulation has remained a rather 
politically charged process that has placed the country as non-competitive and with many 
welfare distortions. After the Zedillo Administration package passed and rejected by the 
Mexican Congress in 1999, other proposals during the Fox and Calderón Administrations 
(from 2000 onwards) have faced setbacks in congress from arguments against 
privatization that were never part of the various proposals for reform. If only political 
strongholds understood the welfare objective of unbundling and deregulation, with 
evidences from across the world, a much better market picture would occur. In spite of all 
the regulation hurdles Mexico has faced, the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía 
Eléctrica (LSPEE), or electricity law, was passed in 1992 and liberalized generation and 
trading under regulated non-utility permits below 20 MW of capacity, for auto-generation 
and co-generation in private hands, small production, and imports and exports. These 
private activities are overseen by the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) created in 
1995 that also oversees the so-called Productores Independientes de Energía (PIEs) or 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) with capacity permits of higher than 30 MW for 
exclusive sale of electricity to the incumbent parastatal CFE, as is described in Chapter 1. 
Beginning in 2008 a so-called “open season” was called to promote and incentivize 
private generation of renewable energies, mostly wind, bio-mass, and recently solar 
(SENER 2011). 
The distribution of permits is at the end of 2011 as follows: 491 auto-generation permits, 
67 co-generation ones, 28 IPPs, 29 import permits, and 5 for export. Total is 619 permits 
under CRE jurisdiction. Private investment stands out at around US$33.704 billion in 
2011, double the US$16.270 billion invested in 2008, which gives an idea of the 
attractiveness of this semi-liberalized market, where private investment seems to be 
complementary, non-rivalry of the incumbent CFE and its transmission arm CENACE 
(See Chapter 1 and next section). 
As for the United States, the overall national system has operated as segmented and 
regionally separated systems, where traditionally utilities were vertically integrated firms, 
either as investor-owned or IOUs, municipal-owned utilities or MOUs, and rural 
cooperatives. The passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act or PURPA in 
1978 opened the market for Independent Power Producers or generators for the energy 
market, at the same time that Independent System Operators or ISOs were created, first as 
part of utilities and then by Orders 888 and 889. In 1996, open access under transmission-
only ISOs was created to operate the flows and administer energy balances in the region 
or area of their operation. A wholesale and retail market began where the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates wholesale markets and interstate commerce, 
while retail is free or overseen by the states’ public utility commissions (Joskow 2005). 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012), there are 8,048 electrical utilities or 
IPPs under the tag Producing Generating Companies (PGCs), creating around 405,000 
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jobs. As for non-utilities, EIA data shows that there are around 1,738 in 2008, mainly 
auto-generators and co-generators, established under PURPA as Qualifying Facilities or 
QFs. The amount of investment in generation has reached around US$900 billion to $1 
trillion in 2009-2010 (EIA 2011). 
One problematic area is the predictability of prices that make generation profitable at 
close to congestion, but where the transmission capacity and prices paid for supply 
delivery are not clear for the generating companies of both utilities and non-utilities. For 
this reason in deregulated systems there are challenges to determine optimal investments 
in power capacity. For example, low wholesale prices could postpone generating plant 
expansions or launch new generating projects. This has occurred in Texas at the same 
time that demand can reach record levels, such as on abnormally hot or cold days. Also, 
generating plants that are broken down or mothballed are incapable to respond at short 
notice in case of emergencies. At the same time, proposals to increase retail prices for 
consumers have faced strong opposition among the citizenry, for which generation 
expectations are strongly affected by this set of circumstances. This chapter reviews 
theory, institutional settings, and empirics from the point of view of generation and its 
determinants on both sides of the US-Mexican border, given the alternative market and 
regulatory architectures. The next section is devoted to the analysis and the governance 
structure that frames Mexico producers. The following section takes account of the US 
power producer, and then concentrates on markets in Texas within ERCOT and in 
California within the CAISO market. The chapter then concludes with an analysis of risks 
and opportunities. 
2.2 Supply Market Architecture: Mexico’s Case 
Concentrating on foreign Independent Power Producers or IPPs in Mexico, the Mexican 
law of 1992 allows for them to participate in larger than 30 MW projects for exclusive 
sale to incumbent CFE. From 22 permit holders in 2008, in 2010 there were 28 of those 
investments, concentrated in Spanish projects by Iberdrola, Unión Fenosa, and Gas 
Natural México (the latter acquired the assets of The French EDF Internacional 
subsidiary in 2008), with 34.3%, 17.2%, and 14.2% of MW name-plate capacity of all 
IPPs in 2010, respectively (65.8% of total foreign investors in this market). Mitsubishi 
reduced its participation from 18.5% in 2008 to 12.3% in capacity for 2010 (Mitsui 
Corporation has maintained one project in the state of Yucatán, with a participation of 
4.2%, so the total Japanese stake is 16.9% of the total). US investors include InterGen 
with 8.9% of participation and AES with 4% (total of only 12.9%). The Canadian 
TransAlta has two permits and participates with 4.4%. 
Given the nature of Mexico’s legal framework for IPPs as facing an exclusive buyer CFE 
in a “build-operate-own” model with power purchasing agreements offered for a period 
of 20 years, the market for IPPs is semi-concentrated, according to regulation practice 
(Church and Ware 2001). The calculated Herfindahl-Hirshman concentration index is 
2,418 points in 2007 and 2,146 in 2010, a change of 408 points of reduced concentration. 
According to Mexico’s competition law (Section 4 of the Competition Commission 
“Resolución en que se da a conocer el método…”), higher than 2,000 points in the HHI 
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or an increase of 200 points in a relevant period are considered elements to conclude that 
a market is concentrated. Hence, the IPP bilateral market in Mexico could be considered 
a concentrated one. 
In a related and relevant matter, investment is estimated by the Comisión Reguladora de 
Energía (CRE 2012), to be USD$ 15 billion in 2011, double the level from 2007. A first 
thought about these specific permit holders under the surveillance of CRE is that given 
their power in similar fashion of California’s experience with power games by generating 
interests, there is a risk of undersupplying the market to pressure prices upwards (Joskow 
2003; Wilson 2002). However, since final prices are exogenous to market forces in 
Mexico (they are set by the Secretary of the Treasury SHCP and Secretary of Energy’s 
proposal), such a behavior would be muted. 
On the other hand, given the sole buyer framework, gaming could arise rather from 
restricted access rights to the national grid set by the Energy Control Center, CENACE, 
which is the Transco within CFE, or by charging monopoly rents by CFE to IPPs, in its 
transmission rate formulas. So far, long-term purchasing power agreements, PPAs, have 
made the semi-market coordination efficient and stable, with few conflicts. Moreover, 
prices between IPPs and CFE are ex ante programmed to increase stability, even if 
contracts are realized in bilateral form rather than in an energy pool or market (Ibarra-
Yunez 2008a). One key aspect frequently argued as a precondition for deep 
interconnections is the price mechanism, to be set in transparent form and arising from 
both regulated prices in the hands of the regulator (in this case CRE), and market prices 
at the zone, or better, node, close to marginal cost. This has been the main argument in 
papers such as Hogan (2002), Hogan, Rosellón, and Vogelsang (2010), and others where 
merchant models of electricity are compared with regulated markets, mainly assuring that 
both transmission and generation are stable and efficient parts of the market. 
On the part of the transmission networks in Mexico, they face a challenge to modernize 
them and improve backbones, mainly nowadays where renewable sources of energy are 
located farther from consumption centers and where there is the question of how to fund 
grid expansion. In the case of CFE, budgetary sources set a limit to expansion, even if 
between 2005 and 2010, these federal allocations have increased but used not for either 
expansion of the Sistema Eléctrico Nacional SEN from CENACE or generation 
(Martínez-Chombo 2010). This could also impel the incumbent CFE to overcharge for 
sunk costs of the grid, affecting IPPs profitability (transmission rights costing). 
Additional to IPPs, the Mexican regulation allows for auto-generation (self-supply), co-
generation, small-scale supply, and permits for imports and exports under CRE’s 
regulation. At present, there are 491 auto-generation permits (down from 563 in 2007); 
67 co-generation permits (up from 57 in 2007); 29 import permits (down from 37 in 
2007); and 5 export ones, low figures in contrast to other markets. However, these 
permits are not a low figure regarding investments, since a calculation by CRE shows 
US$11.8 billion for auto-generation in 2011 (up from US$5.2 billion in 2007), US$3.6 
billion for co-generation (up from US$2 billion), and US$2.5 billion in export activities 
(up from USD$ 1.4 billion in 2007), with a total permitted capacity of 28,893 MW in 
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private producers, both utilities and non-utilities. The following three graphs summarize 
the distribution of private investment activities in Mexico. 
Finally, given a shadow market rather than a true open market in Mexico, the present 
analysis has separated the permit holders between those that form the so-called Specific 
Objective Contract Partnership permits for peak shaving only from permits that have 
implied a sort of internal market and sale of residual energy to CFE via PPAs. From co-
generation permits, 20.1% show this characteristic while 5.5% of auto-generation permits 
show it, although in terms of the latter’s capacity it is 63.3% that is traded (Ibarra-Yunez 
2008b). In summary, there seems to be an implicit and mixed market in Mexico to the 
limit of the regulatory framework. The next section reviews the permit frameworks of 
operation themselves. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Distribution of Permits in Mexico (Number) 
 
Source: Author’s generation with data from CRE. 
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Figure 2.2 
Distribution of Permits in Mexico (in MW capacity) 
 
Source: Author’s generation with data from CRE. 
Note: As can be seen, total private authorized capacity reached 28,893 MW in 2011. 
 
Figure 2.3 
Distribution of Permits by Investment 
 
Source: Author’s generation with data from CRE. 
Note: Total estimated investment by December 2011 reached US$33,704 million. 
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2.3 Analysis of Permit Characteristics in Mexico and Players 
This section spells out the characteristics, aims, and limits of the private sector permits to 
generation activities in Mexico, both of utilities (IPPs) and non-utilities (rest of permits). 
IPPs 
For the case of IPPs, the following are the critical elements for investors to gather all 
requirements under CRE’s jurisdiction: 
1. Proof of existence under public and commerce registry and formally constituted 
as a resident company in Mexico. Note that all IPPs have foreign companies as 
main stockholders, but where US companies are present only marginally with no 
apparent reason. 
2. Programs, designs, constructions, and all activities needed to operate generating 
facilities within a time schedule set by the permit solicitor, along with all 
technical specifications about main transformers, switches, and other links to 
assure supply to the SEN system, also following CENACE technical 
specifications. 
3. Contracts and capacity commitments of electricity generation (technical 
maximum and real capacity in MW). 
4. Purchasing power agreements associated with CFE (in MWh offered in different 
tiers, from day-ahead markets, to economic reserves, to non-scheduled). 
5. Specifications of the types of technologies to use and all requirements of gas, 
fuels, and water usage, and other things for operation and emission norms. 
6. Once operations are initiated, the permit holder must inform CRE quarterly of the 
type and volume of fuels used, quantity of generated electricity, and fixed charges 
for capacity, O&M (operation and maintenance) and the variable charges for 
O&M, by fuel and ramping up. 
7. Get from CFE all property rights of land, land use, and discharges. 
Co-Generation Permits 
In all cases, this research found that main co-generation permit holders are associations of 
industrial companies that use part of the heat and gasses from industrial processes for 
private interchanges and public sales of excess electricity to CFE. They need to solicit a 
registry into a trade figure called Sociedad de Objeto Específico to CRE (Specific Object 
Partnership). One critical point is that CFE has a say in the conditioning of costs of 
congestion to CFE’s grid of the SEN, but without a market mechanism. Most co-
generation processes use vapor recuperation for industrial and mining projects. Noted is 
the concentration of projects for industries in the glass and cement sectors, food and 
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beverages, textiles, petrochemicals, metal-mechanics, hotel services, and municipalities 
into lighting projects (Ibarra-Yunez 2008b). Many industrials are active co-generators in 
discontinuous electrical off-grid activities, with CFE contracting of non-peak load 
services and where base supply to ramping up electricity for own use is around 15% of 
demand. Co-generators can enter into PPAs with the incumbent CFE for the sale of 
excess flows of electricity. 
Recent co-generation projects also have included use of renewable energies (biomass). 
The rules established by CRE for permits is shown next, where solicitors must establish: 
1. Proof of existence under public and commerce registry and formally constituted 
as a resident company in Mexico. Under this modality, all permit requests have 
included a group of industrial or mining partners. 
2. Capacity to install and the distribution by all partners of the production, 
conduction, transformation, and delivery of generated electricity (sales within 
partners is not regulated). 
3. Planned location for the co-generating plant(s), with its technical description that 
include the type of technology, annual estimated generation, self-consumption, 
and use of inputs. 
4. Building and construction program and schedule of initial operations, after 
testing, and disposable excess energy to CFE. 
5. Obligation to supply energy in case of public service requirements and 
emergencies. 
6. Adherence to the rules of dispatch of the SEN (porting). 
7. Responsibility for risks under all circumstances when conditions of co-generation 
supply change. The permit holder(s) are responsible for the property rights and 
rights of way. 
8. Permit holders must accept “associated purchase contracts” before CFE (PPAs). 
9. The permit holder must quarterly inform CRE and CFE of its operations. 
Under the PPA with co-generation, CENACE and CFE establish a programmed auction 
using ex ante prices, or else establish as the purchase price for excess, the so-called 
automatic price, with tariffs dependent on capacity and by KWh. On its part, CFE 
establishes charges for access to the grid by KWh, plus charges for operation and 
maintenance and also ramping up in a regulated type of market (Hogan 2002, Vogelsang 
2001). During the investigation, one risk voiced by co-generating permit holders is the 
red tape when the partnership invites new firms or firms leave the partnership such that a 
whole new permit solicitation is required by CRE. Another risk is the nature of the access 
tariffs to the integrated grid. Finally, a last important risk is the lack of a clear sharing 
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rule for infrastructure expenses by private investors, since transmission and distribution is 
by law, monopolized by the incumbent CFE state corporation. 
Auto-Generation Permits 
There were 491 permits of this category at the end of 2011, down from 563 in 2008 (CRE 
2012), mainly because some permit holders have decided to increasingly depend on CFE 
supply given a recently capped price established by the federal government in 2009 after 
the US recession hit Mexico’s economy. It is also possible that some permit holders for 
self-supply ceased to renew permits, such as Pemex or retailers. Most auto-generation 
permits also allow for a group of companies to share the auto-generation project for 
bilateral, not regulated prices, under the referred Specific Object Partnerships. Most auto-
generation permits do not imply sale of excess electricity. However, around 40 (roughly 
10%) of permit holders, mainly larger installed capacity permits to the limit of their 20 
MW allowance, do sell excess electricity as non-utilities, similar to Qualifying Facilities, 
or QFs, in the ERCOT market (presented in a next section). Second to IPPs, this modality 
has implied the second largest capacity installed with more than US$11 billion invested. 
Private participation in here is rather important, noting that after analyzing all permits in 
Mexico, companies appear in more than one modality (e.g., IPPs plus auto-generation 
permit, co-generators plus auto-generators, IPPs and import permits). In order to 
participate in more than one activity, the investor must secure different permits, not being 
allowed to use permit pancake strategies. The following list shows the characteristics of 
the contracts where permit solicitors must guarantee: 
1. Proof of commercial existence under public and commerce registry and formally 
constituted as a resident company in Mexico. Under this modality, all permit 
requests have included industrial or mining partners but also retailers and other 
members of the partnership. 
2. Capacity to install and the distribution by all partners of the production, 
conduction, transformation, and delivery of generated electricity (sales within 
partners is not regulated). 
3. Authorized capacity to install, and distribution of maximum consumption by each 
permit member. 
4. In case it is needed, the list of additional partners in the planned expansion of the 
permit holder. Sales to non-members of the permit are prohibited by the 
regulation.  
5. Technical description that includes the type of technology for installation, annual 
estimated generation, self-consumption, and use of inputs. 
6. Building and construction program and schedule of initial operations, after 
testing, and disposable excess energy to CFE, according to Arts 36 (I, numeral b), 
and 36-bis of the LSPEE. 
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7. Obligation to supply energy in case of public service requirements and 
emergencies against the received payment from the PPA contracts. 
8. Adherence to the rules of dispatch of the SEN (porting), in the point of 
connection. It is possible that electricity demand could be larger than excess 
supply, for which the contract can be subject to automatic economic supply or 
reception via auctions. 
9. Responsibility for risks under all circumstances when conditions of generation 
supply change. The permit holder(s) are responsible for the property rights and 
rights of way. 
10. Permit holders must accept “associated purchase contracts” before CFE. 
11. The permit holder must quarterly inform CRE and CFE of its operations. 
According to analysis of the governance structure of auto-generators in Mexico, the 
permit holder should inform 15 days in advance if it prefers auction supply, specifying 
quantity and price to offer at daily delivery, up to the grid capacity as the ceiling supply. 
CFE, according to the Mexican regulation, must acquire a minimum of 90% of this 
supply, while the permit holder is responsible that electricity supply stays within 10% of 
variation with respect to power delivered to CFE. In case of non-adherence, then CFE 
would acquire excess supply as non-notified automatic delivery, at a price 85-90% of the 
offered one, depending of the thermal efficiency of the power producer. There are various 
tariffs for wheeling that depend on the use intensity (base load, medium load, peak load), 
mainly for high consumption tariffs (HS). 
Auto-generators in Mexico seem not to distrust the reliability of CFE supply. However, 
ramping up generation is subject to purchase of electricity to CFE of 15% of backup 
energy. Partners in the contracts can save such 15%, and up to around 27% of energy 
costs from non-backing up. Auto-generators would benefit if tariffs and put versus call 
purchasing options were done in a true market, as is the case in WECC-CAISO and 
ERCOT. 
Import and Export Permits 
Under the LSPEE, importer permits are granted for exclusive use of permit holder 
partners, and electricity cannot be subject to resale (Art. 72(II)). If Mexico faced a true 
market with an unbundled structure (Transco, ISO, and qualified users), import permit- 
holders could evolve towards a figure similar to the one seen in the US or Canada called 
a broker or marketing company (Griffin and Puller 2005; Goodman 2010). In such cases, 
importing partnership groups can self-supply or resell as market complement, but in 
Mexico incumbent CFE and the system operator CENACE (part of CFE) under present 
regulations prohibit such parallel market without CFE or CENACE participation. It is for 
the market architecture reason in addition to potential wholesale price risks and subsidies 
that are difficult to predict that Mexican import permit holders are so few and have 
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played a marginal role until 2011. The above does not apply to the incumbent CFE that 
can extend links and connected ports. 
For example, as is presented in other chapters, SENER (2011) shows that there are nine 
high voltage (400 kV- 230 kV) connectors to the US market, plus one with Belize and 
one with Guatemala. Connections exist between Baja California with California at 
Tijuana-Otay Mesa and La Rosita-Imperial Valley, with 800MW available for power and 
energy markets with the north on a permanent basis (Baja as shown elsewhere is part of 
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, WECC). Additionally, there are two 
connectors used for emergencies in the El Paso region (Diablo, Texas, with Paso del 
Norte Mexico, and the Azcárate connection with Reforma in Juarez), with capacity of up 
to 200 MW and medium voltage links of 115 kV. With the Texas ERCOT, there are 
emergency links and asynchronous DC interconnections in Eagle Pass, Laredo, Falcon, 
Frontera, Sharyland-Mcallen, and Brownsville-Military Rd. These linkages range from 
138 kV lines to 230 kV lines, and have capacity for trading of up to 580 MW and 
growing. Finally, the connectors to Belize and mainly with Guatemala in recent times 
shows capacity of up to 200 MW for and to the Central American market with high 
voltage transmission of 400 kV (Belize connects with Mexico permanently also, at lower 
voltages and where capacity can reach 40 MW). Finally, plans to increase investment in 
transmission capacity concentrate in California, Reynosa-Matamoros with the Texas 
Lower Valley, and Guatemala (SENER Prospectiva 2011). 
On their part, exporters in Canada are promoted in three tiers as (a) exporters of physical 
electrons from renewable sources of energy, mainly from hydro, but also wind or nuclear; 
(b) research and advice in engineering of new technologies and smart grids; and (c) 
development of clean energy business services. Contrary to a simplified intervention in 
Canada, export permits in both the US and Mexico are restricted by federal regulations to 
guarantee domestic supply in the US and economic viability and transmission stability in 
Mexico, respectively, before granting aspiring exporter companies with the 
corresponding licenses or permits. 
The Mexican law and regulation under LSPEE allows exports from co-generating 
activities, IPP activities, and any small production activities to be destined for external 
markets. However, permit holders of co-generation or other should secure a separate 
exporting permit, increasing the transaction costs for the non-CFE generators. 
Additionally, the type of interconnection carrier contracts and the distribution of 
infrastructure expansion rates between CFE and a private party is critical. As can be 
deducted, incentives for export between Mexico and the US are restricted at the level of 
the market architecture, in addition to other non-economic and procedural reasons 
(Ibarra-Yunez 2011). 
To close the section, it is important to note that transporting or ramping services 
(wheeling) by CFE has increased at an average rate of 8.9% per year, except for zero 
increases in 2008 and 2009. This evidences a de facto merchant model in Mexico in the 
transitional market architecture. 
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2.4 Supply Market Architecture: the US Case and Main Players 
After the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), the 
formerly integrated although sparsely organized US market faced generating capacity to 
be updated and changed, to be consistent with various players in different layers of the 
market. In the end of the 1970s, Section 210 of the PURPA created an arrangement called 
a Qualifying Facility or QF to promote new players and reduce the US fossil fuel 
dependency after the oil shock of the ’70s. A QF had to have 50% or less ownership by a 
utility, plus it was required that technology diversification was used, such as co-
generation or a generator using renewable energy. Companies could own more than one 
QF and diversify by location. From the end of the ’70s to well into the ’90s, most 
generation was produced by vertically integrated utilities. 
Then the regulator FERC triggered a new type of producer: the so-called “exempt 
wholesale generators,” or EWGs, to make it not compulsory that utilities were owned by 
a holding company. With this plan, wholesalers could be separated from retailers and 
promote more competition. In 1996, FERC passed Order 888 that required all investor 
owned utilities (IOUs) that owned transmission lines to open them for all generating 
facilities in a non-discriminating manner. Additionally, any wholesale producer (QFs, 
EWGs, IOU or any power generating company or PGCs) after passing a test of lack of 
market power could price its electricity at market prices instead of at a regulated rate of 
return, or cost-based caps, thus liberalizing the market (Badlick and Niu 2005; Steinhurst 
2008; Wolak 2005). 
Utilities then had to create independent corporations in charge of transmission: the ISOs 
and regional RTOs, to determine new ways to set access procedures and charges, as well 
as acting passively (ERCOT) or actively (CAISO) to set wheeling charges, wholesale at 
intrastate levels with FERC regulation, and promoting retail competition, at least for 
those that were non-incumbent. To understand unbundling dynamics in the US, most 
incumbent utilities were pressed to divest the generation capacities, similar to the former 
experience with telecommunications, by selling to another party, or creating affiliates 
owning former integrated assets (Beato and Laffont 2002). 
Other stakeholders in the US electricity market, embraced by federal and state 
legislations and sets of rules, complete the panorama. From the generation part of the 
market, the QFs and EWGs discussed above, as well as the allowances for the power 
generating (non-utility) companies or PGCs, were created mostly as divestitures of 
existing generating plants by utilities and also as transfers of utility plants to unregulated 
affiliates and new generating plants (Joskow 2005). These entities are allowed to remain 
affiliated up to 5% of share ownership by utilities or other entities (Baldick and Niu 
2005). Accordingly, around 34% of generation was produced by non-utilities in 2002 and 
39% in 2011, while the comparative figure is roughly 33% in Mexico for 2009 (SENER 
Prospectiva 2011). 
The PGCs operate as wholesale providers similar to Mexico’s definition of IPPs, and are 
regulated. Additionally, the divested retail electric provider REP (this entity is not 
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regulated if it operates within the state boundaries) defined in ERCOT, along with a 
transmission and distribution service providers, or TDSP, complete the set of the three 
unbundled IOUs (Baldick and Niu 2005). 
In an unbundled market with retail and wholesale prices and auctions, other stakeholders 
are important players that do not have s similar entity represented say, in Mexico. These 
are the distribution companies or more generally the Load Service Entities, or LSEs, 
along with Marketers and Aggregators that do not need to own power facilities. 
Table 2.1 shows the sizes of the systems of interest for the current research analysis: the 
California system operation (CAISO), the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas 
(ERCOT), and the integrated national Mexican operation (CFE). 
 
Table 2.1 
Comparison of the US and Mexico Systems of the Research Project, 
2010 
 CAISO ERCOT CFE 
Installed Generation (MW) 57,124 63,025 60,440 
Transmission Lines (miles) 25,526 40,500 31,187 
Population served 30 million 23 million 34 million 
Planned Reserve Margin 
(operational %) 
15 13.75% 13% 
Ave. Annual Load weighted 
price/ MWh 
$39.91 $26 - $170 (7pm) $12 
With fuel adjustment $33.95 n.a. n.a. 
Renewable % of total MWh 
(2009, 2010) 
11 15.1 3 (wind) 
14.2 (wind and hydro) 
Sources: Author’s generation with CAISO data set, ERCOT data set; SENER (2011) Prospectiva del Sector 
Eléctrico 2010-2025. 
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Figure 2.4 
Total Net Generation in GWh: California, Texas, and Mexico 
1990-2009 
 
 Source: Author’s generation with CAISO data set, ERCOT data set; SENER (2010) Prospectiva del Sector 
Eléctrico 2010-2025. 
2.4.1 Main Stakeholder and Player Participation and other Market Governance 
Activity 
The previous sections have spelled out differences between Mexico and part of the 
relevant US systems CAISO and ERCOT, regarding generating players. Now, it is 
necessary to create a framework of the market design and its various players. With this in 
mind, there are different roles other stakeholder participants play in the unbundled 
market. Specifically, Srivastava, et al. (2011), have studied the distribution of 
competences between at least the following players. 
• Generators (of all types and proprietorship structures described above) [G]. 
• Power Marketers that become active participants the more unbundled is the 
market. In Mexico permit holders enter into bilateral non-regulated exchanges 
both with incumbent CFE and among their “off-grid” partnerships, rather than 
operating in a power market. However, CFE definition of firm energy supply now 
works through the system operator CENACE with auctions. Power marketers can 
be active or passive across countries and regions [PM]. 
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• Power Exchanges, as market clearing mechanisms, that exist in some markets but 
not in others (they exist in the California CAISO, but not in ERCOT) [PX]. 
• Transmission owners, similar to the defined TDSP above, that can be closely 
related to overall definition of Transcos [TO]. 
• Scheduling coordinators that generally do not own facilities; they are separated 
from power exchanges or pools. They generally are also separated from the 
system operators and of Transcos. Both CAISO and ERCOT have such a business 
figure. For ERCOT, scheduling coordination and power exchange activities are 
merged and part of the same operation so that a question is what section plays a 
leading role: power exchanges with a secondary role of scheduling, or scheduling 
with a minor role of PX [SC]. 
• Ancillary Service Providers are fundamental to a vertical unbundling, because 
they supply support services to reliability of the power system. Some system 
operators allow for ancillary services, mainly through traded rights in spot and 
forward markets, to be part of power exchanges AS-PX such as in CAISO, while 
others can be part of the Independent System Operator activities, or AS-ISO. For 
example in Texas, the ISO (ERCOT) provides the ancillary services. Moreover, 
there is no PX in Texas, giving the ERCOT ISO the leading role that has been 
considered a successful story of arbitraging and operations, and where ancillary 
services are critical [AS]. 
• Retailers [R] and Distribution service providers [D] complete the map of 
participants. Under the retailing figure, ERCOT defines Load Service Entities, or 
LS, as the D of the map, while marketers and aggregators form the R, that also 
seems clear to encompass the so-called retail electric provider, REP. 
The alternative market design models of stakeholders and players have arisen in the US 
from legal and regulatory designs, and also from pragmatic allocation of power among 
the different participants and how regional regulators have envisioned their own markets 
both from its inception to accommodate agents’ interests and origins of power, in a 
typical case of multi-principals and multi-agents in game theory and the theory of 
incentives (Laffont and Martimort 2005). 
As for the Mexican case, CENACE, the Mexican System Operator, was planned since the 
beginning of the decade to be separated from CFE and become a true ISO. Congress 
voted against many executive reform proposals since the Zedillo administration of 1994-
2000, passing through the Partido Verde, the PRD, PAN party proposals, and executive 
proposals of the following Fox Administration (2000-2006) and the present 
administration of Pres. Calderón of 2006-2012 (Ibarra-Yunez 2011). 
In the research project visit to Mexico City in January 2012 to CFE, CENACE, the 
Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), and the Secretary of Energy (SENER), the 
research team members gathered that given political times, no changes are foreseen 
during 2012 to reforms in the sector, although CENACE high administrators argued that 
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they operated in market clearance operations and wheeling services, as if a true (although 
a shadow) market existed, with daily and fortnightly auctions for system access and tariff 
setting. 
2.4.2 The California Market 
The market ISO began operations as a non-profit organization in January 1, 1998, to 
secure reliable and secure energy to about 30 million California state residents. CAISO is 
part of the Western interconnection WECC that extends from Baja California in 
northwest Mexico to British Columbia in Canada, and is subject to federal oversight by 
FERC regulation. CAISO provides dispatch of energy and transmission access services 
and ancillary services to balance the market hourly and daily (through frequency 
regulation, spinning and non-spinning reserves, and replacement reserves to anticipate 
changes in demand or plant outages). The SC provides the balance schedules of delivery 
to the ISO, while an unbundled PX creates the spot market for electricity and schedules 
trading and market clearance in financial markets. All IOU power producers must bid 
generation to the PX, but own the transmission grid that is operated by CAISO since 
March 31, 1988, when it assumed all the transmission control of investor owned 
generators. To put the California market in perspective, dispatch has a separated PX 
operation not seen in Texas ERCOT, but generators are much more vertically integrated 
in CAISO than in ERCOT. Los Angeles and Sacramento County are not covered by 
CAISO. 
Much has been written about market and regulatory failure in California’s electricity 
market in 2000 and 2001. Among the main research references are Bompard, Ma, Napoli, 
and Jiang (2006); Borenstein (2000); Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002), Gilbert, 
Neuhoff, and Newbery (2004), and noteworthy Joskow (2001, 2003, 2005, 2008); and 
Joskow and Kahn (2002). 
However, some aspects of the example of market and regulatory failure have become 
lessons for restructuring in other parts of the world and within the United States. Since it 
is not the objective of this chapter to delve into California’s complex market and 
regulatory hurdles, only salient points are presented next after analyzing them for lessons 
in deeper integration of binational markets. However, measures taken seem to respond to 
the aim of reducing retail prices. At the same time not all structural problems faced by 
wholesalers, retailers, and unregulated transmission contracts were in place that faced 
new open access and “price to beat” contracts for cost recovery (Joskow 2001). The 
California case can show the following lessons: 
1. Markets where private interests play a greater role than a well-defined mechanism 
of transition and where players at least do not lose is prone to failure as the new 
“market” is tested in its operation. For example, it is reported that the California 
Public Utility Commission (CPUC) sent commissioners to England and Wales 
that were persuaded of their model instead of studying the particularities of 
players in CAISO. The point is especially important in the wholesale market and 
its institutions ISO and PX. 
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2. Separating the ISO from the power exchange in charge of scheduling day-ahead 
and daily hourly trading can create problems of information and reliability for 
generating companies supplying information and trading position to the PX with 
interested objectives of creating tying or conditional sales. This is a topic often 
addressed in game theoretical industrial organization as market failure potential. 
All utilities in California and the main, very powerful, IOUs must trade power and 
energy in the PX. Moreover, in the California price crisis in 2000-2001, the PX 
took hourly day-ahead supply and demand bids and “stacked up” to have 
aggregate demand and supply curves for electricity, so that prices not only 
increased because of conditioned sales by powerful incumbents but by design of 
the regulation applied by the PX. 
3. When various oversight mechanisms are independent for operational reasons, 
such as the ISO and the PX in California, propensity to face moral hazard 
problems and overall information asymmetries increases. Such was the case in 
2000, when critical lack of coordination was more evident in congestion periods 
and its management. According to Joskow (2001), flaws were clear in the 
congestion management system around the “protocols” for investment in 
interconnection and transmission for new generators (in California IOUs were 
three concentrated ones), real time balancing markets, ancillary services, and day-
ahead and real time market clearance. These are aspects of unbundled electricity 
markets, mainly around congestion periods of days, weeks, or seasons, that could 
make others reject deregulation altogether. The California experience has 
postponed many restructuring plans across the world, including coordinated 
binational and trinational efforts in North America. The lack of coordination in 
critical congested periods gave rise to above expected prices over marginal costs. 
4. Moreover, given excessive prices over costs in stressed and congested periods, 
main concentrated generators saw an opportunity to withhold capacity during 
stressed periods to squeeze the markets, so that price increases were a strategic 
result of conduct (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak 2000). 
5. When the ISO is passive, with low power to change incentives, strategic conduct 
by suppliers moves the market referee (the ISO) to not being able to regulate 
market clearance mechanisms of more costly sources of energy, nor to impel 
producers to increase reserve margins in anticipation of unbalanced growth 
between demand and supply, or price caps to interested conduct by powerful 
players. 
6. Regarding retail markets, California established choice of customers over their 
service provider, but if they did not choose one, they would be serviced by the 
local utility at a regulated final price of around $65 per MWh for up to four years. 
This price cap or fixing over retail prices provokes two effects: insufficient 
“churn” and market discipline; and the measure disincentivizes both investment in 
power plants and servicing the market with firm supply, so that utilities buy 
power in more volatile local markets, increasing their market and price risks. This 
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can be somewhat overcome with power flows from other regions, in this case the 
northwest US and Canada, and other southwest or Mexican suppliers. 
7. Oversight by FERC, when implemented in a light manner and reactive way, made 
the federal regulator face diminishing returns in regulatory power and strained the 
policy relationship between federal and state oversights (Estache and Martimort 
2005; Joskow 2001). This element has been frequently minimized but plays a 
critical role in other interconnections (ERCOT follows) and federal oversight 
reputation. For example, Joskow emphasizes that after FERC’s new price 
mitigation rules were applied to California in mid-December 2000, after four 
months of wholesale price hikes, the result was to see prices soar to around $400 
cents per MWh. With such an effect and price freezes, all utilities in CAISO 
reached insolvency at the end of 2000. 
8. Spot prices do not work well or are insufficient mechanisms when supply is tight 
and demand is inelastic, so that long-term contracts under competitive conditions 
are guaranteed. This fact is not totally resolved even nowadays, between CAISO 
and other sources in the WECC, including Canada and Mexico. In the case of 
ERCOT, as will be seen, forward and financial securities are part of that market 
that has been applauded as beneficial to all players. 
After the California crisis of 2000-2001, measures were taken that now place CAISO and 
that market in better position, in addition to its aggressive strategies towards renewable 
energies. First, the PX was merged into CAISO for the ISO to become an active agent 
and market balancing authority in day-ahead markets, as well as congestion in order to 
increase reliability. It also increased its oversight of available capacity obligations, 
financial transmission rights for clearer transmission planning and for generators to hedge 
transmission congestion (see Hogan, Rosellon, and Vogelsang 2010). This congestion 
management is a critical element for reliable energy markets. 
Finally, CAISO is now active and final-word regulator in ancillary services and 
interruptible contracts, mainly after California began implementing its green energy aims. 
2.4.3 ERCOT and the Texas Market 
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the independent, not-for-profit 
system operator that administers, by its original design and governance structure, the part 
of the Texas grid that is not synchronous with the Eastern or Western Interconnections, 
so that interference by federal oversight, through FERC, is minimized and the system 
becomes independent and autonomous, although it follows and adheres to FERC’s 
principles called the Standard Market Design (SMD). This includes the following 
attributes: (a) all transmission access operations under transparent and non-discriminatory 
rules; (b) congestion management; (c) long-term rescue adequacy; (d) market monitoring 
and intervention; (e) demand and response management implementation and 
coordination; (f) ancillary services; and (g) follow “best practice.” 
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ERCOT has existed since 1970 as a reliability council under the standards set by the 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to facilitate work by utility 
producers, non-utilities, and other non-facilities based actors in the industry, as is 
described above. Its council and board of directors are members of all stakeholder 
groups. ERCOT, by operating within Texas (not trans-state), falls not under FERC 
jurisdiction but on the Public Utility Commission of Texas (TPUC) under Texas laws and 
regulations. In comparison with CAISO, ERCOT has evolved over a longer period where 
the participation of all sector actors makes this system a compact one. Moreover, part of 
ERCOT’s success, as expressed by its directors and others in the industry interviewed for 
the research project, is predicated in the representation of interests of all industry agents. 
Since 2000, ERCOT’s mandate by the PUCT and the Texas Legislature is to develop 
rules for wholesale prices of electricity (called protocols), unbundle all generation and 
other, from transmission, where beginning in 2001, ERCOT merged all infrastructure 
under itself to become the single “control area” or ISO. ERCOT nowadays has to access 
all generation by utilities, non-utilities, renewables sources, and accommodate all 
activities of this true unbundled, competitive market. 
Through its mandate, ERCOT has built over 8,500 miles of transmission circuits from 
1999 to 2010 and approximately 2,300 miles of 345 kV circuits to interconnect areas of 
high wind in the western part of the state, after mandated by the legislature to include 
those under the Competitive Renewable Energy Zones or CREZ sent by the PUCT in 
2009. With this, Texas became a leading state in renewable generation (ERCOT 2011). 
ERCOT separates the market participants as follows: first, there are entities performing 
the functions of a qualified scheduling entity (QSE) that are involved in the bidding of 
marketable energy and ancillary services; load serving entities (LSE) that sell at retail to 
customers when they have the choice option; and resource entities (REs) or 
transmission/distribution service provider (TDSP). Additionally, there are the competitive 
retailers or CRs and LSEs that compete to sell electricity to final customers when they 
have a choice, and the providers of last resort, or POLRs, that are distributors when 
customers do not have a choice (ERCOT 2011). Power exchange and ERCOT as an ISO 
jointly perform market clearing at wholesale and retail, somewhat different from CAISO. 
The market clearing activities within ERCOT are classified as:  
1. Bilateral market in a bid-based pool in day-ahead prices (it is different from pools 
where demand is considered fixed). 
2. Balancing energy market with ERCOT playing a passive role and letting loads 
and resources to transact with each other and where the ISO oversees the clearing 
of congestion to keep reliability in the system, nowadays at more than 8,000 
nodes (formerly in zones), at different daily hour schedules. Within the balancing 
market, there are requests by ERCOT of unit-specific bids, out-of-merit energy, 
reliability-must-run units, and non-spinning reserve energy. All of the above are 
market-based settlements to maintain the system reliably. 
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3. Congestion management that includes re-dispatch to relieve transmission 
congestion, price management at base and peak periods of congestion, allocating 
of re-dispatch costs, and congestion rent for the ISO. 
4. Ancillary services market, to further maintain the system reliable and secure. 
Each market participant must provide AS based on its historical load, as Baldick 
and Niu (2005) stress, in scheduled form, such that AS must be offered first by 
low cost power produced, and then offered in increments from other sources of 
power that are more expensive. 
5. Capacity adequacy, so that participants coordinate to install capacity that involves 
paying for own activities in each production chain link, additional to a sharing 
rule of payments for impacted external links (Willems 2000). This activity has 
proven to liberate the tensions between overproduction in generation and 
transmission congestion or need to invest in expansion, such that new generation, 
say from, biomass, or geothermal co-generators share additional transmission 
investment needs with the transmission providers. Also in capacity adequacy one 
determined and plans for reserve margins. 
6. Generator interconnection policy, such that instead of generators paying upfront 
for transmission enhancements, new generation pays first for interconnection 
only, and only if needed, shares costs of upgrading the networks. 
7. Market power mitigation. After the 2000-2001 California watershed, and UK 
experiences with the exercise of market power in its England-Wales area, the 
PUCT established bid caps of $1,000/MWh for energy, and $1,000/MW per hour 
of capacity as a way to reduce potential exercise of market power (Bompard et al. 
2006). 
8. Load response, such that load and demand participants voluntarily opt to reduce 
consumption or stop the load after price signals, receiving compensation. One 
such type of load response is interruptible contracts while another is the provision 
of re-dispatchable energy by other market participants such as QSEs, REs, and 
POLRs (see Chapter 3 in this report). 
ERCOT has been much commended for its observance of a transparent, representative, 
and open market mechanism and system that keeps its operation distinctively 
independent from federal oversight. However, as seen in this section, many stakeholders 
playing a set of complex market activities could make the system difficult to track and 
evaluate its efficiency and welfare characteristics. One concern is that separated bidding 
processes between AS, spinning and non-spinning reserves, and load and congestion 
prices could increase price volatility, reduce hedging capacities by stakeholders, and 
result in diminished benefits for final consumers (Joskow 2008). Additionally, reliability 
of services has seen episodes of stress and events that call for increased interconnections 
and management of them, such as with Mexico’s CFE or to the other two connections 
with Oklahoma and Arkansas (Tierney 2008). 
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However, Texas’ electricity market has evolved from a transition period after 2001 to a 
fully competitive market in 2008, and beginning in December 2010, a market with 
disaggregation at more than 8,000 nodes rather than zones. As a result, prices have 
decreased by more granular load markets, as well as nodal costs became around $31 
million cheaper by launching the nodal market in the course of the first 10 months of 
experimentation, between December 2010 and September 2011, except for the extreme 
load months. As for spinning reserve costs, nodal ones became more expensive than 
zonal (Cleary and Dumas presentation November 2011). As for the market design 
lessons, ERCOT implemented wholesale and retail competition at the same time, 
differently than many other transitional markets including CAISO, where retail price 
freezes or rate caps were applied for default customers. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This analysis presents the nature of utilities (CFE parastatal vertically integrated 
incumbent and privately held subsidiaries IPPs), and privately invested non-utilities in 
Mexico overseen by the CRE, and their legal and regulatory needs and requirements as a 
first exercise. It then compares the size of the Mexican, Californian, and Texas electricity 
markets, and the different experiences of CAISO and ERCOT as two control centers that 
maintain access points with Mexico. The complexity of the players and stakeholders 
gives the analyst an idea of the difficulty in increasing depth of interconnected systems, 
but at the same time, the analysis also shows that complex markets such as CAISO but 
most importantly ERCOT in Texas can function as successful stories of a problematic 
and adjusted California system and a totally de-regulated one in Texas with much 
potential to include new players (notably renewable sources of energy on one side, and 
end consumers on the other extreme). 
The deep and active participation of REPs, PGCs, QFs, TDSP, LSE, and marketers, in 
both CAISO and ERCOT nowadays, should instead of scaring policymakers from taking 
decisive steps toward deregulation, make them aware that transition periods take time but 
where all stakeholders should participate, as it has been evidenced mainly in the ERCOT 
success story. And it shows that market design is crucial as well as the detailed planning 
of all aspects of the restructured market where new rules and practices are included in 
steps. Finally, both the FERC and NERC authorities are important players along with 
state ones, as is the case of California; and adherence and even surpassing rules (such as 
the SMD) by ERCOT along with its own legislative process and state regulator PUCT. 
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Chapter 3.  Electricity Demand Management and Pricing 
by Marcus W. Pridgeon and Tim Regal 
Abstract 
This chapter examines demand management (response) in electricity markets and its 
potential to significantly change the traditional supply-demand relationship within the 
electric utility industry. It provides a literary review laying out the current state of 
demand response programs. Specifically, this chapter examines the current demand 
management programs of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and 
Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), including such items as qualification, 
contractual terms, compensation, and program participation. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the value of demand response and any possible 
impediments it may create should the US and Mexico more robustly connect their 
respective electric grids. 
3.1 Introduction 
Demand response is almost universally accepted as a valuable tool of Independent 
System Operators (ISO) in maintaining the reliability of electric systems. Additionally, it 
has been viewed as a viable and important component in creating price stability in 
liberalized markets. Although significant technological (equipment) advances have been 
made over the past century, the basic physics of electrical generation and supply have 
remained virtually unchanged. Like other commodities, electricity operates in a “supply 
and demand” business model. However, as accurately noted by Faria (2011), the unique 
qualities of electricity differentiate it from other commodities in that a balance between 
supply and demand must be maintained at all moments, and in the inability to store 
meaningful quantities of electricity. Because of these unusual characteristics, it would 
seem logical that the supply side of the equation (electric generators or ISOs) would 
benefit by influencing the demand side of the equation (consumers). 
Although demand management is certainly not a new concept, its application is 
inconsistent across North American power grids. With advancements made in 
communication, metering, and control technology, the customer appears to be ready and 
willing to actively participate as a more sophisticated electrical consumer with the intent 
of lowering cost. For both traditional and technical reasons, the supply side of the 
equation seems hesitant to fully embrace active participation by consumers. One reason 
for this hesitancy is the necessity for grid operators to have the ability, with certainty of 
control and quantity, to increase supply or lower demand as needed to maintain the 
constant balance needed in the electric grid (Borenstein 2002). 
Although much of the current literature and discussion of demand response programs 
focus on the residential customer, about 60% of electric consumption in the US comes 
from commercial and industrial users, according to the US Energy Information 
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Administration (EIA), while it is 65% for Mexico, according to its CFE incumbent 
integrated company (CFE 2011). Part of the attention stems from the pace and 
anticipation of innovation, as the development of new technology offers the potential to 
reshape the electricity market. The 2012 National Electricity Forum focused almost 
exclusively on the continued evolution of the electricity market with its theme of 
“Visualizing the 21st Century Electricity Industry.” Advances in smart metering, micro-
grids, self-generation via renewable energy, and storability are all engaging and market-
altering potentialities. Even small efficiency gains from residential users can yield, over 
time, significant contributions to curbing peak load demand to the relief of strained ISOs. 
In ERCOT, for example, a 0.5% reduction in sales due to efficiency gains, a level 
currently achieved in some states, would lead to a reduction of approximately 3,000 MW 
of peak load demand over the course of a decade, according to van Welie (2012). 
As impactful as residential demand response could become, the lack of demand 
management programs for the residential consumer in both the Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT)1 and the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE)2 and the 
size of the industrial and commercial electricity market relative to the residential market 
suggests that, in order to capture demand management as it exists today, a study of 
residential demand management would be premature, narrow, and still largely 
hypothetical. 
For many years, large industrial consumers have played the key role in demand response, 
primarily through interruptible load contracts. Utilities have used these as “reliability” 
tools. If the consumer were allowed to fully participate in the market, this historically 
passive side of the industry may possess the potential to have a significant impact not 
only on traditionally considered reliability, but also on pricing stability. 
In order for customers to become more actively involved, two primary elements need to 
exist. First, technology has to be employed in order to allow the consumer to see, 
understand, and control its consumption of electrical energy. This technology currently 
exists and is being employed by large industrial consumers. For smaller consumers, the 
revolution in technology is well under way with the development and implementation of 
smart meters. Many utilities are in the process of installing a successive generation of 
smart meters, each generation with more capabilities than its predecessor. Technological 
changes have allowed metering to evolve from time-of-use to real-time, and consumers, 
with real-time price information, have the ability to alter consumption based on these 
more dynamic signals. In a world of dynamic pricing, these meters need to not only 
measure usage in granular time increments, but they also must be able to receive (and 
possibly act) on real-time (dynamic) pricing data. 
The second important element in allowing the consumer to fully participate is a 
liberalized (deregulated) electric market. Unfortunately, North American electricity 
                                               
1
 The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the Independent System Operator and Balancing 
Authority for 75% of the land area in Texas and 85% of the state’s electric load. 
2
 The Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), founded in 1937, is the state-owned electric utility serving 
the entire country of Mexico. 
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markets have been slow to embrace, and at times have even retracted from, liberalization. 
International electricity markets have led the way in liberalization with mixed results. 
Although the goals of increased efficiency of both production and consumption have not 
been fully realized in liberalized electric markets, debate continues regarding the reasons 
for these shortcomings. One area of consensus is the need for more demand management 
in the balance of supply and demand (Borenstein 2002). 
A liberalized market is one that functionally unbundles its generation and delivery 
components and in which active competition exist in the supply (generation) portion of 
the industry. Traditionally, electrical energy pricing has not reflected the true “time 
period” cost of providing electrical energy (dynamic pricing) and thus provided the 
consumer little incentive to alter its consumption pattern. In liberalized markets, this 
impediment has been removed. Competitive markets have produced a number of 
innovative pricing structures which allow consumers, through their action, to control the 
cost of their electric purchases. 
This chapter specifically examines demand response programs in regions of the United 
States-Mexico border, and more specifically, programs offered by ERCOT and CFE. The 
study is divided as follows: after describing the setting in both partner electricity markets, 
the third part analyzes and critically assess the theoretical approaches to demand (load) 
management. The fourth part, the basis of the analysis, goes into great detail to study 
demand response pricing, compliance, and regulation in both markets. Part five concludes 
and sets fundamental propositions. 
3.2 The Setting 
Demand response takes many forms and has been defined in various ways. Both Faria 
and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) classifies demand response as active 
consumption changes by end-users based on incentives used to affect both the timing of 
demand and total use (Faria 2011; Aalami 2010). As noted earlier, residential demand 
response programs are in their infancy and based more in theory than historical 
application. Because of this, demand response programs considered in this chapter are 
those designed to incent (through direct compensation) consumers to alter their 
consumption patterns to increase system reliability, provide cost stability, or reduce 
social cost. These existing programs are tailored to commercial and industrial consumers. 
This is an appropriate focus because as stated earlier, commercial and industrial sales 
accounted for 60% of total retail sales of 3,899 Terawatt-hours (TWh) in the United 
States in 2010 (Energy Information Administration 2010). In the case of Mexico, 2010 
commercial and industrial sales accounted for 64%3 of total sales of 186.6 TWh, of 
which, large industrial sales (Gran Industria) represented 23% of the total sales (CFE 
2011). 
                                               
3
 In the CFE Informe Anual 2010, sales to the former Luz y Fuerza were not segregated by rate 
classification. In determining the CFE’s commercial and industrial sales, it was assumed that the rate class 
distribution of Luz y Fuerza was similar to that of CFE’s remaining customer base. 
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There are multiple US electric Balancing Authorities4 and Mexican electric regions that 
line the US-Mexico border. Regarding demand response on the US side of the border, 
this paper focuses on the ERCOT electric grid. ERCOT was chosen because it is one of 
three isolated interconnections in the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC)5 and a single Balancing Authority. Additionally, it is one of the newest, and 
arguably most advanced, liberalized electric markets in the world. It currently has several 
active demand response programs. A graphic illustration of ERCOT’s service territory is 
shown below. 
 
Figure 3.1 
ERCOT Nodal Market in Texas, 2011 
 
Source: ERCOT (2011). 
 
Although ERCOT currently offers no demand response programs intended to stabilize 
system cost, there is currently a strong push by consumers for ERCOT to amend its 
market protocols, which will allow this to occur.  
                                               
4
 Balancing Authority is defined as the responsible entity that integrates resource plans ahead of time, 
maintains load-interchange-generation balance within the Balancing Authority Area, and supports 
Interconnection frequency within its area. There are 131 Balancing Authorities in the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation. 
5
 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, is the organization responsible for ensuring the reliability of the North American bulk power 
supply system. 
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On its part, all electric service in Mexico is provided by one parastatal utility, the 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad or CFE, as is presented above. Consumer 
classifications, rate structure and rate values are proposed by CFE to the Secretaría de 
Energía (SENER),6 which after review forwards them to the Secretaría de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público (Secretary of the Treasury). The three organizations negotiate any 
differences with Hacienda having the final say. Hacienda then includes revenue produced 
by the electric rates in an omnibus budget presented to the Mexican Congress. CFE’s 
rates and rate structure are not cost based, but rather a result of political negotiation. The 
CFE regions are equivalent to US Balancing Authorities and graphically displayed. 
 
Figure 3.2 
Mexico’s CFE Zonal Divisions, 2011 
 
Source: Sener (2011), “Propectiva del Sector Eléctrico 2011-2025.” 
 
This chapter examines the application of interruptible (demand response) tariffs offered 
by CFE. As discussed in more detail below, CFE’s interruptible program does not limit 
its deployment to emergency situations. As such, CFE could deploy demand response for 
economic reasons, but historically has not done so. 
                                               
6
 The Secretaría de Energía (SENER) was chartered on December 28, 1994, and charged with the authority 
to lead in the development of Mexico’s energy policy. 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
Academic literature is almost universal in its view that demand response will have a 
significant positive effect on both system reliability (its traditional use) and cost stability 
in liberalized markets. Some studies question, however, the best methods of achieving 
these end goals and whether demand bidding programs, dynamic tariffs, or a combination 
of both would be best in a restructured electricity market. Regardless, the great majority 
of literature enthusiastically acknowledges the potential that demand response possesses. 
Demand-side management has traditionally focused on system reliability to the exclusion 
of cost efficiency, which system operators value highly as a tool to deal with unexpected 
changes in supply and demand levels (Faria 2011). This focus on reliability has almost 
solely taken the form of interruptible load contracts, as opposed to time-based rates. 
According to Cappers (2010), 93% of the peak load reductions from demand response 
decisions in the US is provided by various types of incentive-based programs. 
Interruptible load contracts are recognized as a significant reliability tool used by electric 
grid Independent System Operators. As Fahrioḡlu (2000) states, ISOs can deal with 
congestion through congestion pricing, quantity rationing, or interruptible load contracts, 
and when dynamic pricing is lacking, interruptible load contracts work well to relieve 
congestion concerns. With the right incentives, ISOs can stimulate voluntary participation 
in demand management programs. 
Historically, most interruptible contracts do not distinguish by load characteristic (size, 
location, ramp rate). As this type of demand response program continues to mature, 
discussions are surfacing regarding valuing individual loads based on specific 
characteristics, primarily location. The discussion of locational value of demand response 
moves away from the traditional view of it being a tool to resolve supply and demand 
imbalance and into a tool to answer congestion problems. Again, according to Fahrioḡlu 
(2001), most transmission and distribution problems can be addressed by effective 
demand management programs. Fahrioḡlu (2000) and Harris (2006) have written 
extensively about the value of locational demand response, praising its ability to 
customize interruptible contracts to the particular needs of customers and utilities in 
diverse settings and situations. In later research where he developed a model to determine 
the value of demand response by location, he concluded that the value of a contract is 
related to the location of the customer. Hence a mechanism to incorporate locational 
attributes is needed. Borenstein (2002) adds to the discussion of locational demand 
response, but promotes the use of time-based (rate) incentives to address local conditions 
when system load reductions would fail to resolve the situation. Both Borenstein and 
Fahrioḡlu agree that letting the market resolve reliability issues is a preferable action, 
however both acknowledge that there are certain situations where contractual demand 
response must be available to ISOs, specifically where a serious security constraint 
occurs (Fahrioḡlu 2000), or where incentives fail to balance supply and demand 
(Borenstein 2002). Fahrioḡlu’s (2001) later work in modeling locational demand 
response provides clear empirical evidence of its value. He makes it clear that locational 
contracts should be valued differently considering their ability to provide demand 
management at high impact locations.  
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As a reliability tool, the value of demand response is closely tied to a Balancing 
Authorities’ reserve margin.7 The higher the reserve margin, the less value is assigned to 
demand response and the lower the reserve margin, the more value is placed on demand 
response. Demand response can also help system administrators meet reserve 
requirements and temper the need for additional generation (Borenstein 2002; Fahrioḡlu 
2001). 
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation notes that planning reserve margins 
in many regions in North America have significantly increased over 2009 projections due 
to the economic recession, however several areas such as WECC-Canada and ERCOT 
will fall below their targeted reserve margins in the foreseeable future (North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation 2010). The same phenomenon has also occurred to 
Mexico. The reserve margin in ERCOT is projected to fall below its target of 13.5% by 
2012 and as low as 2.15% by 2019, while for Mexico, from a reserve margin that reached 
even 20% in 2009, the planned reserve margins will be around 13% in 2020 (Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas 2011; SENER 2011). 
Based primarily on reserve margins, demand-side management will have a different value 
in different parts of North America. As evidence that interest in and the value of demand 
response fluctuates with electric system needs, whether by increased generation as a 
result of liberalization or reduce demand as a result of economic downturn, Faria (2011) 
offers that load management decreased by 32% in the United States between 1996 and 
2006 because of weak load management services offered by utilities. He blames the 
reduction in money spent on load management programs for the decline, citing a 10% 
reduction in these programs since 1990, and the eradication of the load management 
programs in 32% of utilities between 1996 and 2004. It is also worth noting, that in a 
liberalized market, generators have no incentive to promote demand response. Profits are 
generated by selling electricity and any program that promotes the reduction of 
consumption contravenes the profit motive. Additionally, scarcity (low reserve margins) 
drives the cost of power higher, thus increasing the profits of generators. As noted by 
Loughran (2004), many argue that both wholesale and retail deregulation resulting from 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 weakened the incentives to use demand management 
programs.  
As electric markets liberalize, one issue that consumers face is the volatility of real-time 
(spot market) prices. More emphasis is being paid to the potential for demand response to 
stabilize spot market prices (Faria 2011). Regarding its importance, a common argument, 
echoed also by FERC, is that sufficient demand response is necessary to achieve efficient 
electric market performance (Borenstein 2002). Demand-side bidding has the dual 
beneficial effect of smoothing price spikes and eradicating market power despite the 
existence of structural market power (Rassenti 2003). 
The fundamental question in incenting consumers to respond to price signals is pricing 
structure. Just like each electric generator has a unique marginal cost, each consumer has 
                                               
7
 Reserve Margin is the percentage by which available generating capacity is expected to exceed forecasted 
peak demand within a Balancing Authority. 
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a unique financial threshold at which it is willing to reduce consumption. A benefit of an 
incentive structure, besides enticing participation, is the feedback the pricing structure 
provides in indicating how consumers truly value electricity, or more precisely, the value 
of interruptibility (Fahrioḡlu 2000). Unfortunately for ISOs implementing interruptible 
load programs, the generalized price at which consumers are willing to endure 
interruption, and thus a baseline for payments in demand-reduction programs, is difficult 
to pinpoint (Borenstein 2002) . 
The primary method of introducing the customer as an active participant in the 
economics of the market is through dynamic pricing (Postelwait, 2009). As noted by 
Oren (2001), daily and hourly pricing signals for spot markets are increasing as a result of 
the electric industries restructuring. 
Because of the unpredictability of consumer actions and their effect on the market, some 
are not comfortable with allowing active consumer participation in electric markets. 
Penner (2009) surmises that the inevitability of dynamic pricing and real-time consumer 
response, which would be necessary to reduce peak load, reduce price volatility and 
increase cost efficiency, is still uncertain. Acknowledging this uncertainly and 
discomfort, Borenstein believes that dynamic pricing and consumer response would 
decrease price volatility in wholesale spot markets (Borenstein 2002). Internationally, one 
of the challenges faced by Great Britain in liberalizing its electricity market was real-time 
market power exerted by private generators. One reason given for Great Britain’s 
struggle with this issue was its failure to encourage demand participation through 
interruptible load programs (Rassenti 2003). In a more general sense, Moore (2010) 
concurs with Rassenti that the failure was not with deregulation itself, but the lack of 
consumer demand response in reaction to volatile wholesale prices. 
Even with the recent advances in technology, the cost of participating in a dynamic 
market continues to be primarily limited to large industrial users. Penner (2009) 
addresses the progress made and potential benefits of a continued effort to increase 
residential demand response to dynamic pricing. Kirschen (2003) discusses some of the 
obstacles to integrating spot market price sensitivity into demand-side management, chief 
among them the inability, due to costs and time constraints, of small users (residential 
and small businesses) to obtain the means of price response mechanisms. Flat or 
minimally stepped tariffs do not allow for small consumers to signal price sensitivity and 
initiate active demand response due to the lack of a viable mechanism that allows for 
such dynamic interaction with price fluctuations and discrepancies (Harris 2006). Even if 
the cost of technology decreases to a point that small consumers can participate, ISOs are 
hesitant to allow small consumer participation because of their unpredictability and the 
idiosyncrasy of consumer behavior. A detailed alternative tariff design study conducted 
on 1,300 California households concluded that a small portion of households accounted 
for most of the aggregate demand response (Reiss 2002). Penner (2009) argues that 
although the emerging technology signals real benefits and progress in creating a more 
dynamic electricity market through demand response, significant obstacles, perhaps only 
surmountable over the course of decades, exist. 
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As can be seen, there is much excitement in electric markets regarding the potential of 
demand response to become a more significant player in system reliability. Additionally, 
there is a newfound interest on the part of consumers, primarily because of recent 
technology developments, to play an active role in their purchase of electricity. However, 
political, regulatory, economic, and structural barriers remain to be resolved before the 
full potential of demand response can be realized. The main application to industry and 
commerce in comparison between ERCOT and the vertically integrated CFE in Mexico, 
becomes relevant in the following analysis, mainly because of the need for closer price 
convergence in the foreseeable future, and the importance of industry and commercial 
development in main border metropolitan areas and interlinked industries of the two trade 
and investment North American partners. 
3.4 Comparison of CFE and ERCOT Demand Response Programs 
The overall mindset of CFE and ERCOT, including their views of the value of demand 
response, are quite different—one being a parastatal organization with a captive customer 
base while the other is an unbundled competitive market. In CFE’s case, the difficulties 
of system planning are greatly reduced as they control the entire vertical electric utility 
structure from the generator to the meter and have a captive customer base. This ability to 
more accurately plan and maintain adequate reserve margins reduce the value of dynamic 
demand response. Additionally, since the Mexican market is not competitive and lacks 
any dynamic pricing structure in its retail tariffs, there is no economic incentive for loads 
to be price responsive. Even with this lack of value placed on demand response, CFE has 
had for many years two interruptible tariffs. 
Conversely, ERCOT, which owns no generation facilities, must rely totally on the market 
to provide sufficient generation capacity, including an adequate reserve margin. At this 
writing, one of the major issues facing ERCOT is a dwindling reserve margin. In order to 
maintain grid reliability over the next several years, ERCOT will be heavily dependent on 
demand response. Current Emergency Interruptible Load Service (EILS) protocols limits 
ERCOT’s contracts to 1,000 megawatts (MW) with an annual financial cap of $50 
million. ERCOT has recently initiated a Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) 
rulemaking (PUC Project No. 39948) which would eliminate the 1,000 MW limitation. 
Participating parties to the rulemaking are further recommending that the PUC eliminate 
the $50 million financial cap. Both proposals are being made with the intent of expanding 
participation in the EILS program. The following subsections compare and contrast the 
interruptible load programs of CFE and ERCOT. 
3.4.1 Qualification 
CFE’s has two interruptible tariffs designated as I-15 and I-30. In order to qualify for 
tariff I-15, a consumer must have demonstrated a demand of at least 10,000 kilowatts 
(KW) in either the peak, sub-peak, intermediate, or base period in the three months prior 
to making application. Additionally, the customer must be able to interrupt its committed 
load within fifteen minutes of notification. The customer must designate its total load as 
either firm or interruptible. The interruptible portion must be a minimum of 7,000 KW 
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and a maximum of the average maximum peak during the three months prior to 
application. All current CFE interruptible customers are served under tariff I-15. 
Tariff I-30 is similar to I-15 with the exception that demand demonstration must be at 
least 20,000 KW and must be interruptible with thirty minutes of notification. The 
compensation provided by tariff I-30 is considerably less than I-15, most probably 
because the interruptible notification period is longer. CFE has no customers served 
under tariff I-30. 
Unlike CFE’s program which takes the form of rate tariffs, ERCOT’s program, because 
of its competitive market structure, takes the form of a periodic competitive offering 
process. Retail customers within ERCOT submit competitive offers through a Qualified 
Scheduling Entity (QSE). The minimum amount of load that may be offered is one 
megawatt. QSE’s may aggregate multiple resources to meet the one MW bid 
requirement. Such aggregated bids will be considered a single EILS resource. 
Participants must be able to interrupt their committed load within ten minutes of 
notification. In the prompt PUC rulemaking noted above, ERCOT is seeking to reduce 
the minimum offer to 100 KW and to create different class of demand response 
participation based on differing notification periods. 
3.4.2 Term (Contract Period) 
With CFE, the interruptible tariffs have a minimum term of one year. If a customer 
agrees to remain on the tariff for a minimum of three years, its compensation is increased 
to 1.25 times the standard monthly compensation. 
With ERCOT, EILS bids are currently awarded for four month contract periods 
(February through May, June through September, and October through January). In the 
rulemaking currently before the PUC, ERCOT is seeking flexibility to create contract 
terms of differing lengths. 
3.4.3 Interruptible Period Categories 
CFE designates its consumption categories into three time periods and delineates by 
weekday/weekend and by season. Baja and Baja Sur categories are different than the 
remainder of the country. Since no interruptible consumers operate in Baja or Baja Sur, 
categories for all interruptible consumer areas are defined as follows. 
Summer months (defined as the first Sunday in April through the Saturday before the last 
Sunday in October): 
• Monday through Friday: 
 Peak – 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
 Intermediate – 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. to midnight 
 Base – midnight to 6:00 a.m. 
• Saturday: 
 Intermediate – 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
 Base – midnight to 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. to midnight 
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• Sunday: 
 Base – all day 
Winter months (defined as the last Sunday in October through the Saturday before the 
first Sunday in April): 
• Monday through Friday: 
 Peak – 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
 Intermediate – 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. to midnight 
 Base – midnight to 6:00 a.m. 
• Saturday: 
 Intermediate – 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
 Base – midnight to 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. to midnight 
• Sunday: 
 Base – all day 
ERCOT defines its contract categories as Business 1, Business 2, Business 3, and Non-
Business. It does distinguish between weekdays and weekends, but not seasons. These 
time periods are defined as: 
• Business 1 – 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays. 
• Business 2 – 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays. 
• Business 3 – 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays. 
• Non-Business Hours – All other hours. 
3.4.4 Response Time and Limitation on Number of Interruptions 
As can be seen in Table 3.1 below, CFE Tariff I-15 participants have 15 minutes to 
interrupt their committed load once notified by CFE. Participants can only be interrupted 
once per day, 20 times per year, and any single interruption can last a maximum of six 
hours. 
 
Table 3.1 
CFE Interruptible Tariffs in Comparison to ERCOT 
Program CFE I-15 CFE I-30 ERCOT EILS 
Max Time to Interruption 15 minutes 30 minutes 10 minutes 
Max Duration / Interruption 6 hours 4 hours  
Max Interruptions / Day 1 1  
Max Interruptions / Year 20 14  
Max Interruptions / Contract Period   2 
Max Hrs / Contract Period   8 
Sources: Comisión Federal de Electricidad (Tarifas Interrumpibles I-15, 1-30), PowerPoint; Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas, Emergency Interruptible Load Service, Technical Requirements & Scope 
of Work, November 20, 2009. 
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ERCOT EILS participants must interrupt their committed load within ten minutes of 
being notified. Participants can only be interrupted twice per contract period for a total of 
eight hours. In the current EILS rulemaking before the PUC, ERCOT is proposing to 
delete the twice per contract period limitation. Although the new proposed rule continues 
to contain the eight hour per contract period limitation, it contains a provision that if 
ERCOT deploys EILS and the grid emergency continues to exist at the expiration of eight 
hours of deployment, participants must remain deployed until ERCOT lifts the 
emergency notification. 
3.4.5 Demonstration of Compliance 
CFE’s demonstration of compliance occurs at three different times (immediately before 
deployment, during deployment, and immediately following deployment) on the day an 
interruption is deployed. 
With ERCOT, retrospectively, through 15 minute load interval data, participants must 
average the firm plus interruptible committed load for each category during the contract 
period. By illustration, if during Business Hours 1, a participant declared 10 megawatts of 
firm load and committed 50 megawatts for interruption, the 15 minute load interval data 
must average at least 60 megawatts during all Business Hours 1 for the contract period.  
3.4.6 Penalty for Non-Compliance 
With CFE, if a customer is found out of compliance with any of the three demonstration 
of compliance standards above, a financial penalty is imposed of six times the monthly 
compensation. If a second violation occurs within a 12-month period, CFE has the right 
to suspend service under the interruptible tariff. 
With ERCOT, if a QSE fails to meet its obligations under the current protocol, by either 
failing to demonstrate its committed load during all contract period category hours or 
fails to meet its load reduction obligations in an EILS deployment event, ERCOT shall 
withhold all or part of an EILS resource’s capacity payment for the contract period and 
suspend participation in the EILS program for six months. 
3.4.7 Limitations on Deployment 
CFE may deploy interruptions for any reason, be it emergency, economic, or simply to 
test the system. 
ERCOT may only deploy EILS as part of a defined Emergency Electric Curtailment Plan 
(EECP) event. EILS may not be deployed for economic reasons. 
3.4.8 Participation (Number of Accounts / QSEs) 
CFE currently has 18 participating industrial/manufacturing accounts. As can be seen in 
Table 3.2, energy sales to these participants total 4.3 terawatt-hours which equated to 
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2.17% of CFE’s total energy sales and 10.2% of energy sales to its Large Industrial rate 
class. 
 
Table 3.2 
Mexico’s I-15 Contract Distribution by Industry and State 2010 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad: I-15 Accounts by State, Industry and Load Factor 
Account State Industry Peak KW KWh Load Factor 
1 Nuevo Leon Paper and Cardboard 11,292 80,362,578 81.24% 
2 Coahuila Steel Manufacturing 77,488 413,002,845 60.84% 
3 Colima Ferrous (Iron) Mining 19,133 137,739,896 82.18% 
4 Michoacan Ferrous (Iron) Mining 14,510 78,159,483 61.49% 
5 Colima Ferrous (Iron) Mining 24,783 141,859,977 65.34% 
6 Colima Steel Manufacturing 17,829 135,583,622 86.81% 
7 Morelos Cement 33,212 213,332,473 73.33% 
8 Morelos Textiles and Threading 15,629 96,888,298 70.77% 
9 Veracruz Basic Chemicals 92,800 604,593,500 74.37% 
10 Veracruz Petrochemical 33,351 188,632,404 64.57% 
11 Tabasco Industrial Gases 18,210 92,969,531 58.28% 
12 Estado do Mexico Chemical Products 16,361 125,903,095 87.85% 
13 Guanajuato Steel Manufacturing 252,295 1,406,080,529 63.62% 
14 San Luis Potosi Cement 30,687 205,289,105 76.37% 
15 Puebla Industrial Gases 16,617 149,082,073 100.00% 
16 Jalisco Petrochemical 13,916 115,569,622 94.80% 
17 Jalisco Electronic Components 12,659 73,920,432 66.66% 
18 Jalisco Plastic Bottles Fabrication 10,003 63,589,568 72.57% 
    4,322,559,031  
Source: Comisión Federal de Electricidad (private papers). 
 
Since the inception of ERCOT’s program, participating QSEs have increased from 
approximately 10 in the original contact period to over 120 in the most recent contract 
period. 
The total number of accounts participating peaked in the February-May 2011 contract 
period at over 900. Participation has fallen by approximately 50% since that time, most 
probably due to the economic loss suffered by a 28-hour EILS deployment in February 
2011. 
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Figure 3.3 
Number of QSE Participants 
(Excludes April-May 2011 Special Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from Electric Reliability Council of Texas (EILS Update January 4, 2012). 
 
3.4.9 Load under Tariff / Contract 
For the 12-month period ending November 2011, CFE had the following quantities of 
load designated as interruptible in its three designation periods, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
Load participation within ERCOT is somewhat smaller than participation within CFE. 
However, as shown in Table 3.3, ERCOT's load participations has almost doubled during 
peak hours from the original offers of 262 MW to over 470 MW during the February 
through May 2011 contract period. Consistent with the decline in account participation 
following the February 2011 EILS deployment, load participation in subsequent contract 
periods has fallen. 
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Figure 3.4 
2011 I-15 Interruptible Load 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Comisión Federal de Electricidad (private papers). 
 
Table 3.3 
ERCOT Distribution of Interruptible Contracts 
 Megawatts Taken 
 Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 N-B Hrs 
Feb 08 262.0 262.0 262.0 185.0 
Jun 08 219.0 219.0 216.0 216.0 
Oct 08 287.6 287.6 289.5 271.5 
Feb 09 168.2 168.2 163.4 137.9 
Jun 09 154.7 154.7 237.3 255.6 
Oct 09 353.3 353.3 268.0 334.5 
Feb 10 345.8 345.8 322.1 283.2 
Jun 10 355.8 355.8 335.5 333.2 
Oct 10 306.8 306.8 270.1 295.7 
Feb 11 470.7 470.7 472.6 384.2 
Jun 11 434.1 434.1 420.3 406.0 
Oct 11 403.5 403.5 445.3 388.7 
 Source: Electric Reliability Council of Texas (EILS Update January 4, 2012). 
 
From the data provided above, while the increase of participating QSEs has grown by 
several hundred percent, the number of megawatts under contract has grown at a much 
smaller rate. This is most probably explained by the original participants being very large 
individual accounts, while more recently participating QSEs are aggregators providing 
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much smaller offers in number of megawatts. Graphically, the number of megawatts 
taken by ERCOT by contract period and category is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 
Megawatts Taken 
(Excludes April - May 2011 Special Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Source: Electric Reliability Council of Texas (EILS Update January 4, 2012). 
 
4.3.10 Compensation 
CFE offers two levels of compensation under both Tariff I-15 and Tariff I-30 depending 
on the voltage level at which the customer receives service. Customers are compensated 
by a monthly credit on their electric bill. This credit is calculated by a monthly rate times 
the number of KW designated by the customer as interruptible times the number of hours 
in the month. The monthly rate is determined by a formula tied primarily to the price of 
natural gas. A history of the monthly compensation rate of Tariff I-15 for both the voltage 
levels is shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. A graphic representation of the same information is 
provided in Figure 3.6. 
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Table 3.4 
CFE I-15 Compensation by Tariff Type H-S and H-SL 
Tariff I-15 Compensation – Base Tariff H-S or H-SL (US $ / MWh) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Jan $3.00 $3.35 $3.62 $4.40 $5.41 $5.18 $5.76 $5.14 $5.54 $6.08 
Feb 3.00 3.26 3.65 4.26 5.32 4.94 5.84 4.85 5.48 6.15 
Mar 2.90 3.35 3.68 4.21 5.17 4.89 5.92 4.76 5.68 6.24 
Apr 2.92 3.69 3.66 4.10 4.85 4.96 6.14 5.24 5.89 6.44 
May 2.99 3.96 3.71 4.22 4.94 5.08 6.28 5.37 5.71 6.54 
Jun 3.01 3.86 3.88 4.39 4.99 5.19 6.45 5.25 5.70 6.48 
Jul 3.12 3.71 3.97 4.57 5.35 5.37 6.61 5.19 5.69 6.52 
Aug 3.25 3.45 4.10 4.72 5.51 5.40 6.78 5.33 5.74 6.28 
Sep 3.18 3.44 4.15 4.71 5.40 5.49 6.57 5.19 5.69 5.92 
Oct 3.22 3.45 4.12 4.78 5.41 5.65 5.58 5.27 5.88 5.74 
Nov 3.33 3.54 4.07 5.02 5.30 5.69 5.34 5.40 5.97 5.77 
Dec 3.44 3.49 4.28 5.36 5.31 5.78 5.34 5.51 5.95 5.80 
Source: Comisión Federal de Electricidad, at http://app.cfe.gob.mx/Aplicaciones/CCFE/Tarifas/ Tarifas/ 
Tarifas.asp?Tarifa=I15&Anio=2012&mes=1. 
 
Table 3.5 
CFE I-15 Compensation by Tariff Type H-T and H-TL 
Tariff I-15 Compensation – Base Tariff H-T or H-TL (US $ / MWh) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Jan $2.86 $3.19 $3.45 $4.19 $5.15 $4.93 $5.48 $4.90 $5.27 $5.79 
Feb 2.86 3.11 3.48 4.06 5.07 4.71 5.56 4.62 5.22 5.86 
Mar 2.76 3.19 3.51 4.01 4.92 4.66 5.64 4.54 5.41 5.94 
Apr 2.78 3.52 3.49 3.91 4.62 4.72 5.84 4.99 5.61 6.13 
May 2.85 3.78 3.54 4.02 4.70 4.84 5.99 5.12 5.44 6.23 
Jun 2.87 3.68 3.70 4.18 4.75 4.94 6.15 5.00 5.43 6.17 
Jul 2.97 3.54 3.78 4.36 5.09 5.11 6.29 4.94 5.42 6.21 
Aug 3.10 3.29 3.91 4.50 5.25 5.14 6.46 5.08 5.47 5.98 
Sep 3.03 3.28 3.95 4.49 5.14 5.23 6.26 4.94 5.42 5.64 
Oct 3.07 3.29 3.92 4.56 5.15 5.38 5.31 5.02 5.60 5.47 
Nov 3.17 3.38 3.88 4.79 5.05 5.42 5.09 5.14 5.68 5.50 
Dec 3.28 3.32 4.08 5.11 5.06 5.51 5.09 5.25 5.67 5.52 
Source: Comisión Federal de Electricidad, at http://app.cfe.gob.mx/Aplicaciones/CCFE/Tarifas/ Tarifas/ 
Tarifas.asp?Tarifa=I15&Anio=2012&mes=1. 
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Figure 3.6 
Tariff I-15 Compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Comisión Federal de Electricidad, at http://app.cfe.gob.mx/Aplicaciones /CCFE/Tarifas/ 
Tarifas/Tarifas.asp?Tarifa=I15&Anio=2012&mes=1. 
 
ERCOT customers are compensated for each offer accepted on an as-bid basis ($ offer x 
committed load x hours) for each interruptible contract period category. Individual offers 
are not made public by ERCOT, but ERCOT does release the total megawatts taken 
(accepted) and the total dollars paid. From this an average per megawatt-hour (MWh) 
taken can be determined. A history of the average monthly offers taken by ERCOT is 
shown in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6 
ERCOT Average Tariff Offers 
  Business Hours 1  Business Hours 2 
 2008 2009 2010 2011  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Jan  $10.83 $8.02 $6.90   $11.28 $8.12 $7.19 
Feb $9.73 11.10 7.76 6.39  $9.73 11.56 7.75 6.60 
Mar 9.73 11.10 7.76 6.39  9.73 11.56 7.75 6.60 
Apr 9.73 11.10 7.76 12.80  9.73 11.56 7.75 13.08 
May 9.73 11.10 7.76 12.80  9.73 11.56 7.75 13.08 
Jun 10.92 8.64 7.37 6.30  11.07 8.29 7.44 6.47 
Jul 10.92 8.64 7.37 6.30  11.07 8.29 7.44 6.47 
Aug 10.92 8.64 7.37 6.30  11.07 8.29 7.44 6.47 
Sep 10.92 8.64 7.37 6.30  11.07 8.29 7.44 6.47 
Oct 10.83 8.02 6.90 7.31  11.28 8.12 7.19 6.87 
Nov 10.83 8.02 6.90 7.31  11.28 8.12 7.19 6.87 
Dec 10.83 8.02 6.90 7.31  11.28 8.12 7.19 6.87 
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 Business Hours 3  Non-Business Hours 
 2008 2009 2010 2011  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Jan  $11.40 $8.87 $7.33   $9.61 $7.77 $6.96 
Feb $9.73 11.62 8.38 6.78  $7.86 10.15 7.44 6.37 
Mar 9.73 11.62 8.38 6.78  7.86 10.15 7.44 6.37 
Apr 9.73 11.62 8.38 13.58  7.86 10.15 7.44 12.57 
May 9.73 11.62 8.38 13.58  7.86 10.15 7.44 12.57 
Jun 11.29 9.90 7.81 6.72  8.97 8.66 7.12 6.14 
Jul 11.29 9.90 7.81 6.72  8.97 8.66 7.12 6.14 
Aug 11.29 9.90 7.81 6.72  8.97 8.66 7.12 6.14 
Sep 11.29 9.90 7.81 6.72  8.97 8.66 7.12 6.14 
Oct 11.40 8.87 7.33 7.93  9.61 7.77 6.96 7.18 
Nov 11.40 8.87 7.33 7.93  9.61 7.77 6.96 7.18 
Dec 11.40 8.87 7.33 7.93  9.61 7.77 6.96 7.18 
  Source: Electric Reliability Council of Texas (EILS Update January 4, 2012). 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.6, one offer must be submitted for the entire contract period 
(trimester) for each category, thus the accepted offers hold for the entire four-month 
period. The exception to this was a special offer period for April through May 2011 
resulting from the depletion of EILS commitments during a February 2011 EIS 
deployment. Graphically, the average price paid per megawatt-hour by contract period 
and contract period category is shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7 
Average Price Paid per Megawatt 
(Excludes April - May 2011 Special Period) 
 
Source: Electric Reliability council of Texas (EILS Update January 4, 2012). 
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3.4 Cost of Program 
Table 3.7 shows the total cost to CFE in interruptible credits was $48,327,838 (US 
dollars) for the 12 months ending November 2011. On average, CFE credited its 
participating customers $8.227 per MWh for making its load commitment available for 
interruption. No additional cost was incurred by CFE when an interruption was deployed. 
 
Table 3.7 
Comparison of Costs for CFE and ERCOT 
 Comisión Federal de Electricidad  Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
 Int Cr $ MW Hours $/MWh  EILS Pmt MW Hours $/MWh 
Dec 10 $3,030,283 523.5 744 $7.780  $1,488,226 295.1 744 $6.778 
Jan 11 3,763,711 637.8 744 7.931  1,488,226 295.1 744 6.778 
Feb 11 3,888,157 650.7 672 8.892  2,203,682 427.8 672 7.665 
Mar 11 3,997,380 658.9 744 8.154  2,203,682 427.8 744 6.924 
Apr 11 4,437,222 709.2 720 8.690  2,203,682 427.8 720 7.154 
May 11 4,358,567 686.5 744 8.534  2,203,682 427.8 744 6.924 
Jun 11 4,362,899 693.0 720 8.744  1,938,057 406.4 720 6.623 
Jul 11 4,364,850 688.9 744 8.516  1,938,057 406.4 744 6.410 
Aug 11 4,306,320 705.8 744 8.200  1,938,057 406.4 744 6.410 
Sep 11 4,090,155 710.5 720 7.995  1,938,057 406.4 720 6.623 
Oct 11 3,777,759 677.5 744 7.495  2,182,909 403.1 744 7.279 
Nov 11 3,950,545 704.6 720 7.787  2,182,909 403.1 720 7.521 
 $48,327,848   $8.227  $23,909,227   $6.924 
Sources: Comisión Federal de Electricidad (private papers); Electric Reliability Council of Texas (EILS 
Update January 4, 2012). 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.7 above, ERCOT made EILS payment to its participating 
customers in the amount of $23,909,227 for the 12 months ending November 2011. The 
actual payments were somewhat less based on the individual customer’s availability 
adjustment as noted on Table 3.8. On average, ERCOT accepted offers from participating 
customers at an offer price of $6.924 per MWh for making their load commitment 
available for interruption. No additional cost was incurred by ERCOT when an 
interruption was deployed. 
CFE currently has a reserve margin of approximately 22% and as such does not place a 
significant amount of value in demand response. Conversely, ERCOT is projected to fall 
below its reserve margin target of 13.5% in the near future and is currently seeking 
regulatory approval to significantly increase its demand response program. Based on this, 
convention would follow that CFE would compensate interruptible participants less and 
have less load under tariff. In fact, the opposite is true. The most probably reason for this 
phenomenon is the maturity of the two programs. CFE has had interruptible tariffs for 
several decades. The ERCOT EILS program has only been in existence since 2008. 
Additionally, the fact that the CFE compensation is formulaic and ERCOT’s 
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compensation is determined by competitive offer most certainly plays a part in the 
difference in compensation levels. 
From the inception of the program, ERCOT has taken offers totaling $83,890,558. After 
availability adjustment totaling $6,114,740, the total cost of the EILS program to ERCOT 
has been $77,775,818. 
 
Table 3.8 
EILS cost to ERCOT 
Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 N-B Hrs Total 
$1,070,689 $642,414 $856,551 $2,756,974 $5,326,628 
1,438,710 618,204 829,138 3,696,788 6,582,840 
1,173,106 778,591 1,056,096 5,197,357 8,205,149 
762,703 489,987 637,966 2,620,210 4,510,866 
1,026,881 330,875 808,149 4,196,788 6,362,694 
1,186,711 705,724 779,708 4,927,827 7,599,971 
1,140,394 675,347 906,931 3,944,319 6,666,991 
1,301,549 682,965 901,368 4,498,040 7,383,922 
720,743 549,267 657,305 4,025,589 5,952,903 
1,443,399 887,390 1,237,264 5,246,677 8,814,730 
1,329,577 724,626 971,599 4,726,425 7,752,227 
1,399,046 681,923 1,158,243 5,492,424 8,731,637 
    $83,890,558 
  Availability Adjustment (6,114,740) 
    $77,775,818  
 Source: Electric Reliability Council of Texas (EILS Update January 4, 2012). 
 
3.5 Other Considerations in Demand Response for Electric Supply 
Chain 
Encountering such large sums paid out to participants in both ERCOT’s and CFE’s 
interruptible load program, questions of efficiency and effectiveness lead to a 
consideration of alternative methods of controlling demand. Efficiency standards have 
been increased and incentive programs have been implemented throughout the United 
States, and their effects on slowing the growth of, if not reducing, peak load requirements 
are important to the future of electricity reliability. Self-generation and micro-grids, 
storage, and smart meters offer equally promising prospects to stem consumer demand. 
Still in their infancy in conceptualization or adoption, these new technologies will play a 
still-undetermined role in the future of demand response programs. 
Despite their promise for the future, two conditions prevent energy efficiency and the 
technologies previously mentioned from standing alongside interruptible load programs 
in the study of effective demand management. First, the uncertainty over the structure of 
their implementation and their integration into the whole of the electricity industry 
prevents any real analysis that isn’t burdened by conjecture, and thus an unreliable 
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foundation on which ISOs could build executable programs. Second, although costly and 
at present providing only about 700 MW for CFE and 400 MW for ERCOT, an 
interruptible load program’s value lies in its controllability. As demonstrated by 
ERCOT’s restriction of use to weather emergencies, the priority for ISOs is to control 
demand when circumstance requires load reduction to sustain the system. Even if 
ERCOT adjusts its program to match CFE and allows for interruption due to need beyond 
weather events, the fact that interruptible load programs grant ISOs the power of active 
demand management make those programs nearly invaluable. Although the reduction to 
peak needs that new technologies will provide would be embraced by ISOs, their value to 
demand management, to the true situational needs of system operators, would be limited 
by their ability to allow for responsive control. Without that control, ISOs are passive 
players in demand management, and system reliability becomes increasing vulnerable. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Both CFE and ERCOT have considerable history with demand response programs. The 
value placed on demand response by the two organizations is significantly different, 
primarily based on the market structure of each. Although CFE places a lower value on 
demand response, it has traditionally paid a higher price for having load under control. 
This may be explained based on CFE’s ability to interrupt load for a much broader range 
of reasons, including economic reasons. It is probably also explained by CFE’s 
compensation rate being formulaic and tied to independent variables. 
ERCOT’s dwindling reserve margin and its need to maintain grid reliability makes 
demand response a valuable program. ERCOT is current in the process of seeking greater 
flexibility from the PUC in order to bring more interruptible load under contract. 
The deployment of demand response frees up electric generation to serve more critical 
needs during times of generation scarcity caused by weather or equipment failure. Like 
real estate, the “location” of demand response creates much of its value. Demand 
response loads in western Mexico (Jalisco and Michoacán) would provide very little, if 
any, grid support to ERCOT because of their remote proximity to the border. Similarly, 
demand response load in north Texas would be of little assistance to CFE. 
Although very little demand response load is currently under tariff in northern Mexico, it 
does not mean potential participants do not exist. Because of its current generation 
reserve margin and robust transmission system in northern Mexico, CFE has not 
promoted its demand response tariffs very much. This may well provide an untapped 
demand response procurement market for ERCOT if CFE and ERCOT were electrically 
connected in a more robust fashion. Having CFE demand response capabilities available 
may well assist ERCOT in the event of equipment failure, however weather-related 
events will probably tax both grids at the same time, as was the case in February 2011. 
Although CFE and ERCOT acquire, compensate, and regulate their demand response 
programs differently, there are no insurmountable barriers in either of their programs that 
would hinder a greater integration of the two electric grids, and in fact, opportunities may 
well exist primarily for ERCOT. 
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Chapter 4.  Consumers and Electricity-Use Trends in the 
US-Mexico Border Region 
by Daniel Noll and Bradley Smith 
Abstract 
Growth in energy demand and generating capacity is outpacing growth in the 
transmission and distribution system—a situation that poses real challenges on both sides 
of the United States-Mexico border. The six Mexican states and four US states that 
comprise the border region face similar energy issues and constraints to each country as a 
whole. Decreasing reserve margins and peak demand trends suggest the need to add 
generating and transmission capacity in both countries—a concern that can potentially be 
mitigated by increases in electricity trade and power sharing. Electricity grid 
interconnection can reduce domestic supply concerns and enhance overall grid reliability 
in addition to yielding environmental benefits through the promotion of renewable source 
generation. No entity has conducted a study of the entire US-Mexico border region as a 
single geographic region on the topic of energy use. As a result, this chapter seeks to 
compile relevant data from various studies to provide a holistic view of the main trends 
and indicators of importance in the border region. Additionally, it analyzes recent 
developments in the consumption and demand for electricity in the United States-Mexico 
border region and its impacts for a North American integration scenario—specifically, 
within the border states of California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Baja California, 
Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. This analysis finds that an 
optimized, integrated grid would increase overall grid reliability and induce capital 
investment in generation and transmission capacity.  
4.1 Introduction 
Economists widely recognize a positive relationship between electricity consumption and 
economic growth, as the use of electrical power is ubiquitous in almost every industrial, 
commercial, and residential activity. As such, statistics on the quantity of electricity 
being produced and the functions for which it is consumed provide valuable information 
on the activities in which an economy engages. This information can provide insight into 
how an economy functions, what industries underlie a state or region’s relative strengths 
or weaknesses, what sectors are experiencing growth (or contraction) over time, and most 
important to policymakers, where investments must be made to support continued 
prosperity. This chapter analyzes recent developments in the consumption of and demand 
for electricity in the US-Mexico border region and its impacts for a North American 
integration scenario—specifically, within the border states of California, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Texas, Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and 
Tamaulipas. 
A regional analysis of electricity use in the states along the United States-Mexico border 
is particularly valuable for three reasons. First, the US-Mexico border region contains 
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many high output centers of economic activity. The states of California and Texas rank 
first and second nationally in total population and economic output. When their output is 
combined with that of New Mexico and Arizona, these four border states represent 24% 
of the United States’ 2010 Gross Domestic Product (EIA 2011). Similarly the border 
states of Mexico, while representing a smaller fraction of total population, account for an 
equally large percentage of total GDP. Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, 
Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas all rank in the top 11 (out of 31) in terms of economic 
output, accounting for a combined total just under 22% of Mexico’s national GDP in 
2010 (INEGI 2010). For businesses involved in manufacturing and other energy-
intensive industrial activities, the price of energy inputs is an important factor in the cost 
of doing business. This creates a strong regional incentive for any policy that might lower 
electricity prices and provide supply security—two potential benefits of market 
integration.  
Additionally, states in the border region are expected to grow significantly over the next 
20 years. According to the US Bureau of the Census, between 2010 and 2030 the 
populations of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas will grow by 108.8%, 
37.1%, 15.4%, and 59.8% respectively. With the exception of New Mexico, all three 
other states will outpace the national average of 29.2%. Similarly, growth in the Mexican 
border states is also forecasted to outpace the national average. The population of Baja 
California, in particular, grew by 39.77% over the past decade and is predicted to 
continue to grow by 2.31% annually through 2025—almost four times the Mexican 
national average (CONAPO 2010). This growth has been largely a result of a strong 
export-oriented manufacturing (maquiladora) base that has thrived since the 1960s and 
increased its rate of growth after the creation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
Rapid growth in demand creates significant investment costs and challenges for local and 
regional power delivery systems that, at least theoretically, can possibly be offset or 
mitigated through integration. Hughes (1983) notes that as power systems expand out 
from their urban cores, interconnections among neighboring systems become increasingly 
common—allowing utilities to form power pools, trade electricity, and share capacity 
reserves. For regulators and industry stakeholders concerned with maintaining a stable 
and adequate supply of energy, it is vital that future changes in consumption patterns be 
forecasted accurately for the requisite planning of capacity additions to occur in a timely 
fashion. This is especially true when planning structural changes to the power sector 
(such as in the case of movement towards power system integration) wherein the relative 
growth and/or size of neighboring markets has substantial bearing on the issues, costs, 
and distribution of benefits such change may bring. Differences in market structure, 
natural resource endowment, population growth, or price may affect the allocation of 
benefits (and therefore justification in allocation of costs) involved in integration. 
Third, despite vast differences in market and regulatory structures, the energy sectors of 
the US-Mexico border region are highly interdependent. Traditionally, this 
interdependence focused solely on the transport of oil and natural gas. Mexico has long 
been one of the top three sources of US oil imports, while the gap between Mexican 
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natural gas production and consumption continues to be filled primarily with US imports. 
Further evidence of this growing interdependence is shown in the increasing number of 
cross-border pipelines and power lines that have multiplied in recent decades. Between 
1990 and 2000 the exchange of oil and electricity in North America both doubled and has 
since continued to increase (Dukert 2003). At the same time, the natural gas and 
electricity industries themselves have converged—through mergers, acquisitions, and 
joint ventures—to create an integrated industry in which low-cost natural gas is the 
predominant fuel source for new electricity generation facilities. Gradually, the 
separation of production and delivery systems (in Canada and the United States) has also 
induced participation by energy marketers active in the trade of energy commodities, 
according to regional variations in supply, demand, and price. Though a wide range of 
legal, political, and technical barriers remain, this evidence suggests that the process for 
North American power sector integration is already irreversibly underway. 
Although this chapter focuses on the US-Mexico border region, today’s energy systems 
are integrated over much larger geographic areas. Moreover, the term “border region” has 
no consistent definition. In 1983, the La Paz Agreement between Mexico and the United 
States defined the border region as a non-maritime geographic zone extending 100 
kilometers (63 miles) on either side of the international boundary (EPA 2012). However, 
other entities such as the North American Development Bank use an expanded definition 
of 100 miles into the US land and 300 Km (189 miles) into the Mexican territory for 
investment purposes (see Figure 4.1). 
Energy systems involve complex networks that combine generating units with 
transmission and distribution services over thousands of miles, and these linkages to 
larger geographic regions have important consequences for the local provision of 
electricity. Therefore, this analysis is organized as follows: first, relevant literature is 
presented on consumption and demand trends within the study region in addition to 
theoretical contributions to the study of regional electricity market integration. Following 
that are sections on the structure of the United States and Mexican electricity markets, 
NAFTA and electricity trade, and recent trends in national energy markets. The 
remainder of the chapter evaluates the US-Mexico border region and highlights key 
trends in electricity consumption at the state level. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
demand characteristics and potential for integration in California and Texas—the two 
largest energy-consuming states and largest economies in the region.  
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Figure 4.1 
Border Environment Cooperation Commission Border Map 
 
Source: North American Development Bank, retrieved April 5, 2012, at http://www.nadb.org/ 
about/eligibility.asp. 
 
4.2 Review of Available Literature 
Supply and demand of electricity, as an essential commodity and public good, are 
monitored extensively by state and national government agencies, market regulators, 
financial institutions, and academia. The majority of studies on regional power system 
integration are descriptive, as opposed to analytic, and focus on characterizing the nature 
of demand and the implications of its forecasted growth. Several sources for useful data 
relevant to the subject of this chapter include, but are not limited to, the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), 
the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC), the California Energy 
Commission (CEC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates (CERA), the Center for Energy Studies at San Diego State 
University, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad (CFE), Comisión Reguladora de (CRE), Secretaría de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes (SCT), Secretaría de Energía (SENER), Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y 
Recursos Naturales (Semarnat), and other private research centers such as the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) in Palo Alto.  
The large number of stakeholders in turn gives rise to many studies on the subject that 
differ in terms of the geographic area included, the historical years analyzed, the future 
years for which values are predicted, and even which specific indicators are calculated 
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and by what methodology their values are determined. No known entity has conducted a 
study of the entire US-Mexico border region as a single geographic region on the topic of 
energy use. As a result, this chapter seeks to compile relevant data from various studies to 
provide a holistic view of the main trends and indicators of importance in the border 
region. Forecasts of future energy use are determined through a number of different 
methodologies that include variables such as economic growth, population growth, 
weather patterns, new construction of commercial and residential buildings, the impact of 
energy efficiency and demand-management programs, etc. Many large studies—a such as 
the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook, the Mexican Ministry 
of Energy’s Electricity Sector Outlook, and California Energy Commission’s Energy 
Demand Forecast—take into consideration most, if not all, of these indicators. However, 
others target a narrower area of interest, such as anticipated demand for renewable energy 
(Bird et al. 2009) or expected increases in household demand (Rosas-Flores et al. 2011).  
Generally speaking, national and statewide analyses tend to focus on broad 
characteristics(such as population trends and economic outlook, while regional analyses 
can take a more detail-oriented approach. The San Diego Regional Energy Infrastructure 
Study (2002), for example, acknowledges increased construction of “larger homes” and 
“homes that are inland, which require air-conditioning.” While this chapter targets a well-
defined region, this region is nonetheless large, spanning the borders of four US and six 
Mexican states. As such, the analysis in this chapter seeks to strike a balance between the 
two approaches, accommodating both the granularity befitting a targeted study and the 
wide-angle view appropriate to the region’s geographic and cultural complexities. For 
this chapter, the most important drivers of electricity demand considered are population 
size and growth, economic performance, and the industries in which an economy is 
active. 
More broadly, the literature on the potential for and implications of regional and 
transnational electricity system integration can broadly be divided into three main 
theoretical contributions: (1) literature discussing the impetus behind and barriers to 
system integration, including technical, political, and economic considerations; (2) 
literature evaluating the output measures of integration schemes, including developments 
in physical infrastructure, market mechanisms, and institutional frameworks to 
accommodate integration; and (3) literature focused on factors influencing an integration 
process. These include both studies of specific integration initiatives and strategies as 
well as methodological and theoretical studies pertaining to the technical, legal, 
economic, political, and organizational aspects of integration. In this context, changes in 
consumer behavior can become an economic, political, or technical barrier (or rationale) 
to impede (or catalyze) momentum towards market integration. 
The existing and planned interconnections around the world from which empirical 
evidence has been gathered include Europe’s integrated markets (i.e. UCTE, NORD 
POOL), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, countries of the former Soviet 
Union), Central America (SIEPAC), Africa’s integration efforts (Southern African Power 
Pool), and Southeast Asia’s Greater Mekong Subregion initiative. In 2010, Economic 
Consulting Associates produced the report “Regional Power Sector Integration” that 
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contains a comprehensive review of the available literature and case studies of the 
integration experience in the aforementioned regions. What follows are additional 
contributions relevant to the scope of this study. 
A comprehensive assessment of the benefits of regional power system integration is 
offered by UN-DESA (2005). It finds that although integration is generally welfare 
enhancing, the distribution of social benefits (and costs) can vary between countries and 
groups within countries. This analysis extends to the distribution of environmental costs 
and benefits, and the report concludes with an acknowledgement of the political costs and 
potential for agency capture to which reform is subject. Sarmiento (2010) describes the 
state of US-Mexico interconnections and the technical, economic, legal, and political 
barriers to power sharing. Pineau and Froschauer (2004) provide a comparative analysis 
of issues facing potential integration in northern European countries, the southern cone of 
Africa, and North America. They find that the general complementarity of generation fuel 
sources, peak-load consumption times, physical infrastructure, and relative 
macroeconomic stability are all key to the shape of the integration process.  
Much of the research on international grid interconnection focuses on changes in strategic 
incentives of electricity generators and how interconnector flows are allocated. Neuhoff 
and Newbery (2005) demonstrate the effect of moving from separate to integrated 
markets. They find that integrated markets yield higher welfare outcomes, but that short-
run prices may increase if the number of competitors in the market remain low, or if 
regulators do not coordinate post-integration. Hobbs et al. (2005) analyze the welfare 
effects of interconnection between markets of equal size. They focus on improvements 
that arise from two-directional power flows that loosen capacity constraints. While they 
find that increased interconnections are welfare enhancing, the size of the gain is 
dependent on the pricing behavior of market participants. Valeri (2008) measures the 
welfare and competition effects of additional interconnection between Ireland and Great 
Britain. The study focuses on a case of perfect competition in generation between two 
countries of different market size and measures the benefits of interconnection due to 
differences in demand, factor costs, and generation technology. It finds that the main 
determinant of the size of interconnection needed to achieve integrated markets is the 
extent to which generation technology differs, and that Ireland realizes greater net 
benefits due to higher initial wholesale electricity prices.  
4.3 Structure of United States and Mexico Power Sectors 
The manner in which the generation and sale of electricity is regulated and controlled 
varies greatly between Mexico and the United States. In the United States, the electric 
power industry began with vertically integrated electric utilities that maintained 
ownership of generating units, as well as the transmission and distribution services from 
which consumers purchased electricity at prices determined largely by input costs. 
Gradually, this system has been replaced by one in which entities responsible for 
generation, transmission, and distribution services are separated and wholesale and retail 
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electricity rates are determined by competitive market forces.8 Complete deregulation, 
however, has yet to occur in most of the United States. Between 2004 and 2010, the 
national average price of electricity increased from 7.6 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) to 
9.9 cents per kWh. This increase was attributed largely to increases in fuel costs, but was 
also the result of the removal of regulated rate caps in states that introduced retail 
completion. This in turn led many utilities to adjust rates to recover higher transmission 
and distribution losses and higher wholesale power costs. 
As of 2008, only 14 states (generally high cost states, including Texas) have fully 
deregulated to allow for retail markets in which consumers may choose between 
competing power suppliers. Attempts at deregulation in other states—and important to 
this study, the states of California, Arizona, and New Mexico—have been stymied by 
spikes in retail electricity rates and poor competition that led subsequently to the 
suspension or amendment of deregulation laws. In 2010, deregulated states paid, on 
average, 4.4 cents per kWh above rates in regulated states (APPA 2010). The varied 
nature of market regulation in the United States imposes potential constraints on 
international negotiations for market integration and power trade with partners such as 
Mexico, as international grid interconnections involve complex legal negotiations that 
include national and sub-national stakeholders (UN-DESA 2005). This includes the need 
to establish unified power purchase and pricing strategies that determine how buyers and 
sellers of electricity are compensated for power production, as well as for capacity and 
ancillary services provided over the interconnection. Although Mexico’s power sector 
has perhaps larger barriers to integration in the form of, for example, constitutional 
exclusions to private participation in the market for electricity production and mainly 
transmission, distribution, and retail, the variance of regulatory structures between 
markets and the multitude of actors in the Unites States may have a more important 
bearing on the course of future negotiations. 
IEG (2007) notes the importance of national institutions to lead implementation of 
integration initiatives (with well understood and defined roles) at the country level, while 
regional institutions should be used for coordination and support services, such as data 
collection and dispute resolution. It notes that proper planning and agreement between 
regulators at the early stages of development is of critical importance to the creation of 
institutional and market mechanisms to support integration. These include a harmonized 
regulatory environment, grid codes, and market rules; competitive access to both 
wholesale and retail markets; and legal agreements on issues such as power purchase 
agreements (PPAs), liability for supply failure, environmental responsibility, and physical 
security and operation of the line. This recommendation, however, runs counter to the 
state of relative autonomy with which US regional transmission organizations and public 
utility commissions operate. Historically, the US power sector has evolved to maintain 
distinct and exclusive regional entities for power sharing—a system that has developed 
regionally so as to minimize its vulnerability to shocks and disruptions such as cascading 
power outages.  
                                               
8
 The 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) paved the way for an influx of non-utility 
generators to the market, while the Energy Policy Act of 1992 deregulated the market for transmission 
(Gándara 1995).  
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Currently, the delivery of electricity in the United States over high-voltage transmission 
lines is overseen by 10 industry reliability councils that coordinate the sale and purchase 
of electric power and operate three major interconnected power grids: the Eastern 
Interconnected System, the Western Interconnected System, and the Texas 
Interconnected System. These bulk power systems maintain a network of generating 
plants, high-voltage transmission lines, and local distribution facilities that operate 
synchronously within themselves. Since the systems do not operate synchronously with 
each other, real time power transfers between systems is not possible. The sale and 
purchase of electricity is based on the day-to-day needs of each system, and operating 
authorities coordinate purchase agreements to match the real time supply and demand of 
electricity. This system involves thousands of public and private participants. In 2010, for 
example, 3,972 electric entities—including publicly-owned utilities, cooperatives, 
investor owned-utilities, power marketers, and others—participated in the sale of 
electricity to end-use customers, while 15,228 utilities-owned and independent power 
producers (IPPs) participated in the generation of electricity (EIA 2011).  
By contrast, until 2009 almost all of customers in Mexico received electricity generated 
and sold by two state-owned companies—Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and 
Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LFC). CFE is responsible for the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electricity across all of Mexico, while LFC was mainly responsible for the 
transmission and distribution of electricity in the Federal District surrounding Mexico 
City. In October 2009, all public sales of electricity came under the purview of CFE. 
Another significant change occurred in 1992 when the Law of Public Service of 
Electricity (LSPEE) was amended to allow for participation in the generation market by 
private entities. Since 1993, cogeneration, generation for self-consumption (primarily by 
large energy-consuming industrial firms), and generation by IPPs became permissible 
with the stipulation that for the latter, all power is sold directly to CFE. As of 2011, 
70.6% of installed capacity in Mexico was owned by CFE, with the remaining 29.4% 
accounted for by private generators (REEEP 2011). In contrast to the US case, there are 
670 permits in Mexico for various types of generators—563 permits for self-supply, 57 
co-generation groups, 22 Independent Power Producers, 37 import, and 5 export permits 
(CFE 2010). Estimated total investment by these private participants reached US$16.32 
billion. 
4.3.1 NAFTA and Electricity Trade 
It is widely acknowledged that industrial, commercial, and residential consumers on both 
sides of the US-Mexico border can benefit from the trade of electricity. The UN-DESA 
(2005) report characterizes energy security along six dimensions: energy supply, 
economic, technological, environmental, social and cultural, and military/security; and it 
notes that electricity interconnections tend to have associated benefits and costs within 
these dimensions. Energy trade between any two independent systems can improve 
reliability and reduce cost through transfers of power for emergency support, reserve 
reduction and sharing, bilateral purchases and sales, and spot market transactions. Key 
drivers that create an economic justification for trade include difference in technology 
and fuels, improved generation asset utilization, differences in daily and seasonal demand 
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patterns, differences between retail tariffs and wholesale prices, and temporal differences 
between marginal prices in wholesale trade. Load profiles for CFE and ERCOT, for 
example, display large complementarities due to seasonal variations in peak demand, 
total energy sales, and load factor. This creates a strong economic incentive to initiative 
trade by reducing the need and associated cost of building peak load capacity.  
The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 did much 
to reduce trade barriers and harmonize differences between national treatments of 
commodity market. NAFTA did not supersede the Mexican constitutional requirement 
that the federal government own and operate all of Mexico’s basic energy resources, but 
it did include provisions that make it possible for foreign companies to establish and 
operate electric generation facilities in Mexico. Under the agreement, foreign private 
companies are permitted to invest in and operate generating facilities for the purpose of 
cogeneration and self-supply. On their part, IPPs in Mexico must sell electricity to CFE 
or export electricity to other NAFTA parties, such as for the purpose of supplying US 
states north of the border (Horlick 2002). The agreement expanded Mexico’s Build-
Lease-Transfer (BLT) program to permit foreign companies to build electric generation 
facilities while leasing the construction site, and then to transfer the plant back to CFE 
before commercial operation (Sweedler 2003). Since full implementation in 2008, 
NAFTA’s provisions concerning natural gas also created the opportunity for US owners 
of gas-fired power plant facilities in Mexico to introduce competitive gas supplies from 
US companies. 
Trade in electricity between Mexico and the United States already occurs regularly, 
although the quantity traded is significantly less than has historically occurred between 
the United States and Canada. In 2009, net purchases of electricity from Mexico 
accounted for less than 0.01% of total US supply (EIA 2011). Yet, the history of power 
flows between Mexico and the US reaches back to 1905 when US utilities began 
supplying small amounts of power to Mexican border towns isolated from transmission 
linkages. Power began flowing both ways in the 1950s, after which net transfer between 
the two countries tended to reverse every decade or so (Gandara 1995). From 1996 until 
2003, Mexico was a net importer of electricity from the United States (Table 4.1). This 
trend, however, reversed as new generation facilities in Baja California and other 
northern states came online, and in 2011 the United States imported 1.3 million megawatt 
hours (MWh) while exporting 0.6 million MWh (BEG 2006, EIA 2011). 
With the exception of power transfers across the California border, international 
exchanges with Mexico are currently limited to rare emergencies, such as Texas’ deep 
freeze February 2-4, 2011.9 ERCOT, which manages 85% of the state’s electric load, 
purchased power from Mexico to alleviate the energy shortage. There is considerable 
interest, however, in increasing the capacity for cross-border transmission, particularly by 
states enacting aggressive renewable portfolio standards that could be met by wind and 
solar resources in northern Mexico. California’s Renewable Energy Transmission 
                                               
9
 Over a three-day period, 225 generating units experienced some sort of “unit trip” or other kind of power 
failure due to extreme temperatures, prompting Texas’ independent system operator, the Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT), to initiate rolling blackouts as supply dropped (Texas Reliability Entity 2011). 
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Initiative has identified Baja California as one of its most cost-effective and easily 
accessible potential suppliers (Wood 2010). However, according to the USAID, current 
plans to expand transmission capacity along that stretch of the border are insufficient; 
moreover, it is unclear who should pay for such investment, be it the suppliers, the 
Mexican Federal Electricity Commission, California’s Imperial Irrigation District, or a 
third party (Garrison 2010). According to a report by the Pacific Council for International 
Policy, lack of a “binational plan for electricity generation or transmission” is a 
significant barrier to resolving this dilemma (PCIP 2009). 
 
Table 4.1 
Mexico Electric Power Foreign Trade 1997-2007 (GWh) 
Federal 
Entity 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Exports 
Chiapas - - - - - - - - 1 2 2 
Baja 
California 17 45 31 66 112 164 765 770 1037 1072 1211 
Tamaulipas 6 - - 2 1 - - - - 16 13 
Quintana Roo 28 31 100 127 158 180 188 236 253 209 225 
Total 51 76 131 195 271 344 953 1006 1291 1299 1451 
Imports 
Baja 
California 406 480 646 927 82 311 45 39 75 514 266 
Sonora 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 
Chihuahua 1101 1022 7 129 235 189 21 2 6 3 3 
Tamaulipas - 2 2 9 6 26 - - - 1 2 
Total 1510 1507 659 1069 327 531 71 47 87 523 277 
Net balance 
export-import -1459 -1431 -528 -874 -56 -187 882 959 1204 776 1174 
Source: Secretaría de Energía, 2008. Domestic Electricity Market 1997-2007. 
 
The US-Mexico Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change, established 
by Presidents Felipe Calderon and Barack Obama in 2009, also recognizes this priority 
and “aims to increase electricity grid reliability and resiliency in both countries, including 
of cross-border interconnections” (US Department of State 2011). Beyond simply 
increasing supply for an importing country while providing a “means of income” for the 
exporting country, interconnections have been found to reduce prices and increase 
reliability (Sarmiento 2010). The Border Governors Conference has pointed to “untapped 
potential for increasing energy interconnections among border communities” and has 
identified “cross-border energy exchanges” as a priority (BGC 2009). 
Two key factors limiting the amount of trade in electricity between the United States and 
Mexico are reliability concerns with synchronous connectivity and legal provisions 
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governing the imports and exports of electricity across the border. Current 
interconnections between the United States and Mexico offer relatively small capacities 
and are mostly used for power exchanges in the event of an emergency. With the 
exception of one interconnection between Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras, all ties along 
the Texas-Mexico border are asynchronous HVDC interconnections used for emergency 
support only. Pineau and Froschauer (2004) assess the level of infrastructure integration 
and determine the current transmission capacity for cross-border electricity export, as 
measured by total transmission capability over total production capacity, to be 17.13, 
2.51, and 2.42 percent for Canada, the United States, and Mexico respectively. The 
largest share of US-Mexico trade occurs between Baja California and California where 
two 230 kV ties provide a total capacity of 800 MW.  
Numerous laws and network operation reliability standards in Mexico and the United 
States require local demand to be met first before exportation is authorized. This means 
that excess generating capacity beyond what is required to meet the internal load 
requirements of each system must be available for exports to occur. Exports from the US 
are regulated by Section 202(e) of the Federal Power Act, which requires authorization 
for the trade from the Department of Energy and that the export action must not impair 
the operational reliability of the US power system (North American Energy Working 
Group, 2002). Similarly, imports and exports from Mexico require authorization from 
CFE or the Energy Ministry with similar restrictions plus additional requirements. For 
imports, electricity must only be used for self-supply by the party seeking a permit, and 
in the case of exports, the electricity exported must be the result of cogeneration, 
independent power production, or small-scale production. Mexico’s National 
Interconnected System (SIN) is expected to maintain a reserve margin well above 27% 
through 2015, to move to 13% after 2015, giving it ample export potential (Figure 4.2). 
ERCOT (the Texas interconnection) on the other hand is forecasted to maintain a reserve 
margin at or below its target level of 13.75%, suggesting a strong incentive for additional 
trade (ERCOT 2010). 
4.3.2 Recent Trends in National Energy Markets  
The production and consumption of energy is a major political issue in both the United 
States and Mexico. The link between primary energy consumption and economic 
prosperity is well known—growth in population pushes total energy demand upwards, 
while economic growth leads to an increased per capita consumption in energy. All 
countries over time have moved towards electrification and, it is no surprise, therefore, 
that as the world’s largest economy the US is also the leading consumer of energy. Policy 
goals concerning this consumption seek to balance concerns between three competing 
objectives: national security and the source of energy supplies, the environment and 
external costs associated with energy use, and the economics of achieving a stable and 
reliable supply of energy at a low cost. Very few technologies offer solutions that have 
large benefits along all three competing fronts.  
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Figure 4.2 
CFE Historical and Forecasted Reserve Margin and Operating Reserve 
Margin, 2000-2017 
 
Source: Comisión Federal de Electricidad, 2007. 
 
Wind power, for example, has benefits for national security and the environment because 
it is a domestic source of energy with little to no pollution; however, it is intermittent and 
relatively expensive. Coal, on the other hand, allows for the cost-effective generation of 
electricity from domestic sources, but does so with considerable effect on the 
environment due to air and solid waste pollutants that are emitted. The United States and 
Mexico rely on a similar mix of sources for their energy supplies, both of which depend 
predominantly on fossil fuels. While the reliance on fossil fuels carries with it numerous 
environmental and geopolitical risks, both countries share these risks jointly. This fact 
highlights the opportunities for collaboration between both governments in the pursuit of 
solutions to meet these challenges. Conversely, the large potential for wind and solar 
energy in the region offers the potential to smooth variations in output as generating units 
across wide geographic zones are tied into a common power pool. 
In 2009, the electricity market in the United States was sharply affected by a 2.9% 
decline in GDP that resulted in reductions in total energy generation of 4.1%—the largest 
decline in over six decades (EIA 2011). This decline was most heavily influenced by a 
9.3% decrease in industrial output that correlated with a 9.1% decline in industrial 
electricity demand (EIA 2011). EIA forecasts that total US consumption of electricity 
will experience only modest growth in 2012, primarily from commercial and industrial 
sectors, while the combination of moderate winter and (forecasted) summer temperatures 
are expected to drive down electricity sales to residential consumers by 1.2% in 2012. In 
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addition to the economic slowdown, industry expectations over regulatory caps on CO2 
emissions has led to a shift away from investments in coal generation and a movement 
towards natural gas, which has fewer greenhouse gas emissions. While 40% of national 
electricity is generated from coal, in 2009 emissions from coal-fired power plants fell by 
11%, largely due to a 10.3% decline in coal consumption (EIA 2011). The share of 
electricity generated from natural gas, by contrast, rose by 4.3% to represent 23% of the 
national energy mix. The combination of new future environmental restrictions and low 
near-term natural gas prices has led to a surge in investments in natural gas power plants, 
which account for 48% of planned capacity additions for 2011-2014 (EIA 2011). 
Meanwhile, the generation of electricity from renewables, particularly wind, has 
increased dramatically over the past three years, fueled in party by renewable portfolio 
standards that have been introduced in 29 states. 
Since 1990, interregional trade by investor-owned utilities and cooperatives has increased 
by 216% and 51% respectively (EIA 2011). The impetus for this change stemmed from 
an unanticipated operational impact of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(PURPA), which was designed to improve energy efficiency through the expanded use of 
cogeneration and by creating a market for electricity from unconventional sources. 
However, by encouraging nonutility power generation and making it easier to market 
these outputs on a wholesale basis, the law led to significant operational changes and the 
creation of a competitive market. While the majority of electric power in the United 
States is served by local generators, trade between regions shows a tendency for power to 
flow south in North America. California is the largest net importer of electricity, 
receiving 25% of its supply from the northwest and southwest regions (see Figure 4.3). 
Mexico, by contrast, operates a much smaller market for energy in terms of capacity and 
total consumption. In 2008 Mexico’s installed capacity was 57.8 GW and it consumed 
202 billion kWh of electric power—about 5% of US totals (SENER 2008). While 
residential and commercial customers consume the largest shares of electricity in the 
United States, the industrial sector is the main power consumer in Mexico. In 2007, it 
accounted for 59.1% of total sales, while residential and commercial sectors represented 
25.4 and 7.4%, respectively. The total sale of electricity in Mexico has grown by an 
average rate of 4.5% since 1995, far faster than growth rates in the rest of North America 
or Western Europe for the same period. This consumption varies by region, with the 
states of Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, Distrito Federal, Mexico, and Veracruz as the 
largest consumers. High temperatures and large industrial consumption have driven 
growth in the northwest states of the country at higher rates than the national average (see 
Chapter 8 for congested zones/nodes between Mexican and US border states and 
corridors).  
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Figure 4.3 
Annual Net Power Flows among Regions in North America, 2010 
(million megawatt hours) 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, based on Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
Form 714 Data.  
 
4.4 Overview of the US-Mexico Border Region 
The six Mexican states and the four US states that comprise the border region face 
similar energy issues and constraints to each country as a whole. Policy concerns over 
power sector adequacy in the border region, however, is more immediate given that 
population growth in the region exceeds national averages and this trend is expected to 
continue over the next decade. Demand for electricity in the northern Mexico border 
states is expected to increase an average of 6.5% per year, compared to 5.6% for the rest 
of the country (CFE 2010). As a whole, the population in the 100 km defined zone on 
each side of the border grew from 6.9 million people to just over 13 million people 
between 1983 and 2005 (EPA 2012). The most recent population projections for the 
region—also reported in the 2005 State of the Border Region report—estimate that the 
region’s population will grow to between 16 and 25 million people by 2030. Ninety 
percent of the border population resides in 15 paired, interdependent sister cities, while 
the remaining 10% live in smaller tribal and indigenous communities or in rural areas. 
Over 40% of the region’s population resides in the California-Baja California region, 
which is home to the major border cities of San Diego, Tijuana, and Mexicali.  
These increases in expected demand will require investments in new and upgraded 
infrastructure to handle the generation, transmission, and distribution services needed to 
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serve the growing populations. In particular, a large share of new capacity is planned for 
high efficiency natural gas power plants that will require additional investments in the 
pipelines and pumping stations necessary to carry fuel supplies. The EIA predicts a shift 
in residential demand “to warmer regions with greater cooling requirements,” while at the 
same time demand for clean sources of energy in particular will be driven by renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS) adopted at the state level. Texas, for instance, aims to reach 
10,000 megawatts by 2025, while California recently expanded its renewables target to 
33% by 2020, the most ambitious RPS in the country. 
Various studies have identified enormous potential for renewable energy generation in 
Mexico. A report published by Mexico’s Secretary of Energy estimates that “[w]ith an 
average solar insolation of 5 kWh/m2,” the country’s potential for development of solar 
energy is among “the highest in the world” (Torres Roldán et al. 2006). President Felipe 
Calderón has specifically acknowledged California’s growing demand for renewables 
and “committed his administration to increasing the opportunities for solar power in 
Mexico” (Wood 2010). Mexico’s natural abundance of wind also presents untapped 
opportunity, with an estimated potential of 40,000 megawatts of wind power (Cancino-
Solórzano 2010). A study prepared for the California Energy Commission puts the 
estimate for Baja California alone at 10,000 MW (Karin et al. 2008).  
Before the economic recession of 2008, the border region economy had boomed for a 
long time in large part because of its trade relationship with Mexico and Canada under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The northern border states of 
Mexico had, in particular, experienced dynamic growth. Between 1993 and 2006 the 
Mexican economy overall had an average growth of 2.9%, whereas the northern border 
states exhibited a growth rate of 4.1%. Baja California, Chihuahua, and Nuevo León 
showed the most rapid growth during the period.  
The border region continues to serve as the principal base for industrial output in each 
country. In both Mexico and the United States, the combined border state GDPs in 2006 
were equivalent to approximately one-fourth of total national GDP (25% in Mexico, 
23.7% in the United States), and combined border-state GDPs in 2006 were 
approximately US$3.3 trillion. It is expected that border state GDPs in both countries will 
double every 17 years, whereas Mexican GDP will require 23 years and US GDP 20 
years. In part, border-state GDP has grown more rapidly because population has grown, 
leading to more workers and more output. The total actual value of merchandise trade 
(both exports and imports to and from the US and Mexico) in 2008 was $367 billion—a 
266% increase since 1994. A combination of favorable tax policies and access to export 
markets will likely serve to maintain this trend in the future. Additionally, deep 
production chains by industrial sectors and “just-in-time” production dynamics, call for 
border state growth in economic activity and demand for all critical inputs. This fact in 
combination with higher rates of immigration and population growth, have resulted in 
forecasts of electricity growth that maintain stable, continued growth in electricity 
demand well above the national average.  
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According to the CFE’s publication on the Works and Investment Program of the 
Electrical Sector (POISE) for 2008-2017, Mexico continues to search for alternatives to 
its growing reliance on natural gas for electricity generation, which has grown by 17% 
between 1998 and 2008 (CFE 2008). One alternative that promises considerable benefit 
to Mexican industrial consumers is the import of US-based supply during peak hours. For 
example, under the high voltage tariffs (HT-L), large industrial customers experience 
electricity prices at or above US$0.15 per kWh in addition to billing demand charges 
between US$8-17 (Puga 2006). These prices are highest in Baja California and Sonora, 
and create a strong incentive for trade. Moreover, peak demand and load factor (average 
demand divided by peak demand) vary seasonally at different times between different 
regions of Mexico and the United States. For example, in Texas (ERCOT) annual 
demand and electricity sales typically peak in August, whereas in Mexico (CFE) the 
highest levels are experienced in May (Figure 4.4). As a result, significant gains in 
efficiency would be available through greater interconnections to allow for higher use of 
existing capacity to meet seasonal demand needs in cross-border areas. 
 
Figure 4.4 
Comparison Between ERCOT and CFE Electricity Demand Profiles 
 
Source: Gulf Coast Power Association, 2006. 
The following analysis covers each of the border states and their characteristics. 
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California  
With a total population of 37.7 million, California is the most populous state and largest 
economy of the United States (Table 4.2). It accounts for 13% of national GDP, largely 
due to the growth of its technology sector. Over the past 15 years, it has been the fastest 
growing state, and from 1995 to 2025 it is expected to add 17.7 million people (roughly 
the current population of New York State), primarily through international migration 
(Census 2011). This growth has driven electricity demand, which has gradually grown at 
an average rate of 2% to a cumulative increase of about 65% (CEC 2010). Since 1980, 
both annual consumption and peak load have grown by about 50%, with commercial 
buildings accounting for the largest growth and current largest share at 42%—a trend 
indicating the gradual transition of California’s economy away from energy-intensive 
manufacturing to less energy-intensive services (Brown et al. 2003, CEC 2010). Today, 
California’s workforce is well diversified over many sectors with manufacturing 
accounting for only 10% of in-state jobs (LAO 2010). 
 
Table 4.2 
California Summary Statistics 
Item Value US Rank 
NERC Region(s)  WECC 
Primary Energy Source  Gas 
Total Energy Consumption (trillion Btu) 8,005.50 2 
Gross Domestic Product (billion 2005 dollars) 1,736.90 1 
Energy Intensity per Real Dollar of GDP (thousand Btu per 2005 
dollar) 4.60 45 
Net Summer Capacity (megawatts) 65,948 2 
   Electric Utilities 28,021 2 
   Independent Power Producers and Combined Heat and Power 37,927 4 
Net Generation (megawatt hours) 204,776,132 4 
   Electric Utilities 85,123,706 13 
   Independent Power Producers and Combined Heat and Power 119,652,427 4 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (thousand metric tons) 55,406 16 
Total Retail Sales (megawatt hours) 259,583,623 2 
Distribution of Retail Sales Year 2000 Year 2010 
  Share Residential 32.5 33.8 
  Share Commercial 38.0 46.9 
  Share Industrial 26.4 19.1 
Average Retail Price (cents/kWh) 13.01 11 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2010), Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-861, “Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations Report” and 
predecessor forms. 
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While California has remained the fastest growing state over the past 30 years, this 
growth has been relatively stable and predictable. As early as 1988, the California 
Electricity Commission overpredicted 2000 demand as the subsequent recession of the 
early 1990s slowed growth to a greater degree than was anticipated. Long-term planning 
challenges for the California ISO have instead stemmed from political opposition to the 
construction of new internal generating capacity—namely coal, natural gas, or nuclear—
on environmental grounds. Over 80% of California’s internal generating capacity is from 
plants that are more than 35 years old, and relatively few capacity additions have been 
made in the last 20 years, despite continued demand growth (CEC 2010). As a result, 
California imports an average of about 23% of its annual electricity consumption, largely 
from conventional hydro in the Pacific northwest and conventional fossil fuel production 
from the southwest.  
California’s daily demand trend varies greatly over the time of day and year. Typically, 
demand increases by over 60% from the overnight low to the mid-afternoon high (CEC 
2010). Air conditioning loads are the primary driver of peak demand in the summer; 
incidentally, generation capacity that sits idle for the majority of the year is needed to 
meet peak demand for a few hours each summer. On a hot summer day, it is possible to 
see a demand increase of over 90% from the early morning through late afternoon (CEC 
2010). 
Natural gas is California’s primary fuel source for electricity generation, accounting for 
over 53% of in-state generation. The state’s domestic hydro and nuclear each account for 
roughly 14.6% of generation. Additionally, a relatively sizeable renewables portfolio 
(excluding hydro) accounts for over 14.6% of domestic generation. The state’s 35 
geothermal power plants, while only accounting for 6.2% of in state generation, are 
responsible for more than 80% of total US geothermal electricity (EIA 2011). As a 
whole, the state produces approximately 70% of its electricity consumption domestically. 
Nearly 30% is imported from the Pacific northwest and American southwest, with a 
breakdown of approximately 30% and 70%, respectively. Synchronous connections 
between Baja California and California, operated over two 230 kv lines, hold a combined 
capacity of 800MW. However, due to transmission capacity constraints between La 
Rosita and Tijuana I the import potential is limited to 408MW (Puga 2006). 
California is perhaps best known (in energy) for its aggressive policies on environmental 
protection and de-carbonization. Its policies have often positioned it as a first mover in 
emissions standards, investment in renewable generation capacity, and carbon reduction 
efforts. The state has imposed generous subsidy programs for building retrofits and 
energy efficiency programs that, in addition to other factors, are responsible for a 
flattening of its demand growth forecast over time despite continued projections of steady 
population growth; in 2011, California’s per capita energy use ranked 47th out of 50 states 
(EIA 2011). Importantly, California benefits from a relatively moderate climate that 
necessitates comparatively lower heating and cooling needs in the summer and winter 
than other states in the border region. This makes California’s energy demands less 
sensitive to growth in population or economic output. In general, growth in electricity 
consumption has been steady and anticipated.  
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While California maintains a robust target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 33% 
by 2020, the percent of retail sales provided by renewable generation remains below 15% 
for most regions (Wolak 2009). A major constraint limiting investment by utilities is the 
lack of adequate transmission capacity. The Tehachapi region holds an estimated 4,500 
MW of wind potential, while significant geothermal and solar resources are sited in 
Imperial Valley (Wolak ibid. 2009). In an effort to facilitate construction of transmission 
capacity to connect these resource zones, the California state government established a 
process known as the Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative to identify high priority 
transmission projects. Neither resource zone named above has been developed, however, 
due to other difficulties in obtaining permits and cost recovery for transmission 
expansion.  
Regulatory requirements by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
required new generating facilities and proposed grid expansions to submit several studies 
related to the impact of expansion on grid reliability as well as the environment. This 
creates a significant barrier to the development of new resources both in-state as well as 
potential wind resources in Baja California that are available for export. Specific to the 
development of out-of-country renewable generation facilities, California requires 
extensive documentation of the environmental impact of the facility as if it was located 
within the state pursuant to California Environmental Quality Laws, Ordinances, 
Regulations, and Standards (LORS). This includes not only an assessment of potential 
impact, but also a plan of how the developer or operator will secure and put in place 
mitigation measures to ensure the LORS are complied with. Despite regulatory barriers, 
interest in bi-directional electricity trade between California and Baja California is likely 
to remain high. The wind resource potential in Baja California ranges between estimates 
of 2,000 MW to upwards of 10,000 MW throughout the Juarez Mountains (Puga 2006). 
Other resources, such as pumped storage hydro capacity and small scale geothermal are 
also currently being studied by CFE.  
Texas 
The state of Texas is the largest producer and consumer of energy in the United States—a 
fact that underscores the vitality of energy supply to the state’s economic prosperity, as is 
shown in Chapter 1 of the report (Table 4.3). Over the past decade, growth in Texas has 
outpaced the national average, and in 2009, over half of the nation’s net new private 
sector jobs were generated in Texas (Hayward et al. 2010). Growth in both population 
and GDP are expected to continue to outpace the national average, forecasted at 3.2% and 
1.7% annually through 2030, respectively. 
Annually, Texas accounts for about one-tenth of total US energy consumption, in large 
part due to its position as home to the largest industrial sector in the nation. A high 
concentration of energy-intensive industries in Texas—aluminum, chemicals, forest 
products, glass, and petroleum refining—use more energy than the next three top 
consumers (California, Louisiana, and Ohio) combined. In total, nearly half of Texas’ 
total energy use is consumed by the industrial sector and is 33% higher than the national 
average (EIA 2011). Since 1990, electricity consumption has growth by 45.43%. 
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Population growth and new housing builds have driven residential consumption at a 
higher growth rate of 57.24%, which since 1997 has accounted for the largest share of 
total consumption. 
 
Table 4.3 
Texas Summary Statistics 
Item Value US Rank 
NERC Region(s)  TRE 
Primary Energy Source  Gas 
Total Energy Consumption (trillion Btu) 11,297.40 1 
Gross Domestic Product (billion 2005 dollars) 1,066.40 2 
Energy Intensity per Real Dollar of GDP (thousand Btu per 2005 
dollar) 10.60 14 
Net Summer Capacity (megawatts) 108,258 1 
   Electric Utilities 26,533 4 
   Independent Power Producers and Combined Heat and Power 81,724 1 
Net Generation (megawatt hours) 411,695,046 1 
   Electric Utilities 95,099,161 9 
   Independent Power Producers and Combined Heat and Power 316,595,885 1 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (thousand metric tons) 251,409 1 
Total Retail Sales (megawatt hours) 358,457,550 1 
Distribution of Retail Sales Year 2000 Year 2010 
  Share Residential 36.7 38.3 
  Share Commercial 26.7 33.9 
  Share Industrial 31.9 27.8 
Average Retail Price (cents/kWh) 9.34 21 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2010), Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-861, “Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report.’ US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations Report” and 
predecessor forms 
 
The majority of Texans receive electricity as part of a bulk power system regulated by the 
Texas Reliability Entity (TRE), which is the regional entity responsible for enforcing 
NERC compliance within the ERCOT service area. ERCOT serves 85% of the load in 
Texas, but does not include portions of northeast Texas, southeast Texas, the Panhandle 
and El Paso. In total, the ERCOT market serves 22 million people with an annual total 
generation of 308 billion kWh (ERCOT 2010). In 2011, Texas recorded its highest ever 
peak load demand of 68,379 MW during high-temperature days in August. During this 
time capacity reserves dropped below 8% and supplemental supply was purchased from 
Mexico and neighboring states. ERCOT planners have voiced significant concern about 
the need to maintain future reserve margins above the 13.75% target used in the ERCOT 
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region to avoid outages during higher-than-normal temperatures or other generator 
outages. Current projections hold ERCOT reserve margins at 12.1% for summer 2012, 
while they are expected to drop to 7.6% by 2014 and to fall below 0 by 2020 (ERCOT 
2010). Even with planned capacity additions, reserve margins are projected to remain 
below the target level for the foreseeable future. Since Texas does not have a capacity 
market that can easily induce construction of new power plants, one potential solution 
would be additional electricity imports from Mexico where the existence of 
complementary load characteristics could allow existing generating facilities to 
supplement in state generation during peak days in August (when demand in Mexico is 
comparatively lower).  
Electricity in Texas is mainly generated from coal and natural gas-fired power plants, 
with nuclear and renewables—predominantly wind—accounting for the rest. While over 
two-thirds of Texas’ generating capacity is based on natural-gas fired power plants, a 
significantly smaller percentage of actual generation (47.7%) is attributed to natural gas. 
The higher percentage of coal-based generation reflects the fact that coal is the cheapest 
fuel source and as a result the primary source of base load capacity, while gas-fired plants 
are used largely for peak load generation. Current installed capacity in the ERCOT region 
is about 80,000 MW, which includes 3,000 MW of generation not currently in active use.  
Over the past two decades, new capacity additions have largely been met through the 
construction of new natural-gas fired power plants. Given the recent growth in shale gas 
reserve estimates and that many utilities have entered into long-term power purchase 
agreements with natural gas suppliers, there is a strong likelihood that this trend will 
continue in the near term. Since 1995, about 75% of added capacity has been natural gas 
facilities, despite coal being cheaper on a total cost basis. According to the Department of 
Energy, the cost of coal-fired electricity in Texas in 2010 was $1.81 per million BTU, 
compared to $4.48 per million BTU for natural gas. In part due to EPA regulations that 
govern mandate emissions reductions in key pollutants of older coal-fired power plants, 
such as mercury, the viability of coal as a generation resource has become uncertain—a 
fact that is reflected in the low rate of new coal plants under construction nationwide.  
Congestion in the ERCOT region reached a record high in 2008 when system 
inefficiency reached a total cost of $375 million (ERCOT 2010). These costs have since 
receeded, due to reductions in fuel cost, revised market rules, and transmission system 
improvement, to reach the lowest level recorded in over a decade in 2008. Transmission 
improvements since 2009 have included over $2 billion of investment in new 
autotransformer capacity and over 1,933 miles of transmission. Additionally, major 
investments over the next five years include $9 billion to add another 7,866 circuit miles 
of transmission lines. A major component of these improvements involve the addition of 
planned expansions to the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) in the western 
portion of the state where significant wind resources exist. Connecting these resources to 
the most heavily constrained (and highest growth) counties—namely, Bexar, Harris, 
Dallas, and Tarrant—remains a significant challenge. While wind energy serves as 11.4% 
of generating capacity, intermittency and transmission constraints reduce that amount to 
1.1% of available capacity (ERCOT 2010). No major plans exist to build signficant new 
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cross-border transmission capacity for the purpose of wholesale power exchanges, 
despite the ackowledged benefits of connecting new wind resources from neighboring 
Mexican states. It is well understood that integrating wind resources across larger 
geographic regions helps to reduce problems with intermittency by smoothing drops in 
available capacity. The last major study of potential benefits of additional cross-border 
ties between ERCOT and CFE was conducted through a joint CFE-ERCOT 
Interconnection Study in 2003. It concluded that opportunity exists for mutual benefit in 
block load transfers at Ciudad Acuña in the state of Coahuila, and asynchronous ties at 
Laredo and McAllen. A question remains, however, as to what financing mechanisms, 
public or private, are most appropriate to pay for the establishment of new cross-border 
ties. While benefits associated with grid reliability and security are easy to ascertain, 
gains from increases in trade from a yet-to-be-utilitized connection are harder to 
determine.  
In one assessment of the potential gains from additional ties between CFE and ERCOT, 
Navigant Consulting compared historical ERCOT and CFE marginal production costs 
and simulated electricity prices for both sides of the border. Using an hour-by-hour 
comparison of ERCOT’s market clearing prices for energy and CFE’s marginal 
production costs in 2003, a forward estimate for years 2007 to 2015 was established. The 
result of the study concluded that the direction of trade between CFE and ERCOT would 
vary seasonally in accordance with price differentials, leading power exchanges to flow 
northbound in January, February, June, July and August; and southbound in all other 
months. Price differnetials between ERCOT and CFE also varied by time of day, as the 
market clearing price for ERCOT rises and falls along with demand (compared to CFE 
marginal production costs that remain relatively flat with respect to time of day). The 
result of the analysis concluded that the potential trade benefits of DC Tie connections 
would yield between US$11-16 million for northbound trade of CFE exports to ERCOT, 
and between US$4-8 million in potential trade benefits as a result of southbound exports 
from ERCOT to CFE (GCPA 2006).  
Arizona 
Arizona’s electricity consumption has also been growing markedly faster than the 
national average growth rate over the past few decades. In the 1980s, electricity use in 
Arizona grew by 4.7% a year compared to a national growth rate of 3% during the same 
period. In the 1990s, electricity use in Arizona grew by 3.5% a year as compared to a 
national growth rate of 2.3% during the same period. This pattern of growth rate in 
electricity use continued in the 2000s, with a growth rate of 3.4% for the period between 
2000 and 2007 as compared to a national growth rate of 1.3%. 
Most of the recent growth in Arizona’s electricity use has occurred in the residential and 
commercial sectors, as suggested by the growing share of retail sales for each sector 
(Table 4.4). In 2010, residential and commercial electricity consumption accounted for 
over 84% of total electricity consumption, with residential use the largest consuming 
sector requiring over 32 million MWh. Commercial and industrial use followed with 
consumption figures of 28 million MWh and 12 million MWh, respectively. This growth 
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has been primarily caused by population growth. From 1980 to 2006 the population grew 
from 2.7 million to 6.2 million. From 1990 and on, electricity growth rates have 
surpassed population growth rates; this is partially the consequence of decreasing real 
rates of electric power (Considine et al. 2008). However, in the mid-2000s rates began to 
level off and rates now appear to be increasing. Much of the time changes in end-use 
electricity rates are reflections of changes in the average costs of generation.  
 
Table 4.4 
Arizona Summary Statistics 
Item Value US Rank 
NERC Region(s)  WECC 
Primary Energy Source  Coal 
Total Energy Consumption (trillion Btu) 1,454.30 24 
Gross Domestic Product (billion 2005 dollars) 230.90 19 
Energy Intensity per Real Dollar of GDP (thousand Btu per 2005 
dollar) 6.30 37 
Net Summer Capacity (megawatts) 26,392 15 
   Electric Utilities 20,115 14 
   Independent Power Producers and Combined Heat and Power 6,277 16 
Net Generation (megawatt hours) 111,750,957 12 
   Electric Utilities 91,232,664 11 
   Independent Power Producers and Combined Heat and Power 20,518,293 17 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (thousand metric tons) 55,683 15 
Total Retail Sales (megawatt hours) 72,831,737 21 
Distribution of Retail Sales Year 2000 Year 2010 
  Share Residential 40.6 44.6 
  Share Commercial 35.0 39.7 
  Share Industrial 19.6 15.7 
Average Retail Price (cents/kWh) 9.69 20 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2010), Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-861, “Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations Report” and 
predecessor forms. 
 
For Arizona, coal-fired generation is currently the largest producer of electricity, 
producing more than 40 million MWh. Arizona possesses significant coal reserves in the 
Black Mesa region and produces over 8 million tons of coal a year. Natural gas 
generation, Arizona’s second-largest source of electricity production, supplied the state 
with over 36 million MWh of electricity in 2006. Since the 1990s, natural gas-fired 
electricity generation has grown rapidly and is reflected in the national trend. This is a 
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result of the nature of natural gas plant price structure; natural gas plants are relatively 
capitally inexpensive and require less pollution control measures than coal-fired plants. 
The remainder of Arizona’s fuel mix comes predominantly from nuclear power, which 
has declined in percent contribution since the 1990s, and hydroelectric power, which is 
generated primarily by large dams along the Colorado River, Glen Canyon, and the 
Hoover Dam. Combined, these four traditional sources of electricity generation provide 
more than 100 million MWh, of which a quarter is excess production greater than 
Arizona’s end use. As a result, Arizona is an exporter of electric power and regularly 
supplies its neighboring states of Nevada and southern California through long-term 
power purchasing agreements (Considine et al. 2008). This would suggest that Arizona 
does not possess the immediate incentives, apparent in Texas and California, which 
would create a justification for greater regional integration. However, in order to meet its 
state renewable energy goal of 15% by 2025, Arizona will need to find replacements for 
coal as its primary source of electricity. While the state ranks 24th in total energy 
consumption, it ranks 15th nationally in terms of carbon emissions. Opportunities for 
replacing coal-based electricity with in-state solar or the importation of electricity from 
renewable sources in Baja California, Sonora, or Chihuahua are potential solutions for 
meeting this goal.  
New Mexico 
New Mexico has low energy demand, ranking 38th nationally, primarily due to a 
comparatively small population of just over 2 million. During the 2008 recession the state 
lost an estimated 53,000 jobs, more than 20,000 of which were in construction 
(Department of Labor 2010). Forecasts for growth in 2012 suggest a modest recover with 
GDP growing by about 1%, primarily due to a recovery in private industries like mining 
and oil and gas. Budget deficits, however, are expected to continue to depress growth as 
state and local governments continue to shed jobs.  
Like Arizona, New Mexico’s power generation is dominated by coal, which provides 
almost four-fifths of the state’s electricity. In terms of electricity end-use, the state’s retail 
sales by sector are 30.1% residential, 40.2% commercial, and 29.7% industrial, for a total 
2010 net generation figure of 36.2 million MWh (EIA 2011). These consumption figures 
are with respect to an average annual increase in electricity consumption between 1980 
and 2005 of 3.3%, ranking the state fifth in percent demand growth among all other states 
(EIA 2011). 
In 2010, the primary sources for electric power generation in New Mexico were coal and 
natural gas, at 85% and 13%, respectively (EIA 2011). This trend of electricity generation 
is in large part the direct result of New Mexico’s large fossil fuel resource endowment. 
The state possesses the largest proven natural gas field in the country, as well as several 
of the country’s largest oil fields.  
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Table 4.5 
New Mexico Summary Statistics 
Item Value US Rank 
NERC Region(s)  WECC 
Primary Energy Source  Coal 
Total Energy Consumption (Trillion Btu) 670.10 38 
Gross Domestic Product (Billion 2005 Dollars) 69.10 38 
Energy Intensity per Real Dollar of GDP (Thousand Btu per 
2005 Dollar) 9.70 19 
Net Summer Capacity (megawatts) 8,130 36 
   Electric Utilities 6,345 33 
   Independent Power Producers & Combined Heat and Power 1,785 36 
Net Generation (megawatthours) 36,251,542 37 
   Electric Utilities 30,848,406 33 
   Independent Power Producers & Combined Heat and Power 5,403,136 37 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (thousand metric tons) 29,379 31 
Total Retail Sales (megawatthours) 22,428,344 39 
Distribution of Retail Sales Year 2000 Year 2010 
   Share Residential 26.3 30.1 
   Share Commercial 35.5 40.2 
   Share Industrial 29.2 29.7 
Average Retail Price (cents/kWh) 8.40 33 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2010), Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-861, “Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report.” US Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations Report” and 
predecessor forms 
 
In 2010, the primary sources for electric power generation in New Mexico were coal and 
natural gas, at 85% and 13%, respectively (EIA 2011). This trend of electricity generation 
is in large part the direct result of New Mexico’s large fossil fuel resource endowment. 
The state possesses the largest proven natural gas field in the country, as well as several 
of the country’s largest oil fields.  
New Mexico possesses an extraordinary potential for solar development; in fact, the state 
ranks second in solar potential following only Arizona. The state’s southern deserts offer 
the most concentrated solar potential. Additionally, New Mexico’s Rocky Mountain 
region holds significant geothermal power potential due to its geological activity along 
with regional pockets suitable for wind power development. However, despite these 
abundant and attractive renewable energy reserves, at present the state produces less than 
1% of its electricity from these resources (excluding hydroelectric) with a total installed 
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capacity of less than 4 MW. Given the right price incentives, development of these 
resources could be available to export to neighboring states and Mexico.  
Baja California 
Baja California, located in the northwest portion of Mexico, is composed of variable 
topology that includes hills, deserts, and large mountain ranges. With elevations that vary 
from sea level to mountaintops in the Juarez and San Pedro Martir ranges sitting above 
3,000 meters, the climate of Baja California is characterized by hot and dry summers and 
wet, cold winters. The state is both geographically isolated and electrically independent 
from the rest of Mexico. Instead, due to its geographic disposition, Baja California has 
developed a unique energy interdependence with California and the southwest United 
States that involves regular cross-border trade of electricity and natural gas. Its electrical 
grid connects synchronously with the US at two locations: the Mesa de Otay power plant 
in Tijuana, across the border from San Diego, and the La Rosita plant in Mexicali, across 
from Imperial Valley. Studies are ongoing regarding anticipated interconnection with the 
SIN grid in 2013, accompanied by disconnection from the US grid. The Secretary of 
Energy believes that the move will help reduce generation and infrastructure spending in 
Mexico, in part through postponement or cancellation of generation projects with high 
investment costs. The Secretary also suggests that interconnection will present “new 
opportunities for power and energy transactions” with the US while allowing Mexico to 
capitalize on demand diversity between the SIN and Baja California systems (SENER 
2008). 
In 2007, the primary types of energy produced in Baja California were geothermal and 
natural gas, with each representing 47% of the state’s electricity; fuel oil and diesel 
accounted for the remaining 6%. The state has two major CFE-owned power plants in 
operation, including Cerro Prieto, the world’s largest geothermal power station. Located 
in Mexicali, it has a capacity of 720 MW (SENER 2011). As of 2007, it provided 46% of 
the state’s electricity. The other CFE-owned plant, the Presidente Juárez Oil Thermal 
Power Station in Rosarito, has three generators (one conventional thermoelectric, one 
combined cycle, and one gas turbine) for a combined capacity of 1,093 MW (BECC 
2010). Also in operation is a combined cycle IPP in Mexicali with a capacity of 489 MW. 
Together with the Presidente Juarez combined cycle unit, it provides another 46% of the 
state’s electricity. The remaining 8% is provided by Presidente Juarez’s other two units 
(6%) and imports from the US (2%) (BECC 2010). Between now and 2025, the country 
is expected to increase its dependence on natural gas significantly, along with 
geothermal. Meanwhile, it will reduce dependence on diesel and phase out use of fuel oil 
altogether (BECC 2010). 
Over the last decade, consumption of energy in Baja California grew more slowly than in 
the other border states, though it outpaced them in population growth. Consumption grew 
at an annual average of 1.94% from 2000-2010, representing an overall increase of 
20.78% (CFE 2010). According to the Secretary of Energy, while “industrial and 
population growth in cities like Tijuana and Mexicali” are important drivers of electricity 
consumption, climate also plays an important role because the “region’s principal 
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characteristic is extreme climate with high summer temperatures and intense winter 
colds, affecting electric power consumption patterns in the region’s urban zones” 
(SENER 2008). As a result, the load profile for Baja California peaks in the summer 
(July-September) with overall demand on average about 40% higher than peak demand in 
the winter (Figure 4.5). Over half of this demand is the result of sales to commercial and 
small to medium-sized industrial businesses, while the majority of demand growth is the 
result of commercial and residential growth in the Tijuana and Mexicali urban and 
suburban areas. 
 
Figure 4.5 
Energy Load Pattern in Baja California Norte, 2004 
 
 
Source: California Energy Commission (2005), Energy Supply and Demand Assessment For the Border 
Region. 
 
The state development plan identifies climate change as a concern, citing the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s estimates that Mexico’s northwest region 
may experience significant decreases in rainfall (Gobierno del Estado de Baja California 
2010). It has launched several new initiatives in the last three years, including creation of 
the State Energy Commission and the development of a State Program for the Sustainable 
Use of Energy. Baja California has also joined the other border states in collecting data 
on greenhouse gas emissions. Based on consumption figures, Baja California had the 
lowest emissions of all the border states in 2005. Emissions forecasts show that natural 
gas will be the primary driver of greenhouse gas increases through 2025 (BECC 2010). 
Baja California is the fastest growing of the border states, with population expanding by 
nearly 40% over the last 10 years, at an average annual rate of 3.14%. Nuevo Leon and 
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Tamaulipas followed, each of which grew nearly 1.5% a year in that time (CONAPO 
2011). Baja California is expected to double its 2010 population by 2041 (Gobierno del 
Estado de Baja California 2010). 
Baja California is highly urbanized, with only 14% of its population living in rural areas. 
Nearly 50% of the states’ inhabitants live in Tijuana, the state’s largest city, while almost 
30% live in Mexicali, the state capital (Gobierno del Estado de Baja California 2010). 
While these two cities accounted for the bulk of the state’s population growth over the 
last five years, population in the smaller coastal cities of Rosarito Beach (4.57%) and 
Ensenada (2.61%) experienced accelerated growth during that time and are expected to 
double by 2025 and 2037, respectively. Meanwhile, annual growth rates in Tijuana and 
Mexicali are expected to slow slightly, with forecasted averages of 2.6% and 2.3% 
between 2005-2030 (San Diego Association of Governments 2008). 
The main drivers of Baja California’s economy are manufacturing, agriculture, and 
tourism. The state’s maquiladora industry is centered in Tijuana—which accounts for 
more than half of the state’s GDP and will likely continue to do so through 2030—as well 
as Tecate and Mexicali (San Diego Association of Governments 2008). The most 
economically important agricultural areas are Mexicali Valley and Ensenada, home of the 
state’s sole deep-water port, where fishing and other maritime activities contribute 
significantly to the economy. The coastal cities are important to the tourism industry as 
well; an estimated 85% of tourists come from the US (Standish 2009).  
Both the tourism and maquiladora industries suffered during the recent economic 
downturn (Gobierno del Estado de Baja California 2010), with Tijuana alone losing 
37,148 manufacturing jobs between July 2007 and December 2009 (Villarreal 2011). 
Nonetheless, the state government reports indicators of recovery, including steadily 
decreasing unemployment numbers beginning in late 2009 and continuing through 2011 
(Gobierno del Estado de Baja California 2010). Employment is expected to double by 
2030, at an average annual growth rate of 3.2% statewide. Tijuana, Tecate, Mexicali, 
Ensenada, and Rosarito Beach will experience the bulk of that growth, with the fastest 
growth expected in Tecate and Rosarito Beach (4.3% and 5% annually) (San Diego 
Association of Governments 2008). The state government also cites changes in the 
population structure over the last two decades as a sign of continued economic prosperity. 
The older population (age 15 and older) has increased relative to the number of children, 
creating a low ratio of dependents relative to the working-age population. Known as a 
“demographic bonus,” the ratio suggests a particularly favorable economic climate going 
forward (Gobierno del Estado de Baja California 2010). 
In recent years, Baja California has been a net exporter of electricity to the United States. 
Operating synchronously with the WECC region of the United States, in 2007 it sent over 
1,000 GWh in net exports to California. As stated previously, increased power sharing 
between Baja California and the United States allows for the deferment of new power 
plant constructions, in addition to more efficient use of existing generation facilities. The 
main barrier to increases in cross-border trade is the extent of transmission infrastructure 
that is currently limited, due to congestion, to an effective capacity of 400 MW. Given 
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the high concentration of populations residing in the San Diego-Tijuana urban area, the 
addition of increased transmission capacity would improve reliability and create gains 
from trade for both economies. The existence of large undeveloped potential in 
geothermal, wind, and solar resources suggest future opportunities for investment in 
developing these resources with the purpose of serving both communities. 
Sonora 
Sonora is the second-largest Mexican state in area, accounting for more than 9% of the 
country’s total, much of which is used for agriculture, the state’s economic backbone 
(Standish 2009). As the nation’s “breadbasket,” Sonora is known for its cattle, fisheries, 
and production of wheat, safflower, soybeans, and other products, two-thirds of which are 
exported (Gobierno del Estado de Sonora 2009). Packaging and processing of these 
agricultural products play a major role in the state’s industrial sector (Standish 2009). 
Sonora’s maquiladoras employ more than 85,000 people, with two-thirds of industrial 
GDP associated with production of food and metal products. While the industry is spread 
throughout 43 industrial parks in 15 cities, it is primarily concentrated in Hermosillo, the 
state’s capital as well as its most populous city, where 30% of the state’s inhabitants live. 
Hermosillo is known for its automotive manufacturing in particular (Gobierno del Estado 
de Sonora 2009). Ford’s Hermosillo Stamping and Assembly Plant is often cited as a 
testament to the automotive sector’s success, both in symbol and fact. Despite setbacks 
across the region due to the economic slowdown, production at the Ford plant doubled 
between 2000 and 2010 (Ford Motor Company 2011). Mining of gold, silver, and copper 
also plays an important role in the state economy, with Sonora being the country’s largest 
copper producer. The mining sector showed the strongest growth from 1996-2006, at 
13.97%. Meanwhile, manufacturing grew by 4.99% while agriculture shrank by 2.83% 
(Gobierno del Estado de Sonora 2009).  
Although all of the border states have traditionally grown faster than the national average 
in terms of both population and GDP, Sonora has for many years contributed least in both 
areas. In terms of contribution to the national GDP, Sonora consistently ranked last from 
2003 to 2007 (Gobierno del Estado de Sonora 2009). Nonetheless, it has shown the 
strongest GDP growth of all the border states, with an annual average growth rate of 
9.7% from 2003-2010 and overall growth of 89.3% (INEGI 2010). In addition, 
consumption of energy in the northwest statistical region (which includes both Sonora 
and Sinaloa) grew at an annual average rate of 2.51% over the last decade, resulting in 
overall growth of 28.03% (CFE). These numbers held despite an annual average 
population growth rate of just 1.14% from 2000 to 2010, the lowest among the border 
states (although still higher than the national average, 0.98%) (CONAPO 2011). 
Reflecting similar trends predicted nationwide, CONAPO forecasts a less robust 
population growth rate over the next 15 years, with an expected annual average of 0.62%, 
slightly higher than the estimated national rate of 0.59%.  
Sonora is home to two CFE-owned thermoelectric plants in operation as of 2010. The 
Puerto Libertad Thermal Power Plant in Pitiquito has a capacity of 632 MW, while the 
Carlos Rodriguez Rivero Thermal Power Plant in Guaymas has 484 MW of capacity. 
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Sonora also has two operating IPPs: a 250 MW plant in Hermosillo, and the 258 MW 
Naco Nogales gas plant in Agua Prieta. A second, combined-cycle unit with a solar array 
is under construction in Agua Prieta and expected to come online in 2013 with 394.1 MW 
of capacity (SENER 2008). 
The country’s primary sources of energy, in terms of both generation and consumption, 
are natural gas and fuel oil, which accounted for 35.9% and 61.9% of generation in 2004, 
respectively, while accounting for 33.4% and 66.5% of consumption. Generation and 
consumption of fuel oil—which is responsible for 73.3% of Sonora’s electricity-related 
greenhouse gas—are expected to double by 2020. Meanwhile, generation and 
consumption of natural gas—responsible for 26.7% of emissions—is forecasted to 
decrease slightly (BECC 2010).  
Hydroelectric energy accounts for a small fraction of the country’s generation, at 2.1%, 
and will increase somewhat over the next decade, from 221 MW to 330 MW (BECC 
2010). Sonora also has several renewable energy projects in the planning stages, 
including three solar projects in Hermosillo, each with a planned capacity of 50 MW. 
Another four 50 MW solar projects are in the process of land acquisition in Caborca, with 
a fifth planned for San Luis Rio Colorado (BECC 2011). 
Because 70% of Sonora’s land is characterized by desert vegetation, Sonora’s aquifer 
system is particularly vulnerable to over-pumping and is severely depleted in some areas, 
including Hermosillo, posing a threat to both agriculture and industry (Standish 2009). 
Moreover, the IPCC predicts significant decreases in rainfall throughout northwest 
Mexico, including both Sonora and Baja California (Gobierno del Estado de Baja 
California 2010). As such, the Sonoran government is active in sustainability efforts. It 
recently created an Energy Commission charged with promoting renewables and 
efficiency. Current energy-related projects include Fondo Nuevo Sonora, a fund for 
supporting efficiency efforts, and a rural electrification project that aims to generate 
1,016 MWh of clean energy (BECC 2011). Industry players have also joined the effort. 
Ford reduced its water use at the Hermosillo plant by 40% over the last decade and 
recently announced global plans to implement an additional 30% cut by 2015 (Ford 
Motor Company 2011).  
Chihuahua 
Chihuahua is the largest state in Mexico and accommodates about 17% of the 
“fronterizos” (border-state inhabitants). As an important manufacturing hub, Chihuahua 
is home to 25% of Mexico’s maquiladora workers, and 85% of the population lives in 
metropolitan areas (Standish 2009). It ranks first among the border states, as well as 
fourth in the nation, as a draw for foreign direct investment. The capital city of 
Chihuahua boasts seven industrial parks, while Ciudad Juarez—the state’s manufacturing 
epicenter—is home to 25. Altogether, there are more than 400 maquiladoras in the state 
(Standish 2009).  
Juarez is Chihuahua’s most populous city and most transient, with 75% of its inhabitants 
having been born elsewhere. Other population centers include Chihuahua city; Delicias, 
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the state’s agricultural center; and Hidalgo del Parral, known for its mining (Standish 
2009). Due to the development of several large mining installations, this sector has 
proven a particularly important source of economic growth in recent years, providing 
employment opportunities in rural areas and helping offset setbacks in the industrial 
sector due to the economic downturn, in which Juarez alone lost 46,261 jobs (Villarreal 
2011). Forestry also plays an important role in the economy, producing a variety of pine 
trees useful in manufacturing (Standish, 2009). GDP in Chihuahua grew by an annual 
average of 6.7% between 2003 and 2010, expanding overall by nearly 56% in seven years 
(INEGI 2010). 
Population growth statewide was robust compared to the national average over the last 
decade, yet it was slow relative to other border states. At an annual average rate of 
1.17%, it surpassed only Sonora (1.14%) in that time, bringing overall growth to 13.15%. 
According to CONAPO’s forecasts, the two neighboring states will keep pace with each 
other through 2025, with population growing at an average annual rate of 0.62% 
(CONAPO 2011). Chihuahua is likely to become a net importer of electricity around 
2020, as natural gas consumption surpasses generation capacity. While Chihuahua has an 
interconnection with the neighboring state of Durango as well as with the US (at Juarez-
El Paso), a report from the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) 
suggests that those imports will most likely come from Coahuila, based on projections of 
production and transmission capacity (BECC 2010).  
Natural gas accounts for 86% of gross electricity generation in Chihuahua; fuel oil, 
diesel, and hydroelectric account for the remaining generation, at 11%, 2%, and 1% 
respectively. CFE owns several power plants in Chihuahua, three of which run on natural 
gas. Juarez is home to one pair, Samalayuca I and II, which have 522 and 316 MW of 
capacity respectively. The former is a six-unit, conventional thermoelectric power station, 
while the latter is a two-unit combined cycle plant. A third thermoelectric plant, located 
in Delicias, also belongs to CFE; known as the Francisco Villa power station, it has five 
units and a capacity of 300 MW. CFE also owns a five-unit hydroelectric plant known as 
El Encino; located in Chihuahua, it has 619 MW of capacity (BECC 2010, CFE 2010). A 
combined-cycle IPP-owned plant, Chihuahua III, is located in Juarez and has 259 MW of 
capacity. A second IPP plant, Norte II, is anticipated to come online in 2013 in the city of 
Chihuahua, with a capacity of 376.65 MW (CFE 2010). 
Natural gas is the primary source of the state’s electricity-related greenhouse gas 
emissions, responsible for 70,804 terajoules in 2010; fuel oil, by contrast, accounted for 
20,279 TJ, while diesel oil accounted for 50. According to BECC’s forecasts, electricity-
related emissions from fuel and diesel oil will virtually disappear by 2025, while 
emissions from natural-gas production will grow. Overall, in the next 15 years, annual 
GHG emissions from production-based electricity supply are expected to peak at 8.22 
MMtCO2e in 2015 before dropping to 7.55 in 2025 (BECC 2010). Along with 
participation in the border states’ efforts to collect emissions data, Chihuahua’s other 
carbon mitigation initiatives include a mandate to optimize use of solar energy under the 
aegis of the National Housing Program, as outlined in the state’s 2005 environmental 
protection law. 
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Coahuila 
Coahuila de Zaragoza is Mexico’s third-largest state; its population, however, is 
relatively small, at a density of 16 people per square kilometer, well below the national 
average of 50. The state is highly urbanized nonetheless, with up to 90% of Coahuila’s 
inhabitants living in urban areas, compared to 76% nationally (Standish 2009). Coahuila 
grew at a relatively modest rate of 1.27% over the last decade (expanding by 14.39% 
overall), greater than the annual averages of Sonora and Chihuahua, but less than the 
remaining border states. Forecasts suggest Coahuila will maintain that relative standing 
through 2025, though at a slower annual average growth rate of 0.74% (CONAPO 2011).  
The state’s most significant centers of economic and population growth are found in the 
border municipalities of Acuña and Piedras Negras, along with Monclova, San Pedro, 
Saltillo, and Torreón (Gobierno del Estado de Coahuila 2011). Three-fourths of the 
state’s inhabitants live in these seven centers of industry. Automotive manufacturing is 
particularly influential there, with one in four of Mexico’s vehicles produced in Coahuila. 
The state also produces a third of Mexico’s steel, to supply Chrysler and General Motors, 
among other US companies. Coahuila’s mining region boasts significant coal deposits, 
sufficient to meet 100% of industrial energy demand, while the Gulf of Sabinas has 
important natural gas reserves (Standish 2009). 
The Coahuilan government boasts a long list of “primer lugar nacional” data (statistics in 
which the state ranks first in the country), including highest manufacturing GDP per 
capita and greatest number of registered exporting companies. 
Coal is the dominant source of electricity in Coahuila, making up 91% of the fuel mix as 
of 2007; hydroelectric meanwhile accounted for 8%, while natural gas accounted for only 
1%. CFE currently owns two coal-fired power plants in Coahuila, both located south of 
Piedras Negras. The José López Portillo plant (also known as Carbón I) has a capacity of 
1,200 MW, while Carbón II has 1,400 MW; each has four units (CFE 2010). CFE also 
owns La Amistad hydroelectric plant, which has a gross capacity of 66 MW (BECC 
2010). The combined cycle Saltillo Power Station, located in Ramos Arizpe, is IPP-
owned, with a capacity of 247.5 MW for main industrial centers in both the Ramos 
Arizpe and Saltillo metro areas (CFE 2010). Planning for a second natural gas plant is 
under way, with an expected capacity of 668 MW; it will begin operating in 2017. 
Generation forecasts project dependence on coal, diesel, and hydro to remain at current 
levels through 2025 (at 17,907 GW, 819 GW, and 147 GW, respectively); meanwhile, 
natural gas generation will increase from 1,834 GW to an estimated 6,233 (BECC 2010). 
Coahuila accounts for an estimated 6% of Mexico’s carbon dioxide emissions, based on 
2005 data. In terms of gross consumption, electricity, industrial processes, and the fossil 
fuel industry account for the majority of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions (72.7%). 
Natural gas, coal, and diesel oil are responsible for Coahuila’s GHG emissions related to 
the production of electricity. While annual coal- and diesel-based emissions should 
remain steady through 2025 (at 18 and 0.09 MMtCO2e, respectively), emissions from 
natural gas are expected to increase, from 0.85 MMtCO2e in 2010 to 2.62 in 2025 
(BECC 2010). 
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Coahuila has in place a state climate action plan under which the Coahuila Climate 
Change Advisory Group (CCAG) is currently developing a GHG-reduction strategy. The 
group, which met for the first time in February 2011, is divided into five technical 
working groups that focus individually on mitigation and adaptation strategies. In 
addition, the state sponsors a program for distributing compact fluorescent lightbulbs to 
families. In three years, it has given away four-bulb packages to 186,000 households, at 
an estimated energy savings of 80% (BECC 2010). 
Nuevo Leon 
Nuevo Leon is by far the most economically vibrant of the Mexican border states, 
accounting for 34% of the corridor’s GDP in 2010. Over the last decade, it produced 
7.5% (annual average) of Mexico’s total GDP (INEGI 2010). It is also the most populous 
border state, accounting for 23% of the region’s inhabitants, with 80% living in and 
around the capital city of Monterrey (CONAPO 2011). Between 2000 and 2011, Nuevo 
Leon’s population grew at a robust annual average of 1.47%, with overall growth of 
16.9%; such that the only faster growing border state was Baja California (CONAPO 
2011). Population expansion through 2025 is expected to slow to 0.95% annually, but it 
will still remain higher than the national average and, among the border states, come 
second only to Baja California. The state’s largest population centers after Monterrey are 
the cities of Guadalupe, Apodaca, and San Nicolas de los Garza, all in the capital 
metropolitan area. 
The same time period oversaw the state’s success in becoming a global economic player, 
making it the leader among Mexico’s 32 states in terms of global competitiveness 
(Gobierno del Estado de Sonora 2009). The state has a reputation as the “industrial center 
of Mexico,” with much of its manufacturing centered in Monterrey (Standish 2009). 
Current trends in the industrial sector reflect a greater focus on research and technology, 
with the state government making efforts to encourage investment in aeronautics, 
biotechnology, and the like. Meanwhile, the state is moving toward a service-based 
economy. The service sector accounts for half of the state’s GDP, while manufacturing 
accounts for about 25% (Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo León 2010). The state has a rich 
agricultural area known as the “orange belt” (Standish 2009). While agriculture accounts 
for only 1% of GDP, it is considered important environmentally, as it preserves space in 
an otherwise densely populated country (Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo Leon 2010).  
In 2005, Nuevo Leon’s greenhouse gas emissions were the highest among the border 
states, with the primary contributors being electricity use and industrial processing 
(BECC 2011). Nuevo Leon has joined the other border states in a large-scale effort to 
collect and catalog emissions data. As of 2010, its total emissions related to electricity 
consumption stood at 8.49 MMtCO2e; that number is expected to reach 18.3 MMtCO2e 
by 2025 (BECC 2010). 
The state’s primary source of electricity is natural gas, which stands currently at 5,443 
GWh of installed capacity. Expansions are expected to bring that total to 16,747 GWh by 
2025 (BECC 2010). Currently, records show that the state has one currently operating 
CFE-owned power plant, Huinalá, a 978 MW-capacity thermoelectric plant with one gas 
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turbine unit and two combined cycle. An IPP-owned combined cycle natural gas plant, 
Monterrey III, operates in San Nicolás de los Garza with a capacity of 449 MW. Two 
combined cycle plants are currently in the planning stages, each with a capacity of 517 
MW. They are expected to begin operation in 2015 and 2016 (SENER 2008). 
Tamaulipas 
Tamaulipas, Mexico’s easternmost border state, is relatively modest in size yet has more 
border cities than any other, thanks to a strip of land jutting west along its northern edge, 
between Nuevo Leon and the Texas. Known as Faja Fronteriza, the highly populated and 
industrialized region’s nine cities are home to more than 350 maquiladoras. Some of the 
most populous cities in the region are Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros. The 
southeast region is industrialized as well, with activities related to the fishing industry 
along Tamaulipas’ Gulf Coast. The state’s size belies its many distinct regions, with 
tourism along its beaches, cattle-raising in the mountainous Alta del Poniente region, 
manufacturing (accounting for 20% of the state’s economy) in its urban centers, and oil 
refining in both the north (where oil and natural gas deposits are abundant) and the south. 
Agriculture also plays a large role in the economy, with sorghum being a particularly 
important crop (Standish 2009). 
The state saw overall GDP growth of 58.6% from 2003-2010, at an annual average 
growth rate of 7.1%. That number actually hides an erratic pattern in annual growth, 
which hit a high of 16.48% in 2003-2004 (second only, among the border states, to 
Nuevo Leon, at 16.65%). Half a decade later, in 2008-2009, GDP growth not only slowed 
but reversed in five of the six border states (Sonora being the exception); Tamaulipas was 
among the hardest hit, with an average annual growth rate of -9.68%, faring better only 
than Coahuila at -10.04%. Unlike Coahuila, however, which sprang back in 2010 with a 
growth rate of 16.28%, Tamaulipas recovered to a more modest 5.44% (INEGI 2010). 
Nonetheless, 2011 saw signs of continued recovery, with companies such as Black & 
Decker, DuPont, and Matamoros Spellman investing heavily in new operations. The 
state’s development plan for 2011-2016 includes extensive modernization of border and 
port infrastructure to support security and promote private investment (Torre Cantu 
2011). Tamaulipas was among the fastest growing border states in recent years, with 
population expanding at an average annual rate of 1.42%; overall, it grew by 16.28% in 
the last decade. According to CONAPO forecasts, population will continue to expand 
relatively quickly, at an average annual growth rate of 0.89% through 2025 (CONAPO 
2011).  
Tamaulipas is Mexico’s second most prolific generator of electricity, with a total capacity 
of 5,458 MW (BECC 2010). According to a report from the Border Environment 
Cooperation Commission, Tamaulipas is a net exporter of electricity and will remain so 
at least through 2025 (Chacon Anaya, Tamaulipas, 2010; see Chapter 8 of this report). 
CFE data show that there are currently six IPP and two CFE-owned power stations in 
operation (CFE 2010). CFE’s two plants have four units each; Altamira is a conventional 
thermoelectric plant, with 800 MW of capacity, while Rio Bravo (also known as Emilio 
Portes Gil) is a combined-cycle plant, with 511 MW of capacity. All six IPP plants are 
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combined cycle. Three are in Altamira (named Altamira II, III-IV, and V), with 
capacities of 1,121, 1,036, and 495 MW, respectively. Of the remaining three, all located 
in Valle Hermoso, two (Rio Bravo II and III) have 495 MW of capacity each, and the 
other (Rio Bravo IV) has 500 MW (CFE 2010). The BECC report’s account of 
Tamaulipas’ energy mix also includes one hydroelectric plant with 54 MW of capacity 
(BECC 2010). According to a Tamaulipas state government report, as of June 2011, the 
federal government had awarded 27 federal permits for electricity generation and import, 
19 of which were industrial, six commercial, and two agribusiness (Torres Cantu 2011). 
As of 2010, natural gas accounted for 96% of the state’s capacity, while fuel and diesel 
oil rounded out the remaining 4%. Dependence on fuel oil will likely decrease over the 
next 15 years, dropping from 389 GWh in 2010 to 68 in 2025; meanwhile, natural gas 
generation will increase, from 29,440 GWh to 34,203 (use of diesel oil for electricity, 
already negligible, will remain so). Greenhouse gas emissions will follow these trends: 
emissions from natural gas will increase from 12.8 MMtCO2e in 2010 to an estimated 
14.9 in 2025. Fuel oil will decrease from 0.61 MMtCO2e to 0.11 (BECC 2010). 
The Tamaulipas state development plan outlines broad goals for the promotion of clean 
energy, including research and technological development initiatives, outreach to both 
industrial and residential consumers, and a focus on wind and solar in particular 
(Gobierno del Estado Tamaulipas 2011). As of 2011, 17 of 40 wind projects registered 
with CRE were in Tamaulipas (Torres Cantu 2011).  
4.5 Conclusion 
Literature on the effects of power market integration provide ample documentation, 
through theoretical and empirical study, of the mutual benefit available to neighboring 
countries. Electricity interconnections between the United States and Mexico can provide 
benefits to consumers in the form of reliability and emergency support (such as in the 
case of outages in Texas), reserve reduction and power sharing (leading to more efficient 
use of existing generating facilities, and by allowing for bilateral energy sales (allowing 
prices to converge towards a lower final price). The US-Mexico border region is a 
particularly suitable candidate for integration because of the near universal high demand 
growth scenario facing the region as a whole. In the coming decades, all state 
governments will face the requirement of meeting new capacity requirements through the 
construction of new generating assets, through gains in efficiency, or from the 
importation of electricity from other areas. Imports hold addition benefits to states such 
as California and Texas that face structural (market design) or regulatory (environmental 
laws) impediments to the construction of new domestic capacity. 
As a result, the existence of ample renewable resource potential—wind, solar, and 
geothermal—in Mexico’s northern states could provide consumers in the United States 
with a low carbon energy supply while producers in Mexico would realize gains from 
trade. Similarly, as has been studied in the ERCOT market, seasonal and hourly price 
differentials between ERCOT wholesale prices and CFE’s marginal cost of production 
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suggest additional gains from trade may be available to producers on both sides of the 
border. 
Texas is clearly the state with the most to gain from integration due to the size of its 
capacity requirements and the short-term forecast of inadequate reserve margins. 
However, it may also be the state most unwilling to explore synchronous connections 
with other regions due to its historical preference for autonomy and independence from 
FERC oversight. If integration is to be considered in future planning, it will be important 
for several steps to be taken by regulators. Namely, UN-DESA (2005) describes several 
preconditions for successful integration initiatives to materialize. These include the 
exchange of information about demand forecasts and needs between regulating entities, 
coordination of resource and infrastructure planning to identify congestion zones and 
opportunities for the siting of new generation assets, engagement of government agencies 
from both countries in the decision-making process at the ISO level, and the 
establishment of feasibility studies to determine how cross-border electric transmission 
facilities would be financed. The forecast for electricity demand growth in the region 
shows clear economic benefits of integration, and as a result, barriers to increased 
integration are primarily legal and political.  
  
109 
References 
American Public Power Association (APPA). 2010. Retail Electric Rates in Deregulated 
and Regulated States: 2010 Update. Retrieved January 10, 2012, at 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/RKWFinal2010.pdf. 
Bird, L., D. Hurlbut, P. Donohoo, K. Cory, and C. Kreycik. 2009. An Examination of the 
Regional Supply and Demand Balance for Renewable Electricity in the United 
States through 2015: Projecting from 2009 through 2015. Retrieved October 15, 
2011, at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/45041.pdf. 
Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC). 2011. Energia Renovable Y 
Eficiencia Energetica en Regiones Fronterizas: Iniciativas de la COCEF en 
Materia de Cambio Climático. PowerPoint Presentation presented at Mexicali, 
Baja California. Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.energiabc.gob. 
mx/files/public/downloads/foro_soluciones/10%20Iniciativas%20de%20la%20C
OCEF%20en%20Materia%20de%20Cambio%20Clima%CC%81tico%20-
%20COCEF.pdf. 
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC). 2010. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in Baja California and Reference Case Projections 1990-2025. 
Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.becc.org/english/VLibrary/ 
Publications/Greenhouse_Gas_Emissions/Summary%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20
Emissions%20in%20the%20Six%20Border%20States%20and%20Reference%20
Case%20Projections.pdf. 
Border Governors Conference (BGC), Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars. 2009. Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable 
Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region. Retrieved December 12, 
2011, at http://www.gobernadoresfronterizos2010.org. 
Brown, R., and J. Koomey. 2003. “Electricity Use in California: Past Trends and Present 
Usage Patterns.” Energy Policy (also LBNL-47992) 31(9): 849-864. 
Bureau of Economic Geology (BEG). 2006. Guide to Electric Power in Mexico. Center 
for Energy Economics. Retrieved January 1, 2012, at http://www.beg.utexas. 
edu/energyecon/documents/Guide_To_Electric_Power_in_Mexico.pdf. 
CEC. 2010. California Energy Demand Staff Forecast 2010-2020. California Energy 
Commission. Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2009publications/CEC-200-2009-012/CEC-200-2009-012-SD.PDF. 
CENSUS. 2011. Population Distribution and Change. Issued March 11. Retrieved 
October 5, 2011, at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf. 
CFE. 2010. Comisión Federal de Electricidad Annual Report 2010, Mexico DF. 
Retrieved November 20, 2011, at http://www.cfe.gob.mx. 
110 
Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (CONAPO). 2011. Population data statistics. Retrieved 
October 31, 2011, at http://www.conapo.gob.mx. 
Considine, T., and D. McLaren. 2008. Powering Arizona: Choices & Trade-Offs for 
Electricity Policy: A Study Assessing Arizona’s Energy Future. Retrieved 
December 5, 2011, at http://wms.communicationsinstitute.org/uploads/ 
File/Powering-Arizona-Study-Draft-Final.pdf. 
Department of Labor. 2010. Bureau of Labor Online Statistics. Retrieved February 2, 
2012, at http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.nm.htm. 
Dukert, J. 2003. The Quiet Reality of North American Energy Independence. Institute for 
Research on Public Policy Working Paper no. 2003-09h, retrieved January 16, 
2012, at http://www.irpp.org/miscpubs/archive/NA_integ/wp2004-09h.pdf. 
Ford Motor Company. 2011. Ford Targets 30 Percent Water Reduction Per Vehicle. PR 
NewsWire. Retrieved January 5, 2012, at http://www.prnewswire.com. 
Economic Consulting Associates. 2010. The Potential of Regional Power Sector 
Integration. ESMAP. Retrieved January 15, 2012, at http://www.esmap.org/ 
esmap/sites/esmap.org/files/BN004-10_REISP-CD_The%20Potential%20of% 
20Regional%20Power%20Sector%20Integration-Literature%20Review.pdf. 
EIA. 2011. Energy Information Administration Official Energy Statistics. Retrieved 
November 11, 2011, at http://www.eia.doe.gov. 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). 2010. Report on Existing and Potential 
Electric System Constraints and Needs. December 2010. Retrieved September 5, 
2011, at http://ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2011/2010%20Constraints 
%20and%20Needs%20Report.pdf. 
EPA. 2012. U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program. United States-Mexico Border 
Environmental Indicators, EPA /909/R-98/001. Retrieved January 12, 2012 at 
http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/indica97. 
Gandara, A. 1995. United States-Mexico Electricity Transfers: Of Alien Electrons and 
the Migration of Undocumented Environmental Burdens. Energy Law Journal, 
16(1), 1-63. 
Garrison, J. 2010. Clean Energy & Climate Change Opportunities Assessment for 
USAID/Mexico. Retrieved September 5, 2011, at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PNADS950.pdf. 
Gobierno del Estado de Baja California. 2010. Actualizacion Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 
2008-2013. Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.bajacalifornia.gob.mx/
portal/gobierno/ped/ped.htm. 
111 
Gobierno del Estado de Coahuila. 2011. State Government of Coahuila Statistics. 
Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.coahuila.gob.mx. 
Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo León. 2010. Plan Estatal de Desarrollo 2010-2015. 
Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.nl.gob.mx. 
Gobierno del Estado de Sonora. 2009. Marco Juridico Del Plan Estatal De Desarrollo 
2009-2015. Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.esonora.gob.mx. 
Gobierno Del Estado de Tamaulipas. 2011. Plan Estatal de Desarrollo Tamaulipas 2011-
2016. Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://www.tamaulipas.gob.mx. 
Gulf Coast Power Association (GCPA). 2006. The Evolution of US-Mexico Trade – 
From the Gulf to the Pacific. Gulf Coast Power Association Monthly Luncheon 
Presentation. Houston, Tex., February 16, 2006.  
Hayward, S., and K. Green. Texas Energy and the Energy of Texas. Texas Public Policy 
Foundation. Retrieved January 5, 2012, at http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/ 
2011-01-RR02-TexasEnergyandtheEnergyofTexas-CEE-Hayward-Green.pdf. 
Hobbs, B., F. Rijkers, and M. Boots. 2005. The more cooperation, the more competition? 
A Cournot analysis of the benefits of electric market coupling. The Energy 
Journal. 26 (4): 69–97. 
Horlick, G. 2002. NAFTA Provisions and the Electricity Sector. International Institute 
for Sustainable Development. Retrieved January 15, 2012, at http://www.cec. 
org/Storage/46/3844_nfta5-final-e2.pdf. 
Hughes, T. 1983. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930. 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank (IEG). 2007. The Development Potential of 
Regional Programs—An Evaluation of World Bank Support of Multicountry 
Operations. Washington, DC. Retrieved January 5, 2012, at http://site 
resources.worldbank.org/EXTREGPROPART/Resources/reg_pgms_full.pdf. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI). 2010. Producto Interno Bruto 
[Data file]. Retrieved November 13, 2011, at http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-
win/bdieintsi.exe/NIVR150070#ARBOL. 
Karin, C., K. David, and P. Nicolas. 2008. Challenges and Opportunities to Deliver 
Renewable Energy From Baja California Norte to California. From California 
Energy Commission website. Retrieved January 15, 2011, at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov. 
Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO). 2010. State of California 2011 Economy and Budget 
in Perspective. Retrieved January 5, 2012, at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/ 
2011/calfacts/calfacts_010511.aspx. 
112 
Neuhoff, K., and D. Newbery. 2005. Evolution of electricity markets: does sequencing 
matter? Utilities Policy 13: 163–173.  
Pacific Council for International Policy (PCIP). 2009. Managing the United States-
Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges. Retrieved 
October 15, 2011, at http://www.pacificcouncil.org/admin/document.doc?id=31. 
Pineau, P., and K. Froschauer. 2004. Measuring International Electricity Integration: A 
Comparative Study of the Power Systems Under the Nordic Council, 
MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. Retrieved February 15, 2012, at 
http://www.provedor.nuca.ie.ufrj.br/eletrobras/estudos/pineau1.pdf. 
Puga, N. 2006. Recent Developments in US-Mexico Electricity Trade: A Tale of Two 
Borders. Border Energy Forum XIV. San Diego, California. Retrieved January 1, 
2012, at http://www.bateswhite.com/media/pnc/4/media.274.pdf. 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). 2011. Mexico Power 
Sector Statistics. Retrieved February 2, 2012, at http://www.reeep.org/ 
index.php?id=9353&text=policy&special=viewitem&cid=26. 
Rosas-Flores, J., D. Rosas-Flores, and D. Gálvez. 2011. Saturation, energy consumption, 
CO2 emission and energy efficiency from urban and rural households appliances 
in Mexico. Energy and Buildings 43: 10-18. 
San Diego Association of Governments. 2008. California-Baja California Border Master 
Plan. Retrieved January 15, 2012, at http://www.sandag.org/servicebureau. 
Sarmiento, H. 2010. Issues associated with international power grid interconnections in 
Mexico. Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition, 2010 IEEE 
PES, pp.1-6, April 19-22, 2010. Retrieved February 12, 2012, at http://ieeexplore. 
ieee.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5484529&isnum
ber=5484192. 
SENER. 2008. Secretaría de Energía Prospectiva del Sector Eléctrico 2008-2017. 
Mexico, D.F. Retrieved November 15, 2011, at http://www.sener.gob.mx. 
SENER. 2011. Electricity Statistics: Basic Information, 1999-2011 [Data file]. Retrieved 
January 5, 2011, at http://www.sener.gob.mx/portal/Default.aspx?id=1606. 
Standish, P. (2009). The States of Mexico: A Reference Guide to History and Culture. 
Greenwood Press.  
Sweedler, A. 2003. Energy Issues in the U.S.-Mexican Border Environment: Trade, 
Energy and the Environment: Challenges and Opportunities for the Border 
Region. San Diego State University Press. Retrieved December 5, 2011, at 
http://scerp.org/pubs/m11/chapter%201-5.pdf. 
113 
Torre Cantú, E. 2011. Primer Informe De Gobierno. State Government of Tamaulipas. 
Retrieved December 5, 2011, at http://transparencia.tamaulipas.gob.mx/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/primerinfotamps2011.pdf. 
Torres Roldán, F., and E. Gómez Morales. 2006. Energías Renovables para el Desarrollo 
Sustentable en México [Renewable Energies for Sustainable Development in 
Mexico]. Retrieved November 15, 2011, at http://www.sener.gob.mx/res/
PE_y_DT/pe/FolletoERenMex-SENER-GTZ_ISBN.pdf. 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA). 2005. 
MultiDimensional Issues in International Electric Power Grid Interconnections. 
New York: United Nations. Retrieved January 15, 2012, at http://www.un.org/ 
esa/sustdev/publications/energy/interconnections.pdf. 
US Department of State. 2011. US-Mexico Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and 
Climate Change, H.R. Doc. No. tk-tk99834. Retrieved January 2, 2011, at 
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/press-releases/ep110523-climate.html. 
Valeri, L. 2008. Welfare and competition effects of electricity interconnection between 
Ireland and Great Britain. Energy Policy 37: 4679-4688.  
Villarreal, M. 2011. U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications. 
Congressional Research Service. Retrieved December 14, 2011, at 
http://www.crs.gov. 
Wolak, F. 2009. Making More from Less: Environmental Constraints and California’s 
Future Electricity Investments. Stanford University Press. Retrieved January 5, 
2012, at http://www.stanford.edu/group/fwolak/cgi-bin/sites/default/files/ 
files/Making%20More%20from%20Less_Environmental%20Constraints%20 
and%20California%E2%80%99s%20Future%20Electricity%20Investments_Wol
ak.pdf. 
Wood, D. 2010. Environment, Development, and Growth: U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in 
Renewable Energies. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
Retrieved October 8, 2011, at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
Renewable%20Energy%20report.pdf. 
114 
 
115 
Chapter 5.  The Grid, International Pools, and Exchanges 
by Dyan Knapp and Claire McEnery 
Abstract 
After the North American Free Trade Agreement, The United States, Canada, and 
Mexico began discussions of an integrative electricity market. However, the events of 
September 11, 2001, and subsequent security concerns delayed this endeavor. Electricity 
demand on both sides of the United States-Mexico border is resuming its rapid growth 
after 2008-2009. With this growing demand for energy and increased pressure to bring 
green energy alternatives to the market, consumers in North America can benefit from an 
integrated energy market in the form of lower prices and cleaner energy resources. The 
development of this market, without disrupting current supply and keeping costs low, is a 
major concern in the drive for market integration in North America. This chapter 
addresses the benefits and challenges of establishing an integrative North American 
electricity grid. It will look carefully at other international electricity pools in Britain, 
Chile, Argentina, Scandinavia, and Spain. These systems will provide lessons for North 
America concerning regulatory structure, efficient pricing, and the sharing of 
maintenance and upgrade costs. 
5.1 Introduction 
After the launch of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the post-
NAFTA economic and political environment in North America led to discussions of 
further integration of the electricity markets of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
The United States and Canada began the creation of a rather integrative bilateral grid, and 
Canada is part of the National Energy Reliability Council (NERC) application of 
standards. The two economies benefit from seasonal energy consumption differences and 
the ultimate goal of is a well-regulated transmission network with a competitive market 
for generating capacity that also includes Mexico. A more integrated grid and increased 
trade throughout North American would allow customers to enjoy a host of benefits, 
including lower prices and cleaner energy resources. The ideal network includes a total 
social welfare-maximizing plan to expand the transmission network, curb the 
monopolistic tendencies of generation participants in the market, and maximize the use of 
clean energy. 
Reliability, congestion, price, and the environment are four major concerns for grid 
expansion. A United States-Canada report on the causes and effects of the 2003 blackout 
states that the disaster affected approximately 50 million people and that the cost of the 
blackout was about $6 billion (Minkel 2008). This is one example of the high costs of 
unreliable transmission, especially in today’s global economy. According to the report, 
the principal causes of the blackout were inadequate regulation, ignorance of or lack of 
adherence to industry policies, and insufficient management on the ground. Tree growth 
was the perpetrator of three of the transmission line outages. This particular example 
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points to the necessity of meticulous oversight and maintenance in order to ensure 
reliable supply. The design and function of the system operator and regulator are 
paramount to ensuring reliability of generation and transmission (Minkel 2008). 
Increased demand for electricity and the high potential for congestion along the United 
States-Mexico border is one major motivation for an enhanced North American grid that 
includes the Southern NAFTA partner. A challenge of grid expansion will be ensuring 
that supply does not underestimate demand and that transmission congestion does not 
drive up prices or cause power shortages and blackouts. This is especially challenging for 
an international grid, because it requires regulators to communicate increases and 
changes in demand to one another. 
Recent literature points to the positive relationship among electric grids, economic 
development, and clean energy innovation (Kaudinya and Balachandra 2009). Lower 
prices to consumers and industry have many potential benefits. Electrification is 
commonly associated with increased living standards and growth of national economies. 
The benefits to industry are most obvious. More lighting and power are often associated 
with more innovation and faster rates of economic growth (Hogan 1992; Leautier and 
Thelen 2009). No country seeks to decrease the amount of light and energy it can provide 
to its citizens, and regulators must ensure reliability for domestic consumers before 
exporting electricity services out of a country. Keeping electricity affordable is 
paramount to increased rates of economic growth and increasing standards of living. The 
creation of this competitive market is a major challenge for integrated electricity grids  
We can greatly enhance the use of clean energy in place of non-renewable sources 
through the creation of a well-functioning integrated market. This is already happening 
on some parts of the continent. For example, British Columbia exports energy to the 
American Northwest in the summertime and imports energy during the winter. This 
allows both the western United States and Canada to take advantage of lower prices and 
increase reliability. As a bonus, British Columbia’s energy exports include hydroelectric 
power, which allows Americans to consume more energy without causing additional 
harm to the environment. The Nordic market has had a similar experience, as clean 
hydropower from Norway is available for purchase and use by Sweden and Finland via a 
common energy pool (Dugstad and Roland 2003). 
Concerns over global warming have persuaded policymakers to utilize supplies of clean 
energy in a national electricity grid. However, introducing clean energy sources is not as 
easy as simply installing solar panels in the desert or erecting wind turbines in West 
Texas. The experience of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) in pricing 
electricity produced by wind as well as connecting turbines to the electric grid provides 
an example of the challenges of integrating clean energy sources into the existing market 
(Sioshansi 2009). Nevertheless, the availability of clean energy sources via an integrated 
market is a step in the right direction. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides the underlying reasons for grid 
expansion in North America and the inevitable challenges we foresee. In 5.3, we analyze 
global experiences of grid expansion and extrapolate lessons for North America. Section 
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5.4 reviews the dominant literature on the optimal structure of electricity markets. In 5.5 
we apply findings from that literature to the North American grid to assess the countries’ 
readiness of further integration. Section 5.6 describes the relationship between increasing 
the use of renewables and expanding the grid. And Section 5.7 concludes by 
summarizing the benefits and challenges associated with increased trade of electricity 
through the creation of a more integrated transmission network. 
5.2 Grid Expansion and Underlying Reasons 
Decisions concerning grid expansion include how to organize and monitor transmission, 
how to attract investment in transmission, how to deal with congested lines in the short 
versus the long run, and best methods of pricing electricity that incentivize expansion 
(Kristiansen and Rosellon 2007; Leautier and Thelen 2009; Hogan, Rosellon, and 
Vogelsang 2010; Vogelsang 2001). Without coming to a consensus on these methods, the 
North American market faces social welfare losses that may include higher prices, lower 
reliability, and increased congestion on the grid.  
The transmission system is the most important element of the grid. Connecting generators 
to distributors, a strong transmission system is crucial for maintaining power reliability 
and facilitating competition among generators. The transmission system is vital to the 
future of renewable power generation as it connects these often remotely located power 
sources to cities (Gilbert et al. 2002). Investment in US transmission expansion declined 
steadily between 1975 and 2000 at an average rate of $115 million per year (Hirst 2000). 
Building generation closer to loads and new technologies that allow system operators to 
operate the grid closer to its physical limits have substituted for grid upgrades; however, 
this cannot last forever (Hirst 2000). Expanding the grid is a critical challenge. 
Experiences in deregulation of the power market show that competition among 
generators provides low-cost reliable power to consumers; however, transmission and 
distribution are still considered natural monopolies (Rosellon 2003). Under these 
circumstances, the expansion of transmission capacity is far more difficult than the 
expansion of privately owned generation. Additionally, from an engineering standpoint, 
the nature of electricity flow makes grid expansion difficult. Suppliers cannot determine 
the path of electricity transmission, since electricity takes the path of least resistance. 
Expansions in the grid therefore affect other parts of the network (Gilbert et al. 2002). 
Building transmission in increments of voltage further complicates investment decisions, 
since the added capacity cannot perfectly meet demand for increased voltage (Hirst and 
Kirby 2001). 
The natural monopoly aspect of the grid makes investment decisions particularly 
difficult. The question of who should pay for upgrades and expansion has no simple, 
widely accepted answer. One school of thought, known as “beneficiary pays,” says that 
the beneficiaries of expansion should pay for the upgrades. Another asserts that 
transmission is a regional social good and therefore everyone in the region should bear 
some of the cost. This is known as postage-stamp pricing (Hirst 2000). However, before 
deciding who should bear the cost of an expansion project, the project itself must be 
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approved. This is no easy task. Opposition to new projects is often fierce, as is shown in 
the corresponding chapter on US regulations. Hirst (2000) points out that “The key 
obstacles to building new transmission lines are local opposition and the associated local 
and state regulatory-approval processes.” Opposition to new lines is typically of the not-
in-my-backyard variety with environmental and aesthetic concerns being the leading 
reasons for opposing transmission expansion projects. To overcome this, Hirst 
recommends that rather than utility companies presenting a completed plan to the local 
community for approval, the planning process should involve local community leaders as 
much as possible to increase the likelihood that the project will be approved (Hirst 2000). 
Different methods of approaching the investor problem for transmission expansion exist 
in the academic literature. One is the “merchant approach” where an independent systems 
operator (ISO) facilitates auctions for long-term financial transmission rights (FTRs). To 
be economically viable, long-term FTRs require a fixed-price charge to enable investors 
of the expansion project to recover upfront costs. A “cost-of-service” regulation allows 
for the recovery of these fixed costs in the United States, in specific cases such as the 
PJM interconnection, originally between Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland 
(Rosellon 2003). Another approach is that of the regulated transmission company 
(TRANSCO). The method builds on the natural monopoly characteristics of the 
transmission system and combines a regulator in the form of an ISO with private 
investment. The ISO offers the Transco a range of expansion project possibilities, all 
allowing the Transco to recover its costs while efficiently building and upgrading the 
grid. This mechanism is thought to be preferable to the auction of long-term FTRs since it 
places the responsibility for all externality considerations with one firm (Rosellon 2003; 
Schill, Rosellon, and Egerer 2011). This is expected to make expansion projects more 
efficient both in terms of gaining approval and implementation. The third method, 
“strategic behavior of generators,” involves the ISO leading the facilitation of 
transmission investment. Under vertical integration, the integrated company makes all 
decisions concerning whether to invest in expanding transmission capacity, added 
generation or both.  
The proposed methods for attracting investment and the problems that arise for each 
method lead to two general conclusions. First, investors in transmission capacity must be 
able to recover the costs of their investments. If they cannot they will become reluctant to 
invest in future expansion (Hirst 2000). Second, regulatory uncertainty hinders grid 
expansion. In order to expand capacity, utilities must acquire a variety of permits and 
approvals from various state agencies, often from more than one state. To alleviate some 
of this regulatory burden FERC recommends utilities form Regional Transmission 
Organizations to better coordinate planning efforts and eliminate many of these 
overlapping regulatory requirements (Hirst 2000; Kirby 2001).  
The Electricity Reliability Council of Texas has successfully implemented new 
transmission projects. ERCOT has been able to move forward with these investments 
because it is a smaller system than PJM, for example, so loop flows are less of an issue, 
and it faces far fewer regulatory hurdles since it lies outside FERC’s jurisdiction and 
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works with an ISO in the planning process (Hirst 2000). ERCOT is a functioning ISO for 
most of the state of Texas.  
Further complicating the future of transmission capacity is the anticipated smart grid 
revolution. Allowing customers to change their demand patterns through the use of smart 
meters, smart devices, dynamic pricing, and distributed generation will reduce congestion 
on the grid to make expanding transmission capacity less necessary. Avoiding capital 
costs is the name of the game (Fox-Penner 2010). However, the smart grid can only be 
implemented in steps as utilities install smart meters and shift to dynamic pricing. 
Consumers must purchase smart devices and develop new habits of demand management, 
mostly from industrial and commercial activities. It will take time to introduce smart grid 
technologies to residential markets. In the meantime, demand for electricity continues to 
rise, placing ever more strain on the current grid structure. 
The future of the grid is difficult to predict. The structure of utilities is heading towards 
deregulation and competition for generators with public or privately-owned, yet 
regulated, transmission and distribution systems. Added generation capabilities, the smart 
grid and new technologies that allow for operation of the transmission system closer to its 
physical capabilities all suggest the need for less expansion than more. However, these 
advances are still somewhere off in the future while demand placed on the grid continues 
to increase. The economies of scale inherent in transmission favor overbuilding rather 
than underbuilding (Hirst 2000; Kirby 2001).  
As a natural monopoly, it makes economic sense for one transmission grid to serve all of 
North America. Currently however, Canada, the United States, and Mexico do not 
regulate their grids in a uniform manner. Convergence must be reached concerning the 
ownership and regulation of the grid. The grid as such is a collective action problem and 
questions concerning ownership, investment, and expansion inevitably arise. While the 
transmission system is best left in the hands of large, integrated operators, vibrant market 
competition can exist within generation. Ideally, this competition will lead to greater 
efficiency in the system and lower cost for consumers. 
The electricity industry is concerned with minimizing costs of investment in expanded 
transmission networks and increases in generating capacity while maintaining reliability 
of the system to meet forecasted demand for electricity. Transmission infrastructure 
facilitates the availability of electricity to light cities and homes and provide power for 
industry. As such, electricity tends to increase overall social welfare. Economic theory 
asserts that total social welfare is composed of consumer as well as producer surplus. As 
producers attempt to keep the cost of generation and transmission investment low, 
consumers want the price of electricity to remain low. At first glance, it might seem that 
the two are compatible. However, private generators and owners of transmission 
networks, operating within a competitive market, must accrue a profit in order to invest in 
the future of the grid at the same time that competitive forces are present.  
Ideally, owners and generators operate in the context of a perfectly competitive market 
where price is equal to marginal cost and no market participant can exercise any sort of 
monopolistic control over the market. However, the reality of maintaining fair prices for 
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consumers is the pervasive problem of the regulator. In many countries, generators 
exercise their market power, and in some instances cozy relations with regulators and 
politicians have exacerbated these power dynamics. 
The challenging endeavor of creating a North American grid includes an increase in the 
supply and transmission of electricity, including increased use of renewable energy and 
the introduction of smart grid technology. Regulators must assess the costs and benefits 
associated with each stage of this transformation. While proponents of smart grids 
emphasize the enormous environmental and economic benefits of introducing this new 
technology, regulators are often reticent when it comes to taking risks on cutting edge 
technology without the support of any historical precedent. While there are precedents for 
establishing international pools and exchanges results have been mixed. In order to 
ensure that this particular international grid is successful, we must draw on all of the 
examples of other international pools as we seek to maximize benefits and overcome 
challenges. What follows are country specific analyses of restructured electricity markets. 
These cases shed light on the most effective way to create a North American grid while 
ensuring reliability, minimizing congestion, reducing price, and incorporating clean 
energy resources. 
5.3 Country Profiles 
According to Bye and Hope (2005), five basic requirements must be met for a market-
based power system to operate: a market for trade, instruments for hedging risks, short-
term markets to balance supply and demand, markets for investment in new capacity and 
markets for trade in environmental energy products.  
5.3.1 The British Experience and Hurdles 
In 1980, Britain launched a privatization program for its energy markets. Three objectives 
motivated the privatization of Britain’s energy markets: “Generation of government 
revenues, widening share of ownership and breaking trade union power” (Thomas 2005). 
Privatization included flotation of shares in the telecoms, gas and water industries. Shares 
were also made available for the public to purchase. Not knowing the market value of the 
public utilities, the government underestimated the true value of them to encourage sale 
of the shares and to minimize risk to investors. However, Britain did not break up the 
large generating companies prior to privatization. Furthermore, the government remained 
committed to the use of nuclear as an energy source, and attempted to privatize them via 
“shelter” companies owning most of the capacity. This led to a duopoly between the two 
largest companies, National Power and Nuclear Electric (Thomas 2005). 
In terms of the transmission structure for Britain’s energy market, the priority was that 
transmission not be owned by a generator. All generators were meant to have equal 
access to the United Kingdom’s transmission network. Coupled with a competitive 
market for generation, the expectation was for lower prices for electricity. However, in 
1990 in Britain the cost of generation made up only 60% of the price of electricity. The 
“Power Pool” was created to facilitate competition among generators for access to the 
electricity grid. In the Pool, supply and demand would balance every half hour, 
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generators would have to place successful bids, the Pool price would be the highest bid 
and be paid to all bidders and retails would be forced to buy their supplies from the Pool 
(Thomas 2005). The intention of the Power Pool was to lower barriers to entry for 
Britain’s generators and retailers.  
The following graph shows the bid and ask wholesale price in Great Britain, to 
demonstrate that prices are more complex than only assuming the market to be 
liberalized. Bid and ask prices show a downward trend, where bid prices are always 
higher, with some spikes such as the beginning of year 2010. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Bid and Ask Prices in the UK  
 
Source: OFGEN, online overall and average prices (2012). 
Note: Bid is continuous line, Ask is dotted line. 
 
By 2004, Britain’s electricity market appeared to be competitive. No company owned 
more than 15% of market share. However, financially distressed companies owned 40% 
of capacity. The experience of privatization and deregulation in Britain has been judged a 
failure (Thomas 2005). The Power Pool mechanism was undermined by the allowance of 
bilateral contracts in the market. Under these arrangements, a generator and supplier 
contracted for a fixed price regardless of the Pool price. British generators were required 
by the government to buy British coal for three years following privatization, for which 
the pass-through of prices of inputs were compulsorily being granted to final prices by 
generators. The contracts were renewed for five years in 1993. The price for British coal 
was well above world market price at the time. The government was also forced to 
subsidize the nuclear plants. All these arrangements undermined the establishment of a 
competitive market for energy in Great Britain. Failure to break up the large generating 
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companies, bilateral contracts between generators and suppliers, and the subsidies to the 
nuclear plants all worked against the establishment of a competitive generating capacity 
competing for access to a well-regulated transmission network (Thomas 2005). 
Interestingly, the experience of privatization in Britain resulted in lower prices. However, 
this had little to do with privatization and more to do with outside influences. In 1996, the 
government eliminated the subsidy to nuclear plants. Between 1990 and 2001, the price 
of fossil fuels fell between 30% and 50%. Privatization did allow for the elimination of 
monopoly pricing. Three foreign companies, Electricite de France, E.ON, and RWE have 
fared well in the British market, and they have added outside competition in the former 
monopoly market in Great Britain. Few, if any of these price decreases have been passed 
on to British consumers. Thomas (2005) passes harsh judgment on the British electricity 
market, stating “The criterion on which the reforms must be judged is whether efficient 
markets have been created. On this criterion, they have failed.” 
During the structural adjustment era in Latin America, many countries restructured their 
electricity markets following the British example. Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia had all begun to reform their power markets by the mid-1990s and by 2005 
Mexico and Venezuela were the only two Latin American countries that had engaged in 
very little reform (Millan 2005). However, the motivations for reform in these developing 
countries were different than they were for Britain. Developed countries liberalized their 
electricity sectors to reap the benefits of greater efficiency while Chile (the “pioneer” of 
electricity liberalization) and other Latin American countries had suffered economic 
crises during the 1970s and 1980s, and pursued liberalization and privatization as a 
means of relieving state governments from investing capital in public utilities (Weigt 
2009). 
5.3.2 Chile as Latin American Leading Restructured Market, and Partnership with 
Argentina 
Chile was the first Latin American country to restructure its electricity sector. State 
officials drew on what little global experience there was in 1982 when they privatized the 
sector, unbundled generation from distribution, and implemented spot pricing and 
marginal cost pricing. Chile was among the first countries to use the “merchant 
transmission” mechanism, which meant generators paid for transmission access to 
existing lines as well as for new lines, either by building their own or by negotiating with 
transmission companies. This became problematic because it did not allow transmission 
companies to charge consumers for expansion, and it was difficult to attract investment in 
new lines (Pollitt 2004a; Pollitt 2004b). 
Chile established the National Energy Commission (CNE) to set distribution charges and 
report to the Minister of Energy. The Superintendent of Prices of Electricity and Fuels 
ensured quality of service and that all firms abide by laws and regulations. Despite the 
privatization and horizontal unbundling of generation, the sector remained highly 
concentrated in the hands of three firms: Endesa, AES Gener, and Tractevel. In 2004, 
Chile enacted the ley corta or “short law” in an attempt to overcome many of the 
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shortcomings of restructuring, including this highly concentrated generation sector and 
the difficulty of attracting investment in transmission expansion (Pollitt 2004a). 
Chile’s restructuring and privatization program as a whole did succeed in attracting 
investment and expanding transmission lines. The number of households with electricity 
more than doubled between 1982 and 2002, prices fell substantially for industrial 
consumers (the effect on residential prices is less clear), and labor productivity improved 
dramatically. Chile, the pioneer of electricity reform in Latin America, set the wheels in 
motion for the rest of the continent (Pollitt 2004a). The following graph shows the main 
Interconnected System (SIN) node prices in this economy. Prices have recently 
experienced an upward trend, mainly due to drought conditions in 2008 in the sub-
continent, since Chile shares water resources for generation with Argentina: 
 
Figure 5.2 
Chile Energy Prices 1982-2011 
 
Source: Chile Comisión Nacional de Energía. Retrieved February 22, 2012, at http://www.cne.cl/ 
cnewww/opencms/06_Estadisticas/energia/Electricidad.html. 
 
In 1992 and 1993 Argentina passed Law 24,605, which privatized 80% of its generation 
sector, 60% of its distribution, and all of its transmission. It vertically and horizontally 
unbundled the industry and its two largest state-owned companies, Servicios Electricos 
del Gran Buenos Aires and Agua y Energia Electrica, were broken up into a number of 
generation and distribution firms. Like Britain, Argentina realized the natural monopoly 
character of transmission and distribution and established an independent national 
electricity regulator to prevent firms from exploiting market power. The state recognized 
that generation would be a competitive market, however it did mandate that all generators 
receive a uniform rate. By 2001 there were more than 40 generation firms and more than 
30 distribution utilities in Argentina (Pollitt 2004b). 
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Argentina mimicked Britain and Chile’s privatization and wholesale market designs. It 
used a cost based bidding system and an independent systems operator. It followed 
Britain’s lead when it unbundled generation, transmission, and distribution, and created 
MEM, a Wholesale Electricity Market, which in 2004 covered approximately 93% of 
Argentines’ demand. Its generation sector proved less concentrated and more competitive 
than most European and North American countries, according to Pollitt (2004b). 
Again, one of the major challenges of transmission expansion is deciding who pays for 
the new lines. Argentina used the “Public Contest” mechanism, whereby consumers 
retroactively pay for expansion. This mechanism proved problematic because users who 
were not the ones receiving large economic gains from the expansion, became reluctant 
to pay for new transmission lines. Estache and Trujillo (2008) stress the fact that 
infrastructure restructuring via privatization is more successful when it incorporates 
stricter regulations alongside market driven forces (see also Pollitt 2004b). 
The restructuring and privatization of Argentina’s electricity sector succeeded in 
attracting a high degree of foreign investment (although many argue that it is difficult to 
measure the direct results of electricity market restructuring, due to the structural 
adjustment period and subsequent increased foreign investment into the economy at 
large). In 2004 electricity prices were lower than anywhere else in Latin America and in 
most of the world. Plant availability and labor productivity also improved drastically 
(Dubash and Singh 2005). 
5.3.3 The Scandinavian Regional Market 
With a competitive international market, Scandinavia is often touted as the quintessential 
example of successful privatization, deregulation, and energy market integration. The 
slow pace of privatization and the role of public ownership mark the Scandinavian 
experience as unique from most other attempts at liberalization and market integration. 
The focus for Nordic reforms on the establishment of a competitive market and less on 
privatization also makes the Scandinavian experience different from others (Dugstad and 
Roland 2003).  
Norwegian reforms began with an act passed in Parliament in 1990. The institutional 
structure was completed in 1993. Norway’s power companies were required to separate 
grid and production activities. The responsibility for the grid was hived off from 
Statkraft, the major public utility company, and placed in the care of newly created 
Stattnett. Norway removed any remaining impediment to competition in 1997. Reforms 
in Sweden were similar in nature to Norway’s with the addition of the requirement for 
complete separation of distribution and supply activities (Dugstad and Roland 2003). 
In 1996, Norway and Sweden integrated their power markets. Svenska Kraftnet, 
Sweden’s grid operator acquired 50% of Statkraft. The new entity was dubbed Nord 
Pool. Power companies in Finland were granted access to Nord Pool later that year. 
Finland was fully integrated into Nord Pool in 1998. Denmark joined in two stages. First 
Jutland entered in 1999, followed by Zealand the next year. Today, all power trade 
among the four countries is conducted through Nord Pool as a coordinated power 
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exchange in the regional market NORDEL that accounted for 9% of the total European 
installed capacity since 2000, according to Bielecki (2004). The major factor influencing 
the success of Nordic energy liberalization is the elimination of the national policies of 
self-sufficiency, a characteristic unique to the Scandinavian market and not present in 
North America. This could be a main impediment to full integration in North America 
along the lines of the Nordic example. In the current Nord Pool market, Denmark is 
typically a capacity exporter, while Norway and Sweden are importers, while the 
compact NORDEL exports both to the European Russia and also to the South (the so-
called UCTE market, led by Germany and France), with high capacity connectors, and 
insured installed capacity, to face energy balances with high variations in the pool 
(Dugstad and Roland 2003; Montravel 2004). 
The experience of the Nordic countries seems to suggest that the transmission network 
works best as a public good. National champions Stattnett in Norway and Svenska 
Stattkraft in Sweden are firmly in control of a large part of the Scandinavian transmission 
grid. Working under a common, independent regulator these two companies are able to 
ensure reliable, low-cost electricity to the Nordic energy market (Dugstad and Roland 
2003). 
5.3.4 Spain and its Dismembered Regions 
Attempted deregulation in the Spanish electricity market provides an excellent example 
of how firms attempt to utilize market power. The two largest electricity providers, 
Endesa and Iderbola, act as a duopoly in the market, with several smaller firms 
participating. While Spain was able to establish an independent regulator in 1997, the two 
largest firms have been able to outmaneuver it. Political ties to the Ministry of Industry 
and contracts with the largest producer of fuel for generation have enabled Spain’s twin 
electrical powerhouses to get around much of Spanish regulation (Arocena, Kuhn, and 
Regibeau 1999). Arguments for this situation include the need to have large companies in 
order to compete on the global electricity market. However, Spain is barely connected to 
even its closest neighbors, France and Portugal. Not breaking up the two utility giants 
prior to privatization has allowed them to become practically monopolies (Arocena, 
Kuhn, and Regibeau 1999).  
5.4 Literature Review on Approaches to Grid Evaluation 
There is much debate concerning the optimal structure of an integrated energy market. 
The type of transmission system, the role of generators and regulators, and benefits of 
vertical integration versus unbundled systems are questions plaguing the energy industry. 
Existing literature provides suggestions as to how to identify the current systems that 
work best and how to design the most efficient grids. 
Design of the optimal network structure must take into account many elements of 
generation, distribution, transmission, and regulation. According to Tangeras (2005), the 
optimal network structure depends on four challenges. The first challenge is finding a 
common regulator that can successfully balance the interests of all member states, as well 
as deciding whether one or more regulators should manage the transnational network. 
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The second dilemma is the fact that market integration will vary from one country to 
another. The third is substitutability versus complementarily of network characteristics. 
And the fourth is the social cost of operator rent. A thorough analysis of how domestic 
and international pools have confronted these challenges in the past provides lessons 
concerning what the optimal structure is for North America. 
Schweppe (1988) identifies the transmission grid as essential to the functioning of power 
markets. The role of the transmission grid in a post-restructuring setting is to increase 
competition among generators, in addition to its role of improving reliability and meeting 
demand. While market-based competition among generators may be ideal, the 
transmission grid is the ultimate natural monopoly. In the context of an international grid, 
debate now turns to who should own, operate, and invest in grid expansion and 
maintenance. Leautier and Thelen (2009) provide an overview on grid expansion and 
then compare experiences from 16 jurisdictions that have restructured power systems 
over the last 20 years. They assert that “while vertical separation may be necessary, it is 
not sufficient to induce grid expansion: a well designed incentive scheme is also 
required.” These incentives include financial rewards and penalties for controlling 
congestion. When both vertical separation and specific incentives are present, significant 
congestion reduction is observed.  
Tangeras (2005) discusses whether an integrated or separated transmission grid is the best 
option. In this example, he cites the Scandinavian energy market as a textbook case of 
optimal network structure. Each member of Nord Pool has its own national regulatory 
agency, while the entire network is overseen by a common regulatory agency. Most 
current literature favors unbundling over vertical integration of the network structure. 
However, Leautier and Thelen question whether full vertical unbundling is necessary, or 
whether “legal unbundling” is sufficient enough to induce grid expansion (Leautier and 
Thelen 2009). Again, Tangeras presents the Scandinavian network structure as the 
ultimate compromise between a separated and integrated network structure. 
A properly operating transmission grid in an efficient market will significantly reduce the 
risk of congestion. Persistent congestion problems logically seem to necessitate grid 
expansion. However, Leautier and Thelen emphasize that reduction in the cost of 
congestion is not the only way to measure the necessity of grid expansion. Factors such 
as load growth, fuel prices, availability of alternative energy sources and lack of adequate 
generating capacity also contribute to congestion and may not necessarily be related to an 
inadequate transmission infrastructure. Numerous articles suggest that regulatory 
contracts can be structured to induce an independent transmission company to expand the 
grid optimally, under various alternative scenarios ranging from command and control by 
a regulator, passing through allocating part of expansion incentives to market forces and 
part to Financial Transmission Rights (LTFTRs) plus reserve funds to full market social 
allocation of any grid improvement (Leautier 2000, Vogelsang 2001, Hogan et al. 2007). 
While much focus has been given to the role of the transmission system, the transmission 
grid represents only about 6% to 10% of costs of producing electricity for many power 
systems, but given the nature of sunk costs and network externalities, making the long-
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run investment is a complex project with less than clear profitability outcomes. As a 
natural monopoly, it is likely that the transmission grid will be publicly owned. How then 
can competition be created in the electricity markets? The answer lies with the role of the 
generators. Competition among generators is the key to creating an efficient market-
based energy system. Bye and Hope (2005) provide a description of the proper design 
and operation of a market-based power market. They list five basic requirements: 
1. A market for trade; 
2. Instruments for risk hedging; 
3. Short-term markets to balance supply and demand; 
4. Markets for investment in new capacity; and 
5. Markets for trade in environmental energy products.  
Thomas (2005) judges the results of Britain’s liberalization of its electricity system by the 
criteria of whether or not efficient retail and wholesale markets have been created. The 
government’s priority was to ensure the separation of transmission from generation. 
Competition among privately owned generation companies was expected to significantly 
reduce prices. High entry barriers to new generation capacity resulted in the failure of the 
British wholesale market to promote competition and reduce prices. While prices have 
been lowered in the British market, it has been due to exogenous factors, such as 
decreases in the price of fossil fuels and the undervalued sale of power stations by the 
British government. 
The literature on existing integrated energy markets identifies many cases of success and 
failures. The experience of the Scandinavian countries is generally judged the 
penultimate success story of an integrated energy pool with an efficient market-based 
system of generator competition. Nord Pool meets four out of five of Bye and Hope’s 
five basic criteria for a market-based power system. The authors maintain that Nord Pool 
does not meet the requirement for investment in new capacity due to concerns over 
environmental degradation by expanding capacity. This has resulted in price increases, 
but not yet to the level triggering further expansion. 
Dugstad and Roland (2003) analyze the formation of the Scandinavian electricity market. 
While judged the most successful international pool in existence, Nord Pool still faces 
challenges, particularly in the area of new capacity building. Electricity prices in 
Scandinavia have significantly decreased since Nord Pool’s creation; however, that has 
been due to the utilization of surplus capacity in the national systems. Conflicting 
political agendas concerning the environment have stalled the building of new generating 
capacity to serve the Nordic market. The most significant point of this literature is the 
assertion that a “market-based system will not work without the support of a well-
designed regulation” (p. 143). Competition was assumed to decrease the role of 
regulation. In practice, the tendency is however for an increased role of the regulator in 
competitive markets. 
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As we strive to design a successful transnational North American grid, we must integrate 
the theoretical work of authors like Joskow, Tangeras, Bye, and Hope with the more 
specific case studies of the Scandinavian, British, and Spanish experiences. Furthermore 
one must carefully consider elements of the political and economic climate of North 
America that will determine what the optimal structure is for North America.  
5.5 Application of Bye Requirements to the North American Grid 
Bye and Hope’s (2005) five requirements for a market-based power system are largely 
present in North America. The market for trade is evident in the volume of  binational 
trade that already occurs between Canada and the United States and the growing demand 
for power along the United States-Mexico border. Since load is the most important factor 
determining the price of electricity, drastic climate differences among and within the 
three North American countries ensure that there will be high demand among consumers 
and wholesale buyers for increased trade. Recent blackouts and congestion in the Pacific 
Northwest are also evidence that that there is a market for increased trade even between 
the United States and Canada.  
Instruments for risk hedging are also present in North America. While many markets in 
the United States no longer trade electricity futures, they do use forward contracts in over 
the counter markets to protect themselves against price volatility. Other North American 
markets take advantage of weather derivatives. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for 
example, started a market for Heating Degree Days and Cooling Degree Days derivatives 
in 1999, and by 2005 it had reached a trading volume of 30,000. Weather derivatives are 
a major component of trade between Canada and the United States and will continue to 
play a key role in the expansion of trade in that part of North America (Oum, Oren, and 
Deng 2006). As far as Bye and Hope’s third requirement, short-term markets to balance 
supply and demand, a number of ISO’s throughout the United States provide real time 
market prices. ERCOT, for example provides day-ahead market prices as well real-time 
market prices on an interval basis.  
Bye and Hope’s fourth requirement, markets for investment in new capacity, has been a 
challenge in North America as it has been in energy markets around the world. In the 
United States and Canada, investment in transmission lags behind investment in 
generation, which means that areas that could benefit from more trade, such as the Pacific 
Northwest and western Canada, suffer from congestion and lack of infrastructure. As 
demand increases in both countries, so will investment in generation, which will call for 
steep investments in transmission capacity to avoid congestion (Egan 2007). Investment 
in connections along the US-Mexico border will also have to increase in order to meet 
growing demand and generation investment there. There is clearly demand for investment 
in new capacity, but the challenge will be determining who takes on the risk of 
investment, a particular challenge for an international pool.  
The final requirement, markets for trade in environmental energy products, is another 
challenge. The degree to which North American governments mandate reductions in 
emissions from fossil-fuel generation varies from country to country. Canada has been 
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the most committed to the Kyoto protocol where we have seen a surge in hydro 
renewable projects throughout the provinces. Cost effective, long-term investment in 
environmental energy products has been difficult in the United States as the US Congress 
constantly debates bills that require increased emissions reductions. While there have 
been binational agreements such as the Canada-US Clean Air Agreement, more must be 
done in order to foster a larger North American market for trade in environmental energy 
products (Egan 2007). 
As for Mexico, it does not completely pass the test for a market-based power system as 
established by Bye and Hope. Criteria 1, 3, and 5 are at least partially present between the 
two neighboring economies of the United States and Mexico. Mexico does not utilize 
risk-hedging instruments, but rather has a shadow market for wheeling electricity sold 
from private generators (auto-generating and co-generating permit holders) to the 
integrated CENACE grid. These prices are bilateral and over-the-counter, rather than 
transparent and traded in a true market. Most importantly, there are no markets for long-
term capacity expansion in Mexico (Ibarra-Yunez 2011; Martimort 2008). 
5.6 The Inclusion of Renewables to the Stressed Grid 
Currently, there are competing views on transmission expansion. Some argue expansion 
should be avoided at all costs to be replaced by energy savings via smart grid 
technologies and more distributed generation, while others favor a vision of a 
“transmission superhighway” connecting the entire North American market and allowing 
more renewable energy sources to plug into the grid (Fox-Penner 2010). 
Our hypothesis is that increased trade of electricity among the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico will lead to lower prices and to an increase in the utilization of clean energy as a 
provider of electricity. We also expect to find another relationship between the utilization 
of clean energy resources and price. One particular sample (Denmark) has suggested that 
legal structures, which require a substantial investment in clean energy resources, can 
lead to a smaller decline, or even an increase, in price, at least in the short run. 
The integration of renewable energy sources to the transmission system poses a unique 
challenge to grid expansion. (Chapter 9 spells out all intricacies of renewable energy 
markets in North America.) In short, renewable energy sources, particularly solar and 
wind power, are typically located in rural areas, far from the most energy-hungry 
locations such as cities. The transmission grid was built to transport power from large 
power plants to dispersed load centers. Transporting power from small, remote locations 
generating intermittent power was not originally thought of as part of the transmission 
system. Expanding the transmission grid into a complex mesh by way of a “transmission 
backbone” into areas where renewable such as solar and wind have a high potential for 
development could greatly enhance the possibility of bringing these sources to 
consumers. 
With the establishment of this backbone producers would only be responsible for their 
smaller connection to the larger grid, thus providing incentives to develop these 
renewable sources (Booz Allen Hamilton 2007). In addition, the intermittent nature of 
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these types of energy sources exacerbates the difficulty of transmission expansion, since 
it is unclear at what capacity lines should be built to bring these sources to the grid. In 
general, experts have argued for overbuilding rather than underbuilding the grid. No 
matter how it is accomplished, grid expansion always increases total social welfare when 
compared to not expanding (Schill et al. 2011). However, the same problem of financing 
and cost recovery exists in the case of renewable energy. Building a renewable energy 
plant requires less time than it takes to expanding the transmission grid. But, without a 
guarantee of access to the grid, producers are reluctant to build. (Booz Allen Hamilton 
2007). 
5.7 Conclusions: The Future of North America’s Grid 
In this chapter we proposed that the four major reasons for grid expansion and increased 
trade of electricity in North America are reliability, congestion, price, and environment. 
As congestion increases throughout the continent due to growing populations and 
industry, reliability will diminish, prices will rise, and the continued dependence on fossil 
fuels will be devastating to the environment. While the introduction of smart grid 
technologies may be a fix in the long run, expanding transmission capacity and increasing 
trade throughout the region is the most effective way to address these concerns. 
Challenges to grid expansion include the organization and monitoring of the transmission 
grid, attracting investment in transmission capacity, dealing with congested lines in the 
short versus as well as the long run, and finding methods for pricing electricity that 
incentivize expansion. This chapter has proposed many methods of addressing each of 
these challenges and the next step must be deciding which of these options will work for 
North America.  
Country-specific cases have provided examples of how best to create competition among 
generators to keep prices low for consumers. They also provide lessons on how to 
encourage investment in transmission expansion, ensure reliability, avoid congestion, and 
promote increased integration of renewable energy. By applying Bye and Hope’s 
requirements to markets in North America, we analyzed North America’s readiness to 
increase trade and expand its transmission capacity. 
The anticipated “smart grid” revolution complicates the question of the need for 
transmission capacity expansion, as smart devices and new technologies allow operation 
of the grid closer to its physical limits. In the long run these technologies are expected to 
lower demand for added capacity. However, regulators should be wary of counting on 
these new technologies to solve their transmission troubles. Overexpansion is better for 
social welfare than dangers of underexpansion. 
Finally, we addressed the inclusion of renewables into the grid. Renewable energy 
sources provide a unique challenge to the existing transmission structure since they are 
typically located far from areas that demand the most electricity, such as urban centers. 
Expansion of the transmission grid to reach these areas is necessary to incentivize further 
construction of renewable power sources. 
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Chapter 6.  Cross-Border Cooperation: Assessing Regulatory 
and Political Challenges to the US-Mexico Electricity Market 
by Alejandro Márquez and Michael Simpson 
Abstract 
This chapter identifies the current state of Mexico’s market and regulatory system within 
the framework of structural and market-based liberalization efforts. It reviews 
international trends in the context of challenges to the Mexican situation, examining 
structural, regulatory, and market lessons of the international experience as a lens for 
current Mexican challenges. In particular, it highlights the problems of high costs; 
significant entry barriers to non-utility investors; inefficiencies within the market in the 
form of high prices, strict reliance on contractual obligations, and market rigidity; the 
relationship between lax regulatory structures and the CFE’s uncompetitive monopoly on 
transmission; and, finally, the relationship between US border-state integration and 
continued strength of Mexican electricity exports and imports. In addition to the 
comparative international analysis, it characterizes potential reforms by highlighting the 
relative gap between the interests, objectives, and visions of stakeholders and government 
entities, and provides a blueprint for bridging that gap. 
6.1 Introduction: An Overview of the Market and Regulations in 
Mexico 
Mexico’s electricity sector is at a crossroads. Technical efficiency and factors of 
production are expanding as older generators are retired and new and innovative methods 
of generation are incorporated into the production process. New generation permits 
granted to private producers increased annually until 2009. Mexico has likewise 
increased its overall electricity export margins to the United States nearly ten-fold over 
the past decade (EIA 2011). Moreover, regulatory oversight continues to expand 
incrementally to address the Mexican electricity sector’s increasingly unsustainable 
market structure. Nevertheless, political obstinacy and unfavorable public opinion have 
impeded any attempts at privatization and regulatory reform (Mier-y-Terán 2005). The 
absence of well-defined financial transmission rights and the risks associated with long-
term contracts further hinder investment and infrastructural expansion (Mier-y-Terán 
2005). 
The contemporary electricity market in Mexico can trace its unique challenges to five 
primary events: 
1. The creation of the Comisíon Federal de Electricidad (CFE) in 1934; 
2. The 1960 amendment to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution that placed CFE 
in state hands; 
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3. Passage of the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) in 1975 
and its subsequent revision in 1992 to sanction private generation; 
4. Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by 
Canada, the US, and Mexico, beginning in 1994; and 
5. The evolution of the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) from 1993-1995 
and its incremental regulatory powers in following years. 
While these five events certainly do not fully capture the history of the Mexican 
electricity sector and all its idiosyncrasies, they do underscore the key structural realities 
and sectoral players that currently shape the market. Any potential reforms must therefore 
account for each. 
The Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) was originally developed as utilities that 
would function as both a regulatory body and a supplier to the electricity market. As 
urbanization increased demand for electricity in the cities and a faltering post-war 
economy discouraged private investment in generation, Mexican authorities attempted to 
reconcile the notion of electricity as a public good with the gap between supply and 
demand. To this end, the Mexican Congress first amended Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution in 1960 and subsequently passed the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía 
Eléctrica (LSPEE) in 1975. The former asserted political control over the electricity 
sector, while the latter formally established CFE and the Compañía de Luz y Fuerza del 
Centro (LFC) as the sole public suppliers of electricity.  
The ramifications of nationalizing Mexico’s electricity sector have manifested 
themselves in three significant interrelated ways: (1) providing CFE with a substantial, 
federally-guaranteed budget; (2) consequently ensuring CFE’s overwhelming market 
power by enabling it to invest in infrastructure and capital; and (3) gradually 
accumulating unsustainable levels of public debt in response to growing consumer 
demand (Carreón et al 2003; Ibarra-Yunez 2002). The first two conditions have created 
considerable physical entry barriers to private generators, who must rely on favorable 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) to survive but continue to lack adequate incentives. 
The third has concurrently decreased CFE’s ability to expand efficiently (Mier-y-Terán 
2005; Ibarra-Yunez 2010). 
In response to the mounting burdens associated with its relatively monopolistic market 
power, CFE has attempted to diversify its generation capital. In addition to retiring older, 
oil-based technologies in favor of gas, combined cycle- and coal-based solutions (Peltier 
2011), CFE decision-makers have pledged to transition 25% of their generating capacity 
to renewable energy sources (Bonetto 2010). This reflects a general trend away from fuel 
oil, which saw its supply to generators decline by almost 500 trillion BTUs from 2000 to 
2010 (EIA 2011) and its proportion among generable energy sources decline relative to 
hydroelectric and natural gas during the same period (SENER 2010). 
Following its presidentially-decreed takeover of LFC in 2009, however, CFE is now in 
complete control of all Mexican transmission and distribution functionality and is 
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responsible for more than 70% of all produced electricity in Mexico (Bonetto 2010). This 
development reinforces the conclusion that energy source diversification and 
infrastructural expansion alone do not provide a solution to the challenges of regulatory 
reform, not to mention privatization and unbundling. 
The revisions to LSPEE and passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) occurred only two years apart (1992-1994), reflecting a growing recognition of 
the importance of market liberalization. In response to CFE’s increasing fiscal and 
structural challenges, the Mexican Congress amended LSPEE to allow Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs), co-generators, and self-suppliers to participate in the generation 
market. Private generators were permitted to sell their power through the state-owned 
distributors, reflecting CFE’s and LFC’s duopoly over transmission and distribution until 
2009 when LFC was liquidated. The terms of sale for IPPs further allow for 30-year 
PPAs and minimal pricing flexibility (Ibarra-Yunez 2002). NAFTA and LSPEE, as 
amended, are nonetheless symbolic of the overarching push for electricity market 
liberalization. 
Private producers in Mexico have concurrently encountered a number of limiting factors. 
First, CFE’s continued hegemony in transmission and distribution precludes any sort of 
truly unbundled, competitive market from emerging and has stalled proposals for 
qualified users. Next, the inception of guaranteed credits called PIDIREGAS in 1995, 
redesigned CFE’s infrastructure financing to shift short-term liabilities to long-term 
capacity payments. However, this creates the potential for asset devaluation and debt 
agglomeration (Ibarra-Yunez 2002; Carreón 2003; OECD 2004). This adds a disincentive 
for CFE’s generation subsidiaries to expand their infrastructure over the long run. 
Given the dearth of incentives and CFE’s prevailing market power, private companies 
likewise currently could face little impetus to expand significantly. Finally, while permits 
for private producers have grown steadily during the last decade, the barriers to market 
entry continue to prevent IPP growth from matching market demand. Some have argued 
that self-supply and co-generation firms must expand in order to offset the cost 
limitations on generators who have entered into PPAs with CFE (Demófilo 2005). In 
contrast to many international cases in which additional generating capacity supports the 
need for transmission expansion under various financing options, the Mexican generators 
seeking to invest in expansion projects face legal uncertainties. There are no simple 
answers to the problem of increasing private participation in the generation market, and 
policymakers will have to enact creative solutions in order to encourage investment and 
limit long-term costs. For the time being, PIDIREGAS have been suspended and new, 
more transparent financial instruments are now implemented to IPPs and co-generators 
(Zenon and Rosellon 2010). 
The final—and most weakly pursued—development in the Mexican electricity market 
was the creation of the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) in 1993. Originally 
envisioned to be an advisory body rather than a regulator, CRE was redefined in 1995 as 
a semi-autonomous regulatory body tasked with issuing generation permits and 
overseeing the generation process between non-utilities and utilities (Jacobzone et al. 
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2007). CRE’s relative impotence reflects the fact that regulatory authority over Mexico’s 
utilities lies with the Secretary of Energy (SENER) and the Secretary of the Treasury 
(SHCP). The outsize market power exercised by CFE and other state-owned enterprises 
thus precludes CRE from implementing any comprehensive regulatory reforms. 
Incentive programs, subsidies, tariffs, and pricing structures are likewise determined and 
carried out by SENER and SHCP, while CRE has relatively little impact on the inner-
workings of the market. Without the moderating influence of an independent regulatory 
body, SHCP has tended to keep tariffs artificially low for residential and agricultural 
consumers and high for industrial users (Carreón 2003; OECD 2004; Halpern et al. 
2009). This result diverges from other neighboring markets, where incentives are applied 
primarily to industrial activities. Nevertheless, the resulting subsidies have not as yet 
succeeded in offsetting high costs and have, on the contrary, hampered international 
cooperation and competitive trade. 
Despite CRE’s lack of impact on pricing and incentive structures for utilities, it has seen 
its role, concentrated in non-utilities and their private role in the transition market, 
gradually increase over the past decade. In 2002, the Mexican government charged CRE 
with authorizing permits to exporters of generated electricity (Breceda 2002). Mexico’s 
post-NAFTA trade deficit to the US in electricity generation, coupled with its more 
slowly-expanding investment in infrastructure, thus created the opportunity for the 
government to expand market access to private producers without compromising CFE’s 
domestic market power. CRE’s scope correspondingly expanded beyond its intended 
charge of managing domestic permits. Moreover, the 2008 CRE Law empowered the 
agency to issue directives regarding renewable energy generation. The CRE Law 
represents a marginal increase in CRE’s authority, especially given the relatively high 
cost of generating non-renewable energy sources.  
Physical restructuring and energy source diversification are certainly crucial to the long-
term viability of Mexico’s electricity sector. Without liberalizing (but not necessarily 
privatizing) the market structure, however, electricity generation will fail to meet the 
persisting demand of a portion of its citizenry. Government subsidies to rural areas have, 
by and large, closed the gap between rural and urban electricity needs (Halpern 2009). 
Indeed, roughly 95% of rural residents and 98% of all Mexican citizens now have access 
to electricity (World Bank 2004). Overall generating capacity increased by 48% between 
1999 and 2010, from 35,666 MW to 52,945 MW, while consumer demand increased by 
only 2.8% during the same period (SENER 2010). Still, roughly 6 million Mexicans 
continue to lack access to electricity (Dukert 2007). These numbers suggest that 
incremental reforms do not provide a short-term answer to the problem. 
Most of the literature concerning Mexican electricity sector liberalization emphasizes the 
potential benefits of various internal reforms, such as instituting private financial 
transmission rights, expanding CRE’s regulatory authority, restructuring CFE’s 
transmission and distribution subsidiaries, and extending incentives to industrial 
consumers and capital investors. Given the intractable political response to wholesale 
restructuring of the Mexican electricity sector (Mier-y-Terán 2005), the goal of full 
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market liberalization seems more amenable to medium and long-term solutions. In the 
short term, however, the discrepancy between capacity and demand requires 
unconventional solutions. In particular, this chapter argues that heightened collaboration 
between the US and Mexico would not only provide a stop-gap measure to address 
demand concerns in the short-term, but more importantly facilitate sustainable 
infrastructural investment and long-term market solutions in Mexico. However, 
converging or cooperative policy stances face challenges in the political, economic, 
strategic-visionary, institutional, and practical areas,1 which we critically analyze by 
applying the methodological lens of New Historical and Sociological Institutionalism, but 
also analyzing self-interested motivations of regulatory change. Specifically, the chapter 
aims to develop and contextualize the main challenges and opportunities for regulatory 
decisions and their effects in a concentrated (but arguably more open) market. 
The chapter first reviews relevant theories and methodological frameworks in the 
following section. Section 6.3 grounds the Mexican experience in a comparative 
international analysis by examining analogues in the liberalization of international 
markets and assessing possible bases for Mexican reform. Following a summary of the 
methodological approach in Section 6.4, Section 6.5 characterizes the current makeup of 
institutions, market structures, and regulatory agents in Mexico, including recent 
developments, trends, and implications. Section 6.6 applies an institutional analysis to the 
market and political situations. Finally, Section 6.7 adds a bilateral dimension, discussing 
the current state of US-Mexico electricity border trade and its implications for Mexico’s 
regulatory and market arrangement.  
In this vein, we conclude by addressing the individual and collective concerns of 
stakeholder and governments—both US and Mexican—focusing in particular on the gap 
between short-term interests and long-term viability. Fostering international cooperation 
certainly entails its own list of challenges. The chapter will draw on international 
analogues to provide a general overview of interconnection and international cooperation. 
We thus attempt to reconcile the regulatory and legal challenges associated with 
expanding the interconnection between the US and Mexico, in the broader context of 
integration in the international experience. 
6.2 General Review of International Institutional-Political Analogues 
The privatization of the British electrical power industry in 1989 brought a wave of 
similar reforms around the world, along with many theoretical and technical academic 
works on liberalization of the sector. The interest in Britain’s privatization stems from the 
potential for liberalization to improve efficiency in electricity generation, transmission, 
distribution, and retail supply, lower prices and thus improve social welfare. 
Additionally, regulation helped reduce the costs to governments. Within a larger context, 
deregulation of the electrical power industry is one of the central components to a liberal 
model of economic development that gained political influence in the 1980s and remains 
to this day. The benefits of regulation of the electrical power industry are exemplified in 
                                               
1
 These areas encapsulate the modified stakeholder analysis, which arises from the so-called PESTEL 
framework as a risk-based assessment tool for strategic decisions. 
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the British case, but liberalization still requires further study—especially in the 
implementation of regulation—in order to develop the mechanisms that will help 
societies reap the benefits that the model promises. Woo et al. (2003) show that even the 
textbook examples of deregulation may result in sector failures. Hence, this section will 
analyze the different frameworks of deregulation available and elucidate their potential to 
improve social welfare in different political contexts, particularly in the case of Mexico. 
One of the central components of marketization in the electricity industry involves the 
regulatory regime that will ensure benefits to society. Regulation takes shape in the form 
of rules and a network of institutions that facilitate efficient access to the transmission 
network and allocate scarce transmission capacity. Regulatory institutions must have 
good information, expert staff, and the authority to regulate distribution and transmission 
prices. Moreover, the regulatory bodies could incorporate performance-based regulatory 
mechanisms that set standards for the quality of service (Joskow 2008); cost-of-service 
regulation that is more centered on day-to-day operations; or benchmark regulation, 
which uses econometric models to set generation standards. Stern and Cubbin (2005) 
emphasize the importance of establishing sound and powerful regulatory agencies in 
Latin America by noting that they are the foundation for promoting investment in the 
sector. CFE is the principal player in the market, while the only regulatory agency (CRE) 
simply oversees non-utilities. If, as Stigler (1971) indicates, “regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” then the need for a strong 
and autonomous regulatory agency in Mexico is clear. Moreover, an in-depth analysis 
must consider formal and informal aspects of regulation. Often, the regulatory framework 
looks good on paper, but informal regulatory governance may be more helpful in 
explaining failures and promoting policies attuned to political realities on the ground 
(Stern and Cubbin 2005). 
But what do we mean by strong regulatory institutions? Lofstedt and Vogel (2001) show 
that trust in these institutions is key to their authority and power. They contend that the 
US model of incorporating risk assessment with risk management tasks in regulatory 
operations (in contrast to the current European model, which separates tasks) will 
increase trust in institutions and eliminate unproductive adversarial dynamics. New 
currents of regulatory policies are considering opening forums to civil society and 
interested parties in electricity power regulation. Participatory regulation, then, will 
increase the legitimacy of regulators and improve its services to clients.  
Neither strong regulatory institutions nor privatization will be enough, though. 
Competition is by far the single most significant variable in fostering performance 
improvements in developing countries. However, weak competition can bring some 
performance improvements when a sound regulatory framework has been established 
(Zhang et al. 2007). It is also important to keep in mind that social welfare is higher when 
the regulatory agencies are established before liberalization, as opposed to erecting the 
regime as the market is restructured (Ibarra-Yunez 2002). Ultimately, improved market 
conditions for electricity consumers will hinge on the legitimate, participatory, and strong 
regulatory institutions that will attract investment. From this point, investment and 
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competition will follow, which will set off gains in efficiency, better service, and lower 
wholesale and retail prices.  
6.3 Theoretical Framework on Institutional Economics and Decision 
Making 
6.3.1 Economic Theory on Regulation 
One of the most recognized theories of regulation is the normative analysis as a positive 
theory (NPT), which posits that regulation is necessary in free markets when allocation of 
goods and services is not efficient, i.e., market failure. Market failure will normally arise 
from externalities (external effects of economic activity that are not reflected in prices), 
asymmetric information, imperfect competition (insufficient alternatives in supply or 
demand), or a combination of these (Ogus 2004). Consequently, economic analyses will 
identify the failure of the market and determine which method of intervention will fix it 
at the least possible cost. Ideally, the point where marginal costs of regulation meet the 
marginal benefit would provide the optimal economic solution. Additionally, the 
institutional makeup of regulatory regimes is another factor that merits consideration. It is 
within government and quasi-independent institutions that incentives are shaped to wield 
the most efficient outcomes in the market. Finally, the enforcement of regulation is 
equally important to correct market failures (Ogus 2004). 
The economic theory of regulation proposed by members of the Chicago School of 
Economics indicates that regulation in democratic contexts is not a free good, but can be 
framed as a market for regulation. Regulation is a good demanded by constituents 
(consumers and industries) and supplied by regulators (or politicians) via political 
processes. In other words, both regulators and politicians seek to maximize their 
individual utility. This market dynamic to regulation facilitates a better understanding of 
the forces that drive regulation. In other words, regulators will react to whoever provides 
the most effective demand. Stigler (1971) showed that industries seek to influence the 
coercive ability of the state by “acquiring” regulation to meet their own demands. 
Another way to consider the acquisition of regulatory mechanisms is simply as a transfer 
of wealth. Industries “pay” for regulation by providing votes and resources to politicians. 
Additionally, one could find cases of ex ante influence of “affected” participants before a 
regulatory regime is implemented, whereas in other cases industry lobbyists act after or 
ex post regulation implementation (Beato and Laffont 2002).  
The source of regulation, then, may be dependent on the structure of the industry in 
question. Industries with economies of scale at the local level and with no externalities on 
other communities will see oversight bodies develop endogenously (Beato 2002). 
Alternatively, those industries operating at a larger scale (e.g. regional, national) cannot 
adopt regulatory regimes from various endogenous sources. Rather, these will require a 
high degree of technical expertise and coordination that, for practical purposes, will be 
implemented exogenously. As a result, the cooptation of regulation is feasible and 
economical at this scale. 
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The most sought-after form of regulation is that which limits the numbers of new entrants 
to the market (such as quotas over tariffs and occupational licenses), even if economic 
efficiency is trumped as a result. The degree of influence (and outcomes) is dependent on 
the size of the industry (Stigler 1971). Peltzman (1976) later enhanced the theory by 
showing that industries must spend resources on gathering information and interacting 
with politicians—costs that must be offset by the prospective benefits of “acquiring” 
regulation. This marginal condition would theoretically allow smaller groups to 
effectively demand transfers from regulators.  
Additionally, the larger the group that seeks influence, the larger the costs required are to 
“pay” politicians, i.e. diseconomies of scale (in the form of votes, resources, campaign 
contributions, placating the opposition, etc.). Becker (1983) proposes that groups 
competing for transfers would support changes in regulation that reduce economic 
deadweight losses arising from regulation. Peltzman (1989) further determined that 
deregulation itself is a result of a coalition’s interest in reducing costs associated with 
regulation that are higher than without regulation. Another alternative is that regulation 
itself causes economic inefficiencies, thereby costing more than an unregulated regime. 
Stigler’s theory ultimately holds in showing that, as long as groups/coalitions see a 
benefit in (de)regulating an industry, they will exert pressure on politicians to regulate in 
the manner that maximizes their utility. 
Another school of thought, the Virginia School of public choice, is critical of the private 
interest school (Chicago) for focusing on prescriptive rather than normative analyses. The 
overriding point is that the costs incurred in extracting rents from regulators are a waste 
to social welfare. Similarly, the concentration of power to influence, or “acquire,” 
regulation by small groups over the interests of the majority results in gross inefficiencies 
(Ogus 2004). Public choice scholars, then, have focused on who wins and who loses from 
regulations and public management, with a conviction to test their benefits to society 
(Mashaw 1989).  
Finally, the progressive law-and-economics school of regulation has strived at getting 
economic incentives right. This involves the use of regulatory impact analysis, a type of 
cost-benefit analysis, to provide better information to policymakers in the design and 
implementation of regulatory policy (Ogus 2004). This school of regulation gained 
influence as governments began relying on economic expertise in the 1980s and 1990s, 
during which the OECD encouraged the so-called technocratization of legislative and 
regulatory processes. The standards for these analyses are based on aggregate social 
welfare, so their input, which does not provide a determinative answer as to what is 
socially desirable, is necessarily limited (Adler and Posner 1999). As a result, regulatory 
impact analyses works as a complement, rather than a substitute, to regulatory decision-
making (Ogus 2004). 
Up to this point, the discussion on literature has focused on conceptions of regulation 
developed in the United States that generally entail specific sets of rules to be enforced 
by some regulatory agency. Regulation outside the United States before the 1990s had a 
more broad meaning that encompassed all efforts by the state to steer the economy, 
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including taxation, redistribution, subsidies, among other measures. The rise of global-
wide regulatory reforms and independent regulatory agencies led to a convergence of 
these meanings, which is now used by economists. Additionally, a third definition of 
regulation has gained notoriety with global problems, such as climate change and 
weapons of mass destruction, which involves all mechanisms of social control—even 
those that are unintentional or outside state purview. 
It seems, then, that regulation is increasing in its technical and institutional character, as 
well as its scope. The dominant interpretation of this type of regulation points to the 
increasing use of state authority to set standards and rules in spheres previously 
dominated by public ownership, public subsidies, and directly provided services. In other 
words, regulation is the extension of the modern state (Hood et al. 1999).  
Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) caution that the new regulatory state advances more in 
some sectors of the economy than in others. The regulatory state does not emerge from a 
vacuum, but rather inserts itself in different layers of governance created for different 
purposes and at different times. As a result, the types of regulatory states vary. Opinions 
on the underlying forces that create the regulatory state likewise diverge. Some consider 
the regulatory state a result of imitation across regions and countries, based on 
conventions of best practices for economic governance. Others consider the regulatory 
state an outcome of regional integration within the context of liberalization and 
technocratic legitimacy. For others, the rise of the regulatory state is merely a political 
and administrative process at the national level. The variety of stances suggests the 
multiple levels of regulation that Levi-Faur posits (2004) around the political-institutional 
dimensions of the regulator, its conditioned strategies by the state of the industry and the 
regulators’ original “endowments,” and legal settings. 
The discussion of the regulatory state has also explored other political foundations. It 
seems that the liberalization of the last 20 years would lead to less regulation, one marked 
with conservative, classically liberal underpinnings. However, the rise of the regulatory 
state provides a messier picture of the political forces behind regulation. Braithwaite 
(2000) perhaps provides the clearest interpretation of the regulatory state. He contends 
that the steering (thinking, guiding, directing) and rowing (service-provision) forces of 
regulatory regimes have come from either civil society or the state. During the 19th 
century, both activities were conducted by civil society; both by the state during the post-
war era; and steering by the state and rowing by civil society in the neoliberal (post-
1980s) era (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). 
6.3.2 Liberalization and Regulation Across Countries: Some Relevant Examples 
In addition to being the first privatization of a national electrical power industry, Britain’s 
case is considered among the most successful (Joskow 2008). The process involved the 
division or unbundling of generating, transmission, and distribution operations of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). The process of liberalization began with 
the entry of independent generators to the market, who sold electricity to CEGB, 
followed by the creation of National Power and Power Gen (the former CEGB) and their 
sale to institutional (28%), national (49%), and international (23%) investors. 
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Transmission and distribution were also privatized following the institutional structure 
already in place. These changes resulted in lower prices relative to other European 
markets, lower carbon emissions, fewer employees in the industry, and greater economic 
efficiency and productivity. 
The regulation of National Power and Power Gen (now RWE Npower and E. ON UK 
respectively) is carried out by the Office of Energy Regulation (OFFER). It guards 
against duopolistic behavior and also established price caps after privatization. 
Subsequently, the UK adopted a performance-based ratemaking mechanism to regulate 
the sector. Among its benefits are increased penetration to areas that did not previously 
have service and reductions in losses due to poor maintenance and antiquated equipment 
(Joskow 2008). However, the positive outcomes of liberalization were not felt among the 
consumer base because most of the savings accrued among stockholders. 
Norway’s government, on the other hand, sought to liberalize its electricity power 
industry through structural competition while keeping ownership of generation 
operations. Liberalization involved the privatization of electricity transmission, 
introduction of a common carrier system, grid access to third parties, and the 
establishment of voluntary wholesale markets (Weigt 2009). It is important to consider 
that the Norwegian government liberalized its electricity sector due to environmental 
concerns and not necessarily to reduce prices. As a result, Norway’s regulatory 
framework employed cost-of-service regulation, which ultimately led to reduced capacity 
investment and congestion translating to market power (Woo et al. 2003). 
The experience of large, centralized countries such as China is one of slower 
liberalization, mostly due to its regime structure. China’s breakup of the vertically-
integrated and centrally-managed industry has been slow, and today only generation is 
partly restructured to increase competition (Weigt 2009). China’s regulatory agency, the 
State Electricity Regulatory Commission of China (SERC) lacks authority and 
independence in pricing and investment decisions due to the centralized nature of the law 
instituting the agency. Therefore, China’s incentives to regulate might not arise from a 
will to decentralize authority to increase investment, but to achieve other goals consistent 
with its regime structure. Rather, Austin (2005) suggests that China’s ascending role in 
the world economy will incentivize the establishment of a regulatory framework that 
makes the energy sector efficient, more than anything else. 
The experiences of these countries indicate that the decision to liberalize the electricity 
power industry involves a political context and a will to steer the sector in a particular 
direction, be it price reduction, environmental protection, or increased energy efficiency. 
Having a clear objective in this respect will deepen our analysis of liberalization and 
make policy-making for market integration more effective. 
6.3.3 Transnational Cooperation on Trade and Regulation: Looking Forward 
Across the World  
The prime example of a transnational regulatory cooperation is the European Union. 
Jabko (2004) indicates that the intriguing aspect of regulatory reform in the European 
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Union coincided with the expansion of market forces during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Equally surprising is the wide scope of these reforms that would not have taken place 
under regular economic pressures. The most dramatic regulatory reforms in Europe took 
place in sectors where technological innovation was slow and market forces were weak; 
in other words, where the forces of globalization were not as strong, justifying the focus 
on the technological aspects as drivers of regulation. This adds a contextual dimension to 
regulatory supply and shows that there are different frameworks for regulation. 
As markets were liberalized in the 1980s and 1990s, new regulatory frameworks also 
emerged and support for this package grew as public intervention in the economy came 
under scrutiny. Many of the non-market interventions implemented during this period, 
however, carried over from old monopoly regulations due to the market imperfections 
and engineering limitations, such as those found in the wholesale and retail electricity 
markets (Joskow and Tirole 2005). This policy momentum created a strong support base 
for market liberalization, and the framework to both increase economic efficiency and 
create a complementary regulatory regime offered by the EU convinced countries to 
participate in this project (Jabko 2004).  
With the political will to cooperate on regional liberalization and regulatory reforms, 
countries must engage in a conversation about the financing of transnational trade if it 
requires infrastructure. In the case of Mexico, this will require large sums of sunk costs 
that must be allocated among all participants. As a result, mechanisms to deal with the 
free-rider problem must be established in order to provide enough confidence on the 
projects. According to Laffont and Martimont (2004), international agencies should play 
a central role in coordinating financing obligations. In the case of Europe, the EU 
provided a strong institution with political capital and an attractive reciprocity scheme 
that provided incentives for cooperation. In other settings, cooperation is more difficult. 
The mechanism described by Laffont and Martimont often impose restrictions on 
domestic redistributive policies, reduce consumption by the poor, and condition prices. 
The limitations imposed on individual countries will reduce the likelihood of cooperation, 
the effect of which will be heightened if levels of industrialization are disparate among 
participants. 
6.3.4 Regulation in Latin America 
Regulation in Latin America has increased dramatically since the 1980s, when the debt 
crisis signaled the end of import-substitution industrialization and the start of a series of 
structural adjustments. Latin America’s regulatory capitalism thus rose to unprecedented 
levels, going further and faster than any other region of the world. Of course, the pace 
varied for each country and, as Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005) point out, the start of this 
trend began early in the 20th century—suggesting that regulatory reforms are not 
structural in nature, but rather sectoral and a result of diffusion. Their study on the 
growing number of regulatory agencies in the region shows that probabilities of 
regulatory reform in a country are higher if other countries adopted similar changes, 
rather than if reforms occurred in other sectors of the same country. The authors suggest 
that socialization and information sharing within the international community of 
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technocrats (policy-designers) is responsible for the uniformity in regulation change in 
Latin America. Another potential explanation, which they allude to but do not develop, is 
that privatization is largely correlated with the emergence of new agencies. Privatization 
in the region has grown since structural adjustments were likely prescribed by the 
International Monetary Fund and Washington. Perhaps regulatory reforms were also part 
of the model forced onto Latin America in the 1980s. 
A good place to start an analysis of electricity trade between the United States and 
Mexico is the manner in which electricity is treated in various multilateral trade 
agreements. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not apply its 
framework to electricity trade because it is not considered a good, but often a (public) 
service. The non-storable nature of electricity and the complicated nature of the sector, 
involving vast intermediate products, prevent it from being treated as a commodity. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also fails to provide trade regulations 
due to electricity’s ambiguous nature. Furthermore, the WTO’s Services Sectoral 
Classification List (W/120) only considers “services incidental to energy distribution” as 
services, excluding most of the electricity sector – from generation to distribution. Table 
6.1 provides a list of the electricity-related products as they are treated by different trade 
agreements and international standards.  
Finally, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) does not provide a uniform 
application of electricity trade in the region. The United States and Canada had a 
previous arrangement in electricity trade that remained unmodified after NAFTA, while 
Mexico’s electricity sector was excluded from any provisions as a public utility, although 
trade in electricity is addressed in Chapter 6 of the Agreement. This gives the Mexican 
state sole regulatory control over the industry. In the case of NAFTA, electricity is treated 
as a good with regard to the inputs (listed above). As a result, NAFTA works as a trade 
and investment tool for the sub-sectors related to steps between generation and 
distribution, and does not force the Mexican industry to liberalize further (Pineau 2004). 
Areas in which electricity generation occurs outside the confines of the Comisión Federal 
de Electricidad (CFE) include generation for own use and co-generation in industrial 
settings and Independent Power Production (IPP) enterprises. In the first two cases, 
excess electricity is to be sold to CFE, while in the latter CFE should be sold all 
electricity generated (DeGrandis and Owen 1995). On its part, CFE as a company can 
directly export or import once connections are physically set and owned by the parastatal. 
With regard to electricity trading via non-utilities, NAFTA Chapter 6 allows (non-
binding) export and import licenses in the energy sector. Under this scheme, CFE can sell 
and buy electricity from the United States but also other private permit-holders. However, 
Mexico’s electricity trade with the United States has been rather limited (given that the 
United States is also under the restrictions of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission). In fact, NAFTA has changed little of the electricity industry in the region, 
with most of the integration taking place between the United States and Canada under the 
provisions of their previous free trade agreement. 
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Table 6.1 
Product Classification Systems 
Systems Position of Electricity in System’s Hierarchy Explanation 
Harmonized 
Commodity 
Description and 
Coding System 
(HS 2002) 
Chapter 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils, and products 
of their distillations; bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes 
2716.00 Electrical energy (Optional heading) 
The system only classifies 
goods. Electrical energy is 
included only as optional, 
its nature as a good or 
service being ambiguous. 
WTO Services 
Sectoral 
Classification List 
(1991) W/120 
1. Business Services 
F. Other Business Services 
j. Services incidental to energy distribution  
This section contains 12 
sectors of services and 
reflects the fact that energy 
services were not discussed 
in the Uruguay round. 
Central Product 
Classification 
(CPC Version 1.1 
2002) 
Section 1- Ores and mineral; electricity, gas, and 
water 
Division 17- Electricity, town gas, steam and hot 
water  
Group 171 – Electrical energy 
Class 1710 – Electrical energy 
Subclass: 17100 – Electrical energy 
Section 5 – Construction services 
Division 54 – Construction services 
Group: 546 – Installation services 
Subclass: 54611 – Electrical wiring and fitting 
services 
Section: 6 – Distributive trade services; lodging; 
food and beverage servicing services; transport 
services; and utilities distribution services  
Division: 69 – Electricity distribution services; gas 
and water distribution services through mains 
Class 6911– Electricity transmission and 
distribution services 
Subclass: 69111 – Transmission of electricity  
Subclass: 69112 – Distribution of electricity 
Section: 8 – Business and production services 
Division: 85 – Support services  
Group: 859 – Other support services 
Class: 8599 –Other support services n.e.c. 
Subclass: 85990 – Other support services n.e.c. 
(including reading of electric, gas, and water 
meters) 
Division: 86 – Services incidental to agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, fishing, mining, and utilities 
Group: 863 – Services incidental to electricity, gas, 
and water distribution 
Class: 86311 – Services incidental to electricity 
Subclass: 86311 – Electricity transmission services 
(on a fee or contract basis) 
Subclass: 86312 – Electricity distribution services 
(on fee or contract basis)  
The products related to the 
electricity industry are in 
many different sections of 
goods and services. 
Source: Pineau 2004. 
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6.4 Methodological Approach 
The study of regulatory agencies has gained increased attention, given their prevalence in 
both developed and developing countries. Most studies focus on specific cases with an 
increasing interest in comparing regulatory regimes across countries and sectors. Gilardi 
(2004) indicates that new institutionalism provides a valuable analytical framework to 
improve understanding of regulatory institutions as they change. New institutionalism has 
three main analytical schools of thought, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. 
First, historical institutionalism provides a path-dependent approach to the study of 
institutions in which their development is contingent upon “critical juncture” decisions—
usually when they are established—that lead institutions along a path reinforced by the 
initial and subsequent decisions. This approach takes time and history into account, but 
its application is mainly limited to specific case studies and broad comparisons are 
difficult to make. Rational choice institutionalism argues that politicians establish 
regulatory institutions because they seek to improve their credibility and reduce political 
uncertainty—even if costly in the short-term—in order to solve problems of choice over 
time. Rational choice institutionalism provides an endogenous explanation to institutional 
change in which functional pressures are systematically identified. However, this 
approach does not provide much insight for long-term dynamics. Finally, sociological 
institutionalism illustrates how the symbolic nature of institutions perpetuates them, but 
says nothing of their beginnings (Gilardi 2004). 
These three variations of new institutionalism provide valuable insights for the state of 
regulation in Mexico’s electricity sector. Historical institutionalism is an excellent 
method for explaining the state’s control of energy sectors in Mexico. Sociological 
institutionalism suggests the importance of keeping the energy sector under the purview 
of the state, from the perspective of Mexican society or government decision makers. 
Rational action provides answers as to why CFE and politicians push for (or against) 
certain reforms. Given that we are mainly interested in exploring the state of regulation in 
Mexico and the possibilities for (welfare-enhancing) electricity trade between Mexico 
and the United States, we will employ historical and rational choice institutionalism to 
understand how Mexico’s regulatory regime arrived at its current state and to elucidate 
the political dynamics that encourage change towards a liberal electricity market.  
To ground our institutionalism-oriented analysis in actual institutional developments, we 
will analyze the interaction between political agents, regulatory bodies, and the electricity 
market in Mexico in the context of existing regulations. In particular, we present three 
overarching analytic layers: (1) general regulatory framework; (2) relevant regulatory 
bodies and the state of regulation in the electricity market; and (3) political involvement 
in the regulatory apparatus. Therein, we depict recent political and regulatory trends 
which may potentially affect the trajectory of the Mexican electricity sector. The 
instruments of historical and rational agent institutionalism, finally, allow us to evaluate 
Mexico’s relative conduciveness to exogenous change, namely further integration with 
the US electricity market. Given this approach, the present study contributes, as an 
applied interface with  binational implications, to the stakeholder PESTE literature, 
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Porter’s risk analysis for decisions, and the political “government endowments” 
literatures. 
Having established the regulatory barriers or non-barriers to integration, we will provide 
an assessment of the current state of cooperation between the US and Mexico. 
Specifically, we highlight the dialogue among political, regulatory, bureaucratic, and 
market-based agents from the two countries. The ultimate objective is to ground this 
dialogue within the framework of historical and rational agent institutionalism we apply 
to the Mexican regulatory regime. We thus conclude with recommendations for 
improving transnational cooperation under the regulatory constraints that shape our 
analysis. 
6.5 The State of Mexican Regulations 
6.5.1 General Regulatory Framework 
Partly in response to a 1999 OECD study that detailed the sprawling disjointedness of 
Mexican regulations, Mexico has, over the past decade, embarked in a program of 
reforms aimed at simplifying and integrating the regulatory apparatus. In collaboration 
with the federal, state, and local governments, independent monitoring agencies have 
striven to ease international trade restrictiveness, forge public-private partnerships, 
increase governmental transparency and accountability, and synchronize regulations with 
domestic and foreign standards (OECD 2004). Such efforts have consequently yielded 
lower levels of regulatory fluctuation and increased regulatory stringency (Wijen and 
Tulder 2011). Andres et al. (2008) likewise rank the Mexican electricity regulatory 
regime as the fourth-most transparent among 19 developing Latin American nations. In 
contrast, the same authors’ Electricity Regulatory Governance Index (ERGI) places 
Mexico behind all but five of the included nations. Mexico’s low ERGI rating 
underscores the fundamental impediment to regulatory reform in its electricity sector: 
namely, CFE’s lack of accountability to independent regulators, stemming from its 
constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy. 
The principal catalyst behind Mexico’s incipient reform efforts was a presidential 
initiative to revise the Ley Federal de Procedimiento Adminitrativo in 2000, which led to 
the creation of the Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria (COFEMER). As a 
“technically and functionally” autonomous subsidiary of the Ministry of the Economy, 
COFEMER’s stated mission is to ensure regulatory transparency and demonstrate the 
benefits of regulatory reform. To this end, COFEMER concentrates primarily on 
eliminating and simplifying formalities, reviewing the language and impact of all draft 
regulations, gauging the need for legal and regulatory reform in specific economic 
sectors, and helping state and local governments implement reform programs (OECD 
2004). All federal agencies are required to regularly submit two-year regulatory 
blueprints to COFEMER. The review process then consists of an assessment of potential 
alternatives; recurring consultations; drafting requirements; and systematic appraisals of 
existing regulations (Jacobzone 2007). 
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COFEMER utilizes several bureaucratic instruments to facilitate the review process. 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), a metric commonly used in OECD countries, 
provides a standardized cost-benefit analysis of draft regulations. The Federal Registry of 
Procedures and Services, Registro Federal de Trámites y Servicios (RFTS) is a 
compilation of all federal procedures, which COFEMER administers to increase 
transparency and efficiency. Consultation procedures include reports from specific 
ministries on regulatory progress, as well as an accumulation of private stakeholder 
perspectives and a four-week window for public comments (Jacobzone 2007). The 
amparo process, a form of judicial appeal, likewise provides a juridical complement to 
COFEMER’s assessments. However, the amparo could be over-used by firms to 
blockade COFEMER’s determinations.  
Finally, COFEMER has minimized inconsistencies and redundancies among federal, 
state, and municipal governments by signing coordination agreements with the states. 
The integrative effects of such agreements, coupled with COFEMER’s sweeping 
implementation of the System that Promotes Fast Opening of Firms, Sistema de Apertura 
Rápida de Empresas (SARE), have yielded renewed federal-local and public-private 
relationships and reduced entry barriers to small businesses (OECD 2004). 
Monitoring the regulatory processes of so many different economic sectors prevents 
COFEMER from becoming too intimately involved with any one area. That the agency’s 
principal interaction with the electricity sector has been with the Secretary of Energy 
(SENER) reflects the limited extent to which it is willing—or able—to influence 
comprehensive, market-wide regulatory reform. COFEMER has thus typically restricted 
the scope of its analysis to day-to-day issues, such as pricing methodologies, tariffs, and 
renewable energy. In 2009, for example, COFEMER reviewed a methodology for 
determining maximum wholesale prices for natural gas. The agency recommended that 
SENER incorporate a valuation of externalities into the methodology, which it claimed 
would both clarify the regulations, themselves, and contribute public health benefits 
(COFEMER 2009). COFEMER also addressed a SENER proposal—a de facto extension 
of Article 27 of the Constitution to cover audits of generation plants—by simplifying the 
process and eliminating onerous costs. In 2010, COFEMER helped SENER implement 
changes to an impending rule that would differentiate tariffs according to generation 
method (COFEMER 2010). Specifically, COFEMER suggested that SENER arrange the 
tariffs around the maximum and minimum sales per plant type. These tariffs are, 
incidentally, short of prices that reflect marginal costs either at zonal or nodal levels, as 
was evident in interviews with Mexican officials in Mexico City during the first week of 
January 2012.  
While it is important to note that SENER adopted all of the preceding proposals, 
COFEMER’s influence in the electricity sector has nonetheless been relatively 
constrained. Not only has it not achieved any sort of meaningful dialogue with other 
relevant organizations, such as CRE, SHCP,2 or CFE, but its 2010 characterization of 
CFE as a perpetrator of high levels of pollution conveys the complex separation of 
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 That is, in an electricity-market capacity; COFEMER interacts with SHCP frequently in other contexts. 
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powers in the electricity sector (COFEMER 2010). The diffuse regulatory accountability 
that this separation implies ultimately allows for only piecemeal reforms. Because 
COFEMER is limited to reviewing submitted regulations, it is not typically proactive in 
suggesting regulatory reform, which is legally dictated and delegated to CRE, on one 
hand, and SENER-CFE and SHCP, on the other. Its role as an independent monitoring 
agency therefore extends only as far as the sector’s governing bodies are willing to lead 
it. The power dynamic between the electricity sector’s main players will be further 
explored in the following two sections.  
The Comisión Federal de Competencia (CFC, or COFECO), or Federal Competition 
Commission, represents another cog in the wheel of regulatory reform. While Article 28 
of the Mexican Constitution expressly prohibits monopolistic practices in the economy, 
competition policy was not formally codified until the Federal Competition Law Ley 
Federal de Competencia Económica (LFCE), which excludes parastatals from CFC 
oversight and juridical breadth, was passed in 1993. CFC is broadly charged with 
ensuring open access to markets and upholding market efficiency. It further contributes to 
the approval process for government bidding and private non-utilities participation, as 
well as setting competition standards for specific economic sectors. Pursuant to Article 
28 of the Constitution and Article 4 of the LFCE, however, CFC’s authority does not 
extend to “strategic areas” under state control. Given electricity’s status as a strategic 
economic sector, CFE’s monopoly over publicly-distributed electricity is thus not 
considered anticompetitive (OECD 2004). This distinction effectively limits CFC’s 
authority to mere observer and arbitrator (mainly regarding anti-competitive conduct), 
rather than true ex post regulator, in the electricity market.  
In contrast, Article 4 of the LFCE grants CFC full jurisdiction in activities not explicitly 
covered under the umbrella of public service. CFC’s purview could therefore 
theoretically encompass relevant electricity market issues, such as interconnection and 
renewable energy. Thus far, however, CFC has only applied its authority to reviewing bid 
applications for IPPs seeking contracts with CFE (OECD 2004). In April 2011, the 
Mexican Senate passed a series of changes to the LFCE that similarly enhance CFC’s 
regulatory authority (Harrup 2011). In particular, the amendments clarify CFC’s power to 
impose sanctions on firms engaging in anticompetitive behavior, while concurrently 
increasing the severity of the sanctions themselves.  
Whereas COFEMER has tended to confine its interaction with the electricity sector to 
discussing matters of efficiency and public welfare with SENER, CFC has typically 
engaged a broader range of public organizations. Indeed, under the Convenio de 
Colaboración Administrativa, CFC maintains regular meetings with CFE to discuss 
pertinent competition-related matters (OECD 2004). It further conducted three separate 
bidding investigations in 2008 regarding CFE,3 and delivered multiple opinions on 
SENER proposals concerning natural gas tariffs and pricing (CFC 2008). The review 
process of a number of such proposals, including PMXREF-00-002 and DIR-GAS-001-
1996, notably included COFEMER as an interlocutor. Nevertheless, CFC’s interaction 
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 Each of which, it should be noted, was ruled in CFE’s favor. 
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with the electricity market remains, relative to that of other economic sectors, rather 
constrained. It conducted only seven total electricity-related proceedings in 2008, 
including three mergers and four biddings, concessions, and permits (CFC 2008). It 
likewise oversaw 18 combined proceedings for the electricity, water, and gas supply 
sectors in 2009, including one merger and 17 biddings, concessions, and permits (CFC 
2009). In contrast, CFC conducted 46 proceedings in manufacturing industries, 57 in 
transportation, and 113 in mass media in 2009. These figures suggest that CFC’s 
overarching impact on competition issues in the electricity sector has been minimal. 
CFC’s reformative influence on the electricity sector is equally debatable. The 
commission determined in 2009, for instance, that the most relevant market power 
challenge facing the Mexican electricity sector was CFE’s lack of unreserved acceptance 
of the 28 current Independent Power Producers (IPPs), which supply electricity 
exclusively to CFE (CFC 2009). It further concluded that the present constitution of 
market shares negates any need for CFE to pursue extraordinary bidding procedures (as 
established in Article 33 of the LFCE) outside of “exceptional cases.” Since IPPs 
nonetheless continue to be subject to long-term PPAs with CFE, CFC’s treatment of CFE 
appears to rely heavily on the latter’s designation as an incumbent public-service 
organization. This hands-off approach is endemic among regulators’ treatment of CFE, 
and it suggests that CFC’s influence on public-entity competition in the electricity sector 
is modest, at best. Ibarra-Yunez (2008) similarly notes that CFC has gained little traction 
in the interaction between public and private firms. Unlike COFEMER, CFC’s 
predicament is thus rooted not in a limited dialogue with the industry, but rather in a 
general bureaucratic resistance to reform the constitutionally-protected CFE. 
The jurisdiction of independent monitoring agencies such as COFEMER (through 
oversight) and CFC (through full adjudication capacities) has importantly been extended 
to international trade. Mexico has, for instance, signed several competition-related 
bilateral agreements. Moreover, most free trade agreements generally contain clauses 
which explicitly address competition; Chapter 15 of NAFTA covers competition policy, 
monopolies, and state enterprises. Article 603 of NAFTA likewise prohibits restrictions 
on the importation and exportation of energy by member countries, while Article 604 
forbids taxation on energy exports. Specific regulatory reforms within Mexico, such as 
RIA and the RFTS’ revision process, have expanded on the NAFTA provisions to 
simplify trade restrictiveness (OECD 2004). The Mexican government has also attempted 
to align its trade policy with international regulatory standards.  
The primary impediment to further regulatory harmonization between Mexico and the 
other NAFTA signatories continues to be the principle of National Treatment, outlined in 
Article 301 of NAFTA. This clause requires that the member countries treat the 
investment interests of other partners “no less favorably” than those of resident investors. 
Article 601, which governs energy policy, further stipulates that any trade arrangements 
between the member countries uphold the basic principles outlined in the parties’ 
individual constitutions (Lock 1993). Taken in tandem, these two provisions ostensibly 
clash with CFE’s public monopoly on transmission. Given Mexico’s constitutional 
designation of energy as a publicly-guaranteed asset, the challenge of disentangling the 
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transnational energy trade from the Mexican electricity sector’s complex power balance 
is intimately connected to the more narrow regulatory obstacles outlined above. With this 
overarching framework in mind, we now consider recent trends in the Mexican electricity 
sector’s regulatory structure. 
6.5.2 Regulatory Trends in the Electricity Market 
The potential for regulatory synchronization implied by the emergence of such 
institutions as CFC, COFEMER, and NAFTA has reached an impasse in the Mexican 
electricity market. Given the nature of Mexico’s mixed market, one must consider both 
the role of the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) as a regulator of non-utilities and 
IPP permits, on the one hand, and the role of SENER and SHCP in overseeing the state-
owned enterprises CFE and oil-gas PEMEX, on the other—not not to mention the overall 
role of COFEMER. Ultimately, collaboration between regulators and independent 
monitoring agencies has been too shallow and market-wide reform efforts too diffident to 
yield a stronger regulatory presence, despite a 2003 collaboration agreement between 
CRE and CFC (OECD 2004). Despite the modest dialogue that has evolved between 
outside organizations and relevant sectoral players over the past decade, progress has thus 
far been limited to technicalities. This understated role is primarily attributable to the 
distribution of regulatory authority across the Mexican electricity sector. In the absence 
of robust political will, this market structure is unlikely to change in the short-term. Two 
possible areas of conflict between regulators and the industry in the coming years, 
however, are renewable energy and interconnection. 
At the center of Mexico’s electricity market activity is CFE, the vertically-integrated 
parastatal organization charged with providing electricity as a public service. Under CFE 
auspices, certain subsidiaries have historically overseen the various network functions, 
including generation, transmission, and distribution. The National Center for Energy 
Control, Centro Nacional de Control de Energía (CENACE), which maintains CFE’s 
transmission grid, occupies a particularly influential position in the market. Indeed, 
CENACE analyzes spot market trends to apply electricity prices and facilitate transfer 
payments along the supply chain. In the resulting shadow market, which flows from 
CENACE to other CFE subsidiaries and non-utilities’ wheeling activities, as well as 
companies with excess self-supply generation and foreign trade partners, CENACE’s role 
is analogous to that of an Independent System Operator (ISO) in more liberalized markets 
(Mier-y-Terán 2005). 
In addition to managing the internal financing dynamics of the public electricity market 
via CENACE, CFE further assesses transmission investment projects (Mier-y-Terán 
2005). Currently, CFE disperses investment costs across the market, both as tariffs 
(coordinated by SHCP) and through negotiated power purchase agreements (PPAs). 
Although more progressive financing models have been explored, including auctioned 
transmission rights and direct regulation, CFE continues to operate a de facto monopoly 
on public infrastructure financing (Ibarra-Yunez 2010). Once CFE has determined its 
annual investment budget, it must then receive government approval—both from the 
relevant departments (SENER, SHCP, and Secretary of the Environment) and from the 
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Mexican Congress (Carreón 2003; Ibarra-Yunez 2010). A significant portion of CFE’s 
operating budget is derived from a cyclical process through which it receives federal 
funds to invest in new infrastructure projects and, in exchange, contributes rate-of-return 
payments to the government (OECD 2004; Halpern 2009). The resulting zero-sum game 
represents perhaps the most detrimental consequence of publicly-financed infrastructural 
expansion. Indeed, the consumer subsidies disseminated by SENER and SHCP, which 
account for more than one-third of the electricity sector’s gross revenues, should 
theoretically be counterbalanced by interest payments from CFE (Halpern 2009). 
However, the government’s patronage of CFE’s investment projects, compounded by 
said subsidies, adds more debt than can be offset by revenues alone. 
CFE’s constitutional designation as a public service organization has been interpreted as 
an explicit stake in all energy destined for retail sale. Article 36, Frac. III, of the Ley del 
Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) entitles CFE to all electricity generated 
by independent combined-cycle and natural gas producers (SENER 2010). The LSPEE 
further restricts the national grid exclusively to the flow of electricity (Ibarra-Yunez 
2008). To ensure its stewardship over publicly-destined, privately-generated electricity, 
CFE requires Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to enter into long-term PPAs. The 
specific provisions of each PPA depend in part on the plant, fuel, and technology types 
employed by the private producer. Once CFE has determined the long-term profitability 
of an IPP project, the PPA must then be approved by SHCP and Congress (Mier-y-Terán 
2005). Finally, CENACE establishes “right-of-access” tariffs to be levied against the 
private generator (Ibarr-Yunez 2008). Aside from the inefficiencies associated with 
CFE’s overwhelming market power, the previously-cited author further posits the 
presence of access discrimination in the electricity market. This structural inequity 
presents a salient challenge to  binational interconnection, and moreover raises questions 
regarding compliance with NAFTA’s National Treatment clause. 
6.5.3 Depth and Breadth of CRE’s Legal and Institutional Capacities 
Whereas CFE operates a virtual shadow market for IPPs outside the jurisdiction of 
independent regulators, electricity not bound for public distribution—including self-
supply and co-generation capacity—was, in the 1992 amendment to LSPEE, not deemed 
subject to CFE purview (Ibarra-Yunez 2002). Rather, all electricity generated for 
purposes other than “public service” is regulated by CRE. Although CRE is formally a 
subsidiary of the Ministry of Energy, accountable to the federal government and allocated 
an operating budget by SENER, it nonetheless conducts its affairs under “technical and 
operational” autonomy (Carreón 2003; Andres 2008). CRE maintains a staff of more than 
150 and is run by a four-member commission board, nominated by SENER and 
appointed by the President of Mexico. Among its responsibilities are issuing permits to 
non-utility producers; analyzing methodologies for market-related activities (including 
wheeling, fee scheduling, efficiency standards, etc.); assessing the electricity sector’s 
regulatory framework; and enforcing non-compliance with contractual obligations 
(Ibarra-Yunez 2010). 
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Given the limits of CRE’s regulatory oversight, the effectiveness with which it carries out 
certain other functions is debatable. CRE purports, for example, to regulate wholesale 
transactions between private producers and CFE. In practice, however, CRE has limited 
authority in matters pertaining to energy as a public service. Likewise, CRE provides an 
assessment of grid expansion projects, but CFE (in collaboration with various ministries) 
ultimately determines its own infrastructure plans (Ibarra-Yunez 2010). The challenge to 
CRE, as a quasi-independent regulator, is thus two-fold: (1) CRE relies on other agencies 
for budget, staff, and interagency protocols, thereby implicitly compromising its relative 
autonomy; and (2) CFE accumulates certain proprietary information, such as cost 
estimates and expansion plans, to which CRE is not entitled. The latter consequence has 
invariably resulted in an asymmetry in information between firm and regulator, a classic 
example of the Principal-Agent Problem (OECD 2004; Ibarra-Yunez 2008). Ibarra-
Yunez contends that the best way for electricity markets that are not deregulated, such as 
Mexico’s, to compensate for such asymmetries is to foster a close dialogue between the 
regulator and an independent, competition-oriented monitoring agency. While CRE did 
sign a collaboration agreement with CFC in 2003, the two organizations have never 
mounted a formal challenge to CFE’s comparative information advantage (OECD 2004). 
Empirically, CRE’s primary influence on the public utility component of the electricity 
sector has been its ability to issue permits to private generators. As of December 2011, 
CRE had granted 980 total permits to producers for self-supply, co-generation, sale to 
CFE, and importation—670 of which are currently active (CRE 2011). Whereas all 
publicly-distributed electricity and any projects utilizing the national transmission grid 
necessarily enter into arrangements with CFE, the licensing authority which CRE 
maintains over the importation and exportation of energy provides a modicum of 
leverage. The electricity trade between the US and Mexico has remained minimal over 
the past decade; nevertheless, CRE’s role as permit administrator would likely increase 
its market presence should the number of interconnections expand significantly in the 
future. 
Despite its inherent limitations as the Mexican electricity market’s independent regulator, 
CRE has seen its role expand incrementally over the past decade. Following SENER’s 
promotion of an “Open Season” in 2007, in which new renewable energy projects were 
given special government treatment, Congress moved to broaden the scope of CRE’s 
regulatory impact. The CRE Law, passed in 2008, allows CRE to set and enforce 
standards for renewable energy generation. As the nation gradually transitions to a 
heavier reliance on renewable energy, CRE’s influence will inevitably increase in 
proportion to renewable generation capacity. Congress subsequently passed the 
Renewable Energy and Energy Transition Financing Law Ley para el Aprovechamiento 
de Energías Renovables y el Financiamiento de la Transición Energética (LAERFTE) in 
2008. Reaffirming the regulatory authority in alternative energy matters bestowed upon 
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CRE by the CRE Law, LAERFTE charges CRE with developing a national strategy for 
the eventual transition to renewable energy (SENER 2010).4  
The basic strategies outlined in LAERFTE attempt to differentiate specific technologies 
in order to foster competitive renewable growth, as well as embed alternative energy 
guarantees into transmission agreements for permit-holders (SENER 2010). While this 
framework is not substantively different from earlier legislation aimed at promoting 
renewable generation, two potentially radical regulatory implications stem from 
LAERFTE’s intended implementation strategy. The procedures by which SENER and 
SHCP have traditionally determined wholesale market prices have tended to minimize 
CRE’s decision-making role. That CRE is authorized by LAERFTE (along with SENER 
and SHCP) to set wholesale prices for generated renewable energy is not, in itself, an 
inexorable extension of CRE’s influence on the market, according to its breadth and legal 
endowments. Given CRE’s formally codified authority (via the CRE Law) with respect to 
renewable energy generation, however, there is reason to believe that CRE’s new duties 
project a genuine increase in market presence. Article 10 of LAERFTE likewise 
establishes programs through SENER that incorporate generation externalities into actual 
methodologies and development plans (SENER 2010). CRE, in turn, will use said 
methodologies to formulate contracting rules which compel CFE to enter into long-term 
PPAs with renewable energy generators. 
A second consequence of LAERFTE is that small- and medium-scale renewable energy 
producers, possessing less than 30 kW and 500 kW in capacity, respectively, can now 
sign PPAs without receiving a permit from CRE (SENER 2010). This policy follows in 
the footsteps of Resolución RES/085/2007, a federal rule passed in 2007 which formally 
legitimizes unconventional buy-sell contract models for small-scale generators. Such 
regulations do not substantially alter the market structure of the Mexican electricity sector 
in the short-term: CFE retains its monopoly on transmission and distribution, while IPPs 
have limited contract options and CRE is no less impotent in the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, the upshot of LAERFTE is that, in theory, CRE has not only inserted itself 
into the inner-workings of the electricity market, but further expanded its regulatory 
impact on CFE’s contract-negotiation process beyond the perfunctory duty of issuing 
permits. While it is too early to assess the long-term viability of such claims, especially 
given the current dearth of renewable energy generators in Mexico, the reforms of the 
past decade undoubtedly represent a clear increase in CRE’s market influence. This 
should be of particular relevance to any potential discussions regarding expanded 
interconnection with US firms. 
6.6 Political Involvement in the Regulatory Apparatus 
Over the past decade, CRE has taken discernible steps toward consolidating a stronger 
role in the Mexican electricity sector’s regulatory process. Nowhere is its nascent 
influence more apparent than in the emerging field of renewable energy, which embodies 
                                               
4
 Specifically, CRE is to expedite the Modelo de Contrato de Interconexión para Centrales de Generación 
de Energía Eléctrica con Energía Renovable o Cogeneración Eficiente y sus Anexos (F-RC, IB-RC, TB-
RC). 
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the potential counterweight to CFE that, under the right circumstances, CRE could 
eventually present. Thus far, however, such an outlook is merely speculative: CFE 
maintains a stranglehold on infrastructure and contract negotiations with IPPs, not to 
mention a formidable stock of political capital and a constitutionally-guaranteed stake in 
the market. Comprehensive regulatory reform will ultimately require a multilateral 
demonstration of political will, which has recently eluded every attempt. In anticipation 
of the upcoming presidential election in the summer of 2012, however, candidates from 
both PRI and PAN—two main parties currently vying for the presidency, while PRD 
opposes any changes—have expressed an interest in further liberalizing the energy sector 
(Villiers 2011).  
The Código Nacional Eléctrico de 1926 and revisions made to Article 73 of the Mexican 
Constitution in 1934 represent Mexico’s first modern attempts to politicize energy issues 
(Ibarra-Yunez 2002). The first of these landmark pieces of legislation asserted the 
government’s sovereign right to manage energy destined for public consumption, while 
the latter formally created CFE as the preeminent steward of public electricity. Other 
initiatives have likewise upheld the federal government’s central role in energy policy, 
from the 1960 amendment to Article 27 of the Constitution to the various incarnations of 
the LSPEE. Nevertheless, more recent attempts to reexamine the nature of the 
relationship between government and industry have invariably been thwarted by 
unrelenting partisanship and an unsympathetic public opinion (Breceda 2000; Carreón 
2003; Mier-y-Terán 2005). The political realities evinced by successive administrations’ 
well-publicized failures were, paradoxically, unexpected in light of the relative 
liberalization of the 1990s—exemplified by such initiatives as the 1992 update of 
LSPEE, the creation of CRE in 1993, and the passage of NAFTA in 1994. 
Building upon the progressive foundation laid during the early 1990s, the Zedillo 
administration attempted to enact sweeping reforms in 1999. The administration’s 
scheme, otherwise referred to as the Propuesta de Cambio Estructural en la Industria 
Eléctrica de México, centered on unbundling CFE into separate constituent entities 
(Ibarra-Yunez 2002). Specifically, CFE and LFC would comprise the generation and 
distribution market components, while all transmission operations would be delegated to 
a newly-created ISO—the Centro de Operación del Sistema Eléctrico (COSEN). In order 
to implement such broad structural changes to the electricity sector, President Zedillo 
called for Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution to be amended (Breceda 2000). The first 
of these enumerates the “strategic activities” over which the state exercises sovereign 
control, while the latter expressly prohibits monopolistic practices (aside from the 
exempted economic areas). As Breceda (2000) points out, eliminating energy as a 
strategic enterprise would require the government to deprioritize CFE and its subsidiaries. 
The generation and retail spheres would consequently be opened to private competition. 
While distribution and transmission would be dissociated from CFE’s exclusive 
oversight, all distributed electricity would still be subject to the public service obligations 
established in the Mexican Constitution.  
The demise of the Zedillo plan in congress has been well documented, especially by 
Breceda (2000) and Mier-y-Terán (2005). The amendments to Articles 27 and 28 
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prescribed by the initiative required successful passage through the senate and chamber 
of deputies. Public opinion was, at the time, strongly opposed to fundamentally 
reorganizing the electricity market structure. This inevitably led congress to make a 
spectacle of the ordeal, repudiating the plan outright in the senate’s plenary session 
(Breceda 2000). Despite the Zedillo plan’s overwhelmingly negative reception by 
congress, subsequent administrations have tried, with equal futility, to push through 
comprehensive reform plans. The Iniciativa de Reforma del Sector Eléctrico, 
promulgated by El Partido Verde Ecologista (PVE) in 2001, similarly proposed that 
generation and distribution be opened to competition. PVE’s proposal assigned final 
tariffs to the price of combined-cycle and coal-based electricity, which it bound to 
externality costs (Ibarra-Yunez 2002). The Fox Administration’s Plan de Desarrollo 
likewise emphasized vertical unbundling and competitive, deregulated generation and 
retail markets. Both proposals encountered the same partisan resistance that had 
confronted the Zedillo plan, and both ultimately succumbed to the same fate as their 
predecessor, mainly partisan rejections to administrations that did not face congressional 
majorities in their presidency periods. Following the Mexican Senate’s unequivocal 
rejection of successive administrations’ attempts at comprehensive market reform, 
President Calderón advanced a proposal which advocated a more limited form of 
unbundling. In particular, Calderón’s plan concentrated on corporatization and 
transparency in decisions by the state-run oil enterprise, PEMEX. Even such a moderate 
approach was met with nominal congressional enthusiasm. 
Aside from the obduracy consistently displayed by the Mexican Congress, 
comprehensive market reform has been further hampered by unionized pushback from 
CFE. Indeed, the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República 
Mexicana (SUTERM), CFE’s affiliated public union, has tended to monolithically 
oppose deregulation and public-private competition in the electricity sector (Carreón 
2003). One of Mexico’s largest and most vocal public unions, SUTERM has exerted 
significant influence on energy politics and contributed to the Congress’s general 
aversion to substantial reform efforts. This reluctance has been further compounded by 
the Mexican citizenry’s consistent opposition to changes in the electricity market’s 
subsidy structure. Nevertheless, presidential candidates from both the PRI and PAN have 
recently expressed interest in returning to the issue of energy liberalization. 
Two leading PRI candidates, Enrique Peña Nieto and former opponent Manlio Fabio 
Beltrones, have acknowledged the importance of opening PEMEX to private investment, 
while PAN has openly backed a similar transition since PAN President Calderón’s push 
for private competition in 2008 (Villiers 2011). Whereas no such consensus has yet been 
articulated with regard to electricity, the air of bipartisanship that is currently shaping the 
discourse on private competition in the energy sector potentially lends itself to electricity 
market reforms. Moreover, the mounting debts associated with publicly-guaranteed 
entities such as CFE and PEMEX, coupled with persistently high retail energy costs, have 
led to a rather sudden public opinion shift in favor of privatizing, or at least corporatizing, 
PEMEX (Villiers 2011). Even if PEMEX should undergo a fundamental reorganization 
in the near-future, however, commensurate liberalization in the electricity sector would 
likely still face significant challenges from SUTERM and the Congress, among others. 
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Moreover, energy reform faces such daunting challenges regarding the oil conglomerate 
PEMEX, that such an approach to embracing all energy, could have contaminated sound 
discussion of each parts of the energy sector, negatively affecting electricity 
restructuring. Political consensus will continue to be difficult to attain, and a major 
sectoral overhaul would require a sustainable multilateral solution—none of which seem 
politically viable at the moment. 
6.7 Institutional Analysis 
The preceding analysis of the regulatory framework and relevant regulatory bodies 
provides insight into the institutional history and functional pressures on agents that 
render Mexico’s current state of regulations. The developments of the electricity 
generation industry in Mexico have responded to the restructuring of the economy after 
the 1982 debt crisis. The crisis forced the adoption of neoclassical market policies that 
limited the state’s intervention in the economy and lowered trade restrictions. The new 
model, then, ended import-substitution industrialization (ISI), a system embedded in a 
nationalist economic development agenda that was both resonant with the ideals of the 
Mexican Revolution and maintained legitimacy and resources for the governing party. 
The redistributive efforts of the state were evident in the size of the bureaucracy and the 
state’s presence in many sectors of the economy. Beginning in the early 1980s, changing 
the political paradigm involved inserting market-disciplining forces in order to modernize 
Mexico. Nevertheless, the government kept control over key sectors in the economy, 
such as petroleum and electricity, due to the political weight of its labor unions (who 
would oppose any changes toward market discipline) and the centrality of national 
ownership of natural resources in Mexico’s political culture. 
PPAs constitute a mechanism through which the state resolves the contradiction between 
controlling key sectors and promulgating NAFTA. They could also be considered a 
stepping-stone toward further liberalization and regional integration. Of significance, 
however, is that Mexico transitioned from a system (partly) legitimized by the normative 
guidelines of the revolution, related to the Virginia School’s arguments, toward one 
founded on technical and economic guidelines (i.e. regulatory state) that the OECD and 
other international bodies promote. Evidence of Mexico’s new regulatory efforts includes 
the inception of COFEMER, CFC, RIA, RFTS, and LAERFTE; however, these measures 
are not efficient enough in promoting competition in the electricity sector because they 
clash with remnants of a previous normative economic model. As a result, regulation in 
Mexico does not attempt to overhaul all economic exchanges, but rather focuses on 
specific sectors that have already been privatized. This supports Jordana and Levi-Faur’s 
(2005) argument that the diffusion of regulatory regimes in Latin America is sectoral and 
not conducted on a national basis. It also underscores the fact that any economic 
performance variable, such as efficiency gains, investment expansion, commitment to a 
market, or wholesale or retail prices, are not normally treated as performance indicators 
as one may observe in other parts of the world—or even in Mexico’s trading partners in 
North America and elsewhere. 
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The decision to regulate, then, is the result of a change in economic models, stemming 
from the debt crisis and NAFTA. As expected, this set of policymaking processes is not 
devoid of party politics. Rational Agent Institutionalism (RAI) informs that politicians 
will choose to (not) regulate in order to show their level of commitment to economic 
liberalization; alternatively, incumbents could be insulating their political “territories” 
(i.e. implemented policies) against competitors’ potential efforts to overturn them 
(Gilardi 2004). Mexican politicians have indicated a commitment to harmonize 
regulation in accordance with international norms by implementing RIA and RFTS, as 
well as by granting access to transnational generators.  
The Mexican Left, on the other hand, is adamant in keeping key sectors nationalized in 
order to protect the legacy of the state’s social responsibilities—a position intrinsic to any 
leftist party. The PRI party has also been invested in the status quo since state-owned 
enterprises helped finance the party’s electoral dominance between the 1930s and the 
1980s, as demonstrated by Greene (2007). Now that the PRI lost dominance after 2000, 
perhaps an alliance with the PAN would be fruitful in further liberalization and 
unbundling. However, the rivalry between these parties may prevent an alliance, given 
that the PAN allied with its ideological foe, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
(PRD), in the past round of gubernatorial races in 2010 to ensure PRI losses in Oaxaca, 
Puebla, and Sinaloa. The PAN-PRD alliance lost to the PRI in Chiapas, Durango, and 
Hidalgo the same year. 
In order to score the performance of the electricity sector in Mexico, it only suffices to 
say that: (a) efficiency measures, including sales per employee, penetration changes per 
generating plant, or by worker, are behind US and Canada counterparts; (b) annual 
expansion investment in transmission-distribution-retailing-generating plants has stalled 
under SENER’s plans, which has concentrated its efforts in renewable energy and plant 
retirements; (c) performance in price dynamics shows both wheeling and retail prices, 
mainly to industry, higher—up to 65% greater—than day-to-day ones in the US southern 
border for 2011; and (d) reliability measures, under OECD observation, place Mexico 
and its dynamics below par in relation to international counterparts. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In 2010, Presidents Obama and Calderón met to discuss the creation of a binational 
“Electricity Task Force,” the objective of which would be to explore the obstacles to and 
opportunities presented by a more tightly-integrated network for electricity trade. Two 
years later, the solutions prescribed by a cross-border stakeholder forum that evolved out 
of the presidential task force have been largely neglected, as electricity policy has been 
increasingly deprioritized by both administrations. This chapter has illustrated the 
imminent need for short-term solutions in order to foster long-term sustainability in the 
Mexican electricity sector. It has further characterized the regulatory structure of the 
market, including potential barriers and non-barriers to further integration with the US. 
Despite the dearth of tangible strategies that have emerged from diplomatic exchanges 
between the US and Mexico, the regulatory structure is, with some caveats, conducive to 
international expansion. What remains to be seen, then, is why so few producers and 
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investors have explored interconnection as a viable short-term option, especially given 
the clear need for infrastructural expansion. 
Following the institution of NAFTA in 1994, signatory countries were permitted to 
privately generate electricity in Mexico. Article 602.3 of NAFTA stipulated that the 
government could not prevent foreign companies from constructing generation facilities 
on sovereign Mexican territory (Degrandis and Owen 1995). Moreover, domestic 
companies have the constitutional right to import and export electricity, to the extent that 
it does not constitute a public service (Degrandis 1995; Ibarra-Yunez 2002). All 
permitted importers and exporters of electricity must, therefore, either provide generation 
exclusively for personal use or negotiate terms of sale through CFE. When a private 
company opts to import electricity, it first coordinates a bilateral contract with a foreign 
generator (North American Working Group 2005). Once it has procured a transaction 
agreement, it must then obtain permission from CRE to import electricity. Finally, the 
company must negotiate an interconnection contract with CFE if it plans to utilize the 
national transmission grid. For their part, IPPs are required to disclose all plant 
implementation plans to CFE prior to reaching an interconnection agreement (Ibarra-
Yunez 2008). Among the additional requirements for permit-holders to import electricity 
are proof of compliance with emissions standards and settlement of contractual matters 
with CFE (Ibarra-Yunez 2008; and Chapter 2 of this report). 
Interconnection permit discussions occur between CFE and CRE, in which the former 
analyzes the private company’s grid implementation plan and the latter acts as an 
independent arbitrator (NAEWG 2005). If the two favorably appraise the company’s 
application, the firm then either negotiates an interconnection contract (in the case of self-
supply and co-generation) or signs a PPA (in the case of IPPs). An IPP must also 
navigate competitive bidding proceedings with CFE before being granted a PPA. The 
process by which rates are determined for imported electricity is roughly equivalent to 
the analogous system for domestic generation. CENACE collaborates with SHCP and 
SENER to establish final rates which reflect “economic costs” (Degrandis 1995). In 
accordance with NAFTA Article 301, SHCP sets identical use and general purpose tariffs 
for both domestic and foreign generation (NAEWG 2005). Foreign companies that 
employ the Mexican transmission grid for self-supply and co-generation are additionally 
subject to wheeling charges. In contrast, IPPs are entitled to rebates on fixed costs from 
SHCP (Degrandis 1995). 
As Ibarra-Yunez (2010) points out, the substantial coordination and investment costs 
required of binational interconnection necessitate a shared distribution of funds. This has 
led CFE to explore joint projects with border-region US ISOs, such as ERCOT and the 
construction part of Sempra energy. A majority of the nine current interconnections 
between the US and Mexico exist in Baja California and Sonora, but additional 
interconnections are dispersed along the other grid divisions. Nevertheless, only 29 of the 
670 active generation permits apply to importers of electricity (CRE 2011) and only 
seven permits had been granted to exporters as of 2010 (SENER 2010). These figures 
starkly illustrate the inability of economic and regulatory theory, in the wake of NAFTA 
and asymmetric deregulation, to foster transnational growth commensurate with domestic 
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generation expansion. This failure is further accentuated by the fact that only three new 
import permits have been issued since 2008 (CRE 2011). Thus, not only do import 
permits represent a trivial proportion of overall generation permits in Mexico, but they 
appear to have declined significantly during the past three years due to gaming by 
authorities and CFE.  
Given the advances in transnational trade liberalization produced by NAFTA and recent 
innovations in the Mexican regulatory system, the apparent indifference toward 
electricity market integration is rather counterintuitive. The confluence of certain 
interrelated factors may shed light on this economic about-face. At the inception of 
NAFTA, it was predicted that, within eight years, CFE would allot roughly 70% of its 
service contracts to US and Canadian competitive bids (Degrandis 1995). In retrospect, 
this assumption clearly underestimated CFE’s constitutional stranglehold on public 
electricity. Several conditions that have likewise hampered interconnection can be 
derived from the present analysis: inadequate capacity; lack of incentives; general 
regulatory impediments (e.g. the legal distinction between utilities and non-utilities); 
asymmetric cost structures and production scales; cross-border variations in load prices; 
and the relative impotence of independent regulators.  
All of the preceding factors have indeed discouraged firms from pursuing further 
integration efforts; however, the incompatible interests of CFE, as the incumbent 
organization, and proponents of regulatory reform present the greatest structural 
challenge. Not only does the intricacy of the electricity sector’s decision-making 
structure—particularly with regard to infrastructural investment—impose uncertainty on 
foreign investors, but inefficient administrative practices, such as high residential 
subsidies and inconsistent tariff policies, have largely been insulated from regulatory 
reform (OECD 2004). Perhaps most importantly, CFE’s continued hegemony over the 
transmission and distribution of publicly-destined electricity, as well as all electricity 
imported and exported by IPPs, creates unnecessary logistical and economic costs to  
binational grid expansion. Whereas the climate in Mexico for small-scale, subsistence-
oriented energy producers remains relatively conducive to transnational expansion, 
wholesale generation continues to face a monopolistic market with myriad regulatory 
inconsistencies and few incentives. 
The most obvious recent culprit behind dwindling import/export permit applications is 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 2008, CRE has granted an average of less than one 
import permit per year (CRE 2011). This represents a significant drop-off from the 
annual average of nearly five permits that were granted from 2001 to 2007. Although 
industrial and commercial consumers might find price incentives to import electricity 
from US sources, Mexican producers could likewise realize advantages by exporting to 
US markets—particularly renewable energy. However, a 2009 study by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) found that the financial crisis, which yielded tighter credit and 
volatile market prices, strongly discouraged investment in energy infrastructure. To curb 
firms’ contractionary instincts, conventional fiscal policy stipulates that a government 
should prop up the market by providing incentives and promoting continued investment. 
As detailed in a 2004 OECD study, however, the Mexican regulatory regime has created 
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entry barriers to foreign investors by neglecting to sufficiently harmonize domestic 
regulations with international standards, even in light of the 12 trade agreements that 
Mexico has implemented beyond NAFTA.  
The apparent resistance of the US and Mexican electricity markets to constructing 
additional interconnections stems largely from diplomatic inertia, which can be deduced 
from the New Institutional economic analysis applied in the body of the present study. 
Indeed, relevant sectoral decision-makers have acknowledged the potential benefits of 
market integration (SENER 2010). Why, then, is electrical interconnection neither 
articulated as a policy imperative nor pursued more rigorously by firms and ISOs? Aside 
from the high fixed costs associated with infrastructural investment and economic 
disincentives imposed by the financial crisis, the regulatory challenges detailed in this 
chapter are immanently correctable. Nevertheless, the level of diplomatic coordination 
regarding electricity has virtually disappeared over the past decade. The North American 
Energy Working Group, a transnational initiative established in 2001 to foster 
cooperation on energy policy between the NAFTA member countries, was formally 
dissolved by the Obama administration. In its place, Presidents Obama and Calderón 
created the Electricity Task Force in 2010 to reestablish a collaborative approach to 
solving electricity sector issues. Following a stakeholder forum in October 2010, the two 
governments nominated members to the task force (Biller 2010). Since its initial meeting 
at the end of 2010, however, the task force has yet to publicly formulate an official plan 
of action. 
The idleness of the Electricity Task Force epitomizes the low priority status afforded 
electricity policy by the Obama and Calderón administrations. In his 2010 State of the 
Union Address, President Obama announced the creation of a National Export Initiative 
(NEI), the purpose of which would be to stimulate the domestic labor market by 
increasing export margins. A 2011 assessment of the NEI by SENER, however, neglected 
to detail electricity as a potential source of economic integration, instead focusing on 
such issues as border security and regulatory coordination (SENER 2011). Moreover, 
President Obama’s 2011 Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future expressed electricity 
sector reforms in a purely domestic context (White House 2011). The noticeable absence 
of electricity interconnection from such energy reform initiatives implies that the US and 
Mexico are presently content to focus diplomatic efforts on other related, but tangential, 
matters (e.g. renewable energy, climate change, and oil), while maintaining the status quo 
in the electricity sector.  
Further  binational integration in the electricity sector offers short-term solutions to the 
high costs and rising demand problems that currently challenge the Mexican retail 
market. Concerted diplomatic coordination between the two countries will be necessary 
to reform onerous regulations and reconcile CFE’s market power. Possible regulatory-
oriented solutions include expanding CRE’s authority; increasing the coordination 
between CRE and monitoring agencies such as CFC and COFEMER; and consolidating 
CRE’s ability to regulate generation imports and exports. Diplomatic efforts will 
additionally need to incorporate regional ISOs, such as ERCOT, in order to arrange the 
details surrounding network interconnection. Recent bilateral discussions between the US 
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and Mexico have tended to promote a regional market as a necessary objective. The US-
Mexico Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change, convened by (among others) 
members of the US State Department, SENER, and the two respective ambassadors, 
delegated further research of binational market integration to the Electricity Task Force 
(US Embassy 2011). That the task force continues to be a viable instrument of diplomacy 
is an encouraging sign of future cooperation between the US and Mexico. 
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Chapter 7.  Energy Integration in North America: Politics and 
Policymaking 
by Nora Ankrum, Lun Dai, and Austin Woody 
Abstract 
Greater integration of the electrical grid, both within the US and across its borders, is no 
simple task: despite enhanced reliability, economic efficiency, and other potential 
benefits, regulatory and political challenges remain. Even as utilities, regulators, and 
regional networks acknowledge the urgency of expanding the transmission network, they 
do not agree on who should pay for it or what level of cooperation—much less 
integration—will be necessary. Discussions over interconnections with Mexico reflect the 
dimensions of this argument while taking on further complications due both to shifting 
political agendas and differences in regulatory frameworks. This chapter explores these 
tensions in order to outline the major regulatory and political challenges to greater 
integration of the North American electricity grid from the United States point of view. 
The exploration begins with a review of global trade governance, followed by an 
examination of the current US regulatory and market environment, rooted in the 
evolution of deregulation since the 1978 passage of Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act. The chapter then examines the relative advantages and disadvantages of greater 
integration from the varying perspectives of major stakeholders on both sides of the US-
Mexico border, again, with the US point of view, and analyzes ERCOT in depth as a 
unique participant. 
7.1 Global Regulation of Electricity Trade 
Stakeholder preferences about the importance of energy security limit the global 
regulation of electricity. Moreover, in many US policy forums in recent months and 
years, it has been argued that no energy policy has been clearly defined for the United 
States. The limited regulation creates many grey areas in international trade and provides 
no cross-border protection for exporters and importers. The World Trade Organization, 
regional trade agreements, and domestic regulation all influence the regulation of 
electricity and often contradict each other.  
The decentralization of energy markets coupled with a rising demand in emerging 
economies challenges whether countries will rely on markets to secure access to energy 
sources, or whether state agencies will assume greater control. Furthermore, climate 
change and the accession of large energy economies into the WTO place tensions on the 
grey areas of energy trade.  
As this trade becomes more popular, tensions will develop between divided regulatory 
systems. These tensions may result in international disputes about electricity trade—an 
area that has little precedence, and where we explore its framework, institutional setting, 
and dynamics from the US perspective. After discussing multilateral frameworks in trade 
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law and institutions such as GATT and GATS in the next sections, the analysis then goes 
over a brief history of the US regulations in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 concentrates on 
analyzing some of the key players and determinants of their political will. Section 7.4 
addresses ERCOT, and Section 7.5 concentrates on its main challenges as an autonomous 
and powerful-successful system operator. Section 7.6 concludes with the challenges to 
create an integrated electricity vision in the US, affected by the political positions 
regarding renewables. 
7.1.1 Levels of Regulation 
Three layers of regulation influence the international trade of electricity. On a global 
scale, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 153 members govern the trade of 
electricity. On a regional scale, agreements such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) manage the regional trade of electricity. These regional agreements 
among two or more countries promote inter-regional integration and often include 
specific clauses regarding energy resources and electricity. Finally, domestic 
governments maintain the greatest influence over electricity trade as governments protect 
national sovereignty, energy security, and other political interests. 
These levels of regulation are often at odds by contradicting each other’s policy goals. 
The rules governing energy trade and investment vary among regions, creating tensions 
between the state-dominated versus market-led paradigms (Desta 2003, p. 523). 
Countries choose to participate in multiple regulatory regimes, creating overlapping and 
conflicting memberships. For example, the WTO promotes international trade through 
liberalization, which increases competition in world markets and discourages 
discriminatory practices. Many members of the WTO also participate in regional trade 
agreements negotiated with bilateral partners. These regional agreements could become 
discriminatory in nature and they could reduce outside competition, thus, conflicting with 
WTO regulations even if GATT articles for trade policy accept regional trade agreements 
if they make use of “most favored nation,” “non-discrimination,” and “national 
treatment” of investments in their clauses (see GATT code of trade, applicable by WTO 
nowadays; Trebilcok and Howse 2005). 
Domestic regulation often restricts electricity trade with high tariffs, intense regulation 
and bureaucratic procedures. Many countries seek to protect their electricity from outside 
influence for fear of instability and of situations that are beyond the scope of their 
control.  
When some bilateral agreements are negotiated outside the venue of the global 
institutions such as the WTO, the larger economy often maintains a negotiating 
advantage in the regional trade agreements. Oftentimes, smaller economies seek access to 
larger markets and are willing to offer concessions and preferential treatment to the larger 
economy for this access. The North American Free Trade Act provides an excellent 
example of this. Compared to the rest of the world, North American electricity markets 
are weakly integrated. ERCOT only maintains three connections with outside grids and 
two of these are with Mexico. The Canada-US border is crossed by more than 37 major 
interconnections that have a capacity of 18,977 MW, whereas the major interconnections 
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between the US and Mexico are capable of handling only 944 MW (Martinez-Chombo 
2011). 
7.1.2 Increase of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
Regional trade agreements increase in popularity as the WTO struggles to find consensus 
in trade negotiations. Developing countries with growing energy demands and weak 
bargaining power look to the WTO to promote a less discriminatory management of 
energy resources. However, the WTO is unable to bring about significant improvements 
in trade for developing countries while it is deadlocked in negotiating the Doha 
Development round, which began in 2001. The WTO intended for this round of 
negotiations to address issues of development and market access for developing 
countries; however, with negotiations continuing for 11 consecutive years there is 
decreasing confidence that the round will ever close. Emerging markets distrust the 
ability of the WTO to promote free and equitable trade as larger economies refuse to 
acknowledge their increased role in the global economy. 
Yet, both large and small economies desire greater international trade to support 
economic growth. Countries find it both easier and faster to negotiate regional 
agreements with fewer stakeholders involved. As such, the use of regional agreements 
significantly increased and over 311 regional agreements exist today at different levels of 
depth and width. Many country cases show exceptions in liberalization when industries 
or firms are considered national champions, or strategic for their governments (WTO 
2012). 
7.1.3 The Stakeholders 
Trade agreements handle energy products, energy services such as electricity, and 
energy-related investment activities separately from other goods/services (Victor 2010). 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now managed at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), focused on increasing market access for exporters, as well as on 
increasing access to energy imports, but some exporters of energy were averse to lose 
sovereignty of their oil (Desta 2003). This is similar to the treatment arguably applied to 
“special sectors” such as agriculture or high technology. 
Exporters of energy products concern themselves with demand security, transparency of 
importers policies, and reduced trade barriers (Victor 2010). Exporters seek market 
access guarantees through both multilateral and regional trade agreements. Importers of 
energy products desire security of supply. They favor transparency and predictability in 
their suppliers’ policies and wish to limit their use of quantitative restrictions and export 
duties. Many importing countries also seek access to new technologies from exporters 
such as transmission and smart grid technologies. 
Non-state actors, including energy firms, play a greater role in energy regulation. They 
seek laws, both international and domestic, to support investment and reduce risk, such as 
nationalization. These firms are concerned with transparency and protection of their 
intellectual property. 
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Because of energy’s importance to every government and the massive influence of 
energy stakeholders, there is limited regulation of electricity trade on a global level. 
Individual countries are averse to outside regulators governing their energy trade, 
implying restraints to the county’s freedom to secure energy resources and pursue energy 
policies. Maintaining energy reliability/security is seen as a delicate and sovereign 
process, such that outside regulation is often considered to complicate its delivery. 
7.1.4 The Grey Areas: Is Electricity a Good or Service? 
Within the global regulation of electricity, it is unclear if electricity is to be treated as a 
good or a service. This ambiguity benefits energy stakeholders, allowing flexibility and 
autonomy in their activities. Historically, no formidable interests existed in opening 
markets for energy products. As a result, GATT excluded energy products from tariff 
reduction commitments (Desta 2003). 
Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services within GATT, the well-known 
GATS, electricity is neither treated as a commodity nor listed as a service (WTO 2010). 
Recent indications reveal that the leadership at the WTO considers electricity a good—
for practical reasons, customs clearance is done after the electricity enters the country 
according to measurements at the cross-border link (WTO 2010). Some WTO members 
agree with this classification, while others view the generation of electricity and 
operation of power plants as a service. 
Because of the ambiguous definition for energy and the vested stakeholder interests, rules 
within the WTO provide significant flexibility for energy. Energy is exempt from WTO 
regulations for critical shortages of essential products (Article XI:2(a)) and conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources (Article XX(g)). Electricity producers restrict exports to 
ensure availability of essential supplies to a domestic industry, for which de jure 
prohibitions for trade are accepted because of the consideration of electricity as an 
“essential” resource (Article XX(i)). 
Although most provisions in NAFTA extend to all three countries, the manner in which 
Mexico included energy and electricity in the agreement differed significantly from 
Canada’s strategy. Canada granted importers proportional rights to access Canadian 
electricity in case there is a need to curb exports because of a crisis; Mexico exempted 
itself from such a clause in NAFTA (Pineau et al. 2004). NAFTA (Article 604) 
prohibited taxes and duties on energy exports unless similar charges were applied on 
domestic consumption as well; NAFTA prohibits maximum import and export prices in 
line with non-discrimination principles and market-driven liberalization (Article 603(2), 
NAFTA; Article 902, CUSFTA).  
Given these exceptions, on their part little guarantee protection exists from cross-border 
supply. As a result, few disputes reach the WTO and there is sparse precedence 
governing cross-border energy trade. However, with the decentralization of the global 
economy it is possible that the number of disputes rising to the WTO may increase, 
forcing the WTO to provide further clarity on cross-border electricity regulation, as it has 
already happen in cases of trade of electricity across European countries (see Chapter 1).  
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Energy markets decentralize with emerging economies taking a greater role and interest 
in energy trade. This phenomenon along with regulation of energy demands regarding 
climate change, and large energy economies joining the WTO will likely influence and 
change current regulation of electricity trade.  
The global communities pursuit for solutions to climate change will change regulation on 
the global venue. Concerns of climate change, we argue that will increase global 
regulation of energy, putting pressure on governments to alter their energy consumption. 
Recognizing the importance of alternative energy generation several countries are 
providing significant subsidies to domestic industries. Other countries dispute the use of 
subsidies to encourage the development of alternative energies as this gives subsidized 
industries an unfair advantage in energy markets. New disputes are being brought to the 
WTO regarding clean energy subsidies. These rulings may have an indirect impact on 
electricity trade as new forms of generation in border areas come from clean energy 
sources (Lesage et al. 2010).  
Energy exporters who are also members of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) do not follow WTO regulations on energy trade. The export 
restrictions used by OPEC members could receive more attention as new members join 
the WTO. While no dispute has been brought to date, new disputes may come to the 
WTO challenging rules protecting energy exporters as importing members seek increased 
transparency and guarantee of supply. Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in 2005, Russia 
joined in 2011, and other oil producers prepare to join soon. These new states with large 
economies will change the dynamics of WTO and regulations regarding energy.  
To close this introduction about main stakeholders and institutional frameworks for 
energy, traditional economic powers lose dominance of the global economy to new 
emerging markets, along with a renewables’ agenda that is less than clear for the time 
being. New exporters from emerging economies now controlling an increasing 
percentage of global trade might be calling for greater influence and concessions from 
regulatory agreements, both regional and international. These emerging powers, shifting 
the center of gravity within the WTO, could further challenge the status quo.  
7.2 History of Regulation in the United States 
The federal government’s regulation of electricity utilities is rooted in its constitutional 
responsibility in interstate commerce. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 created the 
Federal Power Commission (superseded in 1977 by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission) in charge of overseeing the development of hydroelectric power, which is 
clearly part of interstate commerce. An amendment to FWPA (Federal Power Act of 
1935) gave the FPC authority to regulate wholesale electric sales and encourage 
interconnections within and among power regions. Naturally, concerns arose over states’ 
rights to regulate, but they did not represent a substantial threat because the FPC did not 
have the authority to establish interconnections. The FPC was only able to exercise 
regulatory powers by forming regional reliability councils to oversee inter-utility 
coordination (Pechman 1993).  
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Government regulation of the electricity sector in the US was a contentious policy issue 
in the early 20th century, as public utilities expanded and amassed economic and political 
power while the Great Depression wreaked havoc on other sectors of the economy. A 
report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) revealed holding companies’ financial 
irregularities in income declarations that inflated profits and rendered dividends 
worthless. President Franklin D. Roosevelt supported efforts to rein in monopoly 
expansion with government intervention. The 1935 Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act (PUHCA) was one such measure, intended to simplify utility holding company 
systems and prevent pyramiding (Pechman 1993). 
The Great Northeast Blackout of 1965 constituted an institutional failure for the utilities. 
The outage affected an area of 80,000 square miles (eight US states plus Ontario) for 
almost 13 hours. Additionally, the blackout revealed the increasing complexity of 
transmission systems and a need to redirect investment to upgrade the grid (Munson 
2005). In 1968, the nine regional reliability councils along with public authorities and 
representatives of the federal government formed the North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC), which was charged with establishing reliability standards, such as 
utility surplus capacities, and collecting and disseminating information about reliability. 
With coordinated interconnections, NERC was the foundation for the trading of 
wholesale electricity in the region (Bradley 2008). In 2006, the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation replaced NERC yet maintained the same responsibilities of 
“ensuring the reliability of the bulk power system of North America” (NERC 2012). 
In 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act changed the name of the FPC to 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and established its jurisdiction over 
appeal hearings on Department of Energy (DOE) oil price control determinations and 
regulation of interstate oil pipelines. The following year, the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) was passed to integrate more efficient generating units 
from non-utilities, promote cogeneration, and use renewable resources. PURPA also 
required utilities to buy power at avoided cost and provide back-up prices at non-
discriminatory prices (Pechman 1993). Similar policy moves and adjustments occurred in 
Mexico much more recently with the passage of the Utilities Law in 1992, which 
maintained a mixed industry in which a vertically integrated state-owned enterprise 
coexists with marketable generation. (See Chapter 6 on Mexico’s state of regulations.) 
Conservation as a resource option started gaining traction in the US in the late 1970s, and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 demonstrated the materialization of this commitment. 
EPACT promoted energy conservation by opening access to the transmission network 
and making it easier for non-utilities to enter the wholesale market. EPACT also allowed 
utilities to purchase energy in the open-access national wholesale market by owning 
“exempt wholesale generators” or establishing subsidiaries anywhere in the country 
(Ardoin and Grady 2006). These measures were intended to increase efficiency and 
conservation so that investments in generation, transmission, and distribution capacity 
would be obviated (Pechman 1993). FERC’s Order No. 2000 created Regional 
Transmission Organizations (Bradley 2008).  
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Utilities’ monopoly power weakened with FERC’s Order No. 888, which outlined the 
conditions for open, nondiscriminatory access to the transmission grid. As a result, 
wholesale producers that included independent generators, government-owned utilities, 
and industrial producers could obtain transmission access at just and reasonable rates. 
Order 889 established transparent pricing of electricity through the Open Access Same-
Time Information System (OASIS), a computer network of electricity market information 
(Koch 2000). President George W. Bush signed the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPAct 
2005). Its objectives were to (1) promote competition in wholesale power markets; (2) 
strengthen FERC’s regulatory authority to help prevent market manipulation and market 
power abuse; and (3) reinforce the energy infrastructure, particularly the interstate 
transmission grid (Nunez 2012). As discussed in more detail in the following section, 
much of the authority granted FERC and DOE in this act has been successfully 
challenged in court by local stakeholders (Agen 2011). 
Today, despite a strong case for the technical feasibility, economic benefits, improved 
reliability, and overall enhancement of social welfare associated with greater grid 
integration between the US and Mexico, there is little evidence of momentum toward this 
goal, especially at the policy level. The two countries have built a foundation of ample 
and deep cooperation, particularly within the framework of NAFTA, yet electricity 
remains a relatively weak area of collaborative trade effort. The following section 
explores the potential regulatory and political explanations for this apparent anomaly. 
7.3 Analysis of Political Will 
Greater integration of the electrical grid across the US-Mexico border poses a unique 
solution to grid reliability challenges faced in both countries; nonetheless, there is little 
evidence that policymakers on either side are giving this approach serious consideration. 
Why there is not a higher level of commitment?  
In exploring this question, the following analysis first looks to the relationship between 
the US and Mexico, one in which shifting political agendas on both sides of the border 
create a shaky foundation for ongoing cooperation on electricity policy. Second, this 
section analyzes the regulatory environment north of the border. Despite little focus on 
the issue binationally, the opposite is true domestically: in the US, greater regional 
coordination of transmission planning is the focus of heated debate among stakeholders.  
Underlying all the explanations gathered here, it seems apparent that the high priority 
afforded domestic control of infrastructure guides decisions on both sides of the border, 
despite abundant evidence of the benefits of ceding some control in favor of greater 
cooperation. (See Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation of how the US and Mexico 
constitute an outlier in this regard.) 
7.3.1 US-Mexico Relations: He Said, She Said 
On the international stage, among pressing concerns shared by the US and Mexico, 
electricity takes a backseat to issues such as security and immigration reform. Even 
among energy concerns, electricity is overshadowed by oil, given that Mexico is the 
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United States’ second largest supplier. Meanwhile the oil sector generates significant 
income for Mexico, bringing in 14% of its export earnings and 32% of total government 
revenue as of 2010 (US Department of State 2011). As such, binational efforts focusing 
specifically on electricity have waxed and waned, dependent largely on each country’s 
shifting priorities and political tides. 
According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-
DESA), which has conducted a comprehensive analysis of trans-border grid projects 
around the world, international and regional institutions are a key strategic component of 
successful implementation of such projects (UN-DESA 2006). However, the US and 
Mexico have been unable to sustain, over the long-term, institutions with the capacity or 
mandate to focus specifically on electricity. For example, the North American Energy 
Working Group—formed in 2001 under the administrations of Presidents George W. 
Bush and Vicente Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien—unceremoniously 
dissolved in 2009, just a few months after President Barack Obama took office. The 
NAEWG worked to “foster communication and cooperation among the three 
governments” on energy issues, and its most notable accomplishment was the 2002 report 
“North America: The Energy Picture,” which compiled energy data, trends, and 
projections in one place and provided an overview of regulatory and infrastructure 
information relevant to all three countries. The group also produced a working paper 
about electricity imports, exports, and interconnections (Center for Energy Economics 
2006). 
The Cross-Border Energy Task Force—a joint effort between the US and Mexican 
governments specifically charged with addressing grid interconnections, among other 
things—emerged in the NAEWG’s stead in May 2010 but has yet to produce public 
reports of its accomplishments. Two years since its inception, its progress appears to be 
slow. According to Rachel Poynter, US-Mexico Border Coordinator with the US 
Department of State, “US invitations to Steering Committee members for the Taskforce 
went out in December 2011; Mexican invites were sent out March 2012.” As of April 
2012, the Mexican Steering Committee members were “due to meet in the coming 
weeks” with hopes of arranging “a meeting of the entire Steering Committee soon” 
(personal communication, March 30, 2012). 
Business News Americas reported in November 2010 that the task force’s “coordination 
difficulties” were responsible for a pace likely to “appear protracted to outsiders.” 
Elaborating on those difficulties, Rick Van Schoik, director of the North American 
Center for Transborder Studies, explained “It is not just arranging a meeting to coincide 
with the availability of the ambassador or the secretary. It is aligning all the machinery on 
one side and all the machinery on the other side, landing on a big enough window that 
they can all fly into a place and get all their work done with a substantive agenda, and 
with all the consultants they need to hire, or recorders, or translators” (Biller 2010). 
Given the complications inherent in coordinating binational efforts, the stop-and-go 
nature of grid-focused initiatives over the last decade suggests not so much a lack of 
political will regarding greater interconnection but a lack of political bandwidth, with 
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competing priorities successfully diverting resources away from an admittedly complex 
undertaking.  
Notably, when asked the reasons behind stalled efforts on grid integration, government 
officials from both countries point fingers at the other side of the border. In interviews for 
this research project, a US state department official suggested that from a diplomatic 
perspective, pressing harder on the issue was likely to be perceived by Mexico as a threat 
to national sovereignty. Meanwhile, the opposite view emerged in interviews with 
Mexican officials, who said that from the Mexican government’s perspective, integration 
would be relatively simple, precisely because of the centralized power structure afforded 
by a nationalized grid. On the other hand, as they pointed out, the US faces a much more 
difficult task, given the complex regulatory structure and fragmented decision-making 
authority of its electricity sector (personal communications in Washington, DC, February 
8-10, 2011).  
Indeed, in the US, each state has in place its own regulatory process for transmission 
planning, and each of these processes interacts differently with federal regulation when it 
comes to interstate projects. In addition to the practical and regulatory complexities of 
transmission planning, there are political complexities as well, because transmission 
projects don’t benefit every constituent equally—and some not at all. Because these 
issues loom large in the minds of US policymakers as they approach transmission 
planning projects, they provide a window into the perspectives of state and local 
stakeholders and decision-makers affected by cross-border grid integration. The 
following section explores this topic in more detail. 
7.3.2 United States: Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up 
Transmission planning is a complex, drawn-out process, even for projects built within 
state lines. In the build-out of the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) 
transmission lines in Texas, for instance, the “expeditious” manner in which it has been 
planned has been characterized as “unprecedented” by Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission Chair Jon Wellinghoff (Titus 2011). It nonetheless took years to organize, 
reaching back to the 1999 bill establishing a state renewable portfolio standard of 2,000 
MW by 2009. The Legislature eventually passed a bill in 2005 directing the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas (PUCT) to identify CREZ zones within which to build 
transmission, but it was not until 2008 that the PUCT issued an order defining those 
zones and triggering the actual build-out (nearly a decade after establishment of a 
renewable power standard RPS). That project is ongoing, with completion expected in 
2013. The CREZ lines have not been without controversy, as property owners—fearing 
harm both to property values and aesthetic views—have fought the build-out (Galbraith 
2010). The PUCT’s attempts to accommodate local concerns by rerouting lines has 
contributed to ongoing delays and cost overruns (Galbraith 2011).  
The problems associated with competing interests are magnified for interstate projects, 
which must accommodate numerous independent approval processes for all affected 
jurisdictions and agencies. These projects also fall under Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) jurisdiction, often pitting regional or national interests against the 
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concerns and legal obligations of state and local stakeholders, who argue that they are 
more uniquely suited to “weigh the impact of transmission projects on local 
communities” (Eagle 2005). Such projects often benefit the former more clearly than the 
latter, a problem compounded by regulatory frameworks with incongruent goals. 
According to Eagle, “while the need for siting transmission lines is regional and national, 
courts generally act on the proposition that a State cannot use its power of eminent 
domain for the benefit of the citizens of another State. In order to approve an interstate 
project, the courts must find at least substantial intrastate benefits arising from it.” 
Increasingly, as projects become more regional in focus, courts are considering cases in 
which “few if any direct benefits accrue within the state” (Eagle 2005). 
7.3.3 Mismatch: Generation vs. Transmission 
This tug-of-war is happening against a backdrop of increasing urgency in terms of grid 
reliability. The “legacy” transmission systems currently carrying electricity across 
hundreds of miles were originally intended to support local, primarily retail markets, not 
wholesale transactions spanning broad regions. Over the last three decades, as 
deregulation has increasingly made it easier for merchant generators—“built solely for 
market sales and not to serve the needs of a specific locale”— to compete with incumbent 
utilities, the grid has accommodated an abundance of generating capacity relative to 
transmission. As of 2005, some states had actually “imposed temporary moratoria on the 
construction of new merchant [generating] plants” to avoid further pressure on an 
overburdened grid (Eagle 2005). Demand growth slowed after the recession of 2008-
2009, but given the economic expansion that began in 2010 and picked up steam in 2011, 
the gap between generation and transmission remains.  
Lack of transmission leaves the grid vulnerable to congestion, which at minimum causes 
wear and tear on electrical equipment; it also creates peak demand prices to be very 
volatile and dramatically high. At worst, it can contribute to costly power outages (DOE 
2009). For companies like Hewlett-Packard, an outage of just 15 minutes at a chip-
manufacturing plant can cost $30 million (Franklin 2003). Costs for the blackout that hit 
Canada and several Northeastern US states in 2003, leaving 50 million customers without 
power, were estimated between $7 billion and $10 billion (Nunez 2007; Eagle 2005). 
Making matters worse, the shortage of transmission also renders the grid less amenable to 
maintenance and repair, due to inadequate redundancy in the system (Bradle 2008). 
Transmission congestion also leads to high electricity prices: “Because power purchasers 
typically try to buy the least expensive energy available, when transmission constraints 
limit the amount of energy that can be delivered into the desired load center or exported 
from a generation-rich area, these constraints (and the associated congestion) impose real 
economic costs upon energy consumers” (DOE 2009). 
It should be noted that transmission additions and upgrades are not the only solution to 
congestion problems. For instance, energy efficiency efforts, demand response programs, 
and distributed generation, all of which curb demand, are playing an increasing role. 
Indeed, the status of some “congested” areas—classified as such in the Department of 
Energy’s 2006 congestion study—improved through a combination of these methods, 
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according to the DOE’s 2009 follow-up study. Transmission projects nonetheless played 
a key role (DOE 2009).  
According to the DOE (2009), in some cases investment in transmission may simply be 
undesirable because the cost of the build-out may exceed the congestion costs. But as 
Pfeifenberger et al. (2012) argue, it is likely that the advantages of many transmission 
projects substantially exceed their estimated value, given the difficulties of assessing 
financial benefits that are “diverse in their effects on market participants” and span 
“multiple utility service areas and states.” Cost-benefit analyses tend to exclude 
significant benefits simply because their “broad range” and “long time frame” are 
difficult to quantitatively capture. Nonetheless, analyses that do include those factors 
suggest a high return, with benefits exceeding costs by 60% to 70%. Notably, following 
the California energy crisis of 2000-2001, the chair of the California ISO Market 
Surveillance Committee estimated that additional transmission capacity during that 
period could have saved the state as much as $30 billion (Pfeifenberger et al. 2012). 
7.3.4 Gridlock: Competing Interests 
FERC has attempted to address transmission planning problems by encouraging 
development of regional transmission organizations (RTOs). In 1999, FERC Order No. 
2000 created the RTO designation, and though formation of such organizations was to be 
voluntary, FERC stated specifically that its “objective is for all transmission-owning 
entities in the Nation, including non-public utility entities, to place their transmission 
facilities under the control of appropriate RTOs in a timely manner” (FERC 1999). This 
expectation “portends a power struggle between the FERC and state regulators” wrote 
one legal expert at the time, as it “creates conflict” between their “traditional roles” 
(Koch 2000). Indeed, FERC’s objective has not totally materialized. Some RTOs have 
formed, but overall the grid is characterized by a “hodgepodge of power markets” 
(Bradley 2008).  
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) further challenged state jurisdiction by 
giving FERC “backstop” siting authority to be exercised within certain areas called 
National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). These corridors were to be 
identified by the Department of Energy. The act gave the DOE the power to conduct 
congestion studies every three years, based on which it would then establish NIETCs. 
These authorities were subsequently—and successfully—challenged in court. In the case 
of Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, a Fourth Circuit Court ruling preserved 
state-level authority to deny permitting. Meanwhile, in California Wilderness Coalition v. 
U.S. Department of Energy, the Ninth Circuit Court vacated the authority of the DOE’s 
2006 congestion study, citing the department’s failure to sufficiently consult affected 
states and consider environmental consequences. The ruling essentially invalidated the 
NIECTS designated within the 2006 study, sending both FERC and the DOE back to the 
drawing board (Agen 2011). 
FERC has since issued Order No. 1000, in summer of 2011, which makes further 
attempts to encourage regional cooperation. According to Agen, “FERC insists in Order 
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No. 1000 that ‘nothing in [the] Final Rule is intended to limit, preempt, or otherwise 
affect state or local laws or regulations’” but that “the legal analysis of a state’s authority 
depends on the specific laws of each jurisdiction.” As such, he writes, “Order No. 1000 
might suggest a roadmap for an end run around state siting authority” (Agen 2011).  
How states are affected by increased federal oversight and greater regional coordination 
depends on a variety of factors, ranging from geographic location and resource mix to 
regulatory structure; therefore, while some states have pushed back against greater FERC 
and DOE authority, others have welcomed it. For instance, speaking before the DOE at a 
2008 Transmission Congestion Study Workshop, North Dakota Public Service 
Commissioner Susan Wefald said that wind developers couldn’t “move forward because 
of transmission constraints.” She spoke on behalf of her state as well as the South Dakota 
Public Utilities Commission in “requesting that the conditional congestion area identified 
in the Department’s 2006 congestion study between the Dakotas and Minnesota” be 
designated as an NIETC in the 2009 study (DOE 2008). 
Nonetheless, EPAct 2005 “has been vigorously challenged by market participants who 
expect to lose under a different trading system” (Agen 2011). For instance while some 
argue simply that it “may not be worth the cost of implementation,” others outright 
benefit from congestion: “states where low-cost generators are located, which in turn 
cannot export power due to transmission constraints, benefit from this power being 
‘locked-in’ to their regions because this keeps wholesale prices lower” (Agen 2011; 
Joskow 2011). 
As competing interests continue to negotiate these issues, the regulatory landscape 
remains an unstable backdrop against which investors and policymakers attempt to make 
potentially costly decisions. As Joskow points out, “Unlike every other energy sector, the 
electricity sector lacks a comprehensive national policy framework.” Without such a 
framework, writes Joskow, the US will not achieve its energy goals (Joskow 2009). 
Nonetheless, there are some very recent indicators that US policymakers are taking a 
broader policy approach. In the fall of 2011, the Obama administration established the 
Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission. It is focusing on seven pilot 
transmission projects around the country, including the SunZia line that runs close to the 
Mexican border, through Arizona and New Mexico (White House 2011). More recently, 
in April 2012, following the North American Leaders’ Summit (convened by President 
Obama, Mexican President Felipe Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper), the White House released a joint statement specifically including electricity 
interconnection as a mutual interest. The statement recognized “the growing regional and 
federal cooperation in the area of continental energy, including electricity generation and 
interconnection and welcome increasing North American energy trade” (italics are 
original) and pledged support for “coordinated efforts to facilitate seamless energy flows 
on the interconnected grid and to promote trade and investment in clean energy 
technologies” (White House 2012). 
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7.3.5 Lessons to Be Learned 
No matter how large transmission projects get, or how many geographical—and 
political—boundaries they cross, local concerns remain the same. As such, the tensions 
between top-down and bottom-up approaches illustrated here provide a window into 
concerns US policymakers may bring to the table of any transmission project, be it 
intrastate or binational. There’s relatively little scholarship, from a political economy 
angle, on such challenges. According to a review of global case studies conducted for the 
World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, “The large body of 
literature discussing the benefits of regional power system integration is not matched by a 
similar-sized body of papers specifically discussing possible problems” (ECA 2010). 
However, the UN-DESA does identify several potential legal, political, and social 
downsides, including the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits, political costs to 
decision makers who defend controversial projects or tariffs, and political corruption. For 
example, “a government may find it more expedient to explain restrictions on or other 
moves against local populations in terms of security of the power line than in terms of 
advancing political goals, even if the latter is the actual overriding concern.” Integration 
also requires some ceding of national control as countries become increasingly 
interdependent, which “has the potential to give one country unwanted political leverage 
over another” (UN-DESA 2006).  
Importantly, such “liabilities” are “very case-specific,” notes UN-DESA. The report 
recommends key strategies for successful binational agreements, including fair 
distribution of benefits and costs and efforts to “work with and through international and 
regional institutions.” As the experiences illustrated here show, these strategies may be 
easier said than done. Nonetheless, further study in this area is likely to shed light on the 
less apparent challenges and solutions as the US and Mexico embark on cross-border grid 
efforts. 
The Texas grid, which operates independently, is relatively unburdened by the regulatory 
hurdles other states must manage. As FERC Chief Economic Advisor Richard P. O’Neill 
put it, “We don’t mess with Texas” (personal communication, February 9, 2012). While 
this autonomy simplifies transmission planning relative to other states, it also represents 
an asset—control—with which officials have appeared reluctant to part, even for the 
benefits associated with greater regional cooperation on transmission planning. The 
following section analyzes this issue in more detail. 
7.4 ERCOT: The Price of Autonomy 
In comparison with the regulatory bodies of other states, the autonomous model of 
ERCOT has proven exceptionally successful in its transition to a competitive market. A 
study of its history and regulatory mechanism could be helpful in understanding the 
advantageous context of cross-border electricity trade in Texas. ERCOT’s success can 
provide insight for federal or other state regulators in overcoming barriers to cross-border 
electricity trade.  
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The following brief description of ERCOT’s history is mainly chronological, with 
categorical discussions followed in accordance with its development progress, which 
includes the establishment of autonomous jurisdiction, the deregulation of transition, and 
nodal development. 
7.4.1 Brief history of ERCOT 
ERCOT is technically a nonprofit corporation under the oversight of the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas (PUCT). According to the report named The Story of ERCOT 
produced by The Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor & The Texas Coalition 
For Affordable Power (2011), ERCOT operates on $191.1 million in annual revenues (up 
to October 2009), facilitates operations of the wholesale electricity market, supervises 
transmission planning, ensures sufficient availability of power on the grid, and manages 
congestion on transmission lines; ERCOT is in charge of the flow of power across 40,000 
miles of transmission lines connecting with more than 550 generation units. The 
transmission line covers about 75% of the state jurisdiction region and serves 22 million 
Texans (The Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor & The Texas Coalition For 
Affordable Power, 2011). 
Jurisdiction of Autonomy 
As is widely known, ERCOT is generally not subject to the plenary jurisdiction of FERC, 
because the Federal Power Act (FPA) imparts federal jurisdiction only with respect to the 
transmission and wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. ERCOT, as a 
concertedly intrastate electrical interconnection, remains beyond the reach of the federal 
jurisdictions. ERCOT’s autonomy can trace its roots to the response from certain 
principal Texas utilities to the passage of the FPA in 1935. These utilities in Texas 
“elected to isolate their properties from interstate commerce”1 so as to place themselves 
beyond the reach of the Federal Power Commission (FPC), “whose jurisdiction was 
limited to utilities operating in interstate commerce.”2 During World War II, these and 
other intrastate utilities interconnected their grids to meet wartime imperatives, forming 
what was then known as the Texas Interconnected System (TIS).  
“After the blackout of 1965—one of the largest in US history—24 utilities set up the 
National Electric Reliability Council (NERC), a voluntary membership organization 
dedicated to the creation of standards, guidelines, and criteria to ensure grid security. 
NERC later changed its name to the North American Electric Reliability Council and 
eventually to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation—although the 
acronym remained NERC” (The Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor & The 
Texas Coalition For Affordable Power, 2011). 
                                               
1
  W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 808 (N. D. Tex.1979) (anti- trust action 
describing the formation of ERCOT). 
2
  Cudahy, supra note 8, at 57 (describing how ERCOT members are “binding themselves to intrastate 
operation”). 
185 
In 1970, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) was created by TIS. It was a 
new, independent and not-for-profit corporation, a “regional electric reliability council” 
that reports to NERC (The Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor & The Texas 
Coalition For Affordable Power 2011). In its formation, ERCOT was not an entity 
exercising delegated state power, but was more akin to a “voluntary membership 
organization” (Fleisher 2008). It should be pointed out that Texas’ PUC was created in 
1975, before which ERCOT operated without comprehensive state government oversight. 
The famous incident of the “Midnight Connection” almost put ERCOT’s independent 
jurisdiction status at risk. The Central and Southwest Corp (CSW) in Texas set up a 
substation connection between Vernon, Texas, and Altus, Oklahoma, in order to obtain 
its status as an interstate electric power holding company, which would allow it to come 
under integration provisions of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. By doing so, 
the CSW could obtain legally advantageous rights, while the entire state and all its 
utilities would be subject to federal jurisdiction. In 1980 an important agreement 
established direct-current interconnections between the Texas grid and Oklahoma.3 The 
FPA stipulates that federal jurisdiction follows the flow of electricity. In the case of DC 
ties in ERCOT, the electrons do not “freely” flow across DC ties, so ERCOT (under the 
FPA) can be kept exempt from FERC supervision, its jurisdictional autonomy being 
successfully maintained. ERCOT therefore could have its limited connections to areas 
outside the state while at the same time steering clear of the federal jurisdiction that 
typically accompanies interstate commerce. 
It is generally regarded that the Energy Policy Act 2005 (EPAct 2005) finally settled the 
ERCOT’s autonomous status. In accordance with EPAct 2005, the majority of ERCOT’s 
utilities would, by virtue of their intrastate operation, be immune from any such order that 
governed the transmission utilities that “own, operate, or control facilities used for the 
transmission of electric energy (a) in interstate commerce and (b) for the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale.” The word “majority” is purposively used to account for the March 
2007 decision approving Brazos Electric Cooperative’s request for an order under 
sections 210 and 211 of the FPA allowing a third interconnection between ERCOT and 
SPP without otherwise impacting its own, or any other utility’s jurisdictional status4 
(Fleisher 2008). 
Deregulation Transition: Need of Transmission Line and Lower Price 
ERCOT’s jurisdictional autonomy exerted tremendous influence in its development. 
ERCOT’s legal autonomy enabled much more nimble policymaking process than found 
elsewhere in the US. For example, in April 1996 FERC issued Order No. 888, which 
called for open access to transmission lines; meanwhile, ISOs were considered to be 
created as one means for US power regions to ensure transmission access (FERC 2012a). 
In Texas, the approval process took about nine weeks; in contrast, those other regional 
                                               
3
  “Electric Companies agree on interstate connections,” The Malakoff News, Jan. 26, 1980. 
4
  Brazos Electric Cooperative, Inc., 118 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,199 (2007) (Order Directing Interconnection and 
Transmission Services and Approving Settlement Offer). 
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counterparts under FERC jurisdiction took years to obtain FERC approval (The Steering 
Committee of Cities Served by Oncor & The Texas Coalition For Affordable Power 
2011).  
In 1999, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 7, to create a competitive retail 
market and to grant the PUCT the authority to certify ERCOT as the independent 
organization in charge of supervising network reliability and retail operations.5 With its 
clearer mission, ERCOT then played a critical role in the deregulation transition. In the 
process of transition, ERCOT’s stakeholder process was born. Accordingly, the ERCOT 
protocols as the main tool of stakeholders came to effect. In 2002, one year after its 
consolidation of its previous 10 control areas to a single control area, ERCOT launched 
the competitive retail electric market as per Senate Bill 7. With the deregulation 
transition, new retail market enters can compete for residential and commercial 
customers. Meanwhile, municipal utilities and electric cooperatives, approximately one 
quarter of the ERCOT load, remain out of the system unless they would like to choose to 
get in. According to an analysis of ERCOT data, approximately 35% of the overall 
electric load within Texas remains outside of competition6 (The Steering Committee of 
Cities Served by Oncor and the Texas Coalition for Affordable Power 2011) 
Reaching in swing, the deregulation transition had posed important challenges to 
ERCOT’s existing transmission lines. After the deregulation happened, statewide lines 
were were required to transmit electricity to the far corners of the state. Meanwhile, large 
amounts of power were also needed to support great-distance transmission. Thus 
insufficiency of transmission lines along with transmission congestion emerged. 
Transmission line construction was planned. In 2005, after legislation was adopted to call 
for the PUC to demarcate so-called “Competitive Renewable Energy Zones” (CREZs ), 
the transmission line construction made substantial progress. These transmission lines 
would extend to the western part of the state and the Texas Panhandle, providing service 
to the rapidly expanding wind industry in Texas. 
Faced with insufficiency of transmission lines and transmission congestion, ERCOT not 
only constructed more transmission lines and did continuous system monitoring, but also 
conducted congestion management by arranging for generators to ramp up or ramp down 
production during periods of high congestion. In this way, congestion was somewhat 
relieved. But the cost of such relegation was passed on to market participants, adding on 
to consumers. Building new lines also drove up prices. As stated in The Story of ERCOT, 
“In 2003, the cost of power from competitive suppliers in the ERCOT region had shot up 
to a level 11% higher than the national average.7 By contrast, residential prices in Texas 
outside deregulation in 2003 remained below the national average” (The Steering 
                                               
5
 Sunset Advisory Comm’n, Staff Report 98 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.sunset.state.tx.us/ 
79threports/puc/puc.pdf (outlining this sequence of events); see also Electricity in Texas, supra note 7, at 8-
9 (outlining this sequence of events). 
6
 Calculation based on review of figures included in email correspondence from ERCOT public 
information specialist Dottie Roark, Jan. 6, 2011. 
7
 Form EIA-826 Data, available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia826.html. 
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Committee of Cities Served by Oncor and the Texas Coalition for Affordable Power 
2011). 
ERCOT’s Nodal Project  
In 2003, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) issued an order requiring 
ERCOT to implement a new wholesale market structure known as the nodal market. 
ERCOT was scheduled to implement the nodal market on December 1, 2010. The nodal 
market does not impact the regulated Transmission Distribution and Service Provider 
(TDSP) delivery rates, the renewable energy obligation for the state of Texas, or the 
federal, state, and local taxes. It does not impact the state’s renewable energy mandate 
nor does it impact the consumer protection rules that apply to electricity consumers 
(Direct Energy Business 2012). 
The nodal market design includes an ERCOT-sponsored day-ahead electricity market, 
which will facilitate the purchase and sale of electricity for delivery the next day. The 
ERCOT day-ahead market provides Direct Energy Business and its customers an 
additional market from which to procure electricity and provides greater electricity price 
transparency through ERCOT-published, day-ahead electricity prices. 
7.4.2 What can be learned from the ERCOT? 
One expert from Analysis Group stated that, “Texas’s retail and wholesale markets show 
strong evidence of many of the basic features of competitive markets: the presence of 
many buyers and sellers; low barriers to entry; non-discriminatory access of market 
participants to essential facilities (such as the wires) and other services necessary to 
participate in markets; rules in place requiring monitoring of market performance and 
mitigation of the ability of market participants to exercise market power; informed 
consumers; and transparent and relatively stable market rules” (Tierney 2008). 
How can ERCOT get such a successful transition? What other states can learn from 
ERCOT?  
General Structure 
As a major participant in the ERCOT market has argued, the success of Texas’ 
competitive electricity market may in large part be owed to the “comprehensive 
jurisdiction over that market that is exercised by Texas legislatures and regulators,” 
although this argument is not totally accepted (Fleisher 2008). Regardless whether 
“comprehensive jurisdiction” matters a lot or not, ERCOT’s independent, simple and 
centralized-control structure is an important ingredient in its success of competitive 
market transition. It should be noted that with a decade of relatively stable and 
transparent market rules, the investors has become optimistic about prospects in the 
Texas market. This stable regulatory environment is partly ascribed to the independence 
of ERCOT (and the PUCT). With a simpler structure of a single regulator, it comes well-
structured regulation such as effective separation of the ownership of generation and 
transmission as well as the lack of complicating interregional issues. 
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With such a relatively simple structure and planning uncertainty removed, the investor, 
especially the private sector can respond well, which is consistent with the Latin America 
model where for some years most new lines have been built by the private sector selected 
in a competitive process, managed by the national regulators (Burnageis 2009). Another 
example of ERCOT’s simple and nimble regulatory structure is evidenced with the speed 
with which the transmission expansion project was planned and implemented. In 2007, 
after a two-years study, the five regions were designated for renewable energy 
generation, and in March 2009, the final order of the transmission line expansion project 
was issued. 
Wholesale and Retail Market Coordinated, while Customers are Always Focused 
 
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the CAISO followed FERC severance in wholesale 
but retail is not regulated, whereas ERCOT has wholesale and retail integrated. The good 
coordination between the wholesale and retail markets supports the development of 
efficient markets in each and makes customers well adjusted to transition. Customer 
orientation is evidenced in the information campaigns, monitoring of customer switching, 
and service providing. For example, when new service is to commence or locations are 
changed, customers must select a competitive provider in most areas. The selection 
process has built up the provider-customer relationship and enhanced the competitive 
environment. As Tierney (2008) states, “Competitive retailers are allowed to manage 
their relationship with customers, including charging customer deposits and having the 
ability to issue disconnect orders for nonpayment for the utilities to carry out under 
guidelines of the Public Utility Commission of Texas.” 
Market Entry 
 
Along with its simple and centralized control model, ERCOT has uniform business rules 
to operate. “The ‘Code of Conduct for Electric Utilities and Their Affiliates,’ established 
in 1999, was important to ensure that competitive market participants (i.e., retail 
electricity providers and power generation companies) received nondiscriminatory 
treatment by transmission/distribution utility companies” (Tierney 2008). As a result, the 
market entry threshold was lowered. In the 1990s, for example, ERCOT adopted “deep 
penetration” integration transmission policy for independent generators requesting 
connection onto the grid, which means that a new generator need only fund actual (direct) 
costs to get connected. Furthermore, market power mitigation is well done by ERCOT. It 
is required that a power generation company may not own and control more than 20% of 
installed generation capacity in ERCOT. If a generation company owns and controls 
more than 20%, it must take measures such as auctioning off entitlements to its 
generation capacity (Tierney 2008). Besides the market power of the competitors, when it 
comes to the regulatory power of ERCOT itself, it should be noted that the centralized 
control style of ERCOT is “passively” oriented. For example, it intervenes in planning 
and scheduling of transmission only in congestion events. This simple control style is of 
course appealing to market entrants. Altogether, these measures above pull down the 
market entries and lead to an attractive competitive market environment to investors.  
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Transmission Expansion Policies 
The transmission access and cost allocation policies facilitate ERCOT development 
(Tierney 2008). Since 1998, generators have taken advantage of a standardized 
interconnection process that avoids discriminating against new plants trying to connect to 
ERCOT transmission lines. New generation is only required to pay for the direct costs of 
interconnecting with the transmission network, while costs for upgrading remote 
transmission systems to accommodate moving power from the new resource to demand 
centers are broadly socialized among end-users. Moreover, in developing the Competitive 
Energy Zone (CREZ), the manner in which new transmission projects are funded is 
attractive to wind developers. 
Developers are not required to make a significant investment in transmission. The 
individual electric utilities are hence responsible for building the transmission that is 
needed to interconnect a new generation facility, and the utility then recovers its costs 
through its postage-stamp rate. The developer needs to post security deposits, but that 
deposit is returned if the generating plant is completed and ready to interconnect on time, 
as opposed to the FERC regional developers who usually have to pay a significant share 
of the cost of the new transmission facilities that are necessary for their plant to 
interconnect to the grid and transmit energy to market (Differ 2009). With such policies, 
the markets were broadened geographically, and during the early years of the market 
incentives were also created for generating capacity additions.  
In sum, admittedly all the policies and practices above may only partly account for 
ERCOT’s success, but important features have been covered. The characteristics inherent 
in its structure have enabled an integrated market design with good customer focus and 
policies encouraging market participation together provide a fertile ground for ERCOT’s 
transition to competitive markets.  
7.5 Challenges for the Cross-border Trade, Applied to ERCOT? 
In this section, the disadvantage of ERCOT’s own regulatory environment will be 
discussed first, then key challenges in aspects of transmission and reliability in the 
context of cross-border trade will be elaborated on based on the outcome of the cross-
border electricity stakeholder forum as a guide to the analysis (Institute of the Americas 
2010), to see whether ERCOT has these challenges. 
7.5.1 Transparency, Challenge to ERCOT Management
 
The ERCOT scandal in 2004 revealed its mismanagement behavior. As described in the 
report by the name of The Story of ERCOT (The Steering Committee of Cities Served by 
Oncor & The Texas Coalition For Affordable Power 2011), there exists an alarming 
increase in borrowing and spending by ERCOT and a lack of accountability to state 
officials and regulators. The self-interested industry players dominate the ERCOT board 
while Texas consumers, who indirectly or directly pay the entire cost of the organization 
and the electric market that it helps oversee, have only a limited voice. Meanwhile, the 
report reveals that “ERCOT still remains exempt from the Texas Public Information Act, 
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and the organization’s current disclosure policies provide less transparency than that 
which is required of state agencies.” It is recommended that the PUC should be granted 
greater authority over ERCOT’s borrowing and spending.  
The Story of ERCOT also documents that electric generators have sold power at levels 
well above their marginal cost, a sign that the Texas market is still insufficiently 
competitive. Some wholesale generators operating within the ERCOT region can engage 
in activities that likely would be considered anti-competitive in other markets; where 
anti-competitive behavior has been alleged, minimal penalties have been assessed with no 
restitution to harmed parties (The Steering Committee of Cities Served by Oncor & The 
Texas Coalition For Affordable Power 2011). All disclosed mismanagement, if not well 
corrected, will dampen the confidence of both consumers and new investors, and hamper 
future trade. Along with mismanagement, the retail electricity price that is always higher 
than national averages easily invites criticism from consumers on ERCOT capability and 
credibility.  
7.5.2 Transmission Permitting 
According to the summary report of the cross-border stakeholder forum (Institute of the 
Americas 2010), access to proper authorities in the federal and state permitting processes 
needs to be streamlined to facilitate faster turnaround on both sides of the border. It 
should be noted that, for cross-border transmission, a presidential permit is needed in the 
United States. Further, in accordance with E.O. 12038, before a presidential permit may 
be issued, DOE will use two criteria to determine if a proposed project is consistent with 
the public interest. One is environmental impact, where DOE must determine the 
environmental impacts associated with issuing or denying a presidential permit pursuant 
to NEPA. The other one is the impact on electric reliability where DOE uses NERC and 
the member regional council (in Texas, the council is ERCOT) standard to consider the 
effect that the proposed project would have on the operating reliability of the US electric 
power supply system. After compliance with NEPA and satisfaction of the electric 
reliability criteria, DOE should obtain concurrence from the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense before a permit may be issued. The time required to process an 
application for a presidential permit is usually determined by the extent of the 
environmental analysis. A decision on a permit may be reached within six months or it 
may take 18 months or longer. 
The recent case associated with presidential permitting for an ERCOT region is AEP 
Energy Partner’s request of temporary continuation of its authorization of energy 
exporting to Mexico. The AEP Energy Partner obtained its presidential permit for energy 
exporting to Mexico in 2007, with an expiration on February 22, 2012. With strong 
protest filed on February 9, 2012, from the Sierra Club who argued that the AEP Energy 
Partner threatened the grid reliability, DOE was asked by Sierra Club to impose a lapse of 
exporting, which would led to disruption in the ongoing cross-border transaction. The 
AEP Energy Partner requested an expedited process from DOE for a temporary six-
month extension of its authorization. The request was finally approved. This case 
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reflected the importance of efficient and timely permitting process in cross-border trade. 
A streamlined permitting process would be helpful to the cross-border transaction. 
Besides the presidential permit, the state regulation of transmission solicitation and 
permitting procedure is also necessary (PUCT 2012). As discussed in the stakeholder 
forum, regulatory complexity slows down cross-border transmission proposals and 
prevents projects from breaking ground, but could also show the desire to maintain 
control by the system operator, in this case the ERCOT. On the other hand, it is known 
that the ERCOT regulatory structure is streamlined. One relevant question is whether 
some jurisdiction of ERCOT on transmission will be affected by cross-border trade with 
Mexico’s CFE, and thereby whether the cross-trade related stakeholders need seek FERC 
jurisdiction? The answer is “no.” 
In 2008, FERC granted a request by TexMex Energy, L.L.C. (TexMex) to determine that 
ERCOT and ERCOT electric utilities and market participants that were not currently 
subject to the Commission’s plenary jurisdiction would not become subject to FERC 
jurisdiction as public utilities as a result of operating and using the Eagle Pass DC Tie, a 
transmission interconnection between ERCOT and CFE. FERC explained the power 
flows and interconnections between the United States and the CFE grids, including: (1) 
interconnections between the CFE Baja California system and the Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council (WECC); (2) the interconnections between the El Paso Electric 
Company (El Paso) and the national CFE grid; and (3) the interconnections between the 
national CFE grid and ERCOT, including the Eagle Pass Tie. It was physically 
impossible for electric energy generated within ERCOT and exported to CFE’s national 
grid to reach the WECC interconnection because CFE’s national grid and CFE’s Baja 
California system were not connected. 
In addition, FERC determined that the only way electric energy could flow from ERCOT 
across the Sharyland Tie to CFE and then into a state other than Texas is when El Paso 
imports electric energy from CFE over El Paso’s interconnection with CFE through El 
Paso’s Diablo substation in Sunland Park, New Mexico (Diablo Interconnection). The 
FERC found this rarely occurred, and that, when it did occur El Paso must isolate the part 
of its system served by CFE, preventing the imported electric energy from flowing into 
the rest of El Paso’s system or into the Western Interconnection. Therefore, with the 
current configuration and operation of transmission line, the ERCOT and ERCOT electric 
utilities and market participants could still retain their non-pubic utilities and remained 
from the FERC jurisdiction. Should the configuration or operation change, the FERC’s 
determination of lack of jurisdiction may no longer apply (FERC 2012b). 
7.5.3 Land Use for Transmission
 
According to the stakeholder forum, large tracts of land will be needed to build this 
infrastructure, and securing the necessary real estate can be challenging because of 
zoning issues, land rights issues, federal land use, and the potential for environmental 
impacts. In the case of Texas, the Trans-Texas Corridor threatened to take massive 
amounts of land for transportation purposes before the project was abolished. With wind 
power prospering, the need for transmission lines led to the condemnation of land. Texas 
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wind farms can generate about 8,000 megawatts (MW) and transmission lines can carry 
approximately 4,500 MW. Plans are underway to build 2,334 miles of lines to transport 
an additional 18,456 MW. The project anticipates taking over 56,000 acres of land 
(Fambrough 2010). Whether the handling of land condemnation is successful matters in 
the construction of transmission lines.  
Again it is the example of a project of transmission line expansion. The construction 
timeline began in late 2009 after the preliminary planning proposal was accepted by 
PUCT.8 However, the preliminary construction timeline was protracted in the actual 
implementation, which required the taking of private land through the use of forced 
buyouts, or the use of eminent domain, in order to build the actual transmission facilities. 
Concerns for scenic integrity and the threat of environmental degradation drove land 
owners and environmental groups to oppose some of the proposed routes. The PUCT had 
to review the proposed route proposal in July 2010, thereby pushing back its original 
deadline by several months (Trahan 2010). It could be said that if the future cross-border 
electricity trade needs secured and sufficient transmission line construction, the legal 
issue of land use should be carefully considered. 
7.5.4 Environmental Regulation Constraint
 
As mentioned in the previous section, a presidential permit is needed for cross-border 
transmission originated in the United States, and the permit needs to meet the criteria set 
by NEPA. The cross-border stakeholder forum suggested that NEPA guidelines be 
revised to allow the use of substantially equivalent environmental documents from other 
jurisdictions to reduce the environmental review efforts. 
Specific to Texas, environmental constraints carry great weight to the cross-border 
process, as reflected in the 2012 incident of the Sierra Club protest against AEP Energy 
Partner’s renewal of exporting authorization. In the case of ERCOT itself, it was relieved 
that the cross-state air pollution rule, which aimed to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxide emissions from power plants, that was supposed to take effect on January 1, 2012, 
and to shutter 8,000 MW of Gas-Fired Generation in Texas, was finally delayed by the 
federal court. The EPA provided little time for ERCOT compliance so that the rules were 
not feasible to take effect in 2012 (Green Building News 2012). ERCOT’s ongoing 
operation, including more possible power generation for cross-border trade, would be 
under pressure until it meets the stipulation of such regulations as the cross-state air 
pollution rule.  
7.6 The Challenges of Renewable Energy
 
The summary report of cross-border stakeholder forum (Institute of the Americas 2010) 
states that the stockholders suggested that the United States needs a uniform national 
policy on promoting renewable generation; a national Renewable Portfolio Standard 
                                               
8
 PUC Docket 35665, supra note 55.  
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(RPS) would enable private developers to make the appropriate investments without the 
risk of regulatory uncertainty.  
Texas is a leader in developing wind energy in US. The Texas Legislature has been very 
supportive of the wind industry, and in 2005 the Texas Legislature ordered the Public 
Utility Commission (PUC) of Texas to create Competitive Renewable Energy Zones 
(CREZs). The Texas RPS is one of the most effective and successful in the country, 
widely considered a model RPS. The wind power has more than quadrupled since the 
RPS was established.  
However, the central question is whether a national RPS is feasible in the future. Davies 
(2010) has argued that the current state-based regime threatens to undermine the very 
goals it pursues. Existing state RPSs prevent the formation of a uniform renewables 
market because of the difference in definition of “renewable” and “renewable credit,” and 
the problems were reinforced by the myriad state RPS policy designs. He held that a 
federal approach could fix the problems the state regime has created. A national approach 
would create a national market and reinforce the RPS’s own efforts by helping energy 
and environmental law merge. 
Spence (2010) pointed out the political barrier of a national RPS. There are real political 
impediments to the goal of enacting a national RPS because it requires congressional 
action that will only be forthcoming if a majority of legislators decide that a national RPS 
serves their interests. Those interests, in turn, are related (but not necessarily identical) to 
voters’ interests or the national interest, which make all federal (and sub-federal) 
decisions politically charged for the time being. 
Rossi (2010) also highlighted some of the distributional and operational problems 
presented by a national renewable portfolio standard in electric power. Market unification 
of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) can be disentangled from a nationwide RPS 
mandate. And even if a national RPS is adopted, renewable projects will continue to face 
enormous legal and regulatory barriers, particularly relating to project siting, transmission 
capacity, and cost allocation. Therefore, the prospect of a national RPS still remains 
uncertain, and affects all efforts arising from the US in binational talks and agreements, 
not only with Mexico but also with Canada. It may be politically good, but 
implementation could face a difficult time. A summary of competent opinions is 
presented in Table 7.1. 
One additional point about renewable energy is the Renewable Energy Credit. One major 
challenge identified in the cross-border electricity stakeholder forum was the differences 
in incentives such as tariffs and RECs. Tariffs have an intrinsic barrier in that different 
markets generally indicate different regulations. There is a strong need to integrate RECs 
across both systems. A deeper assessment of the consequences of tradable RECs must be 
realized in order to achieve a better incentive system for the industry.  
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Table 7.1 
Different Views on Nationalization of Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Lincoln L. Davies • Evidences overwhelmingly support the need for a national law. 
The evidences include a multi-state survey of state RPSs; a newly 
developed metric of state RPS design, RPS’s efficacy tendency; 
and extant data on RPS performance. 
• A national RPS can help energy law and environmental law 
merge. 
David B. Spence • Increased reliance upon renewables implies higher electricity 
rates. While those higher rates will fall on today’s voters, many of 
the benefits of using renewable power will accrue to future 
generations and to people living outside of the United States. 
• Some parts of the country are blessed with more renewable 
energy potential than others, meaning that the national standard 
would impose more costs on some regions than others. 
• A national RPS makes supporting a national RPS politically 
risky and difficult for members of congress. 
Jim Rossi • Some of the distributional and operational problems presented by 
a national renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in electric power. 
o Market unification of RECs can be disentangled from a 
nationwide RPS mandate. 
o A national mandate has the effect of a tax, which makes it 
not be the most efficient lever to induce technological 
change in the energy industry. 
o Geography matters to any regulatory approach that 
encourages the development of renewable resources. 
o Enormous legal and regulatory barriers, particularly 
relating to project siting, transmission capacity, cost 
allocation, pricing of carbon. 
• Addressing climate change will need to involve more systemic 
and larger scale modifications to regulation of the electric power 
industry. 
Source: Author compilation from opinions by selected policy decision-makers. 
 
Summarily, this description of challenges ERCOT may face only highlights the key 
issues, not providing comprehensive information. Understanding of ERCOT could be 
improved in the context of comparative analysis with other states. Moreover, beyond the 
regulatory structure and specific policies, political willingness or barriers in a macro 
picture, as in the case of RPS nationalization, could also deepen the knowledge of 
ERCOT.  
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Chapter 8.  Towards Increased Cooperation in Electricity 
Transmission: A Mexico-ERCOT Simulation Experiment 
by Amin Shams, Josef Varga (and Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez) 
Abstract 
Modeling the strategic interaction of market participants and regulators is important for 
policymakers to capture the opportunities and challenges of transitioning markets. 
Modeling can make use of proxy variables of congestion as triggers for alternative forms 
of binational cooperation. This chapter gathers and organizes contemporary modeling 
strategies based on their capabilities and key findings. We gather model conclusions to 
synthesize what conditions and challenges exist for transmission expansion and 
restructuring of and equilibrium between partitioned markets that could lead to greater 
social welfare by integration. Specifically, we look at models of stakeholders of 
transmission lines and synchronization, as well as national (or transnational) regulators in 
the case of a Texas/Mexico transition towards a deep market. Using a GAMS simulation 
exercise, the chapter demonstrates that more integration between Mexico and ERCOT 
reduces congestion corridors in Texas and Mexico, provokes prices to converge to a 
lower level, increases consumer surplus in Texas, and increases producer surplus, but 
transmission lower profitability might require fixed fee adjustments, according to 
hypotheses tested in other markets. 
8.1 Introduction 
The liberalization of electricity markets in Europe and the United States is transitioning 
from theory to reality as policymakers adapt new paradigms concerning network industry 
efficiency. The United States consists of three independent regional systems. The Eastern 
Interconnection integrates the central and eastern part of the country, plus Eastern Canada 
and Quebec; the Western Interconnection integrates all systems west of Texas, Arizona, 
Colorado, and also includes British Columbia and Alberta in Canada, and Baja California 
in Mexico; and ERCOT in most of Texas. Within the three regional systems, there are 
eight control areas of transmission according to NERC: FRCC in Florida, SERC in 
Southern states, RFC in the plain states and the Great Lakes; MRO in the large mid-west 
states; NPCC in the northeast; SPP north of ERCOT; and WECC in the west, with the 
California Independent System Operator being CAISO; and ERCOT in Texas. Congested 
areas have been detected by FERC that pressure the security and reliability of the grids, 
and set challenges for expansion. 
Problems arise also as regulators from different countries attempt to restructure and 
integrate electricity markets and infrastructure. Because it is difficult to move backwards 
from liberalization, efficient policies must be in place to protect consumers from 
unexpected market failures. Will unbundling lead to increased market power among large 
generators or transmission companies? Will deregulation lead to insufficient investment 
in generation or transmission capacity, thereby limiting the benefits to consumers? Will 
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national regulators act strategically in ways that hurt over-all market efficiency? Will 
open up of wholesale markets open consumers to risky trading policies? These are but a 
few of the key questions that have stalled market restructuring and integration.  
According to Joskow (2008), the overriding goals of market restructuring have been to 
ensure that competitive wholesale markets for power provide better incentives for 
controlling costs of new capacity, to ensure innovation, to provide incentives for network 
operators to provide appropriate levels of service and quality, and to shift risk from 
consumers to suppliers. The ultimate goal can be summarized as achieving a rational 
allocation of social resources and to maximize social benefits to expanding regions. 
Telecommunications is one of multiple industries that have transitioned from an older 
framework of regulated monopolies. Yet, substantial difficulties and setbacks stymie 
progress in the electricity industry exemplified in the 2000 California market failure, and 
other major power outages such as in the northeast United States in 2003. As a result of 
these difficulties and uncertainty, policymakers as well as critical stakeholders desire 
sophisticated modeling to support future progress in optimal industry design.  
While one observes modeling designs for multiple markets, our focus is to derive 
conclusions specifically on the Texas-Mexico region, as compared to the California-Baja 
California more profound coordination for the recent past (Baja California is part of 
WECC). The Texas market is highly liberalized, and uniquely independent from the rest 
of the US grid. In Chapter 6, it is shown that he Mexican market is transitional. The 
parastatal CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad) maintains a virtual monopoly in the 
market with substantial market power under a sole-buyer design. However, beginning in 
1993, a non-utilities law liberalized generation to allow private producers under 
modalities of auto-generation, co-generation in industrial uses of gasification, small-scale 
producers, importers, exporters, and the so-called Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
for exclusive sale of electricity to CFE (Ibarra-Yunez 2008). 
With market design and regulations quite different between the two systems, the ERCOT 
and Mexican grids represent an opportunity for market-integration and restructuring. The 
two markets are already connected (ERCOT has 13 links), as sub-regional 
interconnections using DC asynchronous lines: seven are with SPP, three with WECC, 
and three with Mexico. As of now total Mexican connections amount to only around 286 
MW, and are used for emergencies only, yet trade is increasing. Both markets seem to be 
underdeveloped with room for substantial transmission expansion. Greater trade between 
Texas and Mexico could theoretically support this investment, while simultaneously 
decreasing the necessary reserve requirement for the system and increasing reliability. 
Unfortunately both ERCOT and CFE are relatively happy with the status quo. Also as 
mentioned in Chapter 6, Mexico lacks a clearly defined set of financial transmission 
rights and therefore higher risk to investment in transmission persists. Nonetheless, the 
literature is full of ideas about how such integration would be possible bolstered by a 
wide array of modeling strategies. 
The two countries show a sub-regional network consumer topology that is more similar 
to a star than a meshed one, as seen in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 
US and Mexico’s Transmission Connections, with Emphasis on ERCOT 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from connections and congestion areas in ERCOT and Texas Office of Public 
Utility Council. Retrieved February 17, 2012, at http://www.opc.state.tx.us/ERCOT.html#nodcal,. 
Note that ERCOT shows only two nodes with more than two connections; eleven main lines; 
congestion in ERCOT, north and south, and in Mexico. 
 
In the following exercise, a model is developed to characterize alternative results of the 
challenge for increasing integration at various levels. One option is for the two binational 
systems to remain with no change, with no connections even for emergency supply; then 
for increasing coordination, another step could entail interconnection similar to the Baja 
California through day-to-day flows and participation in WECC for binational, even if 
independent planning; finally, a theoretical exercise would entail integration. Alternative 
scenarios are accomplished with simulation trends of two systems as independent from 
each other and with no links; and when systems are interconnected, even if only for 
emergencies to reduce critical congestion across the Mexican and ERCOT systems 
(Rosellón and Weigt 2011; Zenon and Rosellón 2010). 
This study is organized as follows: in Section 8.2 a review of bilevel optimization based 
on key works is presented. In Section 8.3 we refine modeling approaches to the context 
of US and Mexico. In Section 8.4 the quantitative and block-equilibrium exercise is 
spelled out. Then a set of challenges and opportunities is presented that includes policy 
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suggestions based on the model. Finally, in Section 8.5 we present a conclusion about the 
prospects for liberalization in the electricity industry.  
8.2 Current Modeling Trends 
Weigt (2009) observes a large body of theory from which to draw research on electricity 
markets. Yet the specific characteristics of electricity greatly restrict the application of 
that theory to build satisfying models. Non-storability, inelastic demand, and the 
necessity of physical transmission complicate electricity markets and differentiate them 
from other liberalized markets. Furthermore, electro-technical, thermodynamic, and 
mechanical restrictions add to the difficulties of modeling these markets. Nonetheless, a 
broad spectrum of models has been developed since the 1990s in order to facilitate 
market restructuring. 
We find Ventosa et al. (2005) classification of models as a useful starting point. They 
take a complicated array of modeling techniques and divide them into three major types: 
optimization, equilibrium, and simulation models. They argue that these model types can 
be further divided based on assumptions about market structure and information 
availability. Building on this, as well as from contributions by Day et al. (2002) and 
Smeers (1997), Weigt (2009) sub-divides each category further. Notably, Weigt adds 
welfare maximization as a sub-category of both optimization and equilibrium models. 
Each of these three broad categories offer advantages to policymakers but also suffers 
from inherent weaknesses in their development and applicability to market conditions.  
8.2.1 Optimization Models 
Optimization models address simple, single-firm profit maximization or market-wide 
welfare maximization/cost minimization. Profit maximization models can assume either 
exogenous prices or demand-price functions. Furthermore, these assumptions can be 
deterministic or stochastic (Ventosa et al. 2005). Optimization models benefit from 
availability of optimization algorithms and the simplicity of adding additional constraints 
(Weigt 2009). Bi-level optimization models can be used to investigate the strategic 
interaction between self-interested parties.  
Furthermore, bi-level programming is an excellent tool for modeling optimization 
problems where decision variables are not controlled by the main optimizer but by a 
second optimizer. This modeling technique is especially useful in unbundled, yet 
regulated electricity markets, where generating agents and transmission owners desire 
profit maximization while a system operator attempts to minimize distribution costs and 
guarantee social welfare. Several scholars have used bi-level programming to model 
electric power markets, including Fampa et al. (2008) who use it to model strategic 
bidding under uncertainty in a wholesale energy market in Brazil. Weber and Overbye 
(2002), and Hobbs (2001) consider strategic bidding as a nested optimization problem, 
where the generator maximizes its individual welfare subject to an outcome which 
maximizes the total social welfare based on all bids in the market. These types of models 
fit best with our research question of optimizing social welfare.  
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8.2.2 Equilibrium Models 
Equilibrium models are advantageous to optimization models in that they allow for 
several market participants’ profit maximization simultaneously (Hogan 2002; Weigt 
2009). The major limiting factor in equilibrium models is the necessity to assume 
convexity, and these assumptions may be too strong in certain cases where market 
failures persist or in cases where modeling needs meshed systems of AC connections. 
Day et al. (2002) offer six types of strategic interactions competitors may take in these 
type of agency models: Betrand Strategy, Cournot Strategy, Collusion, Stackelberg, 
Conjectural Variations, or Supply Function Equilibrium. In the following section 
literature on each model will be reviewed. 
Cournot Models 
These economic models are used for analyzing the quantity and supply behavior of 
different players in an oligopoly market. The firms have market power, meaning the 
quantity they produce affects the quantity and price of rival firms. The players, each 
seeking to maximize their own profit, simultaneously decide on their quantity bid; price 
is determined as a function of aggregate quantity. Given the structure of the electricity 
market, this model provides a valuable tool for analyzing the imperfect competition in 
transmission, capacity, and generation.  
Willems (2000) uses Cournot to model competition in an electricity market with 
transmission constraints and explores the role of an Independent System Operator (ISO) 
in preventing overload over the transmission lines. In the short-run the ISO can impose 
quotas on generation, and in the long-run can set the transmission price. Also, Hobbs 
(2001) models two different electricity market structures based on the Cournot model: a 
market in which generators sell the electricity to a central auction (POOLCO), and a 
market in which they bilaterally sell the power to customers. His model goes beyond the 
earlier simple models (like models of simple radial network) by allowing for the 
inclusion of many control areas and interfaces. Neuhoff et al. (2005), Jing-Yuan and 
Smeers (1999), and Bergman (1995) are other examples of implementing Cournot models 
in electricity markets. Using the Cournot model, we can explore the maximization of 
social welfare over firm profit maximization with market power. In a broader view, we 
look at the interaction between a generator, a public/national system operator (this 
operater for example may regulate transmission) and consumers. 
Bertrand Models  
Bertrand models allow for differentiated products. Here the main difference with the 
Cournot model is that the firms simultaneously set the price and then, based on the 
determined prices, consumers decide on the quantity of each product to buy. In the 
electricity market, given the homogeneity of a product, if a firm sets its price below the 
price level of other firms, theoretically, it can capture the entire market by expanding its 
output. However, in reality, generation capacity cannot be expanded easily in the short-
run, making the Bertrand model a less vigorous alternative for modeling the electricity 
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market. There is no general acceptance among scholars in using Bertrand for modeling 
electricity market. 
Stackelberg Models 
These models are based on the quantity-setting approach of the Cournot model, but 
replace simultaneous decision-making with a sequential approach. In this strategic game 
the leader firm moves first and the follower firms, knowing the action of the leader, move 
sequentially. The model fits the electricity industry where there are one or more dominant 
firms in a privileged position and a number of subordinated firms acting as followers. Yu 
et al. (2000) model the strategic behavior of the players in a deregulated electricity 
market with one or more leaders and the fringe producers. They assume that the fringe 
producers adopt competitive pricing strategies similar to what we see in Bertrand models. 
Also De Lujan and Granville (2003) present a bi-level optimization problem in a leader-
follower game in AC power system. “The first-level optimization sub-problem (leader) is 
defined by active power output, which will maximize strategic firm benefits restricted to 
given bounds. The second-level sub-problem (follower) can be considered as a particular 
AC optimal power flow parameterized by first-level variables.” As another application of 
this approach, Dias (2007) models the electricity market in Portugal based on the fact that 
Energias de Portugal (EDP) produces more than 60% of the total electricity in Portugal 
and the remaining firms acts as followers of this leader. 
Collusion Models  
In contrast to the above approach, Collusion models help simulate markets where 
competitors cooperate for mutual benefit. It often takes place in an oligopoly market 
where a few firms have market power and by colluding, can significantly affect the 
market. Bolle (1992) provides a model in which tacit collusion can take place by each 
firm promising to produce less if the others produce less, leading to price increases. On 
the other hand, Fabra and Toro (2005) show the case of Spanish electricity market in 
which collusion does not necessarily result in high price-cost margins. They suggest that 
daily repetition of auctions in electricity market allows firms to learn to compete less 
aggressively and avoid price war. The case of the Spanish electricity market during 1998, 
in which even the over-contracted firms charged above the marginal costs, suggests that 
producer might have been engaged in a tacit collusion. 
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) Models 
In another level of methodological emphasis, SFE models, developed by Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989) allow firms to choose a supply function instead of setting a fixed price or 
quantity as their strategy. Klemperer and Meyer show that under uncertainty there is 
always a Nash equilibrium in the supply function for a symmetric oligopoly with a 
homogeneous good. This resolves the competing predictions of Cournot and Bertrand 
models. Also Baldick et al. (2000) advocate that SFE offers a more realistic view of the 
electricity market than Cournot do where suppliers typically offer a price schedule rather 
than simply bidding a set quantity or price. In Cournot models the market price is 
determined by intersecting the aggregate quantity the suppliers bid and the market 
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demand curve. However the difficulties of estimating the demand curve in the electricity 
market makes the price predicted by Cournot model less reliable. 
Conjectural Variations 
These approaches within equilibrium models allow for consideration of competitors’ 
reactions when deciding on optimal production. In fact, the players in an oligopoly 
market who choose their actions simultaneously assume that their choices will influence 
the contemporaneous choices of the other players. The reaction to other players can be 
modeled by a residual demand function, which is obtained by subtracting the supply 
functions of other players from the demand curve. Garcia-Alcalde et al. (2002) suggest 
that this approach can overcome the Cournot weaknesses relating to its high sensitivity to 
the demand elasticity. 
8.2.3 Simulation Models 
In many cases solutions to systems of equations or differential equations (necessary for 
equilibrium) are too difficult to solve. Simulation models allow greater flexibility than 
equilibrium models (Ventosa et al. 2005). Simulation models allow for dynamic market 
analysis, and agent-based approaches allow for goals and adaption (Weigt 2009). Weigt 
also points out that while these models allow for flexibility, heterogeneity can limit 
comparability.  
The US Department of Energy (DOE) uses several different models to identify the 
greatest economic gains for electrical markets. DOE’s primary models include the 
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS), the Policy Office Electricity Modeling 
System (POEMS), and TRADELEC a computer model developed by private contractors 
to the DOE.9 The sections below will review and compare the assumptions and design of 
each model. 
NEMS 
Developed by the Energy Information Administration, NEMS models integrate energy 
markets and economies in the US with supply and demand modules. The model provides 
policymakers with an integrated framework to evaluate proposed policies and its 
implication for US consumers (EIA 1999). 
NEMS considers four demand modules (residential, commercial, industrial, and 
transportation), two conversion modules (petroleum and electricity markets), and four 
supply modules (natural gas, oil, coal, and renewable fuels). NEMS also contains a 
macroeconomic feedback module representing the effects the energy market has on the 
overall US economy. Further, NEMS incorporates a module to represent the interaction 
                                               
9
 Energy Information Administration, The Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act: A Comparison of 
Model Results, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting (Washington, DC: US Department of Energy, 
1999). Retrieved November 28, 2011,  at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/ceca/pdf/sroiaf9904.pdf. 
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between domestic and international energy markets. The NEMS generates a solution for 
general equilibrium using the modules above to find supply/demand of energy in the US. 
POEMS 
A computer model of the US energy system, POEMS develops a more detailed 
representation of electricity markets in the US than NEMS yet it has many similarities to 
the NEMS model, with many of the same components and assumptions. Moreover, 
NEMS and POEMS use the same data sources from DOE and produce annual forecasts 
through 2020 with very similar results. The main differences are in the treatment of 
regions, dispatching, electricity trade, and pricing.  
The POEMS model, however, considers electricity modules based on the electric Power 
Control Areas of the US considering 114 regions. The NEMS electricity model considers 
only 13 different regions based on the North American Electricity Reliability Council. 
This difference in regionality causes differences in calculations for regional capacity 
reserve margins as well as competitive pricing. 
POEMS and NEMS calculate competitive prices of generation using the marginal cost of 
power (i.e. the short run operating costs of the last plant dispatched during each time 
period). However, the models have different adaptations to the calculation. To the 
marginal cost of power, POEMS adds a charge for new plants to recover investment 
costs, if needed. NEMS, however, adds a reliability price adjustment reflecting the value 
of reserve capacity. 
Both models assume that power from federal and state facilities will continue to be priced 
at the average cost of service. However, reserve margins are imputed assumptions in 
POEMS, where NEMS solves for reserve margins within the model by finding the 
balance of cost and additional reliability with adding a new plant to the system against 
the value consumers place on reliability. 
The DOE’s analysis of the models, prepared in 1999, finds that despite model differences 
the two models produce similar results for electricity sales, carbon emissions from the 
electricity sector, and electricity prices. Looking at the results of DOE’s comparison 
study, the only significant differences between the NEMS and POEMS results are in the 
western regions: the Northwest Power Planning Council, Rocky Mountain/Arizona, and 
California-Southern Nevada. For example, in the 1990s NEMS found it economical for 
California to continue purchasing electricity from the northwest to meet its regions 
demand for power. However, POEMS concluded that California needed to reduce its 
purchases from the northwest and build new power generators in California. The above 
models, even if rather detailed, are concentrated in generation, reserve margins, and flow 
of electricity. 
TRADELEC 
TRADELEC, a model developed to capture greater detail and disaggregation of energy 
markets, is beginning to replace NEMS as it allows for a deeper examination of 
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alternative assumptions in the wholesale electricity markets. TRADELEC is designed 
specifically for analyzing competition in electricity markets and transitions to deregulated 
systems in the US. 
Designed to explore key policy questions TRADELEC is a network model which 
considers stranded costs, consumer prices, mix of new construction, impact of increased 
electricity trading, and interaction with environmental policies to model electricity 
generation, trade, capacity expansion, and pricing. TRADELEC is a network electricity 
model considering interregional trade to maximize the economic gains from trade.  
TRADELEC begins with electricity trade that brings the largest efficiency gains first. 
Descending from the largest efficiency gains to point where transmission capacity is 
reached and possible gains are exhausted. TRADELEC captures economic and physical 
limits to trade by modeling alternative scenarios for transmission fees, losses, 
transmission capacity, and hurdle rates. As a result, TRADELEC models integrated 
interregional trade similar to time-block auctions of electricity. 
The model focuses on market-driven electricity trade, while POEMS and NEMS consider 
the existing electricity transmission system as fixed. TRADELEC quantifies electricity 
trade as the function of relative prices, transmission capacity, and the assumed 
miscellaneous costs to electricity market trading. The model identifies potential current 
and anticipated bottlenecks when operating at full transmission capacity and where they 
may limit trade flows among buyers and sellers. The bottleneck caused by transmission 
capacity results in regional price differences exceeding the cost of transmission and 
trading. As a result of capacity costs, the regional price differences exceed the cost of 
transmission and trade creating a market for electricity trade. The transmission losses are 
modeled as a nonlinear, “distance sensitive measure,” which makes the model an advance 
towards non-linear AC-types, however, with much complexity. 
Finally, for TRADELEC, the trade function is used to determine competitive prices for 
electricity. This function is used to measure efficiency gains from the deregulation and 
restructuring of the electricity market, solving trade relationships to offer insight into 
pricing patterns and motivation for electricity trade. 
Each of the models reviewed provides an insight into one aspect of the market. Among 
them, models with partial equilibrium that allows for strategic behavior of the generators 
are the best fit to the problem at hand. We can use the mentioned techniques to provide a 
model with single equilibrium. Moreover, as it is highly used in the literature, a Cournot-
type model of quantity flows would be the best fit for modeling the competition of 
generators after integration of US and Mexico electricity market. In the first level, like 
what is very prevalent in the literature, one can estimate the market power before and 
after integration based on the difference in the prices that model suggests and prices in a 
perfect competition market. Our hypothesis is that market powers and prices will 
decrease and consumption and social welfare will increase as a result of integration. 
However, transmission capacity is an obstacle in the way of achieving the benefits of 
integration. Therefore, in the second level an analysis of transmission expansion would 
be done mainly to solve potentially congested areas on both sides of the border. 
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8.3 Towards a Workable Approach to the Problem 
This analysis will focus on the integration of electrical markets between the US and 
Mexico. The California energy crisis in 2000 highlights the opportunity for northbound 
regional electricity exports from Mexico (Joskow 2001). There are several key 
stakeholders on both sides of the border who will be considered in the modeling. 
Generators, distributors, and ISOs each have a significant impact on the energy markets. 
State and federal regulators also represent key stakeholders in the market, and these 
include Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas (ERCOT) as a TRANSCO and ISO. Woo et al. (2003) note that greater cross-
border energy trades will require extensive system interconnections that do not exist. 
Commercial growth and integration undoubtedly mean that energy economics will 
eventually become a common topic in border contexts (Sheffield 1998; Jaafar et al. 
2003). 
An alternative for modeling an imperfect market is market equilibrium. In this approach, 
a set of optimization problems is defined—one optimization problem for each player. 
First order optimality conditions are pursued based on demand, supply, prices, 
transmission capacities, and market powers, assuming that lines on both sides of the 
border face congestion as a challenge to integrate. If there is congestion, readily available 
capacities cannot be used at the least cost, and hence units with higher supply costs need 
to satisfy loads. Consequently, prices would be higher than other non-congested regions 
or control areas. This exercise assumes that demands or loads and costs are well behaved. 
Also, it is assumes that given congestion, transmission expansion does not cause negative 
externalities and either binational system could end up with negative net capacity. This 
fact is pointed out by Hogan (2002) and Kristiansen and Rosellón (2010), such that a 
system operator or Transco has reserve financial rights or incentives for expanding the 
grid with different scenarios. 
Based on the nature of the behavior of market participants, this analysis further classifies 
the equilibrium models in two categories: Equilibrium Models based on Competitive 
Behavior and Equilibrium Models based on Strategic Behavior. 
8.3.1 Equilibrium Models based on Competitive Behavior 
Several electricity market models assume mere competitive behavior rather than strategic 
behavior among producers. As an example, Boucher and Smeers (2000) model a perfect 
competition market with a three-node network: two generators competing at two nodes to 
satisfy the demand in the other node. Based on the demand curve of the consumers and 
the marginal cost curve of the generators as a smooth function of the generation level, 
they show that different levels of decentralization lead to the same equilibrium in a 
perfect market. In our view, the model has two limitations. First, the analysis is in the 
short-run and long-run characteristics such as generation and transmission capacity are 
constant. For the purpose of our study, the fact that the model does not allow for 
enhancement in transmission capacity is a significant weakness. Second, the analysis is 
based on a perfect competition among players while the assumption of strategic behavior 
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by producers is closer to reality in electricity markets. In our problem with large 
generator companies, the assumption that a player does not have market power is not a 
credible assumption. Therefore, this model and other models such as Qi and Harker 
(1997) with the same assumptions do not fit well to our analysis. 
8.3.2 Equilibrium Models based on Strategic Behavior 
Cardell et al. (1997) argue “when the incentives are there to exploit market power, 
elimination of vertical monopoly power is not enough to ensure fully competitive pricing, 
at least in the short run.” Therefore, applying assumptions to the model that allows for 
imperfect competition and strategic behavior of players—such as what could be seen in 
Cournot and Bertrand—provides more realistic results, mainly around incentives for 
capacity expansion and interlinkages. 
Stoft (1998) emphasizes that in models with only one Nash equilibrium, the players agree 
on a particular Nash equilibrium and “then, and only then, game theory predicts this 
equilibrium will be the game’s outcome. Although such predictions are not foolproof, 
they are often quite accurate.” Many models in the literature try to achieve a unique 
equilibrium with unique solution by techniques such as creating a competitive market for 
transmission services or simplifying the demand and supply functions. As an example, 
Hobbs (2001) formulates two Cournot models (one allowing for arbitrage and the other 
one not) based on a simplified linear demand curve for the consumers. In this model, 
transmission is charged based on a congestion pricing scheme. The advantage of the 
model is that it does not have existence or uniqueness problems. Moreover, its simplicity 
allows for computing imperfectly competitive equilibria for networks with thousands of 
control areas or busses and large numbers of interfaces, though it might not provide as 
accurate results as more complicated models. On their part, Boucher and Smeers (2000), 
argue that given game theoretical behaviors by players, authorities can establish a 
regulated feasible outcome around the ISOs welfare function maximization. 
Jing-Yuan and Smeers (1999) model a power network between Belgium, France, 
Germany, and Italy with a single utility and two nodes in each country. One node 
represents generation and the other one distribution and consumption. Generators are 
geographically dispersed (one in each country) and behave in accordance with Cournot 
assumptions where transmission prices are determined by regulation. As another 
example, Cardell et al. (1997) model market power arising in a market with a dominant 
firm and a set of competitive fringe. They analyze the role of transmission constraints in 
creating market power: transmission constraints create bottlenecks and isolate markets 
and provide an opportunity for regional powers to practice market power. They model 
three conditions: a dominant firm without transmission rights, a dominant firm with 
tradable transmission rights, and multiple large firms in an imperfect competition. The 
model shows that network constraints allow the large firm to exercise market power and 
increase its profit by increasing its production in order to block the network and foreclose 
competition. 
Although many reviewed models to some extent allow for modeling some aspects of 
transmission expansion across countries and integration of national market, there are 
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some models that primarily focus on modeling a cross-country market. For example, Dias 
(2007) models integration of two oligopolistic markets that are not symmetric in number 
of firms, demand, and market structure with focus on the case of Iberian Electricity 
Market between Spain and Portugal (MIBEL). The model is a partial equilibrium model 
with a leader with competitive fringe for Portugal and a Cournot model with competitive 
fringe for Spain. The assumption for Portugal is based on the fact that Energias de 
Portugal (EDP) produces more than 60% of the total electricity in Portugal and the 
remaining firms do not have any ability to change prices. The paper suggests that a main 
reason of this market power is because of limited transmission lines in the Iberian market 
and between it and its neighboring states. 
8.4 Modeling Exercise 
8.4.1 Data Gathering 
Mexico’s CFE is similar to its northern border systems operators CAISO and ERCOT in 
terms of installed capacity, and they are almost comparable regarding high voltage 
transmission miles of infrastructure. CFE serves more users than its US counterparts, and 
experienced in the past higher reserved capacity (un-planned) than its counterparts, for 
which retirements and modernization efforts are more pronounced south of the border 
(interviews with F. Aboytes and E. Meraz, January 12, 2012). Average load weighted 
wholesale prices are indicative of the existence of a daily market, with adjustments of 
prices to input dynamics. In the table below, only CAISO presents the two comparative 
prices, being the latter closer to real wholesale prices, given the use of fuels and 
renewables. On the percentage of renewables out of total generation, Texas stands out 
with wind energy, while Mexico still has a challenge to bring renewables to its generation 
and semi-liberalized market portfolio.  
 
Table 8.1 
Comparison of US CAISO and ERCOT with Mexico’s CFE, 2010 
Variable CAISO ERCOT CFE 
Installed Generation (MW) 57,124 63,025 60,440 
Miles of Transmission (320 and 
400 KV) 
25,526 40,500 31,187 
Population 30 million 23 million 35 million 
Planned Reserve Margin 15% 13.75% 13% 
Ave. Annual Load Weighted 
wholesale price/ MWh 
$39.91-120 $26.50-170 $12-60* 
With Fuel Adjustment $33.95 n.a. $12-n.a 
Percent of Renewables (MWh) 11% 15.1% 3.5% 
Sources: IRC (2009), “State of the Markets Report, ISO/ RTO Council; CAISO data set; ERCOT data; 
SENER (2011), “Prospectiva del Sector Eléctrico 2010-2025; and Mexico’s data on load wholesale 
prices are gathered from interview (*). 
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The model studies the limits of transmission infrastructure, as demand is greater than 
transmission capacity. First, CFE divides Mexico into 9 regions, with 50 generating 
nodes or regions, from which around 25 show some type of congestion. If one were to 
take a proxy of the model as a DC topology, then 16 nodes represent Baja California and 
Baja California Sur connections, plus Sonora, Chihuahua (and Laguna), Coahuila, Nuevo 
León, and Tamaulipas. Since data sets with such level of disaggregation are not readily 
available, we need to settle for a more aggregate analysis using the so-called control CFE 
divisions: BC-BCS; NW; and N-NE areas, with reference to the aforementioned 
generation nodes.10 According to Hartley and Martinez-Chombo (2002), 8 out of 15 
nodes were importing ones, while the remaining 8 were exporting ones in 1999-2000. For 
2009-2010, the distribution is as shown in Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2 
Mexico’s Regional Effective Installed Capacity and Demand at Non-
Peak and Peak Loads 
Comparison between 2000 and 2010 in GW 
      2000       
Regions BC NW NNE W C SSE 
Non-peak 1,180 1,526 3,874 4,732 4,885 4,287 
Peak 1,899 2,365 5,245 6,062 7,439 5,966 
Capacity 1,701 5,309 7,772 5,781 4,067 13,623 
  congested no no congested congested no 
              
      2010       
Regions BC NW NNE W C SSE 
Non-peak 1,523 1,963 4,938 6,350 6,144 5,719 
Peak 2,600 3,617 7,090 8,175 9,000 7,792 
Capacity09 2,601 7,025 13,222 8,553 5,229 17,654 
  Quasi congested no no no congested no 
Source: Sener (2011), “Prospectiva del Sector Eléctrico 2010-2025,” and CFE (2011) POISE. 
 
The generation and consumption topology in Mexico shows many interconnections in 
Central Mexico and the western regions, while it shows a radial structure in both the 
north and southeastern extremes. Congestion is stark in the central region in 2010, while 
the west was clearly congested in 2000. Close to congested nodes are apparent in Baja 
                                               
10
 All data were validated for each node/ zone and made compatible regarding miles of transmission, 
capacity in GW, loads at peak and base demand in MWh, generation in MWh, prices in US dollar cents per 
kilowatt hour using Mexico’s Central Bank (Bank of Mexico) official fix exchange rate. Data on 
transmission per generation center were calculated as disaggregated as possible for CAISO, CFE, and 
ERCOT from 1999 to 2010-2011, or the most recent data available. Only a subset of all the data set is used 
for the current simulation. 
212 
California, potentially in north and northeastern regions due to their higher than national 
growth rate of consumption, their industrial and mining character, and where prices might 
show higher levels (CRE 2011; Zenón and Rosellón 2010). For the simulation exercise, 
data sets were generated for ERCOT and Mexico, around base and peak prices by zone; 
capacity by zone/node; demand load at base, and demand load at peak by zone/node; and 
connections, assuming a DC topography and where flows occur in two directions. The 
data sets allow to simulate independent systems with no interconnection or flows, and 
then simulate systems with connections and flows that depend on demand, relative prices 
at peak demand, and congestion corridors. 
With other relevant data on Mexico the country can be taken as a unit with some nodes 
connected via more than two lines, while main border regional nodes have a topology of 
star-like infrastructures, as opposed to truly a meshed system. On its part, both the 
California ISO and the Texas ERCOT ISO also show connections out of its intra-regional 
market, of non-meshed nature. For example ERCOT shows four regions and eleven main 
lines, although it has begun to be organized into more than 4,000 nodes for market 
clearance. A stylized topology is shown in Figure 8.2. 
 
Figure 8.2 
ERCOT’s Regional Distribution and Congested Zones, Areas before 
Nodal Topology, 2010 
 
Source: ERCOT 2011. Retrieved at http://www.opc.state.tx.us/ERCOT.html. 
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Figure 8.3 
Mexico’s Regional Distribution of Generating and Transmission Zones, 
2009-2010 
 
8.4.2 Model Description 
The model presents analysis of the generators and the integrated incumbents and their 
incentives to restrict the capacity for transmission. The model is applicable to our 
interests as it considers the social welfare maximizing variables within the Mexican 
electrical market and ERCOT’s transmission players. Further the model takes the 
perspective of the critical stakeholders within in electrical transmission cooperation, 
centered on ERCOT’s transmission companies or Transcos impacts. 
The model has the following assumptions. The demand for the electricity is a function of 
the demand in the previous period and the price. In fact, demand in period (t) is related 
positively with demand in period t-1 and negatively with price at period t-1. The 
variables α and β determine the coefficients of this equation. 
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In the case of the US and Mexico these coefficients could be estimated based on the 
longitudinal data of price and quantity over a period of time. Given the different 
characteristics and preferences of consumers in different regions, more accurate results 
could be reached by analyzing a panel data over time and different regional areas, but 
absence of data with such level of granularity was not possible for the present analysis. 
We settle to analyze the systems in similar fashion as in Rosellón and Weigt (2011) and 
Zenon and Rosellón (2010). 
Given the demand, assume that the topology of the two binational systems is star-like, 
with DC connections and linear demands as shown. Now assume that for the Mexican 
case CFE is both a sole buyer but for our purposes, and also is the Transco that seeks to 
maximize its profits of transmission services in fixed and variable tariffs, net of its costs 
of transmission and regulatory restrictions. However, the simulation exercise 
concentrates on congested zones or areas in Texas ERCOT, where CFE could be a 
supplier in one instance and not a supplier if the systems remain separated. The profit of 
ERCOT transmission company or Transco, could be determined as follows: 
 
Where profit at time t is equal to price p times quantity q plus a fixed fee F minus cost c 
as a function of quantity and capacity k. 
Expanded by congestion, we get the upper level optimization model, as follows: 
Max {k, F} =  -   1 
Where  
And where pd – pg is the congestion rent as the difference between load and generation 
transmitted, whereas FN is a fixed access rate that will be used as a condition with (a) 
totally binational independent systems CFE-ERCOT (could be applicable also to CFE-
CAISO); (b) where markets become interconnected for day-to-day wheeling across the 
borders; and (c) an extreme hypothetical solution of cooperation is transmission 
expansion. Costs are related to capacity investment between two nodes or lines i,j . 
Equation (1) is subject to a regulatory condition of price changes to be lower or equal to a 
price cap, expressed, without the subscripts for ease, as follows in equation 2a. 
Alternatively, in cases (b) and (c) price differences across the border would set the price 
limit as shown in 2b by a congestion rent rather than set by a regulated wholesale cap. 
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Conditions 2a, 2b are the critical differences for an independent versus an integrated 
simulation. 
  
          2a 
 
          2b 
Where 2b stands for having a limit established by an extended binational market through 
prices depending on the congestion change.  
The revenue of the Transco is estimated based on the accumulation of a variable charge, 
which depends on the quantity consumed and is equal to price times quantity, and the 
fixed charge (FN), which is the fixed amount that consumers pay for just being connected 
to the network regardless of the amount they consume in the four states of the world just 
hypothesized. By subtracting the costs of the Texas Transco one gets a function of the 
quantity and the capacity of transmission lines. The model could be anchored based on 
the restrictions that the profit of ERCOT is increasing over time. Also the costs are 
assumed to be the sum of the costs at the previous level and the costs of increasing 
transmission capacity. 
Now, a lower level problem is for the ISO ERCOT to maximize social welfare as follows 
using Rosellón’s model:  
) -     3 
(for all nodes i). Subject to: 
       3.1 
       3.2 
   )     3.3 
The first restriction 3.1 only indicates that generation is lower and up to capacity in each 
node at time (t). Restriction 3.2 refers to the power flow across nodes not to exceed the 
transmission capacity of the line. Finally restriction 3.3 set demand to be satisfied by 
generation at the local node or produced and injected (qit). 
From the lower level, an optimal demand and injections, and zonal or nodal prices, are 
obtained and then substituted in the upper level problem, to get optimal levels of supply 
to reduce congestion; the optimal cost of supplying; change in prices by connection. The 
exercise is created first for no connections, and then for interconnected systems. For the 
simulation, there are six nodes/zones: North ERCOT zone in the Dallas Fort Worth area 
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(N), Western ERCOT (W), Houston (H), South ERCOT including San Antonio (S), and 
two CFE nodes/zones: Nuevo Leon’s and Piedras Negras (CFE1), and Reynosa-
Matamoros (CFE2). Note that ERCOT moved to nodal markets in late 2010. However, 
we still use the zonal congestion corridors for the present analysis. 
In total, we use the six nodes and 14 flow or connection lines. Using GAMS as the 
simulation package, we let it run the simulation on lines flows, costs, and prices to 
converge. The model converged in six runs, optimizing the flows, their direction, price 
alignment to the lowest costs (linear), and energy balance at the zonal levels. Since 
original price differences are higher in the binational systems than regulated price caps in 
models in isolation, the runs assume perfectly competitive markets to check for price 
alignments. Although we have annual data from 1999 to 2010 for the simulation exercise 
only two years are used: 2005 (economies were expanding), and 2010 (the most recent 
period). Two conditions are also modeled: ERCOT in both periods with no CFE capacity 
to export, and ERCOT and CFE with capacity to export and import electricity to optimize 
flows solving for congestion. 
8.4.3 Model Results 
Beginning with 2005, analysis of data in the referred nodes shows congested areas in 
nodes S and H. In contrast, N shows excess capacity, and W, staying as a marginal zone, 
shows no congestion. On the Mexican side, CFE1 is congested, while CFE2 shows 
excess capacity. Now regarding prices in the systems as being independent, base prices 
per KWh were lower in S, W, N, than CFE1 and CFE2, while H was higher. At peak 
prices, ERCOT shows higher prices than regulated Mexican ones in CFE1, but not in 
CFE2. 
The results of the simulation for the year 2005, at peak prices, are as follows: 
1. For independent, not connected systems the GAMS model assumes zero flows 
from CFE1 or CFE2 to S. After six runs towards model stability, reduced costs 
are obtained on W to N, and N to W (US$14.78 per KWh); S to W (14.78); and 
most dramatically N to H ($22.0); H to S and S to H ($22.0). 
2. For price alignment between ERCOT nodes, the dual price change was reduced in 
W by US$7.22, while both nodes S and H experienced price reductions of US$11 
each.  
3. On their part, since CFE1 (Piedras Negras and Monterrey) are importer zones, 
they showed price reduction of -US$22.00 due to self-supply (no export flows). 
4. Now in the second simulated case of inter-connected systems, the GAMS model 
shows that flows occur from S to CFE1 and from CFE1 to S, while there are 
flows from CFE2 to S, with cost reduction after reducing congested zones W to N 
and N to W (US$6.8 and $7.98, respectively); S to W ($14.78); N to H ($22.0); 
and S to H, and H to S ($6.8 and $15.2, respectively). The CFE cost reduction 
from selling to S is $22, the largest reduction from all pairs. 
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5. As for price alignment, between ERCOT nodes including CFE1 and CFE2 as 
back-up exporters, price reduction occurred in all cases, ranging from -US$11.00 
in H, to -US$6.80 in S; to -US$3.02 in N, while CFE1 experienced a noticeable 
price reduction of -US$17.8, all in MWh. 
The analysis then makes use of GAMS simulation applied now to 2010, or simulating the 
case of most recent data availability. Data analysis shows that now all W, N, H, and 
CFE1 are congested, and S is not congested. Again, CFE2 (Matamoros-Reynosa-Nuevo 
Laredo connection) shows no congestion. Now regarding prices in the systems, if taken 
as independent, base prices per KWh are lower in all ERCOT zones than CFE1 or CFE2, 
but H is higher than CFE1 or CFE2. At peak prices, ERCOT shows similar prices than 
CFE1, but CFE2 shows lower prices. 
The results of the simulation for 2010 at peak prices shows the following findings: 
1. For an isolated, not-connected ERCOT with CFE1 or CFE2, the GAMS 
simulation gives an infeasible optimization solution, as all nodes in ERCOT 
solving the congested transport cannot sustain the system, given capacity, and the 
cost differences and electricity flow balances. The finding proves the hypothesis 
that non-interconnected systems are not optimal. 
2. Now in the case of inter-connected systems, the GAMS model shows that flows 
occur from S to CFE1, and from CFE2 to S, while CFE2 now shows flows to 
slack or a dummy node because of over-capacity. For other nodes in ERCOT, S 
supplies electricity to all other nodes in W, N, and H. Cost reduction results after 
reducing congestion W, N, and H from S came to US$4.3 in W; $12.3 in N, and 
H, respectively. CFE2 reduction in cost after the optimization is again the largest, 
although smaller than in 2005, with $12.3, the largest jointly with the S-N, and S-
H pairs. 
3. Finally, as for price alignment between ERCOT nodes including CFE1 and CFE2 
as backup exporters, price reductions occurred the following cases only: N  
(-$12.3) and H (-$12.5), while CFE2 and S showed price increases after six runs. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have synthesized findings from contemporary modeling techniques 
regarding electricity market restructuring and integration. Though a vast array of 
approaches exist, we have focused on a bi-level optimization approach taken by Rosellón 
et al. (2011); Rosellón and Weigt (2011); and Zenón and Rosellón (2010). In our opinion 
this approach represents the most contemporary and promising avenue to produce 
practical market policies from modeling. The complexity of such endeavors is 
immediately apparent however, not only because of the mathematical process required 
and the need to balance elegance with real-world representation, but also because these 
models are meant to mimic an atmosphere of competing and often myopic interests.  
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It is important to reiterate that such models are not necessary to show the utility of market 
restructuring and integration. ERCOT has shown how deregulation can work in Texas for 
example, and could be a source of inspiration for the Mexican market. Markets in Europe 
as well as the Canada-US market have shown how integration can be welfare enhancing 
as well and could be a source of replication for the Texas-Mexico region. As we stated in 
the introduction, however, these successes must be balanced with major market failures. 
It is this dilemma that has encouraged our research in modeling to bolster previous 
initiatives in such market reorganization. 
The models we have explored show how modern electricity markets can be adapted to 
produce greater total social welfare. This should be a major take-away for policymakers 
and market participants and stakeholders. Nonetheless, such model implications are not 
perfect. We share some of the major concerns of Rosellón et al. (2011). For instance, by 
its very nature our models represent a greatly simplified scenario, therefore strict 
implementation of policies suggested by such a theory will inevitably face a sort of 
friction that must be anticipated and overcome. Second, unlike the market Rosellón et al. 
(2011) examines for the case of Germany, France, and the Benelux, the Texas-Mexico 
market we consider maintains exceptional political differences. Most notably, the 
Mexican market remains in transition with a parastatal, CFE, in control. Furthermore, 
FTRs do not yet exist in Mexico, but are assumed in both Rosellón’s model and our 
adaptation. Third, exemplified in interviews with ERCOT executives, integration also 
comes with a level of political uncertainty that is unavoidable with market integration and 
mutual dependency. Though we avoid AC ties in favor of DC ties as they exist nowadays 
(which cause significantly less interdependency) market integration in general requires a 
letting go of autonomy, which is understandably difficult for organizations such as 
ERCOT.  
The previous concerns highlight a major hindrance to market integration—namely 
alternative regulation regimes that may act strategically against one another. Tangeras 
(2010) explores different scenarios involving regulators and system operators in search of 
a welfare optimum combination in integrated markets. He finds that, “no network 
governance structure does uniformly better and no governance structure performs 
universally worse than all others…” He goes on to highlight four crucial elements that 
affect optimal outcomes: 
1. How well a common regulatory agency balances the interests of member states. 
2. How the benefits of energy market integration vary across member states. 
3. The characteristics of the market network (complementarity vs. substitutability). 
4. The social cost of the operator’s rent. 
Although somewhat out of the scope of our research, this paper nonetheless suggests the 
next step in implementation of a welfare-maximizing set of policies that we derive from 
our models. The results of the GAMS simulation in two comparative periods in time 
(2005 and 2010) proves the hypothesis that interconnected systems in both selected years 
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show welfare gains regarding congestion reduction, cost savings, prices reductions, and 
bi-directional electricity flows. Moreover, in the ERCOT case in 2010 and given 
congestion and capacity for internal flows from the zones under study with no 
connections with CFE, render an unfeasible optimization solution for ERCOT. In case of 
interconnections with CFE2 and CFE1, the model can be optimized with congestion 
reductions, cost savings, and price convergence. With the findings, we demonstrate the 
economic benefits of the shared optimization, even if Texan and Mexican operators and 
decision-makers find it easier to stay not coordinated. 
With this, not only will Mexican and Texas policymakers need to advance market 
restructuring, but policymakers on both sides of the border will eventually have to 
negotiate the best combination of regulation and system operation for a more integrated 
market. For a fully integrated market to success, this negotiation will be extremely 
important. We leave it to other chapters to pursue this dilemma further.  
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Chapter 9.  The Green Revolution: Renewable Energy and its 
Future 
by Oscar Padilla and Kaye Schultz 
Abstract 
As concerns of climate change and energy security receive increasing attention, 
government and industry are looking to alternative energy sources to integrate into the 
existing energy portfolio. However, even in developed countries, most renewable energy 
sources remain cost prohibitive for widespread use. This chapter identifies current 
renewable energy capacity in each of the three North American countries and where 
future potential lies. We then discuss trade barriers between the three countries and 
possible market mechanisms that could be used to incentivize renewable energy by 
examining relevant case studies of countries that have successfully implemented 
renewable energy policies. Although coal and natural gas remain the most cost-effective 
and reliable sources of electricity generation, subsidies and regulations can be 
implemented to facilitate renewable energy generation and integration within the North 
American electricity market.  
9.1 Introduction 
9.1.1 Setting of Renewable Energy in the United States 
As a starting point, worldwide, wind energy continues to be the fastest growing 
renewable energy technology sector. Following the global trend, between 2000 to 2009 
wind energy generation in the United States increased by a factor of 14. This is slightly 
more than the global increase which grew by a factor of 9. The compounded annual 
growth rate between 2000 to 2009 wind was 27.3% (US EIA 2010). This growth has in 
large part been a direct result of increased levels of investment in wind energy projects as 
well as market incentives arising from multilateral objectives to reduce the carbon 
footprint in the planet, but also from national plans and strategies. In 2001, investments in 
wind energy projects stood at $250 million, and by 2009 investments grew to more than 
$2 billion (US EIA 2010). Globally, 2009 also marked China’s ascension as the world 
leader in installed wind capacity, surpassing the United States with installed capacity 
levels in excess of 43 GW. The United States installed wind capacity levels currently 
stand at slightly more than 40 GW (American Wind Energy Association 2011). Figure 
9.1 shows details regarding installed capacity. 
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Table 9.1 
Current Renewable Energy Capacity in North America 2011-2012 
 Wind Solar 
United States 40,000 MW 2100 MW 
Mexico 500 MW 25 MW* 
Canada 4,500 MW 100MW 
  Source: Authors’ generation with data from the Wind Energy Association 2011. 
  *Expected 2013 capacity. 
 
In 2009, the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for wind ranged from 8-13 cents per KWh 
for offshore wind and 6-12 cents for onshore wind (US EIA 2010). With the production 
tax credit, the cumulative capacity-weighted average price of wind power was about 4.4 
cents per kWh during the same timeframe, which came very close to non-renewable gas 
or combined cycle energy costs (US EIA 2010). The top five states with installed wind 
generation in the United States measured by installed nameplate capacity are Texas, 
Iowa, California, Washington, and Minnesota. In 2008, Texas led the country with the 
most renewable electricity (excluding hydropower) of any US state, with installed 
cumulative capacity exceeding 9,400 MW. Iowa, California, Washington, and Minnesota 
have cumulative capacities of 3,670 MW, 2,794 MW, and 1,980 MW, respectively. 
Preliminary national data indicate that energy from wind production accounted for 11% 
of total consumption for 2010, a rather large figure if compared to many economies in the 
world. In terms of installed renewable electricity capacity, wind energy accounted for 
approximately 92% of annual installed renewable electricity capacity in 2009 (excluding 
hydropower) in the United States.  
Regarding solar energy, in 2009 cumulative solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity grew by 
nearly 52% from the previous year and followed an increasing global trend as a viable 
alternative to fossil fuel generation. Current installed capacity in the US is approximately 
2,103 MW. In comparison, Germany and Spain lead the world with an installed capacity 
of 9,677 MW and 3,595 MW, respectively. Not surprisingly, US leaders in installed 
nameplate capacity solar PV are California, New Jersey, Colorado, Arizona, and Florida, 
where the number of sunny days are the highest according to the Energy Information 
Administration (US EIA 2010). California’s installed capacity accounts for more than 
half of the total installed capacity among the top five states. In 2010, new financial 
investment in solar technology was $5.5 billion, accounting for slightly more than 18% of 
total new investment in renewable energy technologies in North America (Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance 2011). As of 2009, LCOE for solar PV ranged between 18 and 43 
cents per kWh, making solar not cost competitive with alternative generating fuels, 
namely coal and natural gas. However, the behind-the-meter capacity-weighted average 
installing cost fell by 17% from 2009 to 2010 and by 43% below 1998 costs (Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory 2011). As prices continue to fall particularly at the utility-
scale, generation level investment in solar PV technologies will undoubtedly increase. 
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Other important renewable energies that this chapter analyzes are biomass and 
geothermal energy. Despite the 5% decrease in global new investment in biomass and 
waste-to-energy in 2010, global investment in geothermal saw an increase of 44% from 
2009 investments. New investment levels in the US were $1.4 billion for biomass and 
$700 million for geothermal. Currently installed capacity for geothermal generation in the 
US is approximately 3,087 MW, with California leading all other states with 2,565.5 MW 
of installed capacity. Biomass nameplate capacity and generation levels have remained 
flat, totaling approximately 12,727 MW in 2009. Both geothermal and biomass 
generation have among the highest capacity factors in the renewable energy space, 
ranging from 80-85% for geothermal and 85-90% for biomass (US EIA 2010). Both 
technologies also have a low LCOE, ranging from 8-12 cents per kWh for biomass and 6-
13 cents per kWh for geothermal. Currently biomass accounts for 38% of renewable 
electricity generation in the US.  
9.1.2 Renewable Energy in Mexico 
Although still trailing behind the level of capacity of the United States and Canada, 
Mexico is a regional leader in wind energy in Latin America, with a current capacity of 
over 500 MW. Thus far, Mexico has the second highest amount of installed wind 
capacity in all of Latin America, thanks in large part to La Venta II wind energy park, 
which is the largest wind energy park in Latin America, with 98 wind turbines producing 
a total capacity of 83.3 MW (Cancino-Solorzano et al. 2011). The estimated potential 
energy from wind in Mexico has been increasing in recent years, but is currently 
estimated at over 70 GW (Wood 2010).  
The estimates of wind potential in Mexico have increased due to increases in available 
information regarding the wind patterns and wind strength throughout Mexico. A detailed 
study of the state of Oaxaca funded by USAID in the United States and Mexico, the 
Department of Energy (DOE), the Bureau of Economic Growth and Trade of the 
Mexican Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (NREL), and other Mexican government organizations developed 
both national and US data and resulted in a detailed “wind atlas” of the area. This report 
increased previous estimates of wind energy potential. The increased estimates are 
largely due to the constant supply of wind and mountainous terrain resulting in a natural 
wind tunnel in the mentioned state of Oaxaca, as well as favorable wind patterns in other 
states. Oaxaca has areas that have been identified as class 2, 4, and 5 on the NREL scale, 
indicating that certain areas have wind power strengths that can support the development 
of wind energy on a commercial scale (Cancino-Solorzano et al. 2011). The data 
estimates that Oaxaca contains about 6,600 km2 of land containing good to excellent 
potential for wind energy. The report estimates that this area could supply about 33,000 
MW of potential power, based on a conservative estimate of MW per km2 (Wood 2010). 
The USAID and NREL have also funded studies of potential wind energy resources in 
the Baja California Norte Border Region, Western Chihuahua Border Region, 
Northwestern Mexico Border Areas, Eastern Sonora Border Region, Western Sonora 
Border Region, Baja California Sur, and Quintana Roo and the Yucatan. Interest in 
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developing wind energy in other areas in Mexico is increasing, specifically in the Baja 
California Norte Border Region, due in part to these reports. The vertically integrated 
utility Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) has also taken steps to integrate wind 
energy in the Baja region to the national grid, which should be completed in 2014 (Wood 
2010).  
USAID has also worked with the Mexican government to develop a strategy promoting 
the production of wind power in Mexico, and has helped produce another report assessing 
US and Mexico’s regulatory policies related to wind energy production. Several issues 
were identified in Mexico’s regulatory framework, including transmission infrastructure, 
environmental issues, and missing economic incentives for wind energy production. At 
the present time, the cost of increasing transmission capabilities connecting Mexico to the 
United States would outweigh the gains in revenue for the electricity industry. However, 
if economic incentives similar to those provided to wind producers in the United States 
were provided to producers in Mexico, prices would decrease making electricity from 
wind energy a more attractive option. 
However, wind energy is not the only renewable option in Mexico. Mexico also has high 
solar potential with nationwide predictions for 5 KWh/day/m2. The amount of solar 
energy potential is even higher when focusing on the northwest region of the country as 
well as in states close to the Pacific, which receive approximately 7 KWh/day/m2 
(Cancino-Solorzano et al. 2011). Solar energy generation in Mexico has been impeded by 
CFE’s requirement to purchase the cheapest electricity available, but the addition of 
government or private subsidies could make solar energy competitive. 
However, CFE did invest in one solar project that combines solar thermal panels with 
natural gas generators. This project is located in northern Mexico and had a predicted 
capacity of 31 MW, but capacity was later reduced because of high energy costs, and 
ended up producing a plant with only 10 MW of capacity (Wood 2010). Even with these 
difficulties, Mexico is still expected to generate 14 GWh/year from 25 photoelectric MW 
by 2013 (Cancino-Solorzano et al. 2011). Although solar energy costs are still higher 
than wind energy, the added cost of necessary infrastructure to expand wind capacity 
could eventually make solar a viable alternative. Increased demand for solar energy in 
United States markets will also cause increased incentives for solar production in 
Mexico, which can be traded with the US. 
9.1.3 Renewable Energy in Canada  
Currently, Canada’s most developed form of renewable energy is hydropower. Canada is 
abundant in hydropower capacity that has been used both for domestic consumption and 
also for trading “green energy” with the United States. However, this has not precluded 
Canadian authorities from exploring other sources of renewable generation. When 
considering wind energy, Canada currently has around 4,600 MW of installed capacity, 
over a third of which is located in Ontario. Almost 700 MW of this capacity was installed 
in 2010, and over 1,000 MW of power is projected to be installed in 2011. Wind energy 
currently powers over 1.2 million buildings throughout the country and capacity is 
rapidly increasing (Canadian Wind Energy Association 2011b). Some of this increase is 
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due to federal and province renewable energy goals. Several provinces in Canada have 
set targets for wind power, including 7,500 MW of wind energy by 2018 in Ontario, 
4,000 MW of wind energy in Quebec by 2015, and 1,000 MW of wind energy in 
Manitoba by 2016. Although not all provinces have set specific targets for wind energy, 
most have set standards for renewable energy in general. Canada’s federal government 
has also set a goal of using renewable energy for 90% of all electricity generation by 
2020 (Canadian Wind Energy Association 2011a). 
As for solar energy, since the country is located in higher latitudes, and thus received less 
direct sunlight compared to the US and Mexico, Canada is not as well positioned for solar 
energy. However, Canada is still developing some solar capacity, which totaled around 
100 MW in 2009. A majority of the solar energy used in Canada is used for space 
heating, water heating, and drying crops and lumber, as opposed to being used for 
electricity. Where solar is used for electricity, it is most commonly used as individual 
panels in sparsely populated areas that are not connected to an electricity grid (Centre for 
Energy 2011). 
Although Canada does not have the same potential for solar energy as Mexico and the 
United States, its installed capacity has increased over the past few years. This is in part 
due to Canada’s goal for renewable energy use and in part because of Ontario’s Feed-In 
Tariff (FIT) Program. The FIT program is the most comprehensive pricing program for 
electricity generation from renewable energy seen in North America (Ayoub and Bailey, 
2009). The program sets prices based on the amount of investment required for the type 
of energy being generated, and has become a powerful incentive that is not totally 
replicated in the US or in Mexico. Since solar generation requires higher implementation 
costs than most other forms of renewable energy, this scaled program is likely to incent 
increased development of solar energy (Ayoub and Bailey 2009). The Canadian 
government is also taking steps to improve domestic research and development efforts to 
better understand the PV systems and how to integrate solar energy into the existing 
electricity grids. 
To sum up this introduction, a private parties and governments continue to invest in 
alternative energies for the purpose of reducing emissions and meeting increasing 
electricity demands, certain technologies will undoubtedly lose favor. As such, a standing 
concern will be the potential for state actors to crowd out certain technologies with high 
levels of investments and/or combinations of incentives. As the cost production models 
with respect to certain technologies decreases, irrespective of incentives, technological 
breakthroughs with less favorable technologies might be delayed or might not occur at 
all. The North American experience demonstrates that governments can positively 
influence technological advancements of multiple technological platforms without 
necessarily choosing winners. At this level, further investigation is necessary to quantify 
the potential impacts governments have if one technology is abandoned in favor of 
another. However, in the present introductory framing of the problem, it seems apparent 
that the quest towards increasing renewable sources of energy arise both from exogenous 
pressures towards a better planet, but also from technological developments and 
228 
pragmatic business models that set both challenges and opportunities for binational and 
trinational cooperation. 
9.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework on Renewables 
9.2.1 NAFTA Implications for North American Trade 
Prior to the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), North American trade was primarily multilaterally governed 
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was a general agreement to 
reduce trade barriers and develop world trade regulations. Mexico became a member in 
the mid-1980s, while the US and Canada have been signatories since the beginning of the 
Agreement in 1948. This agreement held 117 signatory countries in 2009 and eventually 
created the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Duke University 2010). After this initial 
step toward increased global trade, the United States entered into a separate trade 
agreement with Canada (FTA) in 1988, and finally, the United States and Canada joined 
Mexico in NAFTA in 1992, to be launched on January 1, 1994. NAFTA included 
objectives to eliminate trade barriers, promote free competition, and increase 
opportunities for investment in North American countries. In signing this trade 
agreement, the three countries committed to “national treatment,” which prohibited all 
countries from discriminating between goods and investments produced in the other two 
countries and goods produced in their own. This agreement was designed to eliminate all 
North American trade barriers, leading to increased trade and regulatory and institutional 
convergence amongst the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
Although some analysts did not predict a significant trade increase to result from the 
trade agreement (Gandara 1995), evidence has shown that there has been considerably 
more trade between the three NAFTA countries since the agreement was signed. Between 
1993 and 2005, the ratio of exports to GDP increased more than 100% in Mexico, and 
around 30% in Canada and the United States (Caliendo and Parra 2009). Although not all 
increases in trade can be attributed to NAFTA, the Caliendo model finds that NAFTA 
accounts for 91% of the increase in Mexico’s ratio of manufacturing exports and imports 
to GDP, whereas 61% of the increase for Canada and 46% of the increase for the United 
States can be attributed to the trade agreement. 
While the agreement did in fact cause an increase in overall trade, with respect to the 
electricity market there were still certain provisions in the agreement that allowed for 
restrictions on imports and exports as well as certain forms of price controls (Fisher 
1994). There were also other provisions that vary by country. When Mexico was added to 
the agreement, it did not institute all of the same provisions that Canada had instituted in 
the first agreement. Some of the differences to which Canada and Mexico agreed may 
have had or may still have future effects on the amount of electricity trade between the 
three countries. For example, Canada allowed for proportional access to US electricity 
importers, whereas Mexico did not assure this right. Mexico also did not extend national 
treatment to foreign energy corporations, and CFE has the authority to provide electricity 
services in Mexico as a parastatal utility incumbent (Pineau et al. 2004). 
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The fact that each country has its own federal regulations could also cause a barrier to 
electricity trade. In the United States, DOE controls cross-border transmission lines and 
electricity exports, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) controls 
transmission and wholesale electricity rates for many operators and across states. The 
National Energy Board (NEB) in Canada also regulates exports, but provincial utility 
commissions control supply. In Mexico, the Comisión Reguladora de Energia (CRE) has 
authority to regulate electricity imports and exports permits, as well as operators within 
Mexico, but the parastatal CFE operates as a unified utility outside of CRE’s control. Not 
only are all electricity markets regulated by different entities, Mexico’s regulations are 
more centralized whereas Canadian and US regulations tend to be more decentralized 
(Pineau et al. 2004). However, although CFE still has control over a large portion of the 
electricity market in Mexico, NAFTA did allow for US and Canadian investment in self-
generation, small power generation facilities, co-generation facilities, and independent 
power production facilities (DeGrandis and Owen 1995). For the case of Mexico, the Ley 
del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) in 1993 provided allowances for 
private investment in the generation side. However, there are more European interests in 
Mexico than operations by Canadian or US companies, a phenomenon not totally 
explained by the market and permit opening in Mexico (CRE 2012). 
With regard to renewable energy, there are additional factors that could cause possible 
trade barriers. The nature of the electricity market and renewable energy are hindrances 
purely because energy generated from electricity is relatively difficult to store, and 
because transmission costs increase as the distance of transport increases. When 
renewable energy is used to generate electricity, energy storage becomes even more of an 
issue, as do the transmission costs, because many forms of renewable energy are 
somewhat geographically limited, but renewable energy assumes from the outset the need 
for storage and batteries to reduce volatile (intermittent) supplies. This adds a level of 
complexity to integrating renewable energy into the electricity market even within one 
nation. Adding foreign trade into the equation makes renewable energy integration even 
more complex. This issue was not originally treated under NAFTA provisions and the 
chapter on environmental protection, for instance. 
When looking at renewable energy in the North American electricity market, another 
complication spurs from the fact that Canada, the United States, and Mexico have all 
begun implementing various renewable energy requirements at federal and statewide 
levels, but that the definitions of renewable energy are not uniform across country lines. 
The Commission on Environmental Cooperation noted that all countries agreed that solar 
and wind energy qualified as renewable, but that there was considerable debate among 
various entities as to whether other forms of energy, such as biomass and hydropower, 
could be classified as renewable (Rowlands 2009). Because of countries’ renewable 
energy standards and increasing demand for renewable energy overall, these varying 
definitions could cause a trade barrier between these North American countries. 
However, while there could be trade implications for various renewable energy sectors, 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico have begun entering into agreements to 
coordinate more sustainable energy efforts. For example, the three countries developed a 
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Trilateral Working Plan on climate change and clean energy at the North American 
Leaders’ Summit in 2009 that promotes similar reporting methods, the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, aligning efficiency standards across countries, and 
collaborating on specific emissions reducing projects such as a North American smart 
grid and joint carbon capture and storage projects (Schott and Fickling 2010). There have 
also been bilateral agreements between the United States and Canada, as well as the 
United States and Mexico, to develop clean energy technologies and promote renewable 
energy markets. 
Due in part to these additional cooperative initiatives, energy trade between North 
American countries has increased alongside that of overall trade since the creation of 
NAFTA. Energy trade between the United States and Canada amounted to almost $100 
billion in 2007, and energy trade between the United States and Mexico totaled almost 
$10 billion (Schott and Fickling 2010). Although trade has increased, North American 
countries are still lagging behind some other electricity integration initiatives globally. 
While there has been initial electricity trade among North American countries, the trade 
remains mainly bilateral, instead of trilateral, involving only US-Canada and US-Mexico 
relationships (Pineau et al. 2004). Further cooperation and infrastructure will be 
necessary to better integrate North American markets, both bilaterally and trilaterally. 
In conclusion, where the research has examined in detail the successes of various 
strategies, the literature has scarcely examined how North America can cooperatively 
design a system that takes advantage of this knowledge for the development of alternative 
technologies. In other words, there exists a gap in the literature for the North American 
experience. Although Canada, Mexico, and the United States have unilaterally been 
successful in the development of alternative energies collectively, a unified scheme could 
force markets to develop more quickly and more efficiently. This chapter presents a 
general background that could lead to addressing this gap and the potential development 
of a framework to address both the advancement of alternative energy technologies and 
the reduction of carbon emissions. 
9.2.2 Why Countries Are Investing in Renewable Energy 
As anthropogenic climate change becomes more of a reality and an increasing global 
concern, governments all over the world have begun devising strategies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to combat the negative effects of climate change. 
However, individual federal governments face difficulties in dealing with climate change 
because greenhouse gas emissions are a global issue. Greenhouse gases emitted in 
foreign regions contribute to the same amount of climate change and the same negative 
consequences globally as those emitted in the home country. In order to address climate 
change on a global level, many countries joined an international treaty, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 (UNFCCC 
2011a). The UNFCCC came into effect two years later, in 1994, and is currently ratified 
by 195 countries, including the European Union. The main outcomes of the Convention 
were establishing a specific goal for greenhouse gas concentrations, placing 
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responsibility on developed countries, adding a focus on adaptation, and directing funds 
to developing countries for climate change initiatives (UNFCCC 2011b).  
Subsequent to the original Convention, participating governments developed terms for 
the well-known Kyoto Protocol, which came into effect in 1997. The main difference 
between the original Convention and the Kyoto Protocol is that the Kyoto Protocol made 
reduction targets legally binding for all ratified countries, opposed to the Convention 
under which reductions were voluntary. The Kyoto Protocol defined legally binding 
emission reduction targets for 37 developed countries and the European Union, which 
totaled to an overall emissions reduction of 5% of greenhouse gas emissions based on 
1990 levels. Each country was given an individual target, and the countries agreed to 
reduce emissions between 2008 and 2012 (UNFCCC 2011c). The countries in the 
European Union at the time of ratification committed to 8% reductions; the United States 
(although it has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol) committed to 7% reductions; Canada, 
Hungary, Japan, and Poland committed to 6% reductions; and Croatia committed to 5% 
reductions from 1990 levels. New Zealand, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine also 
made commitments not to increase their emissions level over that of 1990 levels, whereas 
Norway, Australia, and Iceland committed to limiting their emissions levels to a 1%, 8%, 
and 10% increase above 1990 levels, respectively (UNFCCC 2011c). 
Also, in 2010, countries further agreed that overall emissions need to be reduced to a 
level that ensures global temperature increases do not exceed 2 degrees Celsius 
(UNFCCC 2011a). This will most likely require even more ambitious targets than those 
required by the Kyoto Protocol. Participating countries have also begun discussing the 
best course of action for after 2012 when the current Kyoto commitment period is no 
longer in effect. The Bali Road Map was adopted in 2007 and includes the Bali Action 
Plan, which takes into consideration shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology, 
and financing while discussion implementation of the Convention through and beyond 
2012 (UNFCCC 2011d). 
Because these binding agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are currently in 
effect, and because future and ongoing agreements are likely to form, many countries 
have developed federal policies to meet their required reductions and to help prepare 
industry to take necessary steps for the future. Some countries that are not currently 
legally obligated to achieve specific amounts of emissions reductions have developed 
reduction strategies in anticipation of future agreements and because they feel a 
responsibility to thwart potential negative effects of climate change, both in their own 
territory and around the globe. Many of these emissions reductions strategies include 
provisions regarding renewable energy. For example, the Mexican government 
established renewable energy targets even though it is not one of countries with a binding 
reduction commitment. Renewable energy tends to emit far fewer greenhouse gases than 
legacy fuels, such as coal and oil, making them an obvious component of emissions 
reductions plans. 
Although increased widespread use of renewable energy will indeed help the effort to 
reduce the negative effects associated with climate change, renewable energy is also 
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appealing because it is sustainable, because it runs on resources that are naturally 
replenished within the environment. Because of sustainability, renewable energy is a 
longer-term solution to energy needs, but it also has the potential to increase a country’s 
energy security by decreasing their reliance on finite sources that may only be available 
in certain regions. 
Concerns related to energy security have varied in recent decades, and are generally 
related to petroleum. As the possibility of discovering new oil reserves wanes, it has 
become increasingly clear that a small number of counties throughout the world have the 
majority of the oil reserves, giving them a degree of economic and political leverage over 
other countries. Because so much of the current technology in the developed world 
requires oil to operate, there is the potential to create inefficient market pricing of the 
commodity. This was demonstrated during the oil crisis in the 1970s, during which many 
countries became more concerned about their energy security, or their ability to provide 
sufficient amounts of energy to maintain current operations in their country. 
The oil crisis in the 1970s was spurred by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973. Before this time, many developed countries 
relied heavily on oil for fuel and gave little concern to the quantity of oil consumed and 
the amount of oil necessary to maintain their current conditions. However, after the oil 
embargo, many countries began to doubt the availability of oil for the first time, which 
caused them to place restrictions on oil consumption, leading to a dramatic spike in oil 
prices (State Energy Conservation Office 2011). In response to this global crisis, another 
autonomous international organization was formed. The International Energy Agency 
was founded after the oil embargo, and its initial purpose was to assist participating 
countries with formulating a response to oil crises by providing emergency oil stocks to 
countries in need. The IEA currently has 28 member countries and has expanded its 
mission to include energy security, sustainable economic development, environmental 
awareness, and worldwide engagement (IEA 2011). In order to obtain energy security 
and be able to meet energy needs during a crisis, IEA promotes the development of 
renewable energy generation because renewable energy sources are naturally replenished 
(IEA 2010). If countries can develop the required infrastructure and regulations needed 
for renewable energy, they will be better equipped to deal with a crisis and will not be 
forced to rely on imported fuels. Thus, energy security is another reason more and more 
countries have begun incentivizing the growth of renewable energy. 
9.2.3 How Emissions Permitting and Trading Ties in to Renewable Energy 
The European Union’s tradable permit scheme (EU ETS), which attempts to both address 
climate change concern and spur economic development, has been deemed successful to 
varying degrees (Ellerman and Joskow 2008). Regardless, the EU ETS still stands as the 
world’s largest market for greenhouse gas emissions (Ellerman 2008). Although 
problems associated with global trading schemes, such as lack of institutional 
preparedness and international financial flow, have posed challenges in the past, the EU 
ETS appears to have overcome these challenges. However, issues still exist. (Ellerman 
2008). The current challenges are associated with coordination among participating 
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countries and differentiation and harmonization. The first challenge is well understood, 
but issues related to differentiation and harmonization are unique and are being dealt with 
accordingly as the EU ETS matures. 
The concepts of differentiation and harmonization will invariably play a unique role 
should an emissions trading scheme emerge as a feasible policy action through a North 
American partnership, or even as the Kyoto Protocol sees its second phase die out at the 
end of 2012 to rekindle emission reduction offerings and strategies in 2013. At its core, 
the degree of fairness among similar industries in different countries could lead 
participating members to question whether a trading scheme is at all beneficial as a 
matter of economic policy. The success of a trading scheme is contingent on its members 
actively participating in concert to reduce emissions overall. In other words, partners 
must work in good faith to ensure that their actions move the program forward rather 
hinder it with unanticipated challenges. Although agreements are legally binding, a 
member state could very well weigh the consequences in favor of not equitably sharing in 
the success of the program. This sets qualifications to commitment by countries, under a 
stakeholder theory approach or a new Institutional Economics approach, that evaluate the 
degree of risk-taking by large and powerful decision-makers, as well as weighing in all 
actors (agents in game theoretical approaches) and their interests (Beato and Laffont 
2001; Laffont and Martimort 2005; Wilson 2002). 
Nevertheless, what can be gleamed from EU ETS is that alternative energy technologies 
are very much a part of the solution to address climate change as the Spanish and German 
experiences, to be discussed later, show. The growth in alternative energies in much of 
the rest of Europe has also coincided with the EU’s ambitious plans to reduce the 
region’s carbon footprint. As a matter of economic theory, it could be argued that in a 
vacuum, electricity producers would not have adopted alternative energy technologies in 
favor of legacy fuels for generation strictly on the basis of cost. Moreover, national 
policies to incite alternative energy technologies could have faced challenges associated 
with competing economic interests with neighboring trading partners and competitors. 
Therefore, emission trading platforms can indeed have a promising role in the adoption 
and promotion of alternative energy technologies because they are the tools that help 
achieve goals set by participating members.  
9.3 Relevant Case Studies 
This section examines four countries’ policies regarding renewable energy and the policy 
strategies used to incentivize renewable energy generation. The four case studies 
discussed include the United States, Spain, Germany, and China. They coincide with 
analyses elsewhere in the present overall research project, with regulatory upgrading 
related to electricity. As a result of the unique combination of federal and state incentives, 
state renewable portfolio standards, and government funded research, the US serves as an 
ideal model for examination. Despite the fact that the US Senate never ratified the US’s 
agreement to participation in the Kyoto Protocol, the federal government and state 
governments have worked to support the development of alternative energy technologies. 
Similarly, Spain has become one of Western Europe’s greatest producers of alternative 
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energy in large part due to aggressive renewable energy polices supported through 
government subsidies. For that reason, Spain’s upward momentum merits further 
examination. Like Spain, Germany is one of Europe’s largest producers of alternative 
energies and was one of the first countries to institute feed-in tariffs for renewable energy 
generation with measured success, making their policies noteworthy. Lastly, as China has 
continued to grow both industrially and economically, its government has been extremely 
successful in spurring production in the solar sector and other alternative energies. As the 
technological knowledge gap has narrowed, China has had the advantage of observing 
which policies and technologies work best from the global community. For these reasons, 
China also merits closer examination.  
9.3.1 United States 
The path the United States followed is not unlike that of other economies across the 
globe. Following the oil crises of the 1970s, the federal government determined that it 
needed to invest in alternative energy fuels such as nuclear power and renewables, as 
well as increasing their efficiency standards (Norberg-Bohm 2000). At its peak, around 
1978, research and development in energy technologies such as alternative fuels and 
wind turbines by the federal government exceeded $6 billion. Yet, by the 1980s changes 
in the political landscape as well as lower oil prices led to a dramatic decrease in 
government research and development. By 1998, R&D funding amount to a little over 
half a billion dollars (GAO 2008). Collectively, over a 30-year period (ending fiscal year 
2008) the federal government had invested over $57.5 billion in advanced energy 
technologies (GAO 2008). Despite this level of invest over three decades, the US energy 
portfolio has not changed much from 6% in 1973 to 8% in 2009 (US EIA 2010). 
Nevertheless, the US has experienced growth in the development of alternative energy 
technologies and the energy industry has of late invested considerable time and resources 
to roll out large-scale projects. As observed by the National Research Council (NRC) in 
their report Electricity from Renewables: Status, Prospective, and Impediments, the 
United States has much to gain through the development of alternative energy 
technologies. Whether the aim is to reduce carbon dioxide or to promote a “green 
economy” renewable energy development continues to offer tremendous promise. 
Even though the United States heavily relies on fossil fuels to provide energy, 
technological advancements continue to accelerate growth in the green energy space. The 
NRC estimates that the US could increase its renewable energy portfolio to 10% of total 
generation produced by 2020 and in excess of 20% by 2035, which coincides or even 
surpasses the United Nations or Kyoto targets. The panel notes that in order to reach such 
levels there will have to be a combined effort from government to provide a policy 
platform that is flexible yet predictable, and government must be willing to invest 
considerable resources. 
Actions taken by individual states have also advanced the development of alternative 
energies. Currently, 29 states and the District of Columbia have mandated certain 
renewable standards for utility generation. Among the most aggressive is California’s 
2002 Renewables Portfolio Standard which required at least 20% of electricity generation 
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to come from renewable energy by the end of 2010. Also in 2002, the California state 
government signed Executive Order S-14-08 requiring at least 33% of electricity 
generation to come from renewable energy by 2020 (Wood 2010). Like California, 
Minnesota is requiring utility generation using renewable energies to reach 25% by 2025. 
Most recently, through legislation passed by the California Legislature, California will 
create the first state cap and trade system in the US. Even though the bill was passed into 
law in 2006, it was not until early December 2011 that the administrative body, 
California Air Resource Board, was given the permission to proceed with the program 
(Egelko 2011). 
Prior to these most recent developments, the various government incentive policies set in 
place during the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated that indeed supply-push efforts 
can also lead to an increased rollout of alternative energy technologies. For example, the 
successful development of wind energy is in large part the direct result of the level of 
investment made by the federal government. Through funds made available to NASA and 
DOE, wind technology advanced dramatically, although not precisely as either agency 
had predicted (Norberg-Bohm 2000). Although NASA and DOE’s Mod Program did not 
lead to the commercialization of large-scale wind turbines, advances were made in 
understanding the mechanics of medium-scale wind turbines as well as operational 
efficiencies. 
Nevertheless, through public funding made available to the DOE and to the predecessor 
of NREL, researchers have determined that of the 12 key innovations made in the wind 
turbine component space, seven of them depended wholly or partially on public funds 
(Norberg-Bohm 2000). Most recently, the Federal Renewable Electricity Tax Credit 
(PTC), which has been extended beyond its original end date, has resulted in additional 
development of alternative energy technologies, most notably wind energy. In 2010, the 
PTC provided a 2.2 cent per kWh credit for all wind facilities in operation by the end of 
2012 and closed-loop biomass facilities operating by the end of 2013. All other remaining 
technologies such as geothermal energy, open-loop biomass, and landfill gas, among 
others, received a 1.1 cent per kWH credit. With the PTC, generators receive a tax credit 
of $19 per MWh. Adjusted for inflation the PTC is roughly 2.1 cents per kWh, which 
makes it competitive with fossil fuels. 
Aside from the PTC, other incentives for renewable energy alternatives include the 
Energy Investment Tax Credit and the Renewable Production Incentive. Although the 
federal Investment Tax Credit was modified by the Energy Improvement and Extension 
Act of 2008 and the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, it gives 
companies (taxpayers) an option for project development in lieu of the PTC. The offering 
of options seems to be a characteristic ingredient to many successful programs where the 
emitter is given options to disclose its preference for incentives. This in industrial 
organization and game theory is called “second degree price discrimination” where the 
agent is not-separable and needs optional incentives for it to show its preference to the 
policymaker or regulator (Church and Ware 2001). 
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In general the credit allows for a 30% deduction of project expenditures made by a 
company. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation 
Act of 2010 also provided an incentive by extending the US Treasury Grant program. As 
a result, projects that are under construction by 2011 and projects that are in service are 
eligible. The cash grant is worth up to 30% of the capital investment. In contrast, the 
Renewable Production Incentive (REPI) provided a 2.2 cent per kWH incentive payment 
for new eligible facilities in operation before October 2016 and owned by local, state, and 
tribal governments, municipal utilities, rural electric cooperatives, and native 
corporations that have no tax liability. It is paid subject to availability of appropriations in 
each federal fiscal year of operation. Collectively these incentives serve to entice market 
participants to develop the technologies of the future while supporting those that that 
have yet to mature as commercially viable. 
9.3.2 Spain 
The Spanish experience is one that has been characterized by some as a great success and 
by others as an overly ambitious experiment that led to market disruptions and near 
failure (Perez and Ramos-Real 2009; Alvarez 2009). All things considered, the growth 
alternative energies in Spain have experienced has been dramatic, but at a cost some 
consider to be far too high. Much like fossil fuel-depended economies across the globe, 
the Spanish government began to support certain alternative sources of energy in the late 
1970s, most notably through its National Energy Plans (Perez and Ramos-Real 2009). 
Following the 1991 National Energy Plan, it called for increased support and investment 
in alternative energies ranging from thermal energy, biomass, small hydropower, solar, 
and wind development increased.  
In 1999, the Spanish government also adopted its Promotion Plan for Renewable 
Energies, which aggressively pushed for further development of alternative energies. 
Since then, gross electricity generation in Spain has increased from 25.98 TWh in 1990 to 
nearly 73.57 TWh in 2009 (European Commission 2011). In 1990 only 17.1% of total 
generation in Spain was from renewable sources, compared to nearly 25% in 2009. 
Spain’s remaining generation comes mostly from imported natural gas and nuclear 
power, which account for 38% and 18%, respectively (Eurostat 2011). 
It should also be noted that Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero was a 
proponent for increased development of alternative energy sources and had established a 
phase-out of nuclear energy generation. In that spirit, Spain’s efforts to further increase 
electricity generation using alternative energies were demonstrated by its aggressive 
policy actions, most notably the Royal Decree 661/2007 of May 25, 2007. Under the 
provisions set forth by the decree, new generating facilities were given an option to 
receive tariffs and premiums to remunerate for electricity generated by alternative 
energies including waste to energy, hybrid systems, and cogeneration plants (IEA 2009). 
The cost the grid operator bears is subsequently passed on to consumers. Additionally, 
the Royal Decree set limits that capped the maximum and the minimum prices that could 
be set by investors (Perez and Ramos-Real 2009).  
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However, as the economy began to weaken and governments across the globe collected 
less in revenue from taxes, the Spanish government was forced to reconsider its 
aggressive policy aims that had committed resources well beyond a sustainable range. 
The average annuity payable to renewables in Spain is estimated to be equivalent to a 
little over 4% of all value-add taxes collected, nearly 3.5% of household income tax 
(Alvarez 2009). As such, the Spanish government amended its initial plan to be more 
consistent with the economic and political realities of recessionary cycles. However, 
these changes were done cognizant of the reality that investors had committed 
tremendous resources and needed to be fairly compensated for their efforts to promote 
alternative energies. 
The Spanish experience is telling in two ways. First, when a governmental body offers 
substantial resources in the form of incentives, the private sector can respond in-kind and 
develop technologies as prescribed by government mandates. However, there are always 
tradeoffs that must be considered. Presumably, the Spanish government did not consider 
the probability of a severe global recession that touched all corners of government and 
industry. As a consequence the government made commitments that simply could not be 
sustained in a responsible manner despite the overwhelming growth of alternative 
energies. What can be gathered then is that governments must plan and/or insure against 
potential economic shocks in the market that could disrupt current programs. Spain’s 
response to adverse economic conditions could have very well led to the end of incentive 
policies to the detriment of alternative energy development programs in Spain.  
What the Spanish example also demonstrates, much like the US example, is that 
governments have a significant role in accelerating the development and promotion of 
alternative energy technologies. However, the Spanish government used a feed-in-tariff 
scheme to promote alternative technologies, whereas the US used a strong research 
program to first entice technological advancement, and then supplemented that by strong 
tax support for the subsequent generation of electricity by those technologies. The 
Spanish experience as a case model points to the difficulty of balancing the appropriate 
measures when promoting alternative energy technologies. By guaranteeing above 
market rates for 20 years for electricity generated by alternative energies Spain 
incentivized an overabundance of solar projects to the detriment of taxpayers who in 
effect subsidized their development (Market Meltdown 2011).  
9.3.3 Germany 
The majority of Germany’s renewable energy initiatives can be at least partially 
attributed to the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), 
which was signed in 2000 and amended in 2004. The initial goal of the EEG was to 
achieve 12.5% production of energy from renewable sources by 2010, which was 
achieved in 2007 (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, 2007). The next phase of the goal is set at achieving 27% of electricity 
from renewable energy in 2020, and 45% by 2030. Types of renewable energy that are 
prioritized include wind, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, biomass, landfill gas, sewage 
treatment plant gas, and mine gas. 
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Under the Renewable Energy Sources Act, Germany has thus far reached its targets and 
intends to continue reaching the proposed targets through facilitating the market for 
renewable energy in electricity production by giving priority to renewable sources 
through feed-in tariffs. These feed-in tariffs require grid system operators to prioritize 
purchasing electricity generated from renewable energy and mine gas over electricity 
generated using legacy fuels. Under this system, plant operators are guaranteed a certain 
amount of money from the grid system operators, therefore ensuring there is a market for 
renewable energy production. The amount paid to each plant operator depends on the 
type of technology used, the installation year, and the plant size. Although most plant 
operators are guaranteed fixed tariffs for at least 20 years, which is designed to facilitate 
long-term investment in renewable energy (Frondel 2010), new tariff rates are subject to 
changes by Germany’s government in order to maximize cost-effectiveness in the 
evolving energy market. 
Since its creation in 2000, the Renewable Energy Sources Act has amounted to a savings 
of 45 million tons of CO2 emissions, and a net benefit of 6.1 billion euros. Other than 
helping Germany meet its emissions reductions targets, the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act also benefited Germany by increasing the number of jobs in Germany. Between 2004 
and 2006, the number of people employed in the energy sector increased from 157,000 to 
230,000. Much of this increase can be attributed to the Renewable Energy Sources Act, 
and it is estimated that up to 500,000 individuals will be employed in the energy sector 
by 2020. Furthermore, electricity generation from renewable energy is expected to double 
between 2010 and 2020, allowing Germany to meet and even exceed its renewable 
energy targets (Traber et al. 2011). However, although Germany’s policy has more than 
doubled renewable energy generation between 2000 and 2008, and generation from 
renewables is expected to continue growing at high rates, this increase came at the 
expense of electricity generation from non-renewable fuels, specifically nuclear power 
(Frondel et al. 2010). 
After Germany’s success, many other countries have followed Germany’s example and 
set feed-in tariffs to incent the development of renewable energies. Feed-in tariffs similar 
to those implemented in Germany could be a viable option for North American markets, 
because they do not require funds from the government, which may not be a viable option 
in the US and Mexican governments at this point in time. However, they do have the 
potential to place an economic burden on the grid system operators, specifically in cases 
in which electricity generation from renewable fuels is more costly than that from current 
operations. The fact that many authors have criticized feed-in tariffs as done in Germany 
seems to arise from an interested political system, rather than from the incentives or dis-
incentives these tariffs generate. This would most likely be the case for both wind and 
solar generation, although prices for both forms of energy are decreasing and prices for 
wind are quickly reaching that of legacy fuels. However, increased costs for grid system 
operators could translate to increased consumer prices, which should be taken into 
consideration when implementing feed-in tariff policies. Other effects seen in Germany, 
such as reduced use of other non-renewable energy types should also be considered when 
implementing feed-in tariff policies, as this could result in higher costs to other sectors. 
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9.3.4 China 
China has become an increasing concern when it comes to potential greenhouse gas 
emissions in the past decade. Their industry is growing at a fast rate, and most of the 
electricity generation is still produced from fossil fuels, from which open-mouth carbon 
is massively used (Dincer 2011; Dussel-Peters 2008). However, China is taking steps 
toward cleaner methods of generation. In 2006, renewable energy made up about 8% of 
China’s total primary energy consumption, most of which came from hydropower. 
Hydropower accounted for 130 GW, wind power accounted for 2.6 GW, biomass 
accounted for 1.0 GW, solar photo-voltaic (PV) accounted for 0.08GW, and solar water 
heaters accounted for 100 million m3 (Shuiying et al. 2011). China has set targets for 
these numbers to increase to 190 GW for hydropower, 5 GW for wind power, 5.5 GW for 
biomass, 0.3 GW for solar PV, and 150 million m for solar water heaters by 2010, and 
further increase to 300 GW for hydro power, 30 GW for wind power, 30 GW for 
biomass, 1.8 GW for solar PV, and 300 million m for solar water heaters by 2020. If 
these targets are reached, renewable energy will account for 15% of total primary energy 
consumption in China by 2020 (Shuiying et al. 2011). These targets were set in 2007, and 
strides have already been made in many renewable energy fields since that time. By 
2009, many of the targets had already been surpassed. In that year, total renewable power 
reached 226 GW, 197 GW from hydropower, 25.8 GW from wind power, 3.2 GW from 
biomass, and 0.4 GW from solar PV. Although installed solar capacity had one of the 
smaller increases relative to each renewable energy origin, growth in solar production in 
China has been tremendous. By 2009, China was the largest solar producer in the world, 
supplying about 40% of all solar PV worldwide (Martinot 2010).  
China has only stepped onto the solar energy scene in recent years, but their recent 
renewable energy commitments and policies are quickly allowing them to dominate the 
market, and their PV industry has grown more rapidly than any other country (Dincer 
2011). China’s geography and large size allows for great potential in the solar industry. 
Although the solar radiance varies greatly, about two thirds of the country received over 
5,000 MJ/m2yr, and the country receives an average daily radiation of 4 KWh/m2day 
(Liu et al., 2011). Due to these high potentials, China is expected to meet their 2007 
targets and announce new targets in 2011, and many believe China will be able to surpass 
their target to meet 1 GW of potential solar energy in 2011. By 2020, renewable energy is 
expected to make up 15% of China’s total energy supply, and renewable energy is 
expected to account for 30% of electric power capacity by 2050 (Dincer 2011). 
Much of the advancement in renewable energy can be attributed to the Renewable 
Energy Promotion Law, which came into effect in 2005. Although China established 
renewable energy programs during the 1990s, the government became more serious about 
the issue after China’s rapid industrial and economic growth in the early 21st century 
(Wang et al. 2010). This 2005 Energy Promotion Law requires power operators to 
purchase resources from registered renewable energy producers, and offers additional 
financial incentives for renewable energy, such as tax preferences and a national fund 
dedicated to renewable energy development (China Passes 2005). Before this law passed, 
only two of the top ten worldwide solar cell producers were Chinese companies. After the 
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law passed, the number of Chinese companies in the top ten has risen from two to six 
(Lacey 2011). Since the creation of the law in 2005, there have been additional updates 
that went into effect in 2010, including additional planning and coordination when 
integrating renewable energy in local and federal plans, additional guarantees for 
purchasing renewable power, and strengthening of the renewable energy fund. 
Specifically, the update requires electric utilities to purchase all of the renewable power 
generated, as opposed to only purchasing renewable energy when there is significant 
demand (Martinot 2010). The price at which grid operators must purchase renewable 
energy is also determined by the government, and varies by energy type. These prices are 
still significantly higher than that of fossil fuels, but the set prices guarantee the use of 
renewable energy (Wang et al. 2010). 
There was also a “Golden Sun” program initiated in 2009 that provided subsidies for 
certain solar PV installations through 2011. Under this program, grid-connected 
installations received 50% subsidies if they had a peak capacity of at least 300kW. Thus 
far, this program has funded over $29 billion in investments. The Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Construction also provide subsidies for solar PV installations that are at 
least 50 kW and use PV modules with a minimum efficiency level of 16% for mono-
crystalline modules, 14% for poly-crystalline modules, and 6% for amorphous modules. 
Tariffs are also in place for solar PV, in the form of a new competitive bidding program 
for benchmark tariffs, and new preferential tariffs at a provincial level (Martinot 2010). 
Another major component of the increase in renewable energy investment in China is the 
creation of the Chinese Development Bank. The bank was established as an arm of the 
Chinese central government, but now operates as a separate entity that provides loans for 
Chinese companies. The Chinese Development Bank raises most of its money from long-
term bonds, thus enabling it to provide low interest rates to investors, making investing in 
Chinese companies a much less risky venture (Lacey 2011). Many solar companies in 
China have taken advantage of the loans provided by the Chinese Development Bank 
when financing their solar initiatives in China. For example, some of the larger solar 
companies in China, including Trina, Suntech, JA Solar, and Yingli Solar, received loans 
between $4 and $7 billion from the Chinese Development Bank in 2010 alone (Lacey 
2011). For solar companies, whose startup costs are generally much larger than that of 
other energy generation companies, these large loans can make all the difference of 
whether to invest in solar, and where to invest.  
China’s significant subsidies and financial support for renewable energy have contributed 
to much of its recent growth in the renewable sector and have allowed it to surpass other 
countries in terms of its renewable energy portfolio. However, applying China’s policies 
to other countries is difficult because China has a larger amount of available capital than 
many countries, including Mexico, plus little opposition in congressional games make the 
Chinese objectives easier to implement. Also, their policy of providing large amounts of 
financial aid to renewable energy companies may not be viable if the companies are 
unsuccessful. Therefore, although China’s policies seem to be effectively increasing the 
renewable energy market, especially in the case of solar energy, China’s policies may not 
translate well to that of the United States and Mexico. 
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9.4 Conclusions and Future Developments for Policy Making in North 
America as a Region 
As the leader in alternative energy development in North America, the policies adopted 
by US will continue to have profound consequences both positively and negatively for 
the region. As such a standing challenge that remains, which could potentially slow 
future growth and development of alternative energies, is the political climate in 
Washington, DC. This is evidenced by the US Congress’s inability to commit to any 
long-term climate change mitigation program or protocol. More troubling is the prospect 
that in the near term the US Congress will not pass any type of legislation relating to the 
reduction of greenhouse gases (Weissman 2011). Although in 2009, the US House of 
Representatives was able to pass comprehensive climate change legislation, the measure 
failed final passage due to insufficient support in the Senate. 
The key provision and most contentious part of the bill was an attempt to create a cap and 
trade system that would have limited the amount of greenhouse gases emitted by 
industries. The legislation intended on reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 17% below 
2005 levels. Equally important the legislation would have set a national renewable energy 
standard of 20% by 2020. These measures would have undoubtedly had a measurable 
effect on the level of investment in alternative energies from both the public and private 
sector, most notably across North America.  
As has been documented, the debate as to what tools work best to encourage behavioral 
change within an industry is ongoing and the various conclusions are mixed. Depending 
on the type of market response that is desired, different responses are given as to how to 
best achieve that change (Jaffe and Stavins 1995). At the center of the economic debate 
will continue to be whether “market-based” or “command-control” approaches are more 
appropriate in promoting the development of alternative energies. Whether feed-in-
tariffs, tradable permits, renewable energy standards, or mandatory industry-wide 
restrictions are used, each country will inevitably have to face challenges unique to it. 
The US experience for instance serves as a model in which both the utilization of 
renewable energy standards along with government subsidies has led to successful 
development of alternative energies (Norberg-Bohm 2000). The development of the 
modern wind turbines, for example, shows that while demand-pull strategies were 
effective, alone they were not enough to sustain change. However, with responsive 
governmental policies that attempt to create a balance between policy aims and 
sustainable development of alternative energies, countries can be effective in growing 
their respective energy portfolios. 
In the context of mitigating climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gases, the 
case models of the US, Spain, Germany, and China each illustrate varying outcomes of 
success and potential failure as a result of different strategies used to incent market 
behavior. With regard to the type of technologies that are adopted, what has been 
characterized as the “valley of death” and the “mountain of death” along the technology 
innovation process will continue to stand as a challenge in the roll out of promising 
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technologies (Norberg-Bohm 2000). This notion is of interest because it helps illustrate 
the challenges firms, countries, and policymakers face when deciding the appropriate 
tool, mechanisms, or technology to address policy aims and goals. 
As alternative energy technologies become more commercially viable, Canada, Mexico, 
and the US will continue to play a crucial role in accelerating growth patterns of certain 
technologies globally. For that reason they each independently play an active role in the 
development of alternative energies and must continue to aggressively invest in research 
and development to further advance existing technologies. Although not the panacea for 
reductions in greenhouse gases, renewable sources of electric power generation are a 
critical component in reducing emissions. Although the cost-production models for solar, 
wind, and biomass platforms as well as their respective trading models have unique 
characteristics, they share in common the potential to become viable competitive 
alternatives to fossil fuels. 
The opportunity to trade electricity on a much larger scale between the US and Mexico 
remains challenging yet promising. Without a doubt, the political climate and appetite for 
cooperation between countries will dictate whether any agreement or partnership can be 
made to develop modern infrastructure to facilitate the trade. One obstacle and profound 
challenge is Mexico’s strong attitude toward electricity generation as a symbol of 
national pride and sovereignty (Carreón-Rodriguez et al. 2003). From a historical context, 
following decades of generation capacity developments by CFE, Mexico experienced a 
period of diminished foreign investment that led to the formal nationalization of the 
electricity industry in 1960 (Carreón-Rodriguez et al. 2003). As result, CFE’s political 
positioning grew stronger and along with strong unions in the electricity sector, reforms 
have been difficult if not impossible. 
Similarly, different jurisdictions of regulation of electricity, most notably in Texas, pose a 
challenge to integration. As one of ten independent system operators in the US, the 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas has the authority to ensure the reliability of 
electricity in the region. ERCOT covers approximately 75% of the state of Texas and 
almost the entire US-Mexico border except for El Paso County. The remainder of the US-
Mexico border is under the jurisdiction of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
(WECC). As ERCOT is wholly within the Texas Interconnection it does not fall under 
the jurisdiction of federal regulation. On the other hand, because WECC spans multiple 
states and thus abides by the interstate commerce clause, their organization is required to 
comply with federal regulations. Even though there are only two electricity reliability 
organizations along the US-Mexico border, each state along the border has the authority 
to modify their existing electricity sectors. As a consequence, coordination to integrate 
systems would have to be done at the federal, regional, and local levels. 
Nevertheless, one advantage to Mexico’s vertically integrated energy sector is that 
negotiations would be easier to engage because the US would exclusively negotiate with 
one party, the Mexican government. However, all interested parties responsible for trade, 
electricity reliability along the border, and other appropriate entities in the US would first 
have to determine how to facilitate any new developments or policy changes of 
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consequence. This might very well prove to be the most difficult challenge to overcome 
as each state is unique and their respective legislative bodies might have different 
opinions on how to best integrate our electricity sectors. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the most promising opportunity would emerge if both 
countries were to engage in bilateral negotiations exclusively on the integration of 
alternative energies of production and also trading by seasons and emergencies, as was 
evident in other commodities’ trade in the past, and also electricity backup in 2011 (see 
Chapter 4 on consumption trends, and also Chapters 6 and 7 on regulations). If anything, 
renewable forms of energy production could serve as the catalyst that will move both 
countries to open the dialogue for much greater trade of electricity. This could help push 
for reforms in Mexico’s electricity sector, and for increased cooperation and reliability of 
the electricity grid in the United States. 
 
244 
References 
Alvarez, G.C. R. Merion Jara, and J.R. Rallo Julian. 2009. Study of the Effects on 
Employment of Public Aid to Renewable Energy Sources. King Juan Carlos 
University.  
American Wind Energy Association. 2011. 2010 U.S. Wind Industry Annual Market 
Report: Rankings. Retrieved November 1, 2011, at http://www.awea.org/ 
learnabout/publications/factsheets/upload/2010-Annual-Market-Report-Rankings-
Fact-Sheet-May-2011.pdf. 
Ayoub, J. and L.D. Bailey. 2009. Photovoltaic Technology Status and Prospects: 
Canadian Annual Report 2009. Natural Resources Canada.  
Beato, C. and J.J. Laffont. 2001. Regulations for Development. MIT Press. 
Bloom, D., J.P. Forrester, N.C. Klugman. 2011. State Feed-in Tariffs: Recent FERC 
Guidance for How to Make Them FIT under Federal Law. The Electricity Journal 
24: 26-33.  
Bloomberg New Energy Finance. 2011. UNEP Global Trends in Renewable Energy 
Investment 2011. 
Button, J. 2008. Carbon: Commodity or Currency The Case for an International Carbon 
Market, Harvard Environmental Law Review 32(2): 571-596. 
Cacino-Solorzano, Y., A.J. Gutierrez-Trashorras, and J. Xiberta-Bernat. 2011. Current 
State of Wind Energy in Mexico, Achievements and Perspectives. Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 15(2011): 3552-3557. 
Caliendo, L., F. and Parro. 2009. Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA. 
Mimeo. University of Chicago, Department of Economics. 
Canadian Wind Energy Association. 2011a. Federal/Provincial Initiatives on Wind 
Energy. Canadian Wind Energy Association. 
Canadian Wind Energy Association. 2011b. Powering Canada’s Future. Canadian Wind 
Energy Association. 
Carreón-Rodriguez, V., A. Jiménez San Vicente, and J. Rosellón. 2003. The Mexican 
Electricity Sector: Economic, Legal and Political Issues, Stanford University 
Institute for International Studies.  
Centre for Energy. 2011. Solar Power in Canada. Centre for Energy. Retrieved 
September 23, 2011, at http://www.centreforenergy.com/AboutEnergy/ 
Solar/Overview.asp?page=5. 
245 
Church, J. and G. Ware. 2001. Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach. Boston, 
MIT Press. 
CRE. 2012. Data on Mexican non-utility permits. Retrieved January 10, 2011, at 
http://www.cre.gob.mx. 
DeGrandis, W.D., and M. L. Owen. 1995. Electric Energy Legal and Regulatory 
Structure in Mexico and Opportunities After NAFTA. United States-Mexico Law 
Journal 3: 61-68. 
Dincer, F. 2011. The Analysis on Photovoltaic Energy Generation Status, Potential and 
Policies of the Leading Countries in Solar Energy. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 12(2011): 712-720. 
Duke University School of Law. 2010. GATT/WTO. J. Michael Goodson Law Library 
Research Guides. Duke University School of Law. 
Dussel-Peters, E. 2008. Economic Opportunities and Challenges posed by China for 
Mexico and Central America. Studies of the German Development Institute 
Berlin, DIE, Mimeo. 
Ellerman, D. and P.L. Joskow, 2008: The European Union’s Emissions Trading System 
in Perspective, Pew Center on Global Climate Change (May). Washington, DC.  
Ellerman, D. 2008. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme: Prototype of a Global System? 
Paper prepared for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. 
Egelko, B. 2011. S.F. Judge OKs Cap and Trade for Emission Law, San Francisco 
Chronicle. Retrieved December 9, 2011, at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/ 
article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/07/BA481M9NPV.DTL. 
EIA. 2010. Annual Energy Review 2009. Table 1.3. US Energy Information 
Administration. 
European Commission. 2011. Countries Fact Sheet. Retrieved March 17, 2012, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/statistics/doc/2011-2009-country-
factsheets.pdf.. 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. 2007. 
EEG – The Renewable Energy Sources Act: The Success Story of Sustainable 
Policies for Germany. Berlin, Germany. 
Fisher, J. 1994. NEPA, NAFTA and Cross-Border Electric Generating Projects. 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 277(7): 277-307. 
Frondel, M., N. Ritter, C.M. Schmidt, and C. Vance. 2010. Economic Impacts from the 
Promotion of Renewable Energy Technologies: The German Experience. Energy 
Policy 38(2010): 4048-4056. 
246 
Gandara, A. 1995. United States-Mexico Electricity Transfers: of Alien Electrons and the 
Migration of Undocumented Environmental Burdens. Energy Law Journal 16(1): 
1-63. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2008. Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology, Advanced 
Energy Technologies: Budget Trends and Challenges for DOE’s Energy R&D 
Program. House of Representatives.  
Haas, R., G. Resch, C. Panzer, S. Busch, M. Ragwitz, and A. Held. 2011. Efficiency and 
effectiveness of promotion systems for electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources – Lessons from EU countries. Energy 36(4): 2186-2193. 
IEA. 2009. World Energy Outlook: Feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewable energy 
sources (Special regime). International Energy Agency. Retrieved December 9, 
2011, at http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=weo&id=3648&action=detail. 
IEA. 2010. Overview of the IEA. International Energy Agency. OECD/IEA. 
IEA. 2011. About the IEA. International Energy Agency. Retrieved December 3, 2011, at 
http://www.iea.org/about/index.asp. 
Jaffe, A. and R.N. Stavins. 1995. Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The 
Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 20(3): S43-S63. 
Klaassen, G., A. Nentjes, and M. Smith. 2005. Testing the theory of emissions trading: 
Experimental evidence on alternative mechanisms for global carbon trading. 
Ecological Economics 53(1): 47-58. 
Lacey, S. 2011. How China Dominates Solar Power. The Guardian. Retrieved November 
7, 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/12/how-china-
dominates-solar-power. 
Laffont, J.J. and D. Martimort. 2005. The Design of Transnational Public Good 
Mechanisms for Developing Countries. Journal of Public Economics 89: 159-
196. 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 2011. Tracking the Sun IV: A Historical 
Summary of the Installed Cost of Photovoltaics in the United States from 1998 to 
2010. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Liu,W., H. Lund, B. Vad Mathiesen, and X. Zhang. 2011. Potential of Renewable Energy 
Systems in China. Applied Energy 88(2011): 518-525. 
Market Meltdown. 2011. ASHRAE Journal 53(4): 12. 
247 
Martinot, E. 2010. Renewable Energy Policy Update for China: China’s Latest Leap: An 
Update on Renewables Policy. RenewableEnergyWorld.Com. Retrieved 
November 7, 2011, at http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/ 
article/2010/07/renewable-energy-policy-update-for-china. 
Norberg-Bohm, V. 2000. Creating Incentives for Environmentally Enhancing 
Technological Change: Lessons from 30 Years of U.S. Energy Technology Policy 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 65(2000): 125-148. 
Perez, Y. and F.J. Ramos-Real. 2009. The public promotion of wind energy in Spain 
from the transaction costs perspective 1986–2007. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 13: 1058–1066. 
Pineau, P.-O., A. Hira, and K. Froschauer. 2004. Measuring International Electricity 
Integration: A Comparative Study of the Power Systems under the Nordic 
Council, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. Energy Policy 32(2004): 1457-1475. 
Rowlands, I.H. 2009. Renewable Electricity Politics Across Borders. In Selin, H., and 
VanDeever, S.D. (eds.). Changing Climates in North American Politics: 
Institutions, Policymaking, and Multilevel Governance (American Comparative 
Environmental Policy). MIT Press. 
Schott, J.J., and M. Fickling. 2010. Revising the NAFTA Agenda and Climate Change. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief Number PB10-19. 
Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. 
Shuiying, Z., L. Chi, and Q. Liqiong. 2011. Solar Industry Development and Policy 
Support in China. Energy Procedia 5: 768-773. 
State Energy Conservation Office. 2011. The Oil Embargo of 1973. Texas State Energy 
Conservation Office. Retrieved December 3, 2011, at http://www.seco.cpa. 
state.tx.us/seco_about-embargo.htm. 
SustainableBusiness.com. 2005. China Passes Renewable Energy Law. Retrieved 
November 7, 2011, at http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/ 
news.display/id/5679. 
Traber, T., C. Kemfert, and J. Diekmann. 2011. German Electricity Prices: Only Modest 
Increase Due to Renewable Energy Expected. German Institute for Economic 
Research Weekly Report 6(7): 37-45. 
UNFCCC. 2011a. Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate 
Change. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Retrieved 
December 3, 2011, at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. 
UNFCCC. 2011b. First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations Framework 
248 
Convention on Climate Change. Retrieved December 3, 2011, at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php. 
UNFCCC. 2011c. Kyoto Protocol. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Retrieved December 3, 2011, at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
items/2830.php. 
UNFCCC. 2011d. Now, Up to, and Beyond 2012: The Bali Road Map. United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Retrieved December 3, 2011, at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/bali_road_map/items/6072.php. 
US EIA, Energy Information Administration. 2010. 2009 Renewable Energy Data Book. 
US EIA: Washington, DC. 
Wang, F., H. Yin, and S. Li. 2010. China’s Renewable Energy Policy: Commitments and 
Challenges. Energy Policy 38: 1872-1878. 
Weissman, S. 2011. Effective Renewable Energy Policy: Leave It to the States? Center 
for Latin American Studies University of California, Berkeley, 10. 
Wilson, R. 2002. The Architecture of Power Markets. Econometrics 70(4): 1299-1340. 
Wood, D. 2010. Environment, Development and Growth: U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in 
Renewable Energies. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico 
Institute. 
 
249 
Appendix A. 
List of People Interviewed for the Research Project 
(in alphabetical order) 
Florencio Aboytes (Ph.D.), Vice President, Power Transmission Planning, Comisión 
Federal de Electicidad, México 
Ing. Manuel Alanís Sieres, Coordinator General, National Electric System, Comisión 
Federal de Electricidad, México 
Lic. Luis Arias Osoyo, Director General, Dirección Genral de Generación, Conducción y 
Transformación de Energía Eléctrica, Secretary of Enerfy SENER, México 
Lauren Azar, Senior Advisor to the Secretary, US Department of Energy, Washington, 
DC. 
Bill Bojorquez (P.E.), Vice President Planning, Hunt Transmission Services, Austin, 
Texas 
John C. Butler, Associate Director, Center for Energy Finance Education and Research, 
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin 
Ing. Federico Carranza Almaguer, Director Gestión de Energía, Iberdrola México, S.A., 
de C.V., Pesquería, Nuevo León, México 
Robert F. Cekuta, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities, 
Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, US Department of State, 
Washington, DC. 
Mike Cleary, Chief Operating Officer, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc., 
ERCOT, Taylor, Texas 
Benjamín Contreras Astiazarán (Ph.D.), Director General, Dirección General de Estudios 
Económicos, Comisión Federal de Competencia, México 
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